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"Between God and Beast: An Examination of the Ethical and Political Ideas of 
the Poet, Pindar; the Historian, Thucydides; and the Philosopher, Aristotle"
Through an analysis of the work of the poet, Pindar, the historian, 
Thucydides, and the philosopher, Aristotle, this thesis builds on the 
conception of m an as a creature between god and beast in an attem pt to 
develop a sense of the kinds of thought and language that are appropriate for 
political theorising. It discusses an understanding of political theory that is 
based on the hum an capacity for reasonable, creative action. In this, it 
opposes another model of political theorising, one that has been collapsed 
under a scientific model that judges itself successful only when it yields 
precise and definitive answers to dilemmas that grow out of a contingent and 
indeterminate world.
I have argued that man's good, his potential to become a responsible and 
flourishing actor, is realised through attentive and reflective political 
experience. This experience is not 'raw', acquired alone by passively 
'absorbing' whatever m an perceives to be the case in pursuit of his individual 
whims. It is instead guided, shared, interpreted, evaluated, and demanding. 
The texts I have chosen serve to supplement direct political experience.
Pindar's odes - their elliptical language and use of metaphor, their 
juxtaposition of seemingly mutually exclusive characteristics in men - 
demand effort on the part of an audience/reader to cultivate the capacity to 
derive meaning from culturally-situated complex ideas and images. 
Thucydides' description of the war through a fragmented' perspective, his 
examples of the kinds of reasoning that precede decisions, point to a 
perspective that seems to argue that agents should develop the kind of 
character that can creatively balance a general conception of what m an is as a 
species w ith the relevant concrete details of a situation and proceed to act 
accordingly.
That m an is a species with a fixed good is one of Aristotle's fundamental 
assumptions, and leads to his conviction that ethics and politics are inherently 
imprecise. I discuss how he defends this position and its consequences as 
elaborated in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. I then attempt to show how 
what he has to say in the Poetics realises and supplements his ethical and 
political goals. The Poetics indicates that men must leam to extract sound 
generalisations by drawing inferences from disparate actions, to transform 
mistakes into valuable aspects of life, and be able to carve out the proper, 
dynamic, realm of responsibility. This generates a conception of man whose 
good goes beyond mere preference satisfaction but instead grows out of a 
reasonable (general) sense of what he is which can be used creatively in the 
specific (concrete) circumstances he confronts.
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Introduction
The conception of man as a creature whose nature lies between god and beast 
was common in ancient Greece. This dissertation seeks to examine this idea 
and its political repercussions through three Greek authors: the poet, Pindar, 
the historian, Thucydides, and the philosopher, Aristotle. What can these 
thinkers tell us about this ancient conception of hum an nature? And further, 
what might such a conception mean for abstract political theorising, not only 
in ancient Greece, but in Western societies that have placed a prem ium  on 
abstract thought? These related questions divide this project into two parts; 
the first deals with generating a more detailed understanding of this 
rudimentary conception of man, the second, given this richer interpretation, 
attempts to trace its effects on political theory.
Perhaps one of the most significant consequences of this belief is that it locates 
man in a contingent and indeterminate world. The assumption that m an is 
caught between divine and animal natures makes his life one which is 
distinguished by probabilities, where there is regularity and consistency, but 
precious few necessities or universal truths. A hum an life thus embodies a 
series of choices in light of potential and possibility. While this description of 
the 'hum an condition' provides a broad, abstract framework, ultimately, it is 
too general to be of much use in political theory—understood here as a 
discipline that should help us both to understand and actually live good, 
fulfilling lives. Clearly then, the image of man as suspended precariously 
between god and beast demands some fine tuning.
Aristotle, for instance, claims that the nature of a theory depends on the 
nature of its subject matter.^ If this were the case, it would seem that theory 
must begin by pinning down its subject matter, at which point one can 
analyse with appropriate expectations for a study's results. But, what 
happens when the subject matter is, in some sense, a moving target, when its
^Nicomachean Ethics 1098a27-30.
very nature precludes the possibility of its being pinned down? This appears 
to be the case w ith hum an beings. Unlike plants and (many) animals, hum an 
beings are not at the mercy of their physical needs, nor of external forces 
utterly outside their control. At the same time, they are not free, perfect, and 
immortal like the gods—yet they alone have been taken to be responsible for 
the quality of the lives they lead.^
Classical scholars have argued persuasively that clear distinctions between 
animal, man, and god are difficult to maintain in an analysis of ancient Greek 
thought—"the boundaries of humanity itself are too porous," and the three 
'realm s' blur into each other.^ In Polarity & Analogy for example, Lloyd 
expands on this issue; many Greek gods, he stresses, possessed decidedly 
'manlike' attributes (e.g., 'irrational' and conflicting emotions, base desires, 
even at times the inability to direct their lives according to their wishes).  ^
Such anthropomorphic characteristics make it difficult to draw  a sharp line 
between the hum an and divine realms. Furthermore, at the 'other end ' of the 
cosmos, Lloyd draws attention to the common Greek practice of personifying 
animals and inanimate objects, giving them too what we might classify as 
hum an qualities. This has some interesting consequences for political theory: 
if one assumes (as I do) that putting theory to use, actually connecting it 
to/realising it in practice, demands identification on the part of the théoriser 
with the theory, how might gods (and for that matter, animals) with hum an 
characteristics generate such identification and thus be a more effective access 
to a usable abstract theory than one which relies on purportedly 'neutral'
2 In his discussion of Aristotle, Salkever suggests that unlike many other animals, man's 
'natural' (instinctive/inborn) inclinations do not lead him automatically and directly to his 
proper (and thus, praiseworthy) end. Rather man is unique in that he is responsible for 
choosing to realise his 'right' end amongst other possible ends that may be more intuitively 
appealing (e.g., a life of physical pleasure). This capacity, Aristotle will claim, depends on a 
political life ("Aristotle's Social Science" Political Theory vol. 9 (1981, pp.479-508).
3por further discussion on the relationship between the natures of god, man, and animal, see 
Heath, I. "Disentangling the Beast: Humans and other Animals in Aeschylus' Oresteia" Journal 
of Hellenic Studies 119 (1999, pp.17-48); Vemant, J.-P. Myth and Thought Among the Greeks 
(Boston: 1983, pp. 323ff.), and his Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: 1980, pp. 
143ff.).
^Lloyd, G.E.R. Polarity and Analogy (Bristol (repr.): 1987, pp.196-201).
concepts? That is, could abstractions that are more recognisably 'hum an' 
cultivate self-identification,^ (for example, through the crystallisation of 
different kinds of recognisable motivations) and through this, affect an 
internalisation of principles which might cultivate an ability to use the theory?
The relationship between animal, man, and god in ancient Greece places man 
is in the indeterminate position between two extremes, capable of moving 
closer to one or the other, but never identifying completely with either one. 
Given this inherent flexibility and mobility, we m ust seek to grasp just how 
m an makes sense of his space, the stretch of middle ground he inhabits. What 
is it that makes him godlike and what, more animal? Should he aim to shed 
his animal attributes, and drive single-mindedly towards a pure godlike 
excellence? Or should he, on the other hand, recognise his ties to the physical 
world, and resign himself to a "lower" status in the cosmos? Or, does the 
answer lie somewhere in the middle? That is, should man seek to cultivate an 
excellence which is distinctly human, harmonising both extremes of his 
nature? It is this third tack which interests me here, and is the approach each 
author in this study seems to adopt.
How then can we bring about this harmony, thereby achieving a distinctively 
hum an excellence? To do this, we must understand and structure the 
indeterminate world we live in, at all times taking into account our 
'composite' nature. If we assume that 'man's space' needs organisation, how 
do we understand the principles on which such organisation is based (more 
specifically for my purposes here, what is the nature of our abstract political
 ^This sense of self-identification is not derived solely from a better developed conception of 
oneself as an individual with one's own personal and spontaneous preferences, but 
additionally (and perhaps, more importantly), one's sense of self is secured by the 
understanding that as human beings, one is a member of a larger kind/type—the human 
species—defined by needs and goods which point beyond the individual's private (and often 
erratic) wishes. It is my belief that a recognisably 'human' abstraction wiU serve to cultivate 
both a sense of individuality (as one sees oneself from 'outside', as reflected in others who are 
similar) as well as a sense of belonging to a group with certain constant/fixed characteristics 
(which imply for that group certain stable goods and the 'members' with a sense of security).
concepts?) and how are they to be accessed—through reason, through 
perception and experience, through inspiration?
Answering these questions lies in recognition of what is perhaps the most 
fundamental consequences of such a conception of hum an nature—and one of 
which Pindar, Thucydides, and Aristotle seem to be aware. Once again, this 
is the acknowledgement that the human world is indeterminate, rooted in 
probabilities, where there are (thankfully) detectable recurring patterns, but 
(almost) no certainty or truth. The way we lead our lives; the choices we 
make and the actions we perform, demand theories which are suited to and 
therefore, in some sense, based in our actual experience of such a world. The 
abstract principles in political theory therefore have a unique nature, 
decidedly different from the demonstrable, objective ones of ancient 
cosmology and mathematics—the stars and geometric shapes do not face 
difficult decisions.^
Is then abstract theory compatible with the uncertainty and opacity inherent 
in hum an life? My hope is that a careful analysis of the use of abstract 
language and general style in these three different disciplines will answer this 
question in the affirmative. This demands a clarification of political theory's 
aim—which, these authors suggest, is not to sacrifice everything in a blind 
reverence for certainty, but rather, through a critical examination of how we 
actually live, to illuminate a realistic sense of the kind of creature man is, the 
kinds of choices he faces, to cultivate the capacity for attentive and reasonable 
deliberation, and finally, to facilitate creative action. Though presented 
through different media and with distinct styles, Pindar, Thucydides, and 
Aristotle all suggest that the hum an world is essentially a political one. Each
^Recognition of this comes, for example, in Aristotle who claims that the point of the 
Nicomachean Ethics is not simply to "know virtue," presumably through an intellectual 
awareness of some set of codified laws or principles, but rather to "become good" through a 
combination of other, more diverse and varied means (1103b28). Similarly, Thucydides 
claims that his History will be "a possession for all times" (1.22)—yet nowhere does he 
provide his readers with a systematic theory of objective principles.
one grounds his understanding of the political world in a conception of man 
which serves to shift the focus of political theory from an end (which it 
presumes is universally accepted^, to process, from goals to the activities 
which identify and work towards them, from definitive answers, to an 
understanding of the reasons behind one's beliefs and convictions.®
I begin here by exploring this conception of human nature as it is manifested 
in the odes of Pindar (Thucydides and Aristotle will follow this discussion). 
As I go, I will keep in mind a number of possible questions involving 
comparisons/contrasts between the three: both Thucydides and Aristotle are 
largely 'absent' from their texts, Pindar on the other hand is undeniably 
'present'—what effect does this have on the theoretical nature of each work as 
well as on the reader's relationship to the work? While both Thucydides and 
Aristotle are 'absent', the character of each work is utterly different. Yet, at 
some level, they seem to express similar ideas—how is this possible? Pindar's 
work died out in the years following his death. Many claim that this was due 
in large part to the fact that his work was too firmly embedded in the 
immediate circumstances of its occasion, and lacked the coherent narrative 
which would make it accessible in the future. Narrative in Aristotle's work 
does not take the form of a single overarching history of a people, nor does it 
describe through imagery and metaphor the life of one man, yet his writings 
seemed to have had a (relatively) steady following—why is this? What is the
 ^In Aristotle for example, the human end is eudaimonia. This "truth" is not subject to 
debate—as a member of the human species, man has no choice in the matter of his end. It 
arises out of what he biologically and psychologically is. This however is not to deny that the 
means to this end and how exactly it is realised in any individual life can come under scrutiny 
and critique.
®This, 1 expect, wiU support something more akin to ConnoUey's "agonistic" pluralism, rather 
than the "reasonable pluralism" of Rawls (which seems to be getting closer and closer to 
"reasonable homogeneity"). While such a stance admittedly is open to (traditionally 
conceived) stability problems, it is my belief that a solid understanding of why and how we 
come to the decisions we do will generate its own stability. That is to say, close attention to 
actual experience of decision making and action within an inherently indeterminate and 
contingent context will yield a stability appropriate to the constant fluctuations and 
conflicting particulars of human life. This is a stability which does not grow out of or depend 
on fixed, immutable 'truths', but nonetheless is framed by certain fixed principles of moral 
action to necessary ends.
content and form of Aristotle's narrative, or more generally, what is the role of 
narrative in 'philosophicar discourse, specifically, political theorising?
I will proceed here chronologically, beginning with Pindar who will allow me 
to examine how a poet, active in a decidedly un-theoretical mode of 
discourse, and writing before the emergence of concepts like 'political theory', 
might enrich the above conception of man so as to be a contribution to 
political thought. In this study, Pindar presents an interesting case—precisely 
because the poems he wrote are not presented as political or theoretical.^ 
Despite this, the surviving Pindaric odes do reveal a certain understanding of 
hum an nature, and implicit in this, a discernible political ideology.
A better understanding of Pindar's conception of what man is will support 
the later discussion of what his poems might contribute to political theory, 
specifically, what they can tell us about the relationship between abstract 
language and concrete human choice and action. How might theory work 
within what has come to be seen as outside theoretical discourse? How might 
the form and language, the style of poetry serve to create a different, more 
effective and fruitful relationship between abstract political concepts and 
concrete human choice and action? As much contemporary political theory is 
manifested in abstract concepts which strive to be neutral and universal, it
^The attempt to extract concrete political references from Pindar was seriously challenged by 
Bundy {Studia Pindorica Berkeley: 1962), which it has been said, effectively revolutionised 
Pindaric scholarship. This was perhaps a response to what Bundy viewed as failed/futile 
attempts by scholars to historicise/politicise Pindar's work (one of the most prominent 
examples of this kind of interpretation is Wilamowitz. Pindaros Berlin: 1922). Bundy's 
analysis suggests that (initially, at least) the reader must understand and judge each poem at 
a more formal level, on its success in fulfilling its most basic function, i.e., praise of the victor 
within the rules of the epinician form. Bundy's ideas have had a large and influential 
following, notably developed by D.C. Young {Three Odes of Pindar: A Literary Study of Pythian 
11, Pythian 3, and Olympian 2 Leiden: 1968). At the same time, the attempt to analyse Pindar's 
work in relation to the (hypothesised) historical events of his time did not altogether fall from 
favour, but rather has been developed and refined: see for example: Pfeiijfer, I. Three 
Aeginetan Odes of Pindar (Mnemonsyne Suplpements, no. 197,1999); Kurke, L. The Trajfics in 
Praise (Ithaca: 1991); and Cole, T. The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: 1991). 
However, as my research is not so concerned with Pindar's own political views, nor with his 
possible commentary on "current events," but rather, with the ability to communicate 
political theory through poetry, this discussion will not be raised.
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requires and cultivates a narrow kind of means-to-end reasoning. Hum an 
choice and action are reduced so as to correspond to an almost mechanical, 
methodological capacity, which is well equipped to deal with the 
m anipulation of necessary universal concepts, but little else. Thus, it provides 
little guidance for much of human experience. Given this, poetry, and the 
experience its form and content offer, might inform and augment this 
excessively limited conception of political theory. What then is Pindar’s 
'theory ' of hum an nature? Through what kind of language is it expressed? 
A nd finally, what might his conception mean for political thought today?
Part I: Pindar
Chapter 1: Pindar^o
As stated above, like much of the ancient Greek world, Pindar seems to divide 
the world into two separate yet related, even 'touching' spheres—the elevated 
world of the gods and the heavens, and the lower world of humans, animals, 
plants, and inanimate 'things'. As human beings, we, more than other 
animals, have the capacity actively to strive towards, and at times even 
become godlike. The "great games" which took place in Greece (in this case, 
specifically the Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian, and Olympian) are a concrete 
manifestation of such striving. Success represented man at his best, pushed to 
the limits of the species and closer to the gods.^i
Still, in victory, m an is only close to the gods—he is still essentially man, and 
we are not yet significantly nearer to a substantive understanding of just w hat 
this means. W hat details about human nature can we uncover in Pindar's
All quotes from Pindar's odes will be Bowra's translation, unless otherwise noted.
^^What can we make of the purely physical nature of the games? This godliness is not the 
elevated intellectual type praised by later philosophers, but rather bodily success and visible 
beauty. See for instance, Pythean X, where man's happiness is won not by his intelligence, 
but by "steadfastness and strength" (24). Man's excellence—always tied at some level to the 
physical world—demands effort: "Any bliss that man that man may win/And without labour, 
none! God shall perfect/ Today, perhaps! P XII (27-28). This quote supports Norwood who 
notes that toil and hard work are insufficient to guarantee success: human success also 
requires a natural (i.e., inborn) goodness iphua), and favour from the gods (Pindar Berkeley: 
1945,pp.49ff.).
11
dense and often cryptic poems that might serve to flesh out this mere skeletal 
description? Below, I will examine a selection of his odes, with an eye to w hat 
I see as five major characteristics he seems to attribute to man, each of which, 
in its own way, places the human being between god and animal. Perhaps 
the most fundamental fact of human life is that it ends in death—we are 
essentially and thus inescapably mortal creatures. This brute certainty 
underlies, and to a large extent, defines the species. However, given a close 
reading of the odes the reader can 'extract' other significant characteristics of 
m an which help to develop a richer conception of what he is. For instance, 
m an seems to have an essential and beneficial connection to a community 
larger than himself (which I will argue simultaneously constrains him  and 
provides the conditions necessary for his freedom); he is at once beautiful and 
frail; he is susceptible to the forces of chance and luck, rendering his future 
unknown and unpredictable;^^ he must be mindful, even at his most 
successful moments, that he has limitations; and finally, the fact that hum an 
life demands toil and hard work, but that through it, man can realise a good 
'higher' than mere physical survival. With these examples briefly sketched, I 
will turn briefly to some historical background before moving on to the 
poems themselves.
Background
The bulk of Pindar's extant and complete poems are epinician odes—that is, 
poems written for victors in the Panhellenic games. At the time when Pindar 
was writing (an exceptionally long career—from the age of 20, 498BC, to a 
ripe, old 72, 446BC), such poems were regularly commissioned and 
performed at post-game celebrations (komoi).^^ The poems were recited orally
hope to show, however, that this indeterminacy, far from being wholly negative in its 
capacity to destabilise, is also the source of human individuality which, when connected to a 
culture's sense of reasonableness, is the precondition of change and progress, creation and 
innovation.
^^Simonides is said to have been the first poet to perform for money {Greek Lyric vol.UI Loeb 
ed. pp. 347-350). Additionally, he is said to have been the first to compose especially for a 
victory (Trypanis, C. Greek Poetry: From Homer to Sheris (London: 1981, p. 106). The precise 
relationship between Simonides and Pindar is difficult to discern. Simonides was almost a
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and accompanied by music—they were in fact (performed) songs of praise. 
The komos, the celebratory event or, more literally, "reveling progression," 
w as geared towards a particular yet diverse audience, including the victor, his 
family, members of the larger society to which they belonged, and even at 
times, members of rival cities and states.
The poet, often (though not always) the performer of the ode, was obviously 
central to such an event, and therefore had a complex range of duties. Some 
of these duties were laid out explicitly, as in for example, the rules which 
structured and defined the genre of the epinician itself. At the same time, the 
poet had to keep his audience at the forefront of his mind, and in this was 
saddled with the exceedingly difficult task of satisfying its often differing and 
at times, contradictory needs and expectations.^^ Thus the poet was 
constrained by two different classes of rules—both the rules of the genre itself, 
as well as the far less easily defined social ones. Both kinds, we will see, 
Pindar bent, and even at times, unabashedly broke.
Chapter 2: The Epinician Genre
Lyric poetry has roots extending back to (at least) the 7th century BC, 
grounding it firmly in Greek culture. Poetry at this time was performance— 
often enacted in elaborate festivals accompanied by music (originally the lyre, 
or another melodic instrument) and often dance, a chorus (hence, choral
generation older than Pindar, yet the times during which each composed did overlap (e.g., 
both were commissioned by Ihrasyboulos in 490BC, Pindar's P.VI). That they enjoyed 
friendship, or even a sense of mutual respect is unlikely (e.g., some assume that Pindar's 
reference to "crows" in Olympian 2 was meant to indicate the work of both Simonides and 
Bacchylides).
^^ole, T. Pindar's Feasts or the Music of Power (Rome: 1992, p.l4); Nisetich, F. Pindar's Victory 
Songs (Baltimore: 1980, p.lO). Nisetich suggests that the wide variation within one single 
audience, often including recent enemies of war, might be related to the fact that Pindar 
wrote during the "sacred truce," a time when, instead of warfare, the Greeks engaged in 
contests of skill and strength for the prize of glory, rather than territory.
For an innovative and influential analysis of the relationship between the poet and his 
audience, see Gentili, B. Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece trans. Cole (Baltimore: 1988, esp. 
ch. 8).
13
poetry).!^ The epinician ode flourished in the late Archaic period and is itself 
a 'subclass' of performed poetry. Therefore it was included in this long and 
well established cultural tradition. Despite its Dorian roots, (and therefore 
not 'native' to Athens) choral and lyric odes held a distinct and unshakeable 
place in her cultural life. The epinician form specifically flourished in Athens 
(e.g., with Simonides and his nephew Bacchylides), and it is believed that 
Pindar left his home in Thebes to train there in the art of the ode.^^ The rules 
of the genre were demanding, and clearly set out. The epinician ode was 
divided into roughly four parts;^® praise of the gods, praise for the 
achievement of the victor, a reference to myth,^^ and an assertion of, however 
indirect, some truth or maxim (though not necessarily in that order).
Closer examination of this structure indicates one of the epinician ode's most 
significant features—and a way in which it is different from, for example, the 
Homeric epics.^o Epinician odes were firmly historically situated: "expressive 
of stability and locality...bound by time and p l a c e . T h e  poems illuminated 
and reflected current events rather than to recreate an image of an illustrious
The performances were intended to represent the "collective voice ...of the community" 
{Oxford Classical Dictionary 1996, ed.)
That Pindar was Theban and not a native of Athens, and as such, was a permanent 
'outsider' to the city in which he was trained as a poet, is another parallel between himself, 
Thucydides, and Aristotle. The fact that Thebes had a somewhat dubious relationship with 
Athens (it was thought to have cowardly surrendered when under attack by the Persians, and 
even sided with them at the battle of Plataea) no doubt made Pindar's relationship to the 
emerging superpower complex at times, strained.
While these four elements are commonly found in the odes, there was some variation. For 
example, in 1.7, Pindar does not include a myth, but where the reader expects it, instead tells 
the story of Strepsiades' uncle.
^^ For elaboration on the social/political function of myth in ancient Greece, see Vemant's 
Mortals and Immortals where he reinforces the inherently public and political status of myth in 
ancient Greek life, stressing the fact that it was used as a means of strengthening the 
intercormectedness of a particular society (Princeton: 1991, pp. 145ff.. See also his Myth and 
Societyin Ancient Greece Boston: 1988 pp. 203ff.). In Myth and the Polis, (ed. Pozzi & 
Wickersham Cornell: 1991) this issue is raised again, with a focus on the idea that the 
flexibility inherent in myths allows for, and even encourages, fruitful debate between rival 
cities or political factions (see especially the Introduction-Ch. 1.).
^^For a more detailed analysis of the linguistic/etymological genealogy between the two 
genres, see Gentili Poetry & Its Public in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: 1988 pp. 57-60).
2lParry, A. ("Bacchylides: An Introduction" in The Language of Achilles and Other Papers, 
Oxford: 1989, pp. 64-65).
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and glorious p a s t .22 Indeed, in Isthmian 7 ,  Pindar claims that the great deeds
of the past are easily forgotten by men, and implies that it is the recent deeds
of men, captured in song, that will grab and hold the attention of the public:
But the grace of old
drops to sleeps, and mortal men forget
whatever has not intermingled
in the glorious streams verses,
and come to flower
through a poet's skill.
for Strepsiades too—
victorious in pancratium at Isthmus,
he is awesome in strength
and handsome to see. (11-18)
The odes, however, did not refer solely to the current success of the exalted
athlete, nor merely to the immediate political context in which the victory was
s i t u a t e d .2 3  In addition to the requisite tribute to existing cities and their recent
successes, recall the other common ingredients of the ode—specifically,
reference to myth.^4 This element enabled Pindar to use a traditional and
familiar cultural medium to express new ideas. Gentili suggests that the more
"realistic subject matter—human existence as experienced in the altered
sociopolitical conditions of the archaic city-state" entailed that the choral
odes/lyric poetry occupied the "middle ground between tradition and
i n n o v a t i o n .  "25 Through the epinician odes, as a part of the larger lyric
tradition, Pindar seemed to succeed in grounding his audience in the familiar,
and within this comfort of the known, he more "gently' introduced new ideas.
22 See Kurke for insight into the cultural and economic context during which the odes were 
written {The Traffic in Praise Ithaca: 1991),
23 Parry, for instance, claims that with the emergence of choral poetry comes the origins of 
abstract language ("Bacchylides: An Introduction" in The Language of Achilles Oxford: 1989, p. 
62).
24Though indeed inclusive of familiar myths, Pindar's odes presented them neither 
straightforwardly nor in complete form. This raises the question as to just how accessible his 
odes were, even at the time he was writing. Was Pindar deliberately elusive? What might lie 
behind his often enigmatic verses? An easy, and admittedly perhaps an accurate suggestion, 
is that his poems served to create an impenetrable circle around an educated elite. However, 
maybe the 'work' required to understand his words fully served a different, less malicious 
purpose. For example, perhaps the style and effort demanded of the audience (now reader) 
have increased individual experience in the event, promoting identification, which in turn 
allowed the message of the poem to become more firmly 'fixed' in the listener.
25Centili, B. Poetry & Its Public in Ancient Greece (Baltimore: 1988, p. 61).
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This blend of old with new in Pindar's words, mirrors the actual 'journey' of 
the successful athlete about whom the poem is written. The victor, from the 
known world of his family and society, effectively catapults himself into a 
new arena. He pushes himself to the very limits of what he can do, often in a 
city foreign to him, and then returns to share his trium ph with his family 
{oikos) and city (polis). Observers of his success are thus compelled to expand 
their own views of what had hitherto been known and accepted as possible. 
Pindar facilitates this reintegration through embedding the exceptional event 
in the well known form of the epinician ode. Thus, we see how the athlete's 
journey (and the inevitable introduction of the new' which follows from it) is 
more easily absorbed through the fact that it is brought home and distilled in 
the melody of Pindar's enchanting poems. ^ 6
However, this réintroduction might be said to be jeopardised by the 
celebration itself -  Cole suggests that the komoi which centred around the odes 
were potentially "explosive." They did not serve so much as a re-grounding 
in the personal and familiar, but acted so as to penetrate a wider, public and 
political sphere. This leads us directly to the 'social rules' of the epinician.
Social Constraints
The 'social rules' confining Pindar were no doubt subtler than those of the 
genre, yet in many ways, they were more powerful, and 'breaking' them had 
far more serious consequences. Again, the audience at such a performance 
was a complex one, and Pindar had to find a very delicate balance, whereby 
he aimed to satisfy everyone, or at the very least, offend no one. 7^
76 Kurke explores the theme of nostos (return home) in the odes, highlighting "the heroic or 
agonistic need for the individual to leave home and to return bringing the glory he has won" 
(The Traffic in Praise Ithaca: 1991, p.32). The individual's success takes on meaning and 
significance when it is shared with that community which made it possible. For more on 
nostos, see Burton Pindar's Pythian Odes (Oxford: 1962); Ruck and Matheson Pindar: Selected 
Odes (AnnArbor: 1968).
77por a discussion of the make-up of the audience and complications involved in performing 
before one, see Cole, T. Pindar's Feasts: or the Music of Power (Baltimore: 1991, pp.l4ff.). Race
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In looking to understand the social constraints put on Pindar, we m ust keep 
in m ind when reading his odes that the surviving printed words we read 
(often to ourselves) do not capture the entire experience of the komos. Recall 
that originally the odes were accompanied by music, and (often) dance, food 
and drink. Perhaps even more important, they were firmly embedded in a 
particular political climate.^® Because of the local' nature of the events to 
which Pindar refers, and the fact that he does not provide much context to 
explain his allusions and metaphors, one might assume that his original 
audience had a substantial common knowledge base, which is now remote 
and obscure. In this, we see how much the endurance of later thinkers like 
Thucydides and Plato might be due to the more unified and single narratives 
into which they situate their ideas, as well as the known (to us) social 
constraints which are implicit in their work. For the latter, we have a 
surviving context linked inextricably to their ideas, ensuring (a level of) 
comprehension in future times. For Pindar on the other hand, we can only 
attempt as best we can to fill in the content of the social conditions which 
shaped his poetry m order to appreciate not only the subtler nuances of his 
language and style, but the basic ideas his work conveys.
What then are thought to have been the events that accompanied Pindar's 
epinician odes? Cole explores this subject, beginning with an etymological 
examination of the word, enkomia. Taking "e«" simply as in/w ithin, "komos/' 
he tells us entails first an occasion of revelry, but also, equally important, it 
assumes a procession. It is therefore not a static event, but a moving one. Its 
movement is "beyond the bounds of the p r i v a t e .  In this, praise becomes a 
kind of speculation, a projection from the inner, the personal, to the outer, the
discusses the potential for Pindar to cause resentment in his audience (perhaps for cutting 
short a complimentary story), and suggests that this causes the poet to "assume an 
apologetic' stance " at times ("The End of Olympia 2: Pindar and the Vulgus" CSCA 1979, 
p.256).
28As Pindar's life spanned some of the greatest battles of the Persian Wars (Marathon, 
Salamis, Plataia, and the lesser known Himera) and the closing of (what has come to be seen 
as) the Archaic period, ^current events' were often dramatic and volatile.
2^Cole, T. Pindar's Feasts or the Music of Power (Rome: 1992, p.l8).
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public. This, Cole notes, helps to explain why the odes are often written in the 
future or imperative.^o They are forward looking, their aim is to extend 
beyond current psychological and social boundaries.
The question then remains, once having penetrated the public sphere, what 
"contains' the komos? Do the strict rules guiding the epinician's construction 
reign it in? What then do we make of the fact that Pindar often disregarded 
these rules? How were the 'liberties' Pindar took in writing the epinician 
odes a means of inducing change not only in the genre itself, but in the social 
roles and tradition in which they were situated as well? How might this be 
seen as a means for changing established political rules?^^
This general background stated, let us now turn to the odes themselves with 
an aim to extract' some features Pindar seemed to understand as essential to 
man. I will begin by restating some of the recurrent human characteristics I 
plan to trace through a selection of the odes: the effect of the brute fact of 
m an's mortality; the essential and beneficial connection between man and a 
community larger than himself (which simultaneously constrains him and 
provides the necessary conditions for him to flourish); simultaneous hum an 
beauty and frailty, man's susceptibility to chance and luck (which prevents 
him from knowing his future with certainty), the need for man to put in effort 
and hard work towards his endeavours (through which he may come to 
realise a good 'higher' than mere s u r v i v a l ) 3 2 ,  and finally, the importance of
For further discussion on the "encomiastic future" see Hayden, P. Mind, Body, and Speech in 
Homer and Pindar (Gottingen: 1995, ch.3); and on the use of tiie future more generally. Slater, 
W.J. "Futures in Pindar" Classical Quarterly vol. 19 (1969) pp. 86-94
These questions will arise in slightly different contexts throughout this study as I explore 
the idea of reasonable creativity- two concepts which seem at face value to be at odds. To 
what extent must man follow rules thereby maintaining stability and security- the reason(s) 
that order(s) his environment? When and how can he challenge and even break existing 
rules? This issue arises with the choices generals make in Thucydides' History, as well as with 
the application of the law by the "equitable" man in Aristotle.
2^ The sense of something 'higher' comes through the personal—here, a particular deed—but 
can lead men to an understanding of a more general human good. I believe that this is one of 
the functions of Pindar's odes, i.e., to embed the individual event/action in a song in such a 
way that a general truth can be gleaned from it.
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recognising his own limitations, that is, avoiding hubris and pleonexia (or 
over-reaching). I will begin with Pythian X, thought to be Pindar's earliest 
work, composed at the age of 20.
Chapter 3; Pythean
"Happy Lacedaimon/Blessed Thessaly!:" Pindar begins Pythean X with a 
joyous exclamation. However, it is not directed, as one might expect, towards 
the victor he had been paid to praise, but towards the cities (and surrounding 
areas) from which the victor and the poem's commissioner sprang. The praise 
gradually becomes more finely pointed, and finally, at the penultimate line of 
the opening 'turn,' Pindar refers to the athlete himself, Hippocleas. The order 
here is significant. The victor comes into focus, only after the audience 
understands him to be a part of a political community, which has itself been 
located, if somewhat indirectly, in a larger, more 'cosmic' context (Sparta and 
Thessaly were believed to share Heracles, the great hero and son of Zeus, as a 
common ancestor). Therefore, while Hippocleas' glory is undoubtedly the 
result of his particular feat accomplished due to his individual prowess, through 
the words and music of the ode, the audience is compelled to consider the 
larger context of his victory, or, more precisely, the preconditions necessary to 
bring it about:^
For further analysis of P. X, see Rose, P. Sons of Gods, Children of Earth (Ithaca: 1992, pp. 164- 
184); Glidersleeve, B. Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes (New York: American Book Co., 
1885 pp. 348-356); Nisetich, F. Pindar's Victory Songs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
press, 1980, pp. 213-218); Burton, R.W.B., Pindar's Pythian Odes Oxford: 1962, pp. 1-15). 
^Kurke emphasises the importance of explicitly acknowledging family in an ode: "victories 
of other family members are included as a matter of course" {The Traffic in Praise Ithaca: 1991, 
p. 19). The dependence of son on father, of both on city, and of all on the grace of the gods, is 
a theme common to almost every ode. Pindar's words enforce the need not only to recognise 
this inescapable dependence of the particular man on the broader group to which he owes his 
excellence, but demand further that such recognition bring with it respect. Individual victory 
is always coupled with a sense of obligation to give the highest honour/praise to those powers 
that are responsible for all particular successes. See for example, P. VI, where Pindar draws 
attention not only to Xenocrates, the victor, but also to his son. He embeds the story of 
Antilochus (a model son because he died for his father), in a tradition of son respecting father, 
and man—more generally—honouring the gods:
Zeus Kronidas,
The deep voiced Lord of Lightening and Thunderbolts,
Him thou shalt worship first of the gods:
19
The end and the beginning,
O great Apollo, ripen into sweetness for men 
when a god urges them on.
He has done what he has done 
in accordance, surely, with your plans.
But he has also walked
in the footsteps of his father. (7-11)
The importance of the community as opposed to the individual athlete
himself arises again when Pindar refers to "the host of dwellers" who
proclaim Hippocleas winner. In this, there is (perhaps) the insinuation that
Hippocleas' success depends, to some extent, on the collective recognition of
those around him. It is the community's conscious judgement and
acknowledgement of Hippocleas that makes his victory significant—glory
does not come from the brute fact that he, the young man Hippocleas, won a
race (which is itself comprehensible only due to the broader, established
tradition of the games). The concrete race and the victor alone cannot enter
consciousness in a meaningful way—the sheer uniqueness of the event places
it outside the known, it has yet no place. Hippocleas' exceptional speed is
insufficient to give meaning to the race; it needs to be affirmed in some more
formal way by those around him.^^
If Hippocleas' speed, the beauty of his action, succeeds in 'piercing' public 
consciousness, yet cannot be automatically understood and integrated into the 
minds and lives of the spectators, what more is needed? Such integration 
involves something more active than the mere passive watching of an event—
And a like honour
Give to thy parents for the length of their days.
Antilochos was a warrior long ago
Who kept to this purpose,
for he died for his father. (25-45)
This theme appears again in N. II when Pindar claims that "Truly Salamis has strength/ To 
breed a man for the fight" (12-14) and later: "In old tales of Archanai/ Had brave men, and in 
every event of the Games" (15-17). While it is Timodamos' feat that occasions the ode, his 
physical ability is not its only, perhaps not even its primary focus— rather those poleis that 
produce the individuals are the object of praise.
Rose argues that Pindar's words imply that "man's achievement of true blessedness depends 
on his being celebrated in song by skilled poets" {Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth Ithaca: 
1992, p. 176).
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it requires a kind of guided and active experience. The gradual procession
Pindar leads in his ode, connecting god, city, family, and finally individual,
provides such an experience. The participants of the komos are actively
involved in the celebration, for each must follow^^ Pindar's melody, through
which he draws connections, at times using complex images and metaphors,
between the victory, themselves, and the world.^^ The poem does more than
just state these connections. Pindar himself notes that his praise works
complexly, at many levels at once—in Nemean V, he contrasts the form of the
ode, w ith that of a other, more static arts:
I am no maker of statues,
who fashions figures to stand
motionless on the self-same pedestal;
rather, on every ship, every bark
set sail, sweet song going from Aigina
to say Pytheas, the mighty son of Lampon,
won the victor's crown in the pancratium at Nemea. (1-5)
Not only can Pindar's odes be verbally communicated and so travel easily
beyond the location of their performance, but the words that makes them up
are inherently more flexible/fluid than say, marble, requiring interpretation
from all who hear them. The intricate and complex approach to his subject
serves to realise an important part of the ode's function, i.e., to ensure the
active involvement of the audience. Only given this shared, participatory
experience can the truths he brings be leamt.
^^Though I recognise the potential implausibility of the suggestion that the audience "must 
follow" Pindar's path, one might see the music as a benignly coercive force, luring the 
audience in to hear (and hopefully to absorb) its message. North notes that the lyre (which 
often accompanied the performance of an ode) was thought to have "calming, civilizing 
effects," encouraging and cultivating sophrosune—moderation/self-restraint (From Myth to 
Icon Ithaca: 1979 p. 65). Perhaps this state of mind allowed for a more unified experience, 
bringing diverse identities/peoples together harmoniously, and the collective involvement in 
the ode in turn, likely encouraged greater individual participation.
^^Again, one might ask, to what extent was the audience able to follow what seem to us now, 
exceedingly obscure connections, juxtaposition of images, cryptic metaphors of Pindar's 
odes? Was this a way to exclude the lower, less educated masses? I would argue that this is 
not necessarily a sign of elitism, but might be the result of a belief that concerted effort brings 
greater, better entrenched understanding.
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The experience is not an appeal to what has come to be known as the 
"rational" side of man. Rather, the ode engages the audience through other 
means; through emotion, through man's response to beauty, through his 
curiosity and his desire to feel a part of something. While this kind of access 
might be seen as more personal/subjective than the so-called "neutral" 
principles of much contemporary political theory, it is not therefore confined 
to a limited audience, but can succeed in illuminating ideas and stimulating 
thought in all those who actively take part. The odes. Miller suggests, are 
""transpersonal;"" because of their references to both commonly known, 
overarching myths and the cultures and histories of particular, individual 
poleis. T h e y  offer an alternative means of identifying and addressing m an -  
they echo his experience and simultaneously demand his participation in and 
reflection on this experience. In this, the odes represent universal hum an 
characteristics in a way in which "neutral" principles cannot. And further, by 
their very nature and structure, they seem to encourage and "activate" m an to 
think actively (which is to say, creatively).
The experience Pindar crafts weaves together many diverse ideas. One 
"thread" is the continual reference to actual, familiar cities which serve in part 
to lead members of the victor"s community to feel a real share in Hippocleas" 
success. This, one might assume, cultivated confidence and pride, and 
ultimately, a firmer and more expanded sense of cultural (and individual) 
identity. However, if it is true that Pindar"s audience was not homogeneous, 
what of the participants in the komos who were not of the same political 
community? Just as the success is not exactly Hippocleas" own, neither is it 
solely the property of his own political c o m m u n i t y B o t h  the individual
Lyric Texts and Lyric Consciousness (New York: 1994, p. 86) 
fact, Pindar words often suggest that a fundamental virtue of a community is its capacity 
to make outsiders feel welcome. In N.V, for instance, he refers to the victory of Pytheas, 
claiming that "To the Aiakdai, he has brought honour/ And to his mother city, land that loves 
strangers." (6-8). In P.V, Pindar praises the city of Cyrene, referring to it as "A tower of a city,/ 
A most bright eye to strangers." (56-57). In N.in.3, he refers to Aigina's "welcoming Dorian 
island"" (3), and again in N.I Pindar praises the virtue of generosity towards strangers:
I have taken my stand at the courtyard gate
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victor and the society to which he belongs are humbled in light of the gods. It 
is "great Apollo" who "ripens into sweetness" the trials of men (10-11). Thus, 
all listeners, whether sharing a common citizenry, or from distant, and 
possibly even rival cities, are reminded of their place in a larger order, and 
their ultimate subordination to the (often erratic behaviour) of the gods.'^o 
But, crucially important is the fact that while the ode reinforces and stresses 
the importance of the larger 'cosmic' order (producing both pride and 
humility), it was commissioned and performed for a specific reason—the 
recent success of the particular individual, Hippocleas. This success 
highlights the domain, however small, of m an's f r e e d o m .^ i  It represents
Of a man who welcomes strangers.
And sweet is my song.
Here a fitting feast is set; not often
Is the house without guests from overseas. (19-22)
On a smaller scale, in O.Vn, Pindar opens the ode with the description of wedding rites, 
indicating the good of the resulting union of two different households:
As a man takes in his rich hand a bowl 
Bubbling inside with the wine's dew.
And shall give it
To his young bridegroom to pledge him 
From one home to another. (1-4)
That Zeus was (among other things) the god of hospitality also points to the importance of 
treating visitors with appropriate respect, generosity, and trust. Traditional literature and 
mythology have shown that betraying this fundamental duty can have disastrous 
repercussions.
Yet, the Greek attitude towards "outsiders" was in no sense straightforward. From today's 
standpoint, it seems at times paradoxical. The importance of being a good host was 
undeniable, but not everyone was welcome into a particular household or community. Just 
who was the appropriate recipient of a community's warmth is ambiguous -  the line between 
welcome guest, and adversarial "other" is not always easy for us, from this distant vantage 
point, to discern (this includes both enemies of equal status, as well as inferior, irrational, 
almost inhuman 'barbarians'). Dougherty discusses the complex relationship of victory, 
friendship, and colonisation in Pindar (The Poetics of Colonization: From City to Text in Archaic 
Greece Oxford: 1993, pp.l32ff.).
^  The motivating force of the gods on man, often by way of his thymos, is discussed by 
Hayden in Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar (Gottingen: 1995).
I use "freedom" here in a very narrow sense. Pindar's use of the Greek word eleutheria is in 
no sense the modem one. It is limited, referring to the freedom of a polis as not the subject of 
another polis (e.g., in O.Xn, Pindar begs Zeus to watch over the freedom of Flimera, a land 
recently having undergone a revolution: "Aigina, dear mother,/ Keep this city in her voyage 
of freedom " P. Vm ( 95-100). Eleutheria was not directly attributable to an individual (whose 
life was too ephemeral, too vulnerable the forces of chance to secure something like freedom, 
and who therefore could only access freedom through the structure of a flourishing polis). 
However, the individual was free to choose to undertake the necessary training/work needed 
to cultivate his talents if the polis in which he lived provided him with such options.
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m an's ability to stretch beyond what he has been until that point. The 
individual is not lost entirely in the face of greater powers—indeed, his 
particular actions are the motor behind progress and growth. The individual 
effort which climaxes in a glorious, new achievement is a kind of catalyst, 
causing the ode's existence, which, in part through oscillation between 
familiar and unknown, community and individual, serves to expand m an's 
self-image which in turn affects his actions in the world.^z The ode thus has 
two important and in some sense opposing messages: praise for the 
immediate occasion—the success of the individual (in this case, Hippocleas)— 
illustrating man's freedom to push and actively extend himself beyond past 
bounds. Yet, at the same time, through reference to family, city, hero, and 
gods, it also firmly established m an's place in a larger context. Disregarding 
this place and pushing too far, we will see later, had grave repercussions.
Placing man in a larger context has another important effect—it gives him 
some security and stability—of utmost importance given the inescapable 
hum an susceptibility to chance and luck. In what might be seen as an attempt 
to qualify his praise of hum an greatness—whether in terms of the city, family, 
or individual victor—Pindar follows some largely 'political' praise with an 
indication of the frailty of man. Pindar speaks of possibilities and hopes: 
"May their luck hold, and keep in the days to come." 3^ It is unclear, Pindar 
suggests, whether or not glory will continue, even given a noble family and 
multiple past successes. "There's no guessing," he echoes later in the poem, 
"What any twelvemonth brings" (62).^ Unexpected twists are inherent in
^Professor J. Lidov in a seminar at the Graduate Center at CUNY ("Pindar" Fall, 2003) 
highlighted the necessary (and often productive) tension between individual achievement, 
triggered by hope (Elpis), and the (general) force of Tuche, which often served to limit and 
impede the aspirations of particular men.
Lines: 17-19 — epoito, optative mood, indicating wish/hope.
^Pindar's odes are full of references on the theme of human frailty and vulnerability to 
chance/luck, for instance, P. XII:
Any bliss man may win
(And without labour, none!) God shall perfect
Today perhaps! But fate may not be escaped.
Then lo! Time's hand.
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hum an life, and often come and steer man off his intended path. The gods act 
according to their own rules, which, though unknown to man, greatly affect 
him. Thus, hum an beings cannot know with certainty what the future holds, 
they cannot "hand pick" the events that will influence their lives and guide 
their decisions. However, if man can more accurately identify and 
understand his nature more generally—his inextricable place in a larger web 
of fluctuating relationships with other men, the physical world, his past, and 
as well as his immediate circumstances—he might generate the strength and 
adaptability to endure ""the change of winds"" which blow him.^5
The "human condition", however uncertain, is not marked by utter chaos and
despair. Pindar repeatedly invokes natural metaphors when speaking of
hum an beings:
Even now Alcimidas gives valuable witness 
That his race is like the fruitful fields 
Which change about
And now give men abounding life from the soil.
Now rest again and pick up strength. (N. VI, 7-11)'^
This highlights human beauty (as a kind of sovereign hum an excellence),
which, though fragile and delicate, dependent for survival on the right
environment and care, is nonetheless, like nature, a genuine good in its own
Throwing at you the unforeseen
Turns calculation upside down, and gives you
One thing, but another not yet. (27-33)
Other examples may be found in P. X (17,20); P. VII (16-18); I, Vm (14-17).
^^For example, Lloyd remarks that however unable we are to control the lives of the gods, we 
can gain some understanding of them because their lives bear resemblance to those of 
humans: "Not only are the Olympians generally conceived in the form of men, but the whole 
Homeric description of the gods—of their life, their behaviour and motives which govern it, 
even of their rudimentary political organisation—faithfully reflects Homeric society itself  
{Polarity and Analogy. Bristol (repr): 1987, p. 194). A similar idea is expressed by Pindar in N. 
VI (discussed more fully below): "Single is the race, single/ Of men and of gods;/ From a 
single mother we both draw breath./But a power in everything/keeps us apart" (1-4). Given 
the similarity, Lloyd argues that there is a potential for acquiring understanding by way of 
analysing and interpreting analogy, and not through learning fixed truths. Such an 
understanding, though imprecise, can be seen as itself a good, implying the further point that 
not all understanding leads to certainty and control.
^ I^n N. n, Pindar draws an analogy between Timonoos' success and "the finest harvest" (8-10). 
We will see that for Thucydides also, attention to nature and her recurrent cycles helps to 
increase man's understanding of his world and his capacity to establish order in it (see 
especially the discussion on Demosthenes below).
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right. Hippocleas is crowned with "splendid wreathes" which are beautiful, a 
sign of excellence, even despite the fact that over time they will in time wither 
and dry out. This is unlike the "bay leaves of gold" which crown the gods.^^ 
"Lordly wealth," he hopes (but cannot know) "will stay aflower," again 
indicating the ephemeral nature of man and his fortune. The comparisons to 
the natural beauty of flowers, the symbol of the victory wreath, suggests that 
man is indeed a valuable and worthy being amongst mortal creatures. His 
achievements, while fleeting, are objects of genuine recognition and 
celebration.
However, the success and celebration should not lead to hubris or excessive
vanity. This might result in a false sense of power, the belief that even as
mere mortals, men can become like gods on earth. This inflated—and false—
sense of self Pindar indicates, often leads to pleonexia, grasping for more or
"over-reaching."'^ Instone indicates how the violent nature of many of the
myths Pindar uses illustrates the admonitory nature of his odes.^^ Pindar
repeatedly stresses the contrast between god and man as if to hinder the
development of excessive arrogance:
They [the gods] feast and are glad.
And sickness never, nor cursed old age 
Touches their holy bodies;
W ithout toil, without war
They dwell, and do not trouble. (41-44)
Man, on the other hand, is often troubled, his hopes and reality do not always
coincide. Pindar repeatedly remarks on man's inherent limitations:
He shall never climb the brazen sky
^^Pindar regularly contrasts the eternal and enduring nature of the gods with the ephemeral 
lot of men. For example, gods' dwellings are sturdy and fixed, e.g., "Apollo's porch" P.Vn.9, 
"Pillars of Heracles" O.in.42. In N. I, Pindar contrasts the men who live in the (seasonal) 
"Green branch of Syracuse", who compete for the (passing beauty) of "Olympian olive's 
leaves", with gods who wield "bronze weapons" and sit upon "golden thrones." Man's 
memory cannot be dependent on physical constructs (the results of techne), but he can win 
ever-lasting remembrance through song (the result of divine inspiration).
®^For a clear and concise analysis of myths involving the dangers of excessive hubris, see 
North, H.. From M yth to Icon (Ithaca: 1979, pp.27-33).
'^ I^nstone, S. Pindar: Selected Odes (Warminster: 1996, pp. 2-4)
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But what glittering things we mortal men attain;
He travels there. (25-28)50 
We will not—and indeed cannot ever—elevate ourselves to the greatness of the
gods, Pindar seems to caution again and again. Note too that human glory
''glitters." It is not a bright and constant source of light—objects that glitter
catch light, they are not a source but a kind of a reflection, intermittent and
elusive. As hum ans then, men cannot expect to 'shine' like the gods, and thus
should not try to live a divine life; "drop the anchor quick from the bow s./Let
it bite the bottom, to keep us off the reef" (51-52). Divine happiness is eternal,
while that of m an ebbs and flows throughout a single life, and man should
expect such fluctuations.^!
The contrast here between god and man is made all the more forceful as it 
follows immediately after a comment on m an's limitations, and the absurdity 
of excessive pride or self-aggrandisement: "He [Apollo] laughs as he 
sees/Their beasts high cocked presumption!" (33-36). Through the story of 
Perseus, who could only visit, but could not remain in the land of the 
Hyperboreans, Pindar's message is unequivocal: man is not, and should not 
presume to be divine, to live as immortals do.^2 However, this leaves the 
present reader (and perhaps the audience) with an ambiguity—Pindar seems 
to suggest that man should strive to be godlike, yet only to a certain point. 
W hat is this point? How does he know when he has 'h it' it? These questions 
are not easily answered.53 We have seen already that excessive hubris is a
5^Notice that Pindar includes himself in this—"we mortal men '—he is present in the ode (and 
trying to display his own respectful modesty).
5!ln P. m, Pindar again reflects this theme: "We must ask from the Gods/Things suited to 
hearts that shall die/Knowing the path we are in, the nature of our doom" (57-60).
52 Rose notes that the praise of the just, "upright minds" of the Hyperboreans can be seen as 
parallel for appropriate (human) achievement of the Thessalians (Sons of the Gods, Children of 
the Earth Ithaca: 1992, p. 172). See also Gildersleeve: "The land of the Hyperboreans is a 
glorified Thessaly" (Pindar New York: 1890, p. 350).
53 Aristotle will explicitly highlight the difficulty of finding this balance in the Nicomachean 
Ethics: "while there are many ways to miss the mark, there is only one correct way." The lack 
of definitive theoretical answers to concrete ethical and political dilemmas in both poetry and 
Aristotelian philosophy indicates the inexact nature of any philosophy of man. This 
imprecision however is not necessarily negative for it leaves space for man to question, to be
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common hum an fault, and a recurring theme of Greek myth, but ultimately, 
this abstract "truth' does not give definitive answers as to just where striving 
for excellence ends and pleonexia begins. Is it then finally a matter of trial and 
error? And if so, is the athlete, sent out to 'stretch' the limits of the species' 
excellence an innocent guinea pig, a sacrifice in the hope of progress?^^ I wish 
to argue that the odes themselves—through the examples they demonstrate 
and the participation they demand—help the audience (and later, readers) to 
enrich and make useful their understanding of the necessarily imprecise 
concepts of human excellence, pleonexia, and hubris. The odes suggest that 
while these concepts can yield no definite and universal rules to guide action, 
experiencing them through their representation in myth, analogy, and story 
can inform man's understanding in a practical way, so that he is better able to 
act well.
There is one aspiration about which there is neither question nor lingering 
ambiguity, for it is simply and forever outside m an's scope. This is the 
characteristic that most traps him in the 'lower' world—his mortality. 
However, Pythean X (and indeed almost all Pindar's odes) suggests the way 
in which man, so far as he is able, can achieve a certain, hum an immortality. 
This comes through being captured in the beauty of song—the intoxicating 
odes themselves are vehicles for a peculiarly hum an type of immortality. 
While men die, the poems celebrating them live on, and can be sung for 
generations, indeed, for thousands of years.^^ The odes recurring presence in 
a culture not only recalls the victor himself, but triggers broader memories,
critical and reflective—which is to say, it provides the conditions for man to exercise his 
reason, after which he can make prudent, creative choices.
While there is no denying the element of risk in actions which strive to extend beyond the 
known and accepted norms of a particular society. Nonetheless, this risk is decreased given a 
more general understanding of the kind of creature man is as a species (which reflection on 
the odes can provide). Such an understanding does not provide precise rules about how far 
one should reach, but it can offer some guidelines to shape and structure one's choices. 
Furthermore, societies (organisations of men living/cooperating together) provide men with 
exemplars, people (perhaps athletes, or aristocrats, or men of virtue) who have, through 
experience, acquired a broader understanding of (at least a piece of) the world which they can 
impart through their words and actions.
Preserving memories for posterity, we wUl see, was a goal for Thucydides as well.
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awakening a dormant sense of its history, pride, and identity. In composing 
an ode, Pindar is thus raising man to the closest he can get to "pure" divinity. 
However, his victory songs imply that immortality has a special meaning for 
hum an beings, it is not the extension of the concrete life of an individual. 
Rather man, preserved in words, becomes a vital force through the memories 
he stimulates, all the more powerful as they evolve into the collective memory 
of a community.
The ability to achieve this goal of a place in (a common cultural) memory 
depends to a large extent on the medium through which the memory flows. 
Often Pindar, when speaking of his odes, likens them to fluids, a metaphor 
which is not only appropriate to the songs themselves, but for man as well. A 
fluid indicates the simultaneous strength and variability of hum an beings. 
Fluid moves in a kind of constant, yet unpredictable motion—powerful, yet 
often erratic, as hum an life can be. In order to realise its power effectively, a 
fluid must take on a definitive form, that is to say, it must be channelled, 
always somehow constrained and directed in its flow. These characteristics of 
fluids find a parallel in human life which also must be lived within a 
structure, according to a definitive order. If hum an freedom is to be 
constructively actualised, so as not to become a chaotic (and violent) fight to 
secure one's own desires and personal survival, it must be deliberately 
shaped and guided.^ Fluids in Pindar's imagery come in many forms which 
illustrate these qualities; e.g., the flowing of nectar and honey, attracting men 
and influencing through sweetness. Elsewhere, water images invoke the 
mighty flow of rivers and the tremendous power of the sea.
In Pythean X, fluid images recall both the past and future. Hippocleas' 
present success would not be possible without the goods he received from his 
family:
This idea emerges again with Aristotle who claims in the Politics that man without the 
structure of a polis is potentially worse than the 'lowest' beast (1253a30-33).
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the blood in him follows his father's tracks.
Who won at Olympia twice. (12-13)
Pindar's words suggest that the blood is transferred simply and naturally
from father to son (it "flows"), and not recklessly, but in "tracks." Towards
the end of the ode, Pindar evokes the future playing on the fluidity of song
itself:
I hope that the when the men of Ephyra 
Pour out sweet music beside [the river] Peneios 
They will make Hippocleas with their singing 
More splendid than ever. (55-58)
Here Pindar depicts men singing together—an activity that requires a shared
goal and cooperation, the result of which is a beautiful way of imparting
information. The song both exalts the individual and creates a shared,
pleasurable experience for those involved. That the singing takes place near a
river continues the fluid metaphor, and suggests that the words in song will
travel, and like a river, nurture those with whom they come into contact.
Like fluid naturally seeps into and nurtures the earth, song permeates easily 
the minds of men, influencing and shaping their thoughts. Words embedded 
in melody can take root in the mind of an individual, and flower into a 
lasting, yet dynamic image, evoking, in this case, memory. Memory, Pindar 
suggests, serves to enhance and replenish a fading identity (which, I would 
argue, cultivates agency necessary for deliberate choice and action). 
Hippocleas is made "more splendid than ever" through his representation in 
the ode. There, his magnificence is distilled, bringing his family and 
community pride, a sense of who they have been, and who they are. The 
unique beauty of Hippocleas' action casts a light; at once illuminating a 
coherent, shared past, emd simultaneously suggesting possibilities for the 
future.57
Rose makes the further point that not only does the ode bridge past and future, but abstract 
and concrete: [Pindar's] suggestive shift from the concretely athletic to the generally 
human... [indicates] the broader relevance of the 400 meter dash" {Songs of the Gods, Children of 
Earth Ithaca: 1992, p. 169).
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Pindar's songs of praise captivate an audience in part by stimulating potent 
memories. These can in turn generate a sense of identity, empowerment, and 
hope given the described past success. At the same time, the melody of the 
ode mirrors m an's peculiar kind of excellence—like a song, it is not static or 
immutable, rather it "darts from one thought to another" (54). It flows and 
changes within a larger structure, and its inherent variability allows for, even 
at times invites improvisation. This fluidity reflects a certain freedom m an 
has to consciously construct his own life, though, of course, only within the 
parameters of his nature (just as a song, to be pleasing, must retain its 
organised composition). The epinician, like the memory it triggers, and man 
himself, is at once in flux and lasting. The medium of song through which the 
ode is communicated creates a distinct and pleasing experience for the 
audience which makes its message more easily absorbed. Once internalised, 
this message continues to be thought-provoking and inspirational. At its best, 
the truths the ode embodies, though not fixed, immutable principles, 
nonetheless increase understanding and provide the stabilisation needed for 
reasonable, creative action.
Chapter 4: Nemean Vps
Nemean VI, like Pythean X, does not open with direct praise for Alcimidas, 
the trium phant wrestler, but with the larger issue of the relationship between 
god and man:
Single is the race
Of men and of gods;
From a single mother we both draw our breath.
But a difference of power in everything
Keeps us apart;
For the one race is nothing,
whereas the bronze heaven remains a secure abode forever.
(1-4)
There is here an explicit recognition of similarities between the two. They 
share a common ancestry, which one might presume gives rise to the
58 For further analysis of N. VI, see Nisetich (Pindar's Victory Songs Baltimore: 1980, pp. 255- 
258); Bury, J.B. Pindar's Nemean Odes (London: 1890, pp. 98-113); FameU, L.R. The Works of 
Pindar: Critical Commentary London: 1932, pp. 281-288).
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resemblance in body and mind which come in the following lines: "Yet we can 
in the greatness of m ind/O r of body be like the Immortals" (5-6). However, 
neither likeness can override the essential differences, which Pindar does not 
hesitate to make known. Once again, these differences revolve primarily 
around power specifically that which is gained through foresight and 
immortality. Ironically, it is precisely his most ««-godlike attribute, that is to 
say, his mortality, which provides man with his only substantive bit of sure 
foreknowledge. Therefore, human beings must not only face the inevitability 
of their own mortality, but also the fact that death is, in truth, their only real 
certainty. However, as man travels from birth to death, this "certainty' has 
limited use, for it does not release him from his ignorance of what, on a 
smaller scale, will come next.^^ Each day in a hum an life involves constant 
fluctuation and change, and the incessant threat of interference by unknown, 
external forces: "we do not know /by day or in the n ight/w hat course 
destiny/has marked for us to run" (4-7).
The fact of this inherent indeterminacy in human life demands that man make 
choices:
There are broad approaches 
from every direction 
that bards may take. (44)
The allusion to choices here (presumably, to the choices Pindar himself faces
in composing the ode)^^ invites the audience (and reader) to speculate on the
many 'approaches' among which he must decide in his own life.^  ^ The
Indeed, one might argue that this brute fact simply cannot enter into our every day 
consciousness. The psychoanalyst, Thomas Ogden, argues that "We are incapable of both 
maintaining our sanity and experiencing our own mortality," Reverie and Interpretation (New 
Jersey: 1997, p.l8).
Pindar 'appears' in other odes (e.g.: Nemean IX, 40-45: "I shall tell..." phasomai; Isthmian IV, 
1: "It is I" esti moi; Olympian XQI93 "But I..." eme d'...). For a more detailed study on the 
nature of Pindar's presence in his odes, see Lefkowitz' discussion in First Person Fictions: 
Pindar's Poetic '/'(Oxford: 1991).
Not only must man decide between a variety of different external possibilities given his 
particular 'place' in life, but each man is, internally, a unique creature, capable of more or less 
than others due to his own natural make-up:
What nature gives is in every way best, but many 
have tried to win renown
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concrete reality of Pindar's choice brings the abstract fact of hum an choice to a 
concrete, personal, and thus a very real level, but within constraints (of the 
lyric's frame and structure). In expressing this experience, Pindar, (who is, in 
his role as a poet, external to the audience) makes a confession, and in this, he 
extends a metaphorical hand out to the listeners—the two separate spheres 
are bridged. He sympathises with the audience (albeit indirectly), and in this, 
validates a common human plight—the necessity of choice amidst 
contingency and u n c e r t a i n t y .^ 2 jj-^  this again, an experience is created—one 
that recognises in a 'public' (i.e., shared) forum a human phenomenon which 
is common to all involved.
At the same time, one might assume that with the reference to "bards" (or 
tellers of tales, logioisin), Pindar helps to 'elevate' (the thoughts of) his 
onlookers beyond even himself as the poet /  performer. This allusion could 
not help but conjure up memories of the work of great, indeed almost 
superhum an poets of the past—(most likely) Homer and Hesiod. In this, the 
participants in the kotnos would have been compelled again to draw  
connections from within their own particular worlds to ideas and images of 
the past. For the audience to remember the greatness of these men, now 
almost abstractions themselves (but abstractions with qualities with which 
they could undoubtedly identify) perhaps served to cast their very real and 
often murky, concrete choices in a somewhat brighter light. At the very least, 
the memory might provide models to use to enhance an understanding of the
By taking lessons in prowess.
If a God is not there, nothing,
for some roads go farther than others.
No single training wiU look after aU of us. (O. IX, 100-106.)
This idea is echoed later in Aristotle who also speaks of the diversity of men, claiming that 
not all, for example, should eat the diet of the wrestler Milo {NE 1106bl-8)..
2^ This is not to imply that to have choices is entirely negative. It may be difficult, given that 
humans lack foresight, but Pindar also refers to choice as a sign of god's grace:
By grace of gods 
I have an endless path
On every side; For you MeHssos, in the Isthmian Games
Have revealed to me abundant means
To pursue in song the prowess of your race." (I. IV, 1-3)
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hum an condition and through this, give some guidance. The personal 
divulgence of Pindar's condition so immediately juxtaposed to a familiar, 
relevant, and, in an important sense, human abstraction, encourages a 
connection between listener (reader) and some larger, more formidable 
abstract entity with which one can feel some kinship, and which one might be 
able to use as an exemplar.
The scope here, however, need not be so wide. The actual decision making 
process it seems, can be aided by looking much closer at hand. This becomes 
clear in the lines that follow. There, Pindar reflects on the ancestors of 
Alcimidas:
The Aikiadai,
by the display of their great deeds
have bequeatiied to it a glorious heritage. (46-47)
This direct reference to the more recent past, to a more personal/local history, 
helps the audience see the many tiers of exemplars to which they might 
appeal for guidance. Reflection on and engagement with history, whether 
recent or remote, can bring the present to a level of intelligibility otherwise 
seemingly impossibly confused and overwhelming. Man left to himself in his 
own fleeting present cannot think, much less act reasonably—from such a 
narrow viewpoint, he is often incapable of even discerning the full range of 
options and choices in front of him. Past human experience, Pindar suggests, 
should be made to do the work it is capable of, that is to illuminate, inform, 
and suggest by revealing man's already realised potentials, which serve to 
reinforce his identity, and at the same time, shed light on future possibilities.^
How then do "future possibilities" manifest themselves in the odes? 
However important the past, Pindar does not dismiss, nor downplay the 
significance of the present moment, specifically the occasion of Alcimidas'
^^Kurke writes that the odes suggest that "the road of achievement and the road of the 
ancestors are one" (TTze Traffic in Praise Ithaca: 1991, p. 61).
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success. However, he recognises the present, only after admitting his own 
debt to past poets:
This theme men of old found a road for traffic;
I too follow it and make it my care.
But the wave that rolls nearest the ship's keel
Is always a m an's first concern. (53-56)
The "wave" here, that which lifts and carries the audience forward, the source 
of the ode, is Alcimidas himself, or, more specifically, his magnificent 
wrestling ability displayed in the Nemean game. Pindar speaks to Alcimidas 
directly "you have added it [glory] to your illustrious race." This remark, so 
pointed and direct—actually calling out the young victor by name—in 
conjunction with the metaphor of a mighty wave, brings out the power of the 
concrete, of the present (most immediately experienced) particular individual 
(or action). Like a great wave, a beautiful action moves people, it can elevate 
and uplift. In doing so, those witnessing it gain a new perspective, they are 
catapulted into new 'territory' from which they can reassess where they have 
been and are now. This overt reference to the individual Alcimidas and the 
analogy of the wave gives each person a new perspective from which to 
reflect on his unique place in the broader world, and in this to recognise the 
power a single action can have. At the same time, as Kurke forcefully argues, 
the victor's transcendent' action is always brought down' and re-connected to 
his family. Only given this reunion does it become accessible and 
meaningful.^
Almost as though anticipating the potential for the growth of insolence and 
hubris given such recognition, Pindar ends the poem praising the skills of the 
victor's trainer, Melesias, who, Pindar claims, is like a "dolphin in the sea." 
Such a graceful and intelligent animal is able to ride the waves (echoing the 
preceding metaphor). He is a necessary part of maintaining the sea's natural 
equilibrium. Equally important is the role of Melesias, as Alcimidas' trainer. 
By providing a habitual and rigorous education, he is able to compose the
64 Ibid. pp. 58ff.
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athlete's brute force into ordered and meaningful action. That is, Melesias 
'channels' Alcimidas raw potentials and natural abilities into a beautiful and 
skilled display of bodily virtue.^^ All hum an 'transcendence', Pindar seems to 
suggest, though coming from an individual, and in its most final and 
complete form, the action of a particular man, depends on a recognised, 
organised, collective strength.^ This strength takes the form of a tradition of 
training, of 'riding' (a wave), though not yet 'steering' oneself, in order to 
bring the individual to his excellence, and without which training, he would 
not have succeeded.
Pindar's reflection on man and his lack of foresight in Nemean VI suggests
another, slightly different human truth. Human excellence cannot depend on
a capacity to predict the future. Such an ability is simply not available to man.
Even a great family like the one of the victor, Alcimidas, does not in itself
ensure a bright future. As inherited excellence is perhaps m an's most assured
claim to an auspicious future, when Pindar doubts even its reliability, the
hum an quest for foreknowledge and certainty is called into question.
A lc im id a s' lin ea g e , th o u g h  u n d en iab ly  extraordinary,^^ is  like:
crop-bearing fields 
which alternate
and at one time give men abundant sustenance 
from the plains,
but at another rest to gather strength (10-12).
The good life for man, his good fortune, is never assured nor is it in any sense 
etemal.68 if any regularity is detectable, it is, like that of seasons and crops, a
Recall the metaphor of the channelled fluid above, and the function of the laws of the 
Aristotelian polis below.
^  This 'collective strength' is derived from a culture of shared values and a general sense of 
reasonableness which serves as the grounding from which the individual feat can extend/fit 
into/depart from.
^^Nisetich cites twenty-four previous victories for the Bassidai (Pindar’s Victory Songs 
Baltimore: 1980, p. 255). However, success seems to skip generations, highlighting the 
variability of even the best "genes."
In P. I, Pindar again underscores the inherent variability in man's fortune and the 
importance of song in providing him with some measure of lasting stability and certainty: 
Only the glory of fame which they leave behind them 
Proclaims men's way of life, when they die.
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cyclical one—hum an beings must work and rest, progress and retreat, always 
aware of their vulnerability to forces outside their control.^^
In comparing hum an life to an agricultural cycle (ostensibly familiar to most 
Greeks), Pindar captures an important and subtle point. The planting, 
growing, and reaping of crops embodies and crystallises an experience which 
involves a limited amount of human control. Through this parallel, he 
highlights the more "animal' side of composite hum an nature. Agriculture 
illustrates m an's intermediate (and ambiguous) level of power, a concrete 
example of regularity which admits to "bumps'. However crucially important 
is the fact that often the obstacles man meets can be managed, not by 20/20 
foresight, "the streams of foreknowledge" Pindar sings, "lie far off", nor from 
a supreme power that prevents them from happening in the first place, but 
rather through different, more human means. Hum an excellence does not lie 
in the capacity to foretell the future with any kind of precision, but much 
more in the astonishing ability to adapt to and shape the present given 
unexpected twists of fate. This adaptability demands that man be responsive 
to and alive in the particular moments of his life. The odes demand this kind 
of attentiveness and sensitivity—full and fruitful experience of them, requires 
reflection and participation. Thus, they act as training for men to be active in 
how they live their own lives.
Underlying m an's adaptability is the recognition that alone he can achieve 
neither success nor can he even derive meaning from his actions. In order to 
be a responsive, deliberate, flourishing agent, man needs to see his particular 
decisions and actions as meaningfully connected.^o This requires that he be 
well habituated within a particular tradition—one which has enough 
organization to provide him with training, which can accommodate the
In history and in song. (91-93)
Pindar uses a similar agricultural metaphor in describing the success of Timodamos in N.II: 
"Timonoos's son shall often reap/The finest harvest of victories" (8-10).
The notion of one's actions being connected in such a way as to form a coherent whole, will 
be discussed below in my chapter on Aristotle's Poetics.
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games, which has a public which values coming together to listen to and 
reflect upon poetic performance. Only with this common, shared, and 
recognised structure can he hope to gain the capacity to reshape and 
'transcend' the seemingly unintelligible/ unmanageable fluctuations inherent 
in his own individual situation.
The realisation that men lack complete control is made less severe in light of 
the subtle reminders from Pindar that they do have some. Through the 
analogy to the commonly experienced and familiar cycles in m an's
relationship to nature, Pindar's audience (and later readers) get an
understanding quite distinct from that imparted by an abstract law or 
principle. Through reference to this common experience, Pindar catches 
nuances that abstract theoretical language, often deliberately severed from 
concrete experience, cannot. Furthermore, the 'cognitive' work necessary to
draw  these connections/to understand the analogies between similar
processes exercises man's reasoning capacity and helps to develop it more 
fully. In comparison to the godly ideal, man may seem impossibly unruly, 
contradictory, and unpredictable. Yet, when seen in light of the experiences 
of his own species, this unpredictability is not a call for despair. Rather it calls 
for closer attention to and engagement with the world man does inhabit, 
working within hum an bounds to find what is possible, and ultimately, 
generating an understanding of what is humanly best.^^ This understanding 
arises only through praxis, in the context of having been trained for excellent 
action (which seems to have formed the basis of Pindar's understanding of 
the aristocracy).
Once again though, we are left in somewhat of a quandary. Where exactly are 
these 'hum an bounds', what is the nature of the 'humanly best'? Can they be
Gentili writes that the hero in Pindar helps man to see this distinctly human balance: "The 
Pindaric hero functions as a paradigm in two ways—both through the positive qualities that 
make him like the gods, and negative ones that distance him from them. Man's destiny may 
be defined in terms of this relationship" (Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece Baltimore: 1988, 
p. 136).
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expressed in abstract laws and principles? Pythean X made clear the fact that 
the consequences of pushing beyond our 'natural' limitations were severe 
and, frankly, dangerous—would not the Greeks then have been better off 
simply accepting who and where they were, leaving any hope of 
'im provem ent' behind as an excessively risky endeavour? Was there no 
access to, much less motivation for progress? These questions, while 
puzzling, lead to an important aspect of hum an nature which underlies 
Pindar's work—man's constant striving/^ Our 'motion' may not be perfect 
and regular like the heavenly bodies, but by our very nature, we do continue 
to move, both physically and intellectually. How then are we to understand 
this movement and what might constrain it?
Again, as seen in Pythian X and the partial analysis of Nemean VI above, we 
m ust remember that hum an 'motion' (i.e., the ability, the freedom, to change 
and progress) is continually and simultaneously pulled in opposite directions. 
On one hand, Alcimidas' victory and Pindar's ode commemorating it work to 
re-invoke the memory of past ancestral glory, thereby reinforcing the bond 
between individual, family and community—all of whom share some 
common history. While I agree with Kurke that such recognition and 
acknowledgement acts to empower and 'refuel' (individual) and cultural 
identity: "The victor's ultimate goal in winning kleos is to bring it home, to set 
it in the house as a renewal of past achievements and an inspiration to future 
glories,"^^ it is also inherently a limiting force. After all, a reminder of the
This striving, it seems to me, is ultimately a striving towards stability. Homblower, writing 
about Thucydides, notes this tendency in language, where he finds that: "the goal of 
descriptive and analytic writing is certainty" {Thucydides Baltimore: 1987, p.l55). But where is 
this stability really located? Of what can human beings be certain? Might we somehow 
harness the certainty of man's curiosity and the accompanying drive (or motion) it produces? 
Such striving might be more "productive" when allied with a discourse which admits to 
"narrative vagueness." Perhaps the ambiguities inherent in Pindar's odes are the perfect 
compliment to a nature which is compelled by and drawn to solving mysteries: " Who can 
doubt that vagueness of a certain enticing sort offers a pleasure all its own: the pleasure, not 
of grasping the inconceivable, but of thinking one's grasp is truly about to close upon it" 
(Harris, J.R. Accidental Grandeur: A Defence of Narrative Vagueness in Ancient Epic Literature 
New York:: 1989, p.3).
Kurke, L. The Traffic in Praise (Ithaca: 1991, p.60).
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value and importance of community, family and tradition, though perhaps 
optimistic and self-affirming, is inherently limited to what has happened in 
the past—it is a strength rooted in conservatism, and thus cannot help but 
constrain pure, free movement. Pindar's odes balance this constraint through 
his deliberate and unqualified praise for the particular action of the victor— 
here, Alcimidas. That is, the concrete manifestation of a physical beauty 
embodied in the observable, particular actions of a uniquely skilled wrestler. 
It is therefore through this concrete act of human beauty—skilled/excellent 
action arising from rigorous training within a particular tradition (which is to 
say, not merely a beautiful body)—that we can, perhaps even, are forced to 
break free from tradition. The awesome, and yet crucially, wholly individual 
human action is that which pierces into new t e r r i t o r y .^ 4
Therefore, we see again the split message of the ode. Alcimidas' victory 
serves a dual purpose for Pindar. On the one hand, he uses it to illuminate 
the past and the importance of belonging to a particular tradition with 
structured practices. The ode brings to light, or perhaps more accurately, 
reminds the audience of the similar victories of his grandfather, and again, his 
great-grandfather before that. Success extends beyond family, and praise is 
given to the community as well, uncovering a (perhaps neglected) sense of 
strength and common, cultural identity. This pattern in the lives of the 
Brassidai clan through analogy to experienced, repeated cycles, delineates a 
kind of logical rhythm in human life. The recurring echoes of success reveal a 
kind of meaningful and continuous narrative, developing a sense of identity 
which, though dynamic, generates stability.
4^ The tension between the freedom of an individual to 'create' his own life, and the fact that 
this freedom is contingent on man being bound to a particular tradition finds a parallel in the 
poet's capacity to 'create', Gentili writes of the debt poets have "to tradition and to the 
achievement of [their] predecessors", whether acknowledged or denied. Poetics, he states, 
should be understood as "heuristic imitation rather than aesthetic creation"—the poet does 
not create from nothing, but rather is free to manipulate creatively the material he has 
available to him in virtue of his experiences, his tradition and culture. This is true even of 
Pindar, who unlike Bacchylides, strains to distinguish himself from his predecessors and 
highlight his 'originality' (Gentili Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece Baltimore: 1988, 
pp,53-55).
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And yet, while this strength, derived from a renewed sense of belonging and 
enduring identity gives meaning and stability to the world, it is also that 
which enables young Alcimidas to go out and push beyond traditional 
bounds (thereby potentially upsetting the stability gained). His effort 
culminates in an action so awesome that it raises the sights of men. It lifts 
them up to "peer' over old boundaries and thus illuminates new horizons of 
possibility. This perspective gives man space (a critical distance) from which 
he can assess things anew.^s Therefore, it is in a sense, the conscious valuing 
of tradition and belonging (within family, community, society, cosmos) which 
provides the force needed to transcend it, and without which it would never have 
occurred. The poem continues to 'w ork' long after the actual action occurred 
because the magnificence of the particular victory is reflected by and retained 
in the language, imagery, context, and style of the ode. Thus, as the words 
and the images they recall are themselves preserved, so too is the capacity to 
gain critical distance from them.
Each new victory the audience enjoys presses further than the previous ones. 
The current victor, Alcimidas, augments the successes of his forefathers: 
"Alcimidas," Pindar sings, "you have added it [glory] to your illustrious 
race" (59-60). Thus his victory has its own important particularity as it 
introduces something new into the family, something is "added." 
Importantly, however, it also serves to reach back and pull the old glory into 
the present. The beauty Alcimidas displays is inspirational in both its utter 
newness and its reinforcement of tradition. As in Pythean X, the newness of 
the present victory is made 'absorbable' by Pindar in part through 
simultaneous references to both the past of the individual family as well as a 
larger past embodied by myth.
Therefore, the particular, personal, concrete act of beauty is that which allows one to use 
the past creatively and prudently without being unduly burdened by it. Importantly, this is 
not in some utterly detached utopian fantasy which might serve to turn attention from the 
here and now, but because the action is both real and beautiful, it encourages a closer 
attention to what man actually experiences and the kinds of deeds of which he is capable.
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All this progress does not come easily, however. Human 'extension' requires 
hard work:
three prize winners
Reached the peak of prowess by tasting of toil.
With good fortune from god
Boxing has proved no other house
To hold more crowns in the heart of all of Hellas. (23-26)^^
Men, unlike gods, must work to reach the heights of excellence. Again,
Pindar reinforces the idea that human excellence exists in man through the
grace of the gods, and only as a mere potential which must be deliberately
realised through concerted effort. In this, man has the freedom to push to his
limits. However, as humans, fallibility is always a possibility. Even Pindar
himself recognises his potential to make a mistake: 'T hope,/in  making this
great claim, to hit the mark head on" (27-28). Pindar's admission of possible
error is significant. It provides the audience, who are not victors, most likely
not members of a prestigious family, and almost certainly not great poets, an
opportunity to recognise and further accept their own fallibility.
Fallibility provides a convenient stopping place for this examination of 
Nemean VI, as it serves as a smooth transition to the next ode I will analyse.
Chapter 5: Olympian V II^
While the theme of fallibility in Olympian VII is most significant for my
purposes here, I want to look briefly at the opening turn of this ode, as its
difference from those considered above is remarkable:
As a man takes in his rich hand a bowl 
Bubbling inside with the wine's dew.
And shall give it
To his daughter's young bridegroom to pledge him
"Without labour," Pindar sings elsewhere, "few find joy" O.X (20-24).
^  For further analysis of O. VII, see Nisetich Pindar's Victory Songs Baltimore: 1980, pp. 110- 
116); Dougherty The Poetics of Colonization: From City to Text in Archaic Greece (Oxford: 1993, 
pp.120-135.); Young, D. Three Odes of Pindar: A Literary Study of Pythian 11, Pythian 3, and 
Olympian 7 (Leiden: 1968); and Gildersleeve Pindar London: 1890, pp. 183-191).
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From one home to another,
-  All of gold, crown of possessions,
Joy of the revel, -  and honours his bridal.
And makes him to be envied before his dear ones 
For his wedding in which two hearts are one. (1-8)
What is distinct about these lines, and what are their repercussions? First, 
note that Pindar does not begin this ode with praise for a particular family, or 
city. Instead, somewhat unexpectedly, he speaks directly of "a man." Such a 
reference is undoubtedly less specific than the opening lines of the odes 
examined above—his words do not point to a single individual. Through the 
use of the indefinite pronoun (tis) Pindar broadens the scope of reference, yet 
not so much as to render it amorphous, unrecognisable, or unidentifiable. 
This "a man" feels honour and envy, joy and love, he makes pledges, and has 
"dear ones"—it is an abstraction that accurately evokes many of the facets of 
what it is to exist as a human being. The abstraction is somehow fluid, its 
imprecision demands effort /  thought, and allows for some creativity and play, 
but is not entirely without form. Indeed, from these words some of Pindar's 
most recognisable themes resonate, for instance, the importance of being a 
welcoming host, of sustaining and respecting a connection to family, and the 
joy of revelling. The words, and the often intangible, and complexly nuanced 
meanings behind them, create an opportunity for the audience to see 
themselves—they can project and connect their own experience to something 
outside them, something common, more formal, and public. And, crucially 
important, this experience and sense of identity is reflected back at them.
Ultimately, "a man" gives way to the concrete individual victor whom Pindar 
has been commissioned to praise in Olympian VII. It is Diagoras, one of the 
most famous boxers in antiquity. Diagoras' talent, not surprisingly, is 
attributed to the gods.^® However, his skill was not simply given to him fully 
formed—it was a potential that he chose to realise through persistent effort
Nisetich writes that Diagorus, as a Dorian, could trace his genealogy back to Zeus {Pindar's 
Victory Songs Baltimore: 1980, p. 110).
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and strenuous labour. Yet even such dedicated hard work, Pindar indicates, 
could not guarantee success. Success, or more generally, hum an excellence, 
he insists depends on continued charis, or fortune. Human dependence on 
charis highlights the contingency and unpredictability of m an's experience: 
"Charis, who makes life blossom, looks with favour/now  upon one man, now 
another"(ll-12).79
A hum an life then, while not wholly determined by, is nevertheless greatly
influenced by deliberate and focused hard work. Because such a life is
defined by the relationship between fluctuating external circumstances, and
equally variable internal potential and individual choice, it is inherently
unpredictable and indeterminate. This results in an openness that makes
hum an beings prone to, or at the very least, capable of making mistakes:
But about the minds of humans hang
numberless errors, and it is impossible to discover
what now and also in the end is best to happen to a man. (25-26)
As m an's future is uncertain, he acts freely (to the extent his nature allows)
and thus, he has a degree of choice in terms of the course his life will take.
Inevitably, some of those choices lead him into unexpected hardship. The
choices that result in difficulties, those that take him 'off track' illustrate his
fallibility. However, in Olympian VII, fallibility is not seen solely in terms of
man, but is viewed from both levels of the cosmos, divine and human.
As one might expect, Pindar embeds this issue in a blend of m yth and history. 
The history he recounts flows backwards, beginning with the colonisation of 
Rhodes (the homeland of Diagorus), back to the birth of the goddess Athena, 
bom  there out of the head of Zeus, and culminating with the actual birth of 
the island. Each step in this reverse chronological sequence embodies 
mistakes and their repercussions at a divine level. However, the fact that
As discussed above, the metaphor of "blossoming" ties man to the natural world, and 
suggests his ephemeral and fragile nature. Additionally, the personification of charis reveals a 
style that makes abstract concepts more human.
44
gods can and, in fact, often do make mistakes does not necessarily lead to 
destructive consequences—at times they even yield unexpected yet 
undeniably good results.
Helios, for instance, having missed the 'meeting' during which Zeus divided
up the earth's land among the gods, is none the poorer for his absence (his
'mistake'). Helios does not passively bemoan his fate, nor does he angrily
demand a redistribution of land:
And Helios was absent—no one assigned him a portion, 
he was left without a place, 
even he, the sacred god.
At his complaint
Zeus would have cast the lots a second time 
but Helios forbade it (55-60, Nisetich)
Instead, Helios claims possession of a newly emerging island—Rhodes—seen
by him as it "grew from the watery sea." Thus, despite his failure to attend
the important divine event (which might have been construed as an
irrecoverable error), he perseveres and uses the error as an opportunity—
given nature's creation, Helios himself can create. He directs his mind not to
regret about his error, but elsewhere—he is attentive to and engages w ith the
present moment which reveals to him the possibility of creating a new,
hitherto unforeseen good.
But what does this say to man? What does it tell him about his life and the 
errors he makes? If we now recall man's dependence on charis, we are 
reminded of man's indeterminacy, his vulnerability to chance, and the 
possibility of error that arises from it. Perhaps 'experiencing' divine error and 
its good repercussions through the ode works as a model demonstrating a 
way that man can view his mistakes, allowing him to see that he can adapt (at 
least sometimes) and turn them to his own benefit in the end. Error might be 
conceived not as something entirely or necessarily adverse, but rather as a 
deviation from a norm /pattern that has grown out of the past, perhaps one 
about which there has not been much reflection. Breaking free from such a 
norm /pattem  might open up new possibilities, unknown before the 'error'
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dem anded reflection. As mistakes are something inevitable to hum an nature, 
they should not be seen as irreversibly negative actions, but lapses or 
diversions which can both shape and be shaped by man. Given this view, 
m an's aim should be not the futile task of eliminating error altogether, but 
instead working to develop ways of 'correcting' them and, as much as 
possible, adapting to them profitably as they emerge.
But all this seems only moderately plausible, or at least is only half the 
message. Surely man cannot hope to have the good luck Helios does. Nor 
does it seem likely that Pindar's message is simply: "Look around, whatever 
you've done, it's not so bad!" Men make mistakes—grave ones which have 
terrible consequences—and it seems ludicrous that Pindar would be 
attempting here to deny or somehow gloss over that fact. Perhaps a closer 
look at the way Pindar tells these myths will illuminate other possible 
meanings.
In recounting the history and praising the city of Rhodes, Pindar does 
something interesting—he 'revises' the more traditional stories about it.®° He 
works to 'adjust' accounts which have been mis-told by others in the past. 
Thus, Pindar himself corrects human mistakes in this ode—he aims to "set 
straight from the start" (21) various misconceptions people have.^^
Following this bold declaration, he proceeds with two major 'revisions'. The 
first has to do with the murder of Lykymnios, killed by Tlapolemos, founder 
of Rhodes. In the Iliad, Tlapolemos is described as "huge and mighty," a 
"spear-tamed leader" who "sacked many cities of god-supported fighters." 
This description does not awaken a sense of pity or compassion. Hom er's 
words suggest that the murder of Lykymnios was a deplorable act: "he
^  For other examples of Pindar's 'revisions', see his treatment of Ajax in N.8, as well as that of 
Neoptolemos in N.7. For a useful discussion of this practice, see Gentili Poetry and Its Public in 
Ancient Greece Baltimore: 1988, pp. 139ff.).
This 'correcting', we wiU see, is a project for Thucydides as well (e.g., his more accurate' 
account of the story of Hippias and Hipparchus).
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[Tlapolemos] struck to death his own father's beloved uncle [Lykmnios]...a
man already ageing." After committing this shameful deed, Tlapolemos is
portrayed as a "fugitive," a man of "great m i s f o r t u n e . The picture Pindar
paints in Olympian VII is strikingly different:
In Tiryns once, this city's founder, 
furious, with a club
of gnarled olive wood battered to death
Alkmena's bastard brother
Likymnios, as he came from Medea's room.
Disturbance of mind has turned 
even a wise man astray. (28-31, Nisetich)
The m urder, though explicitly referenced, is presented as an act committed in
(justified?) retribution—at its very worst, it is the result of a "disturbance of
mind," which, Pindar asserts immediately: "turn even the wise man astray."
Tlapolemos is not the malevolent fugitive described by Homer, but "the
founder of this land." Pindar takes great care to let Tlapolemos off the hook,
effectively saying that one mad act does not define or determine a m an's
character.®^
Pindar's second 'revision' has to do with the source of the great artistic skill
attributed to the Rhodians. Popular belief attributed this skill to the
Telchines, cunning magicians—or, less euphemistically, a group lacking in
moral standing. In Olympian VII, Pindar suggests a different source of the
Rhodian skill—it is due, he sings to his audience, to Athena, great goddess of
the arts and native to the island:
The bright-eyed goddess [Athena] gave them 
all art, to outshine mankind in the yield 
of their hands' skill. (50-53, Nisetich)
^^The Iliad (Book H, 653-670), trans. Lattimore, R.
Dougherty remarks on Tlepolemos' posthumous "purification," his visit to Apollo's oracle, 
and notable transformation from murderer to "colonial founder to civic hero " Diagorus, he 
writes, by association has "similar powers to confer on his city " {The Poetics of Colonization 
Oxford: 1993, pp. 125-126). All this indicates, among other things, the complex identitiesa of 
individuals, their power to change, to be shaped not by one action, but by a life time of 
actions. Aristotle, we will see, makes a similar point regarding the judgement of man's 
character.
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W hat then to make of these revisions? While one could claim that Pindar was 
a shameless sycophant, (a "toady," according to one scholar), and that his 
revisions served merely to charm and please his wealthy hosts, such an 
explanation seems thin and superficial. After all, it is likely that the audience 
was not solely made up of Rhodians, and furthermore, as himself the 
composer of the ode, Pindar could have avoided these rather 'uncomfortable' 
topics altogether. That he deliberately brought these issues up, and explicitly 
changed them seems significant.
Pindar suggests through his corrections that man, over time, has distorted, or 
somehow misinterpreted events. In Olympian VII, Nisetich indicates that 
Pindar's accounts are alternatives to well-known stories.^ The audience is then 
placed in an interesting position. Each must think about the source of this 
information. That is to say, experiencing the ode, listening to its words and 
conjuring up the images it recalls, demands that participants weigh and value 
differing, perhaps conflicting messages. Do they accept the words of the poet 
in front of them, or do they, on the other hand, maintain the validity of a 
different, previously held account? What does one do upon encountering the 
brute fact of this kind of seemingly irreconcilable conflict?
Again then, the ode itself distills an experience common in hum an life—the 
uncomfortable, unsettling, and highly de-stabilising effect of conflicting 
'facts', or interpretations of facts which directly oppose one another.^s What 
can we make of the fact that Pindar actively creates such a condition? To 
what extent might he have been encouraging the Rhodians to redefine 
themselves as they pleased? Can man freely pick and choose his history? (Or, 
for that matter, his present reality?) This extreme interpretation, I believe, is 
not one the words in the ode endorse. However, through his revisions.
^  Nisetich emphasizes that the story was told by Homer, implying its renown (Pindar's 
Victory Songs Baltimore: 1980, p, 110).
^  For more on this issue -  specifically how the inherent flexibility in myths allows for, and 
even encourages fruitful discourse, and hopefully resolution, see Myth and the Polis, ed. Pozzi 
and Wickersham (Ithaca: 1991, esp. Ch. 1).
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Pindar again indicates man's limited freedom. Without doubt, Pindar presents 
alternatives that do not correspond to more traditional accounts, however 
they are not pulled blindly out of thin air. They are reasonable alternatives, 
where reasonable implies an acute awareness of his circumstances, a common 
body of knowledge based on attentive experience which provides some 
grounds for justification of his proposed changes. Such experience reveals 
that man can choose, within limits, how he defines and understands himself. 
Pindar's stories in Olympian VII are not those of Homer, but belong to 
another legitimate, if perhaps lesser known tradition. Remembering this 
tradition with its more positive description of their past could have reinforced 
a sense of identity that cultivated a sense of empowerment. We cannot, 
Pindar suggests, be anything, but, within what we are, we have some choice, 
and it is attentive, guided experience which allows us to discern choices and 
reasonably act on them.
Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks
In attempting to capture something of the experience of 
being alive, the words themselves must be alive. Words, 
when living and breathing are like musical chords. The full 
resonance of the chord or phrase must be allowed to be 
heard in all of its suggestive imprecision. We must attempt 
in our use of language in...our theory making...to be the 
makers of music, not the players of notes.®^
Thomas Ogden, though speaking here of psychoanalytic theory, makes a 
relevant point about political thought as well. All language that seeks to 
express an understanding of human experience, as political theory must, 
should be somehow alive. "Alive" here implies a theory which recognises and 
integrates the details of the concrete and particular moment at hand. This 
requires that theorisers develop an ability to be attentive to the complexity 
and richness of this moment, rather than to attempt to reduce it to a lifeless, 
'neutral' abstraction. A 'living' theory must have 'space' to incorporate the
Reverie and Interpretation (New Jersey: 1997, pp.4-5).
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unique and relevant aspects of an individual life, and the théoriser m ust be 
prepared (i.e., trained or habituated) to used this "space' reasonably and 
c re a tiv e ly S im u lta n e o u s ly , political theory must reveal the continuity 
which exists between discreet moments in a life so as to disclose the way this 
particular, inimitable life is not only a whole in itself, but also more generally, 
a human one. These two aspects of life, the individual moments, and the 
meaning which arises out of their coherent unification, echo the relationship 
between man and the larger community and tradition in which he is raised 
and lives—alone, the decisions and actions of one man are incomprehensible. 
It is only in the context of common, recognised practices that an individual 
life becomes intelligible. Theory thus must be capable of reconciling both 
these aspects of hum an life, which at times appear to be mutually exclusive. 
The words which describe and explain the "human condition" have to retain a 
certain elasticity, and inherent in this flexibility is imprecision. This 
imprecision however, does not mean ethics and politics rely on careless 
argumentation and confused logic. The imprecision necessary to political 
theory becomes precise in its application—it leads to deliberate choice and 
concrete action. Given this, when reading Pindar (or poetry as theory in 
general), we cannot be passive users of language. This is too often the case 
with some "modem" political theory, which has come to rest (to a large extent) 
on the mechanical manipulation of fixed, immutable terms. Language that 
makes no claim to this kind of definitive certainty, on the other hand, 
demands a different kind of interaction and participation.
As I hope to have made clear in the discussion above, Pindar's odes often 
contain language which is elliptical, enigmatic, perhaps even deliberately 
obscure. The images and metaphors he invokes do not always sit 
harmoniously side by side, guaranteeing immediate comprehension or easy 
reading (listening). The elusiveness of the odes themselves at once mirrors
The capacity to theorise given a theory which is imprecise is not an irmate ability. Man 
develops it given broad guided experience and reflection. This is why Aristotle thought that 
youth should not study ethics and politics. (This issue is discussed in more detail below.)
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the fleeting quality of human life, and through this reflection of experience, it 
simultaneously creates an experience. The ambiguity of Pindar's words, the 
flexibility of language he employs is alluring. The simultaneous obscurity 
and familiarity of the odes incites curiosity and invites active participation on 
the part of the reader (listener),®® the reward of which is a renewed, and 
expanded sense of identity. Through a continued oscillation between poles of 
certainty and uncertainty—death and life, traditional myth and the present 
moment, common practice/inherited customs and the individual—Pindar 
accesses something universally human, though not in the form of a certain 
and fixed abstraction.
But w hat is this 'hum an thing' that he accesses, and through what capacity? 
Is it more than individual passion directed at particular (arbitrary) desire? 
Are his odes based on the untenable concept of 'intuition'? How does he 
ground 'theory' so as to avoid floating subjectivity and relativism? The 
escape comes through the experience of the ode itself which I have argued 
demands that the audience (reader) weigh diverse ideas, connect and 
integrate new and old beliefs, test and reflect on the web of beliefs that guide 
a particular community. This work grounds this mode of discourse and makes 
it not mechanical means-to-end reasoning, but more than flighty emotive 
nonsense. The experience generated by the odes with their integration of the 
individual and the common, does not give us external objectivity, an 
Archimedean point of pure Reason, but rather a sense of reasonableness, where 
the objectivity needed to make reasonable judgements and evaluations arises 
out of the actually doing it within a tradition of practices.
The odes Pindar composed, through both their style and language as well as 
their substantive content, worked to re-enforce traditions, to stress the
®® John Heath explores the effect of ambiguity on an audience, specifically, when the 
distinction between man and animal becomes obscured: "the blurring of distinctions between 
human and animal.. .produces the desire for critical analysis and systematizing of the 
resulting order," "Disentangling the Beast" Journal of Hellenic Studies 119 (1999: p.20).
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importance of family and community, and to renew the norms and values 
they endorsed. Man saw his place, as a kind of creature, in the larger cosmic 
order. By invoking and re-examining past traditions, and triggering 
memories which became part of a larger cultural consciousness, the odes 
succeeded in cultivating and sustaining a meaningful moral 'infrastructure' in 
the present based on a sense of how societies were presently structured and 
what had been understood as reasonable in the past. The vivid cultural and 
historical images manifested in the odes were a familiar framework, 
illustrating what humans had been capable of and through this, developing a 
reasonable sense of the kinds of possibilities men might have open to them 
now and in the future. Through (guided) exposure to actually realised 
hum an potential, active critical reflection could generate a general sense of the 
'human-ness' which continued to evolve through further reflection and 
ongoing discourse. This 'hum an' identity revealed, among other things, the 
limited nature of m an's freedom, which can be actualised by creative action 
firmly grounded in the sense of reasonableness derived from experience 
gained through living in a polis, and participating in its culture (literature, art, 
history) and practices (laws, education).
Ultimately however, the odes did more than just reinforce old customs—their 
structure, language and imagery (ideally) enabled the active audience 
member to gain distance from the traditions into which he was raised, 
allowing him to reflect on, and extend his 'horizons' of his thought. By 
securing man with a sense of structure and belonging—a sense of 
reasonableness—the odes enabled him to act creatively. Descriptions of some 
of the things man had been helped to illuminate a range of things he could be. 
This broad framework based on a balance of past and future, reason and 
creativity, infused the human world with meaning, a precondition for 
deliberate choice and action. Thus, through poetry, Pindar created an 
experience which served to both illuminate m an's world and to train him to 
be reasonable and creative given the kind of being he is.
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Thus, the conception of man that emerges through Pindar's odes was an 
embodiment (and even a celebration) of the coexistence of opposites—man 
was both the vessel for tradition, continuity, and the sense of reasonableness 
they provided, as well as the instrument for innovation and creativity 
(themselves dependent on the existence of the former). Understanding how 
these two elements come together to guide an active hum an life is the 
foundation of political theory, and will emerge again below in Parts II and III, 




In the previous chapter I explored how the conception of man, understood as a 
being suspended between god and beast, was manifested in a selection of 
Pindar's epinician odes. The discussion began with the premise that given such 
a position (or, from a slightly different angle, given this 'compound' nature), man 
finds himself in a contingent and indeterminate world, Pindar depicts the 
human world as essentially dynamic, where any order or regularity was under 
constant threat of interference by gods or chance (tuche). As both chance and 
divine actions were often indecipherable in terms of human logic and reason, 
man's world could offer him no guarantees—events could be likely or probable, 
but never certain. However, even in the midst of this 'flux', there did exist a 
certain stability; for instance, recurring cycles in nature and the inherited values 
from those traditions into which man was acculturated. Thus, for Pindar, the 
world of man, like man himself, had a complex, and at times seemingly illogical 
and contradictory, nature.
The world that emerges from Pindar's odes, though perhaps unpredictable, is 
not without structure. The odes illuminate a natural hierarchy (an ordered 
kosmos), and disclose man's distinct, yet variable place within it. This variability 
makes man's nature intrinsically indeterminate, and requires that he actively 
work to sustain the structure of his world, and in doing so, both acknowledge 
and respect the 'larger' order of the kosmos. This meant, for instance, observing 
and using the natural cycles to his advantage, e.g., developing agricultural 
practices to correspond effectively with the seasons. However the structure did 
not end with the natural world, that is, the 'natural hierarchy' itself indicated a 
moral/political structure, so that the two spheres were in some sense, fused. 
This conflation of the natural and political demanded that man participate in the 
customs and practices of family and community. In short, man had to habituate 
himself to his culture's traditions, to live by the laws of his city. He had to
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actively engage in the "training' his society provided (i.e., both its moral and 
physical praxeis: paideia and gymnasia). For Pindar, part of what this 
comprehensive education entailed was honouring one's 'noble ancestors', and, 
more broadly speaking, acknowledging a debt to the immortal gods who 
bestowed certain bloodlines with excellence.
Given this, the individual (exemplified by the athlete in Pindar) takes on a 
complex role. Praise of a particular victor became a vehicle for a broader object 
of glorification—that is, of the athlete's family and the culture which nurtured 
him. Of course, such praise finally made its way back to the gods, who were 
ultimately responsible for the potential excellence dormant in all noble lineages. 
In this, the victor himself was never praised, and in fact could not he understood, in 
isolation. Rather Pindar always placed him (and his success) in a larger context, 
or again, a 'cosmic order'. The odes reinforced this "order" and in doing so, 
facilitated man's education, or perhaps more accurately, they were an essential 
part of iO  The performance of an epinician ode created an experience which 
stimulated and secured a conscious and shared cultural memory, one which 
strengthened and further cultivated tradition and reinforced a god-given order 
(which, not surprisingly, was often the order accepted by and benefiting the 
elite). This memory secured for man a sense of pride and identity, giving both 
him and his world continuity and stability, while at the same time, deflecting his 
persistent hubristic tendencies by reminding him of his (relatively small) place in 
the cosmos.
However, the odes did not work solely to discredit man as an individual—it was, 
after all, the individual athlete who prompted the composition in the first place.
I^n his book, Thucydides, J.H.Finley points out that the notion of the poet as teacher permeated 
other genres of Greek culture, see for example, Aristophanes' Frogs, line 1054 (Cambridge: 1963, 
p.39). Even in Sparta, a culture not traditionally associated with a thriving "art culture" we see 
the importance of poetry, see, Plutarch's "Life of Lycurgus" (IV.3). Richard Martin expands on 
the role of the poet in "The Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom" in Cultural Poetics in Archaic 
Greece (eds. Kurke and Dougherty, Oxford: 1998 pp. 108-131).
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Nor did the odes, in calling upon tradition, simply reinforce the status quo. The 
victors, whose actions Pindar elaborately praised, revealed a world of new and 
genuine possibility, of hitherto unrealised human potential. The individual feats 
glorified in the odes invoked a sense of awe in those watching, they illuminated 
and extended man's previously accepted limitations. By embedding the athlete's 
concrete display of beauty in the familiar form of the ode, the once exceptional 
action became accessible to the audience. In connecting the 'new' (i.e., the 
extraordinary, unprecedented deed) with the 'old' (i.e., the familiar structure of 
the ode and its content of praise for a mighty tradition and culture), man was 
simultaneously inspired and empowered. The strength imparted by a renewed 
sense of (abstract) identity, a sense of belonging, strengthened man, making it 
possible for him to access and use the (concrete) action. While newly illuminated 
'choices' might, on their own, 'destabilise' man's sense of who he is, in the 
context of an ode, change and growth became an unthreatening (or at least less 
threatening) possibility—even more, an essential part of what it is to be human. 
Because this expanded range of human potential was made in a public setting, 
and appealed to a common tradition, man was better able to see and experiment 
with the choices before him in his own life, to take advantage of his own limited 
flexibility and freedom. This is not, of course, to say that the actual 
accomplishment of each victor was suddenly possible for the physically (or, for 
that matter, economically) average audience member. Rather, when captured in 
an ode, each magnificent athletic achievement was transformed into a kind of 
practical tool, allowing and encouraging the members of the audience to 'stretch' 
themselves to greater lengths.
In this, the deed of the victorious athlete became a model or exemplar, which 
helped to bridge the gap between individual and human standards (where 
'standard' is not understood as simply the feat itself, but more broadly, the 
capacity for change without loss of identity). The odes both praised and inspired 
virtuous, beautiful actions. But, crucially important, it was only because the
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actions were put in a recognisable context that they became "useable'. They 
cultivated not an unrealistic, anything-is-possible attitude, but a reasonable sense 
of progress that was appropriate to man's own species^ In summary then, Pindar's 
odes sought to secure in man a reasonable and humbling sense of identity, yet 
one which was in no way stagnant. The odes did not engender complacency. In 
fact, quite the contrary—the very act of 'fixing' man's identity in a tradition and 
larger order of which he felt both proud and an important part, gave him the 
security and stability which enabled him to see, consider, and (ideally) to stretch 
himself beyond his own prior limitations and those of his predecessors. The 
newly illuminated range of possibilities the athlete displayed at once revealed 
the inherent human indeterminateness together with a sense of the kinds of 
opportunities such 'imprecision' made possible. The odes gave man a sense of 
his ability to grow, they encouraged (guided) experimentation and action. They 
allowed him to see and better understand (through a kind of indirect experience) 
his own kind of excellence. The abstract sense of his species' identity (which 
grew out of belonging to a tradition) served in some sense as the conditions for 
man's agency in the present. Ultimately, Pindar's odes suggested that man had 
the stability and strength necessary to excel further beyond what he knew, but 
that he should always strive and extend himself only so far as his species allowed 
and defined.
These (outwardly) divergent commitments further highlight man's peculiar 
condition, specifically, the tension between his potential for growth and change, 
and his need for stability and continuity (this is related to the desire to be an 
discrete individual, and the need to be part of a group in order to realise oneself 
as an individual). Pindar's poetry acknowledged the fragile relationship
2 It is important to note here that 'progress' for Pindar (most likely) meant a strengthening of or 
movement towards the embodiment of recognised aristocratic values and practices (which is, I 
suspect, the reason he is often deemed elitist—though I believe that this is a potentially 
misleading term. If one takes "aristocratic" literally, Pindar might be understood as encouraging 
man to be his best). This is quite unlike today, when the (Western) notion of political progress has 
become inextricably linked to the development of 'democratic' forms of government (in name, at 
least).
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between these two, and recognised the importance of each as an essential part of 
what it is to be human. Rather than trying to suppress either man's capacity for 
change, growth, progress, and individuality, or his need for identity, stability, 
consistency, and sense of belonging, Pindar attempted to harmonise the two.
In Part II of this dissertation, I want to explore some of the same issues, but this 
time through the work of Thucydides. Therefore, as above, I will pursue several 
different lines of inquiry. The most immediately pressing task will be to 
untangle from his complex narrative a more fully developed view of Thucydides' 
understanding of man (presented until now through the lens of Pindar and the 
epinician ode). How does the History of the Peloponnesian War invoke a similar 
conception of man—i.e., as a being between god and animal? Just as Pindar's 
odes revealed an image of natural order or hierarchy—a kosmos—I will argue 
that Thucydides' text too presupposes such a hierarchy, and given it, suggests a 
distinct understanding of human freedom. He presents a conception of human 
freedom which is 'larger' than that implied by Pindar, yet of an entirely different 
nature than many modem accounts. With a better understanding of man and his 
peculiar kind of freedom, the next endeavour will be to clarify the way in which 
Thucydides' conception of man informs and shapes how we might best theorise 
effectively about politics.^
The issue of genre is of some importance in allowing the reader access to 
Thucydides' understanding of man. With Pindar, we saw that the form of 
poetry, specifically publicly performed poetry, played a large role in his message 
and its accessibility. His odes reflected certain aspects of the human experience 
and in doing so, created an experience to be shared by his audience. The odes 
depicted man as simultaneously noble and beautiful, and vulnerable and weak—
3 Part of what this will entail is thinking about the kind of community needed for this particular 
model of the human being to flourish (where flourishing implies the realisation of the capacity to 
see choices, to deliberate reasonably about them, to choose makes choices, and finally, to act 
creatively given the specific details of one's situation).
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that is, at his most godlike and his most animal. Experiencing, actively 
participating in the ode meant reconciling this juxtaposition of opposites (an 
exercise which undermined traditional or scientific logic—man is simultaneously 
good and bad, free and constrained because of his nature). Ideally, this was an 
activity in which a group of people with different (and at times, competing) 
needs, interests, and concerns was obliged to take part. In examining 
Thucydides, we need to ask how might a written, and most likely, privately read 
history of a war generate and make accessible a similar understanding of man, 
and how might such an understanding be used to shape/effect, and possibly 
cultivate an more active role for political theory for citizens in a polis?^
The structure of the present chapter, therefore wül be divided into roughly three 
sections. To begin, I will give some background on the History itself in order to 
place Thucydides, to the extent it is possible, in a socio-historical context.^ With 
this in place, I will examine a selection of episodes in Thucydides' History with 
an aim to fleshing out some of the basic characteristics of man as conceived by 
Thucydides, keeping in mind what this conception implies about political theory 
specifically, how it might benefit from a history such as this. That is to say, I will 
examine how Thucydides' History might be not merely descriptive, but 
normative as well. How does it aid political theory in its capacity to enlighten 
and empower 'man,' conceived specifically in terms of his ability to see the
 ^Moles argues that Thucydides' concept of truth "was becoming something much more complex 
than factual truth." As he was not simply recording the particular and specific facts of the war, 
but presenting it in such a way as to capture both "specific truth and general truth," the language 
and structure of his text became more subtly nuanced and, more complicated ("Truth and 
Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides " from Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World eds, GUI and 
Wiseman Exeter: 1993, pp. 106ff). To untangle and derive meaning from Thucydides' narrative 
then, demands active participation on the part of the reader, who likely would be able to identify 
with/recognise some of the character types and events he represents. For other discussions of 
Thucydides' style, and the purpose such a dense and complex written history might serve, see 
Crane, G. Thucydides and The Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley: 1998, pp. 294ff.); Kitto Poiesis (Berkeley: 
1966, pp. 349ff).
5 In doing this, I do not mean to imply that his ideas are relevant only to his particular 'moment' 
in history. However, especially in light of Thucydides' attempt to be an "objective" observer and 
reporter, a sense of his time will help to tease out some of his unstated biases, influences, and 
values.
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possibilities before him, to deliberate reasonably about them, and finally, to 
facilitate acting on the choices he makes.
Chapter 2: Thucydides' History o f the Peloponnesian War^
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War extends back to the earliest stages of 
Greek civilization, though all but 21 years of this rich past are summarised 
succinctly in the first of eight books. While he highlights in some detail the 50 
years following the Persian invasions and preceding the Peloponnesian War— 
the "Pentecontaetia" (I.89-I.118)—the majority of this awesome work focuses on 
the years spanning from 431-411BC, documenting "the greatest war there has 
ever been."^ Though the more distant events in Greek history are only briefly 
sketched out, it is worth noting that the momentous and often brutal conflict 
between Athens and Sparta is scrutinised by Thucydides only after he embeds it, 
as best he can,® in its broader historical context.^
 ^AU quotations from Thucydides' History are from Blanco's translation (New York: 1998), unless 
otherwise noted.
 ^Although the war between Athens and Sparta lasted from 431BC-404BC, Thucydides' narrative 
ends abruptly at the close of his eighth book, mid-winter in 411BC, with the sacrifice at Ephesus. 
There has been much debate among scholars as to why his History is incomplete and if it 
nonetheless forms a unified whole. But as theses issues are not relevant to my present analysis, I 
WÜ1 not explore them here.
® Thucydides makes it clear in his opening chapter that a precise and accurate history of the 
distant past is an impossibility: "Because of the amount of time that has gone by, I have been 
unable to obtain accurate information about the period that preceded the war or about epochs in 
the stUl more distant past." (I.l) This highlights his conviction that man can only reaUy know 
what he has himself actuaUy experienced at the time in which he Uved (an understanding that 
prevailed in both the middle ages, and later with Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History trans. Nisbet, Cambridge: 1975).
’ One might note here a resemblance to Pindar, who, though working in a different medium, also 
took care to place his subject (i.e., the victor) in a larger context, which often extended back 
generations. Thucydides' relationship to ancient' history is more compUcated. Despite voicing 
disdain for the way it had traditionaUy been reported (i.e., with no concerted attempt for factual 
accuracy), and an acute suspicion about its reliance on "fabulous" stories and myths, Thucydides 
does nonetheless take care to retell some ancient' Greek history (and such references are not only 
in the initial (possibly "earlier") chapters (e.g., further mention of the more distant and personally 
unexperienced past occurs again at: VI.2-6). Clearly, such events were important in some way at 
some point for Thucydides. Parry argues that Thucydides' concern for distant events, though 
perhaps central to his more youthful thought, dwindles after his experience of the war, so 
absolute émd massive was the path of its destruction ("Thucydides' Historical Perspective" in 
Yale Classical Studies 22,1973). His experience of the upheaval in his own time. Parry suggests, 
was so personally overwhelming and disillusioning, that it dwarfed the events of earlier history, 
and made them important only insofar as they culminated in those which he personally
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In the first book, however, Thucydides gives more than a concise review of the 
events which culminated in the war he goes on to describe (and in fact himself 
took part in). In a series of remarkably revealing chapters (1.20-1.23), he lays out 
both a critique of his predecessors, and an outline of his ambitious intentions. 
These chapters reveal a man with a passionate concern for reporting ""the facts,"' 
and a heightened sense of responsibility to his ""serious" readers. He emphasises 
the validity of his project through reference to his rigorous method—the History 
did not flow effortlessly onto the page, Thucydides" process demanded from him 
considerable toil and effort. The account he leaves, Thucydides claims, is 
presented only after meticulously examining and extracting material "from the
experienced. Thucydides' dismissive treatment of the distant past, and his confidence in the 
importance of his own time serves to amplify not only the magnitude of the Peloponnesian War, 
but also his own limited viewpoint. As an active participant in the events he describes, 
Thucydides was unable to achieve substantial reflective distance on those events. However, far 
from devaluing his work, this is a privileged position, one which gives his readers a distinct, 
inimitable insight into the distant past. Thucydides is Hegel's quintessential "original historian." 
His distinguished position as a general in a politically and socially structured polis like Athens 
gives him a voice which necessarily expresses the "spirit" of his time: "the substance of his 
narrative and of his own culture and consciousness are in equal measure the substance and 
consciousness of those words he renders" (Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. 
Nisbet Cambridge: 1975, p.l4). Thucydides' words, the events he selected and chose to describe 
all reflect a particular time and, if indirectly, its peculiar way of assigning value and significance.
It is in these introductory chapters that Thucydides first makes his own presence explicit. 
Though obviously 'present' throughout as the author of the text, his primary aim is to provide an 
account of "the facts," keeping his personality (and often, his own generalisations and 
conclusions) out of it. This makes Thucydides' detailed representation of men and their actions 
an immediate, almost "living" account of the war. His appearance at I.l is, of course, easily 
explained—this is the introduction to his unprecedented project. However, this direct self­
reference is noteworthy in that it is juxtaposed to what is perhaps the most general, detached 
analysis in his work (i.e., Thucydides' account of the events of ancient Greek history). In Book V, 
at the "second preface," Thucydides again emerges, reintroduces himself, and proceeds to give 
another general sketch of events. Thucydides' appearance during these 'summarising' moments 
is significant because through them, the reader sees the individual in stark contrast to the general. 
It sets up an experience in which the reader 'views' simultaneously a distinct man opposed to a 
more detached, abstract account of events. Thus, if unintentionally, Thucydides prevents his 
readers from any illusion of a 'neutral' standpoint in the face of abstract generalisations. Rather 
we step into his shoes—we experience the war as Thucydides, the particular reporter, did. He is 
our access into the facts, his initial appearance creates (and halfway through, again re-establishes) 
an inherently personal framework—in this case, a framework from the perspective of 'a someone' 
who is acculturated in a way to see events as a member of a particular 'class' (and, according to 
Hegel, Thucydides' class is the historically significant/representative class). It is then from this 
'partial' viewpoint that the reader must place and understand the string of 'facts' that follow.
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best available evidence" (1.21) and often "with difficulty...going over each event 
in as much detail as possible" (1.22).^ ^
And Thucydides does not disappoint. Any arrogance one might detect in these 
introductory statements is almost surely forgiven after reading his staggering 
account of the war. Thucydides works systematically and painstakingly— 
"passionately"—leaving his readers an historical account like no other. Yet, 
Thucydides gives nothing away. A solid understanding of how he fleshes out 
his conception of man demands more than a mere passive reading of the History; 
it requires rigorous analysis. Like Pindar's odes, Thucydides' History requires 
his audience's (in this case, the reader's) active participation.
In what then do we, as reader's, participate? What is the nature of Thucydides' 
work? As he insists (provocatively) that his text will be "useful" (ophelima), even 
of "permanent value" {ktema te es aeï), this question is relevant to my present 
investigation. After all, knowing what is useful, or what will be of enduring 
value to man surely presupposes an understanding of what kind of being he is. 
Before looking at the nature of the text itself, let us look first at the background 
against which Thucydides wrote. In order to fruitfully explore the questions 
raised above, a general sense of the 'climate' during which Thucydides wrote 
will be useful, if only to get a sense of the 'raw materials' available to him.^^ Was 
he, for example, influenced by the sophists' lively debates on moral issues? Is his 
History akin to the tragedies which flourished during his lifetime? That is, does it
" Thucydides again references his method in the "second preface" at V.26—again, using it to 
stress the reliability of his account. However, even given these confident guarantees of accuracy, 
Thucydides is not at all clear about just what his rigorous method entails. What criteria does he 
use to separate fact from fiction given the enormous and varied body of data from which he 
worked? Given this crucial omission as to his actual method of distinguishing and selecting only 
the 'valid' evidence, the reader is again reminded that Thucydides' narratives is very much his 
own. Therefore, however 'factual' it may seem, it is ultimately the product of a particular 
viewpoint embedded in a particular place, at a particular time in history. This is not to call it 
'subjective', rather the History represents a 'particular' viewpoint as a cultural/status perspective 
of what is believable/plausible and what is not.
For a helpful and insightful discussion on Thucydides' language, see: Parry, A. "Thucydides' 
Use of Abstract Language" in The Language of Achilles and Other Papers (Oxford: 1989, pp.177-194).
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weave together individual lives, developing "characters' with personal motives, 
particular needs and desires? Or, is it on the other hand, more like a scientific or 
medical treatise, reporting facts to be used to generate the fundamental abstract 
laws and principles that govern human behaviour?
Chapter 3: The History's Historical and Intellectual Context
"...it can be said of Greek thought that it derived on the one 
hand from observation, not from dogma, but on the other 
hand from observation of experience, not scientific 
observation.
The Athens of Thucydides' day was marked by upheaval and change. There 
was, of course, the kinesis that was the war itself, yet Athens was also 
experiencing a distinct shift in intellectual atmosphere. Very broadly speaking, 
prose writing and oratory were emerging as important and effective media for 
public discourse. Writing on Thucydides' use of language. Parry claims that it is 
towards the end of the fifth century that "prose begins to replace poetry as the 
most serious vehicle of thought."!'* That which had previously been almost 
exclusively the domain of poetry—cosmological doctrines, state constitutions, 
works dealing with moral issues—came to be a matter of public debate, and 
displayed a new 'rational' s t r u c t u r e . i^  This new prose made extensive use of 
abstract concepts, and was conspicuously lacking in allusions to "the divine 
element." The repercussions of this shift were enormous in terms of the Greeks' 
conception of man. Poetry, though delivered by man, did not originate in him— 
man was its vehicle, its origin, the muses. Furthermore, (as we have seen) poetry
Finley, J.H. Thucydides (Cambridge, MA: 1963, p.61).
Parry, A. "Thucydides' Use of Abstract Language" in The Language of Achilles and Other Papers 
(Oxford: 1989, p.l79).
This structure regularly employed the use of antitheses, 'proving' a point/establishing a 
conclusion by setting up linguistic oppositions, which, though often immediately persuasive, 
frequently rested on faulty logic (see Lloyd, G.E.R. Polarity and Analogy, Cambridge: 1966 
pp.lllff). Thucydides makes frequent use of antitheses. However, his use of them is subtle and 
complex, suggesting an essential ambiguity underneath their apparent precision and certainty. 
For further discussion, see Boyd-White When Words Lose Their Meaning (Chicago: 1984, pp.62ff); 
and Parry, "Thucydides' Use of Abstract Language" in The Language of Achilles and Other Papers 
(Oxford: 1989, pp.177-194).
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used myth and divine prerogative to explain both cosmological and political 
order. The abstract concepts used in the "new prose," on the other hand, if not 
themselves man-made, were "man-discovered'. They grew out of observation of 
the natural world, and pointed to the idea of a logically structured, almost 
mechanical cosmos, which was not at the mercy of the grace or ill-will of the 
gods, but could be fully understood, and to some extent at least, even controlled 
by man himself.
In seeking to explain the world in terms of 'natural' rather than divine causes, the 
emerging prose style carved out a fresh, and significantly bigger role for man. 
As the most intelligent species in the 'natural' world, man was empowered by 
this shift in thought and language. If power was taken away from the gods, 
surely he was next in line. His mind (nous) and its distinctive rationality (logos), 
were certainly equal in potency to the new abstract concepts which they were 
responsible for discerning and articulating.^^ Thus, man's perceived sphere of 
control expanded.
The Sophists
This shift was undoubtedly bolstered by the presence of sophists in Athens 
during this same p e r i o d . W h i l e  it is impossible to define a single 'sophist 
doctrine', one cannot deny that the instruction offered by these roaming teachers 
put traditional Athenian beliefs and convictions under rigorous scrutiny, 
"dispel[ling] clouds of tradition and dethron[ing] v a l u e s . T h e  so-called "new 
learning" was greatly aided by the extensive travel of the sophists. Movement 
from city to city meant exposure to diverse ways of life and political
Vemant, expands on this idea, focusing the emergence of to on as a new concept of being, not 
accessible through experience, but through logos itself. This promoted a kind of mechanical 
reasoning, aimed at logical certainty and relying primarily on the principle of non-contradiction 
(Myth and Thought Among the Greeks Boston: 1983, pp. 127ff.).
For more extensive discussions on the influence of the sophists during this period, see (among 
many others) Havelock, E. The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London:1957, pp.lSSff; Jaeger, W. 
Paideia vol. 1 (Oxford: 1954, pp.286ff.); Kerferd, G.E. The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: 1981). 
i®Adcock, F.E. Thucydides and his History (Cambridge: 1973, p.3).
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organisation. The sophists thus brought to the attention of the Athenians 
alternative approaches to intellectual inquiry, suggesting new answers to the old 
question of the source of human excellence.^^ As the sophists' 'lessons' 
frequently took the form of public debate,^^ and were often on issues of morality, 
they generated a more conscious awareness of values, where they come from, 
and how they are acquired. This subject matter perhaps encouraged those 
watching to reflect on and question some of their culture's long-standing beliefs. 
The sophists stimulated a critique of Athenian traditions and values—previously 
held to be both natural and universally necessary—and in doing so, made man a 
more critically active force in his world.
The extent of man's power in the world was an important theme for Thucydides, 
and the "art of persuasion," polished and refined by the sophists, was arguably a 
large impetus behind (and influence on) his work. Again, their stylised moral 
arguments made extensive use of abstract terms, which made for some rather 
'elastic' rhetoric. This revealed not only the dangerous possibility of moral 
relativism, but the equally threatening potential for an expanding discrepancy 
between language and reality.21 Thucydides' profound concern for this appears 
again and again in the History through his juxtaposition of word and deed (logos 
and ergon)—raising the question concerning the extent to which words, and 
implicitly, human intelligence can shape and effect brute fact.^
As Pindar showed, the primary, if not the sole source of human excellence had been thought to 
be god-given 'good' blood.
20 Some argue that the sophists' debates played an analogous role in Greek society to the recited 
poetry of earlier eras.
21 The issue of relativism was a central concern for Aristotle, who was uneasy about the sophists' 
steadfast attempt to form persuasive argument, often with little regard for truth (N£1181al0-20). 
This will be discussed further below in Part HI, on Aristotle.
22Adam Parry expands on this theme in the early books of the History in "Logos and Ergon in 
Thucydides", doctoral thesis (Harvard: 1957). It is interesting to note that Cleon, a general who 
most certainly did not earn Thucydides' respect in most areas, directly echoes his worry on this 
point (IV.37-38).
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Finley writes that the sophists "applied to humanity those principles of 
mechanistic causation which the Ionian physicists applied to the cosmos. 
Natural science and ethical principles seemed to have been travelling on parallel 
roads. The linguistic 'battles' waged by the sophists required a strong command 
of language, and suggested a dubious relationship between abstract words and 
the concrete world. Ober highlights the danger inherent in the extreme elasticity 
of some of the abstractions used in some of the speeches in Thucydides'— 
likening their words to "empty vessels," filled simply by whatever the 
immediate context r e q u ir e d .^ ^  Surely this echoes a capacity seen in the sophists, 
who seemed to manipulate language with ostensible success. Thus, during the 
5* century, an intriguing, and previously unarticulated flexibility in language 
arose, one which threw into question man's once secure place in the cosmic 
order. Through this develops a theme which runs through Thucydides' History: 
How much freedom and control did man have?
Because one generally assumes that words have referents in some form of 
external reality, the flexibility in language revealed by the sophists perhaps 
indicated a similar flexibility in the world. As man seemed perfectly capable of 
controlling the terms in an argument, he might have assumed that a similar 
capacity to manipulate actual things in the world would follow. That is, the 
evolving ability to control words might be understood to imply a parallel 
capacity to control their concrete referents. When the words in question are 
abstract, their range of referents is ambiguous and easily inflated, and thus, so 
too becomes the extent of man's perceived control over the external world. Thus, 
the deterioration of an accurate and fixed understanding of the relationship 
between word and external reality might have serious—even disastrous— 
practical consequences. Parry notes an extreme of this case in Gorgias, who
23 Finley, J. Thuq/dides (p.39).
2^  Ober, J. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (Princeton: 1998, pp. 52ff.). Hansen argues that 
Thucydides' speeches represent a new and unprecedented style of writing (Historia 1993 ppl61- 
180). Pritchett refutes this claim in Essays in Greek History Berkeley: 1994, pp 27-109).
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implies that his abstract words are "superior to what we call reality...because 
they can create this reality."^
The Athenian Democracy
And, as a budding democracy, Athens was indeed creating a new reality for 
herself, and one in which words played a central role.^^ In rejecting the more 
traditional forms of government in ancient Greece (primarily, tyrannical and 
oligarchic regimes), Athens also gave up a fixed and (largely) unquestioned 
moral code. Democracy thrust values and political practices under the public 
microscope to be scrutinised and critiqued by a much larger audience. In doing 
so, it was particularly susceptible to the far reaching intellectual and practical 
implications of the sophists' finely honed rhetoric. Democracy was an arena for 
reflection and critique, and in this, as a political structure, it forfeited its 
stability—Athens' political world, Forde writes, "points beyond itself. The use 
of language and argument as political leverage (as opposed to noble birth, or 
wealth)—accessible to all Athenian citizens—became a potent source of influence 
and control, often empowering those who previously had been excluded from 
public decision making. Ober expands on this linguistic equaliser, this political 
"might" which was open and available to all citizens: "Athens," he writes, "was 
a democracy because the ordinary citizen was a participant in maintaining a 
value system that constituted him as the political equal of his elite neighbor. "28 It 
was no longer solely wealth, property, or noble blood that determined a man's 
political status and endowed him with political muscle. Rather it was also a
^ Parry, A. The Language of Achilles and Other Papers (Oxford: 1989, p.l92).
For interpretations arguing that Thucydides was opposed to democracy, see Grote, G (A 
History of Greece New York: 1857), Popper {The Open Society and Its Enemies Princeton: 1952), and 
McGregor "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides" Phoenix 10,1956). For less definitive 
conclusions about Thucydides' political beliefs, see Finley, J. {Three Essays on Thucydides 
Cambridge: 1967), Connor, R. {Thucydides Princeton: 1984), de Ste Croix {The Origins of the 
Peloponnesian War London: 1972), and Pope, M. ( "Thucydides and Democracy" Historia vol. 37, 
1988).
Forde, S. "Political Ambition in Thucydides and Plato" in Politikos II: Educating the Ambitious ed. 
Rubin, L. (Pittburgh: 1992).
Ober, J. "Civil Ideology and Counterhegemonic Discourse: Thucydides on the Sicilian Debate" 
in Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology ed. Boegehold and Scafuro (Baltimore:1994, p.l04).
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well-trained mind, manifested in the ability to speak effectively, the capacity to 
persuade an audience,^^ that became a channel to power which had previously 
been blocked to most of the demos
In this respect, Gorgias was right to attribute to words a hitherto dormant and 
remarkable potency. A democracy did make available a "universally' accessible 
weapon—language—and through its seemingly boundless power, man himself 
seemed invincible to interpret the world as he thought best. Words were capable 
of shaping and effecting both man's character and the broader public sphere. Bit 
by bit, confidence in the ability to control the world seemed more and more 
plausible: "Speech," Gorgias boldly asserts, "is a powerful master and achieves 
the most divine feats with the smallest and least evident body."^^ If this power 
was not routinely checked against concrete experience, the repercussions could 
be (and were) disastrous. 2^
Ultimately, it seems irrelevant (and futile) to try to judge definitively whether the 
effects of this new kind of (public) thought and discourse were on the whole 
positive or negative. What is of no doubt is that the kind of questioning and
Aristotle, critical of the sophistic movement, thought that the 'learning' taught by sophists—i.e., 
the training needed to win a plausible argument over opponents—was misguided for it was not 
concerned with truth. Thus, such 'clever' rhetoric was insufficient to train men to judge correctly, 
a virtue essential to the good statesman (NE 1181al2ff).
^ While the democracy in Athens was indeed more inclusive of the 'common man' when 
contrasted with past oligarchic or tyrannical regimes, it was in no sense open to all people as 
(many like to think) modem democracies are. Citizenship in ancient Athens was a narrowly 
defined category—only males above the age of thirty were granted full political rights. Thus, 
citizenship, the prerequisite for political participation remained in many ways an elite status, 
closed to women, foreigners, and slaves.
Gorgias "Encomium of Helen" in Early Greek Political Thought ed. Gagarin & Woodruff 
(Cambridge: 1995, p. 192). Contrast this attitude with Plato's distinction between word and deed 
in the Crito, where the laws of Athens "speak" to Socrates and imply that his actions indicate 
something stronger than his words (53b33-34).
^^ Thus we see that hubris, perhaps the most dangerous human vice in Pindar, persists in 
Thucydides, and remains a threat to man's well being. Euben articulates the potential problems 
accompanying such an inflated sense of power: "The sense of possibility that attends the 
recognition of the world as open to the shaping hand of human power can too easily initiate a 
dialectic capable of destroying the culture that made such power possible in the first place." 
Corrupting Youth (Princeton:1997, p.l34).
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explanation they encouraged developed an important and new understanding of 
abstract language and through that, man's relationship to the world.^s
Other probable influences on Thucydides were the medical writers and the dramatists. The 
largely abstract work of the sophists might be said to have been countered by the more 
empirically based work of the medical writers (specifically that of the Hippocratics), which 
flourished during the 5* century. Unlike the sophists, Hippocratic language was closely linked— 
in some sense even inextricably tied to the concrete—its primary aim being the correct diagnoses 
of particular observed diseases. (Lloyd however, notes a parallel between the medical writers amd 
the politicians in that each required speaking skills: Magic, Experience, and Reason 
Cambridge:1979, p.254.) The ability to diagnose would ideally lead to the right prediction for the 
proper remedy. According to Cochrane, prediction was then (and perhaps, is now), "the essence 
of science." He writes further that the Hippocratics were well aware that: "the possibility of 
prediction depends on close attention to the facts [i.e., observable symptoms]" (Cochrane, C. 
Thucydides and the Science of History, London: 1929, p.8). The resonance here with Thucydides' 
stated method is unmistakable, as he too insists on the same kind of rigorous analysis and 
attention to the particular details of actual events and implies that the "facts" that make up such 
collected data will be repeated—more or less—throughout the history of man. Cochrane expands 
on what he understands to be a direct parallel between Thucydides and the medicine of his time: 
"The logoi [H/sfory]...represent the attempt of Thucydides to do for history what Hippocrates was 
at the same time trying to do for medicine...which thus becomes for him the semeiology and 
prognosis of human life" (ibid. p.26). For a more tempered interpretation of Thucydides as an 
objectivity seeker/realist, see de Romilly Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford: 1963, p. 
272).
Thucydides' History has also been linked to the Greek drama, especially tragedy. In fact, parallels 
to the dramatists of his time are unmistakable; the narrative style of the History, the events he 
recounts tied in with the characters evoked; the 'dialogues' formed by contesting speeches, the 
plights of both the individuals and poleis during the war all echo themes of the ancient Greek 
playwrights. One could easily take Athens to be the excessively hubristic 'protagonist' of a 
traditional Greek tragedy. Comford, for instance, draws extensive parallels between Thucydides' 
and Aeschylus' psychological "theories" (Thucydides Mythistoricus repr. Philadelphia: 1971, 
pp.l54ff.). In his Three Essays on Thucydides, Finley draws on the parallels—stylistic, linguistic 
and thematic—between Thucydides and Euripides (Cambridge: 1967, pp.1-54). Kitto highlights 
the similarities between Thucydides' and Sophocles' understanding of the limits of human power 
{Greek Tragedy London: 1961, pp.l82ff.). Homblower, however, notes that some of the 
connections drawn between Thucydides and Euripides are "forced" (Thucydides Baltimore: 1987 p. 
170). Not only does the story of the war as a whole reflect a tragic narrative—the fall of the 
seemingly invincible 'actor', Athens—but the reader can detect paradigmatic tragic elements in 
the lives of the particular individuals within the History (e.g., ill-fated outcomes despite well 
thought out intentions (the Spartan soldiers hurrying home to defend Pylos), the confrontation of 
dilemmas for which there is no single "right" answer or course of action (Pericles' policy advising 
the Athenians to abandon their farms and relocate to the city), the ethical impasse posed when 
loyalties are split between man's personal and 'civic' duties (Nicias and the Sicilian expedition), 
the danger of hubris (Alcibiades and the Sicilian expedition). In keeping with a theme central to 
many tragedies of his day, the History portrays the constant tension between external necessity 
and man's (limited) freedom. From a slightly different angle, Thucydides' work also bares some 
resemblance to the comedians writing during the 5* century—notably Aristophanes. There is a 
sense in which the History offers a commentary on the politics of the day, bringing to mind 
Aristophanes' critical and comedic work which 'starred' many of the same 'characters'. Like 
Aristophanes, Thucydides was both critical and fiercely proud of Athens, and showed overt 
contempt for those, like Cleon, who did not realise those qualities which made her excel.
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Chapter 4: The Nature of the History
"No writer ever worked harder to achieve the Archimedean 
standpoint. No writer ever understood more deeply the 
impossibility of that quest."^
Though it is impossible to be precise in dating the kind of gradual 
intellectual/linguistic transformation Athens was undergoing during 
Thucydides' lifetime, and harder still to determine whether her developing 
democracy was its cause or its by-product, it is sure that during the 5* century, 
new kinds of thought and discourse were slowly making their way into the 
public consciousness.^^ However powerful this shift was, it is crucial to 
remember that for Thucydides, this was still a relatively new mode of public 
expression, and had yet to develop into the truly dominant force it later became. 
In his time, for example, disciplines had yet to be categorised, and were not yet 
sharply distinguished from one another. As he predated the existence of 
'history' and 'political theory' as explicitly defined 'subjects', Thucydides stood 
"between two worlds, dazzled by ideas but never quite willing to break the 
bonds of s e n s e . W r i t i n g  on the cusp of these linguistic and intellectual 
developments, Thucydides was able to experiment with new methods of 
interpretation and expression, resulting in an innovative style and novel 
approach to historical d o c u m e n t a t io n .^ ^  Thus, i t  was his rather precarious and 
transitional position in Western intellectual history that in retrospect appears to 
have enabled Thucydides to undertake a unique venture in prose writing and 
effectively forge what proved to be a new path for historical research.
At the same time it was precisely the instability of the intellectual and 
historical/political conditions during which Thucydides wrote which
^ Crane, G. Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley: 1998, p. 14).
35 Vemant, J-P. Myth and Thought Among the Greeks (Boston: 1983, pp.348ff.).
36 Finley, J.H. Three Essays on Greek Thought (Cambridge, MA: 1967, p.56).
37 J.W. Allison discusses the opportunity this opened up for Thucydides, he was, she says: "free to 
narrate the war . obeying no rules of past prose" (Word and Concept in Thucydides Atlanta: 1997, p. 
X).
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complicates our ability to classify his account of the Peloponnesian War.
Thucydides does not carefully cite sources, he does not pay much attention to the
undoubtedly powerful economic forces at play in the war—there are many
lacunae scattered throughout the text which make his work decidedly un-historic
to the modem sensibility. Therefore, the term "history' does not neatly
correspond to the kind of work a modem historian might expect, and the
question of the precise character of his work remains open. Not surprisingly, it
has generated much scholarly debate. One might trace a major source of the
disputes to the interpretation of a mere two sentences:
Those [however] who want to see things clearly as they were 
and, given human nature, as they will one day be again, more or 
less, may find this book a useful basis for judgment. My work 
was composed not as a prizewinning exercise in elocution, to be 
heard and then forgotten, but as a work of permanent value.^®
There have been, broadly speaking, two 'camps' on this issue in the course of 
Thucydidean scholarship. The first are those who see his work as fundamentally 
'm odem ', 'scientific', a search for objectivity'. Scholars of this persuasion 
understand Thucydides to have undertaken a work heavily influenced by, and 
structurally similar to, the science of his day.^^ Gomperz, for example assumes 
that Thucydides' primary aim was to uncover "the natural foundation of 
historical phenomena," embodied in the "universal forces" which control 
human life.'*^  He characterises Thucydides' narrative as a "pursuit of strict
1.22, trans. Blanco, my italics.
However 'fact based' we would like to think science to be, it is important to note that the 
medical writers of ancient Greece, like researchers today, had to begin with a theoretical 
proposition. For 'modems' this is then ideally confirmed or disproved by concrete data. 
However, a purely 'impartial'/'objective' account of empirical data is impossible—all human 
perception of the world comes through the filter imposed by our physical and psychological 
make-up. Scientific hypotheses are often theory driven, that is, facts are selected to support a 
particular theoretical standpoint. In ancient Greece, it important to note that among some 
'intellectuals' there existed a powerful distrust of physical objects, the world of becoming was for 
many, much less real, even much less scientific than that the world of ideas, of thought, of 'pure 
being.' (For further discussion, see Lloyd, G.E.R., both Magic, Reason, and Experience (Cambridge: 
1979), and Science, Folklore and Ideology (Cambridge: 1983). For examples of a similar 
phenomenon in Thucydides' own reporting, see Hunter, V. both her Thucydides the Artful Reporter 
(Toronto: 1973); and Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides (Princeton:1982).
^ Gomperz, T. Greek Thinkers (excerpt in HPW trans. Blanco New York: 1998, p.407).
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objectivity." In a similar vein, Cochrane claims that Thucydides wrote "with the 
assured faith of the modem scientist," and CoUingwood suggests that 
Thucydides sought above all to reveal the "laws" which guide human conduct. 
De Romilly provides a contemporary, and more refined version of the view of 
Thucydides as an "objective" recorder of the war.^^ This line of interpretation 
seems to presuppose a post-Enlightenment understanding of human 
knowledge—i.e., that human objectivity comes through neutral, empirical, 
detached discernment of events. While 1 believe there are similarities between this 
'm odem ' project and Thucydides' (both, for example, look to find recurring 
pattem s in order to help prepare and predict effectively for future 
circumstances), Thucydides' History must be distinguished in this crucial way: no 
where does he seem to have aimed to 'remove' himself from the world of men so 
as to view human life from an disengaged standpoint. His objectivity lies in 
reporting both sides of the war from man's point of view—i.e., with values and 
purposes recognised (and not from the imagined 'neutral' or 'purely empirical' 
standpoint of post-Enlightenment pretensions). Thucydides strove to discem 
those continuities that give meaning to actions and events which are observable 
from within the fluctuations and uncertainty of human life.
Let us now leave the nuances of this kind of approach to one side, and examine, 
for the sake of drawing out a contrast, the extreme end of this line of 
interpretation. This 'optimistic' view of the History assumes (at least implicitly) 
that "usefulness" and "permanent value" must be in some fundamental sense 
"scientific" or "clinically objective"—presumably exemplifying the kind of 
precise and exact knowledge associated with modem science. Scientific 
knowledge, then and now, is often thought to be reducible to clear abstract laws 
and principles which operate everywhere and throughout time. These 
abstractions are generalisations, free from the inherent mutability of concrete, 
particular events and people. Their purity, simplicity, and detachment from the
La Construction de la Verite chez Thucydides (Paris: 1990). For a similar interpretation, see also 
Wallace, W.P. "Thucydides" Phoenix vol.18 1964 (pp.251-261).
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merely ^superficiar or 'inessential' ensures their constancy and longevity, 
allowing them to be used to predict accurately at any time or place. Abstract 
scientific laws therefore allow man to maintain a high level of control over the 
present and future world. The conviction that a "work of permanent value" 
must be some form of this understanding of "science' will be a comfortable, 
indeed almost instinctive conclusion for the modem. Western, post- 
Enlightenment mind. Again, it is precisely these 'modem ' and 'scientific' 
characteristics that will ensure that a work will endure.
And indeed, at a certain level, it requires no stretch of the imagination to 
understand why Thucydides has eamed the title of a "scientific historian."'^ His 
unbiased stance, his insistence on his own reliability, his unwavering confidence 
in his unstated, yet trustworthy method of discerning the good evidence from 
the bad, makes such a title seem all too fitting. Further, Thucydides is adamant 
that his narrative will not contain the "fabulous" /  "romantic" /  "entertaining" 
(muthodos)^—characteristics which had been essential ingredients in earlier 
poetry and history. He promises to be accurate, assuring the reader that he, 
unlike his predecessors, will not simply accept the familiar and too often 
unquestioned accounts of the past, so often blurred and merged with mythical 
narratives and stories.^^ No doubt, his hyper-critical approach towards collecting 
nothing but the most sound and reliable data has the distinct flavour of scientific 
method. However, it is interesting to note that while Thucydides insists on his 
rigorous critical method, nowhere does he inform the reader as to just what this 
method entails. Furthermore, as insistent as these commentators are about the 
nature of Thucydides' History, it is similarly unclear where his final 'scientific'
^ Cochrane, C. Thucydides and the Science of History (Oxford: 1929).
Gomme. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides Bk 1 vol. 1 (Oxford: 1945-1972, p.l36).
44 Flory suggests that Thucydides' disdain for the muthodos referred, not to a rejection of all 
pleasurable stories, but more specifically to his refusal to report: "patriotic stories in particular 
and sentimental chauvinism in general" ("The Meaning of to me muthodos (1.22.4) and the 
Usefulness of Thucydides' History" in Classical Journal, vol. 85 (p.l94).
45Thucydides works hard to disentangle history from myth, e.g., at 2.29, he distinguishes Tereus, 
a figure of myth, from Teres, an actual king of Thrace whose son made an alliance with the 
Athenians.
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conclusions lie. The 'data' is collected, but the explicit conclusions drawn from it 
are absent—there are no formal laws or principles stated anywhere in the 
H i s t o r y The absence of such theoretical guidelines led Gomperz to wonder: 
"not what he [Thucydides] denied, but what he affirmed.
Given such an omission, it is not surprising that Thucydides' History has been 
cast in a strikingly different light by a second group of scholars who are less 
easily categorised. One might suggest that they ally Thucydides' History more 
closely with literary narrative (specifically, Attic tragedy) than with the science of 
his day (and certainly not with the science of ours). Comford was perhaps first to 
argue along the lines that the History, far from being a 'rational' scientific treatise, 
showed that Thucydides knew "the limits of certain knowledge" (i.e., universally 
necessary and certain knowledge, which later becomes Plato's episteme).^^ Wade- 
Gery refers to the History as a work written, not with the exacting accuracy of the 
scientist, but with "a poet's p r e c i s i o n .  "^9 Parry insists that far from being a 
"calculative machine" allowing one to accurately predict human behaviour, 
Thucydides' History reveals just the opposite, precisely that there are, for human 
beings, no "scientific" laws of b e h a v i o u r In discussing this issue of certainty 
based on fixed laws or principles more specifically, Fliess suggests that 
Thucydides' attitude towards the principle of imperialism indicated that he was
^K].E.M. de Ste. Croix remarks that Thucydides, far from seeking to make explicit the laws of 
human nature, simply "takes them for granted" {The Origins of The Peloponnesian War London: 
1972, pp.5-7)
History of the Peloponnesian War trans. Blanco (p.412). I argue that Thucydides' method serves to 
reveal data which then allows and encourages the reader to draw his own general conclusions 
from the text. This capacity to discern general ideas from within/immanent in particulars is a 
fundamental part of Thucydides' lesson.
^ Comford, F. Thuq/dides Mythistoricus (repr., Phiadelphia: 1971, p.73). This view was also 
developed by Finley, Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge: 1967). For more recent 
interpretations of a similar view, see, Lloyd-Jones The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: 1971); and 
Edmunds "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in his Description of Stasis" from Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology vol. 79 (1975).
^^Oxford Classical Dictionary (3^ *^ ed.) For further discussion on Thucydides and the poets, see 
MacCleod "Thucydides and Tragedy " in Collected Essays (ed. Taplin Oxford: 1983, pp. 140-158); 
and Homblower's Greek Historiography (Oxford: 1994, pp. 64-69), and his Thucydides (Baltimore: 
1987, p. llOff.).
50 Parry, A. "Logos and Ergon in Thucydides" (Doctoral Thesis, Harvard: 1957, p.l08).
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neither "for nor against it...[but] seems to have been quite willing to accept any 
policy that made sense in a given situation."^^ Orwin emphasises the fact 
Thucydides was "little known as a theorist," underscoring that his History does 
not articulate ideals about utopian conceptions of what a good city or just 
international order might be. Instead of describing an unattainable goal, 
Thucydides works to reveal the difficulties that men face as they try to make 
decisions given the many political demands with which any polis or international 
community must c o n t e n d . ^ ^  Thucydides tells a story, where (certain kinds of) 
characters make choices and take actions within a web of other agents.
Like the "scientific" reading, this line of interpretation is also supported by the 
text. For instance, it has been argued that the History is reminiscent of a tragedy, 
portraying vivid descriptions of particular individuals, their concrete needs and 
specific desires (often in stark contrast with their inevitable fates known only 
retrospectively). While the interpretations which follow this kind of argument 
often recognise the "scientific" nature of Thucydides" stated method, ultimately 
they must understand the ""permanent value"" of the text to lie in a different kind 
of knowledge—a knowledge which is not so exact as that of much modem 
science, or ancient "science" as episteme (that which is universally and necessarily 
true). The knowledge imparted by the History admits to probabilities, to more or 
less. However, arguments on this "side" do not clearly answer the question of 
how such a narrative (i.e., one which recounts the immediate details of a 
particular time) succeeds in being lasting, much less useful as Thucydides 
himself claimed it to be. One might legitimately ask what temporally embedded 
events, however accurately reported, might mean for a future in utterly different 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 5 3  jg it possible to reconcile Thucydides' passionate concern for
Fliess, Peter. Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity (Louisiana: 1966, p.ll4).
52 Orwin, C. The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, pp.172-173).
53 One interesting account of the relevance of history (even the most remote ancient history) to 
contemporary life is that provided by Quentin Skinner, who states that the study of history is not 
best understood as the "crude lessons" which can be extracted and imperfectly applied to our 
own lives, but rather its effective ability to "provide a lesson in self-knowledge." ("Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas" History & Theory 8:1969 p.53).
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the immediate and concrete facts at hand, with his broader claim of permanent 
value and use?^
Having stretched to extremes two polar interpretations of Thucydides, my aim 
was not to represent a comprehensive survey of the sophisticated and complex 
arguments which make up much of Thucydidean scholarship, but rather to mark 
out a basic framework for further analysis and thereby develop the "middle 
ground". Either argument in its most radical form runs into trouble; the 
"scientists' are left with no explicitly stated methodological theory, and the 
"dramatists" are left unsure of just what kind of truths are both particular and 
enduring. How then to find the middle ground, and in doing so, come to some 
understanding of how lasting knowledge, knowledge which will be of continued 
use to man, might be culled from such a complexly detailed and massive text? 
Clearly, it must be a form of knowledge that is less precise and less demonstrable 
than that of "science" in either the ancient Greek or the modem sense. Is there 
then a different kind of enduring knowledge? I will argue that there is, and that 
Thucydides' History is a tool for obtaining it. I will begin by exploring 
Thucydides distinct understanding of man, which is presupposed by his 
insistence on his work's enduring practicality.
Chapter 5: Thucydides' Conception of Man
I will argue that Thucydides' understanding of man is a variation on the one we 
saw in Pindar—that is to say, he is portrayed as a species between god and 
beast.55 Man, for both Thucydides and for Pindar, seems to occupy a "space' in a
^ For further discussion on Thucydides' personal involvement with and emotional commitment 
to the events he describes, see Connor "A Postmodernist Thucydides?" {Classical Journal 1977 pp. 
289-298); Badian "Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: A Historian's Brief in 
Conflict, Antithesis, and the Ancient Historian (ed. Allison Ohio: 1990 pp.46-49); Homblower 
Thucydides (Baltimore: 1987 p. 34ff.).
55 According to Hunter, Thucydides wrote his History with a strong set of theoretical conceptions 
about the nature of man: "Thucydides used unchanging generalisations about human nature and 
human behavior in order to link events together in a meaningful process" {Past and Process in 
Thucydides Princeton: 1982, p. 159). I suggest further that the capacity to "link events together in a 
meaningful process" underlies man's freedom, for this ability implies a fundamental
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larger order or natural hierarchy. While the odes often sought to illuminate and 
reinforce this order, the History draws attention to the nature of man's freedom 
given his (somewhat elastic) place in the kosmos. In the History, the reader sees 
man caught in a world over which he has a limited amount of control. This is 
apparent almost immediately, in the words he uses to describe the power of the 
war. At 1.23, he claims that it "brought upon Greece sujferings" {pathemata—in 
Greek, literally "imprints" from without, the effects of external conditions).^^ 
This vulnerability to external environment however, does not capture the whole 
picture of man as he appears in the History. Thucydides reveals man to be a 
complex creature; he is not powerful enough to direct to his advantage all events 
external to him, yet he is not wholly determined, simply at the mercy of natural 
causation. Man both shapes, and is shaped by his world. Given this, the History 
attempts to illuminate this obscure truth about man's nature, and at the same 
time, helps him to be better able to contend with and make sense of it. What 
more can we say about the image of man that emerges out of Thucydides' 
History, and in what way might his History be useful to such a creature?
Taking into account both the content and structure of the History, together with 
Thucydides' claim that it will be a "possession for all time," makes a definitive 
conception of man and the kind of knowledge he can have about himself and his 
place in the world elusive. Nowhere does Thucydides interrupt the flow of his 
narrative to define explicitly the nature of its 'actors', nor does he present a 
consistent relationship between them and their external environment. This is not 
to deny the fact that there are direct statements about human nature in 
Thucydides' text. However, these claims in themselves do not seem to be what
understanding of his environment which is necessary to determine and carry out reasonable 
actions in his world,
^KZonnor argues that suffering is the primary theme of the History {Thuq/dides Princeton: 1984, 
p.31). Kitto too, after examining Thucydides' detailed references (his "burning passages") about 
the brutalities and horrors of war, suggests that it was Thucydides' intention to bring out this 
extreme suffering in the History above all else {Poiesis Berkeley: 1966, pp.273-274). Therefore, the 
conspicuous absence of economic/political details can be explained if one sets aside our modem 
expectations for what should be included in an historical text, and tries to understand the nature 
of the history that Thucydides himself was trying to write.
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vest the History with lasting use and value, in part because they frequently come 
out of the mouths of men who are less than t r u s t w o r t h y  To further blur this 
issue, Thucydides does not state explicitly why or how the History he leaves 
might embody a kind of knowledge that will be valuable to his later readers. In 
omitting these precious details, Thucydides deprives the (modem) reader of the 
information he/she most expects given his bold introductory claim.^s
With Connor and Orwin, I contend that the obscurity many (modem) readers 
find in Thucydides is intentional.^^ Or, perhaps more accurately, the tension 
between what he claims he will deliver, and what he actually does deliver serves 
an important purpose: the oblique and indirect style in which Thucydides 
imparts his message in part embodies the message itself. As with Pindar, 
Thucydides' style helps to 'train' the reader to think critically and reflectively 
about a world in which there seem to be no permanent, immutable rules, where 
no abstract theory can capture every relevant particular nuance. The History 
teaches the reader to be active, to find a sense of stability and security that does 
not depend on fixed, extemal abstractions, but one which nonetheless enables 
him to make good choices.^ Because man occupies a similar 'stretch' of middle 
ground we saw in Pindar (as opposed to a fixed point), his place in the kosmos is 
'flexible'. Thus, there can be no grand, overarching theory to guide him 
successfully through the particularities involved in those difficult decision he 
faces. Instead, he must develop a consistent, stable and enduring character, 
embodied by the capacity to act with honesty^^ and a sense of reasonableness
57 Some examples of generalisations made about human beings throughout the History are: the 
Athenian ambassadors at the start of the war (1.76), Thucydides himself (11.50, in.82, IV. 108, V.68), 
Cleon at (in.39), Diodotus' response to Cleon (111.45), from Spartan ambassadors (IV.19), from 
Hermocrates (IV.61), from the Athenians in the Melian dialogue (V.105), from Nicias (Vn.69).
55 Perhaps this boast is a rhetorical tool, designed (at least in part) to motivate the passive reader 
to actively look for the information Thucydides insists is there.
5’ Connor Thucydides (Princeton: 1984); Orwin, C. The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994).
55 For further discussion on Thucydides and the demand for reader participation his History 
makes, see, Connor Thucydides (Princeton: 1984, pp. 12-19)
5^ The importance of honesty to Thucydides is a theme that is articulated in Thucydides' 
introduction, and woven throughout the entire History (e.g., the specific case of correcting the 
mistaken, yet prevailing account of what realty happened between Hippias and Hipparchus). On
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even given the uncertainty which arises out of a contingent and variable life. In 
demanding that the reader engage in this intellectual "work out" (as opposed to 
simply supplying him with an explicit, universal abstract theory) Thucydides' 
text suggests a distinct understanding of man and the kind of knowledge 
available and appropriate to him.^^
Abstract and Concrete
"No matter how abstract our theories may sound, or how 
consistent our theories may appear, there are incidents and 
stories behind them which, at least for ourselves, contain as in 
a nutshell, the full meaning of whatever we say."^^
Thucydides' History reveals man to be a creature who has the capacity both to 
'extract' generalisations from specific past circumstances /  experiences, and to use 
those abstractions to understand and judge future situations in order to make 
reasonable decisions as to how to act well.^ Both the structure and content of his 
text work together to teach his reader how to engage effectively in the process of 
negotiating between the abstract and the concrete, difficult though it may be. 
Euben, for instance, reads the History as "point[ing] to, but not establishing...a 
separation between theoretical and practical life."^ I wish to argue that the
a larger scale. Palmer suggests that a lack of honesty—self-deception—is that which leads to the 
downfall of Athens {Love of Glory and the Common Good Maryland: 1992, p.43ff.).
One aspect of this intellectual training might be seen as the active participation Thucydides 
requires of his readers. This line of Thucydidean interpretation is not unique—indeed, Hobbes, in 
the preface to his translation makes a like point: "Thucydides makes his auditor a spectator...so 
that he may, from the narrations, draw out lessons to himself" (Hobbes' Thuq/dides, "To the 
Readers"). For an expanded review of more contemporary interpretations similar to this one, see 
Connor Thuq/dides (Princeton: 1984, p.6ff; p.231ff.); Euben The Tragedy of Political Theory 
(Princeton: 1990); Farrar. Origins of Democratic Thinking (Cambridge: 1988, p.l26ff.); and Orwin. 
The Humanity of Thucydides. (Princeton: 1994, p.203ff.); and Adcock Thucydides and his 
History{Cambiidge: 1973). Kitto states this point explicitly when examining Pericles' comments 
about the Peloponnesians at 1.141, and the seeming lack of information Thucydides provides 
about their behaviour at 111.15: "What he [Thucydides]does not furnish, he expects the reader to 
work for." And with this work, Kitto argues, many of the lacunae in the History disappear 
{Poiesis (Berkeley: 1966) pp.301-302).
^ Arendt, quoted in Disch, J. Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Cornell: 1994, p.llO).
^ This understanding of man shares much with that conception of man described by Gill as the 
"objective-participant" model. Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy (Oxford: 1996, 
p.ll).
Euben, P. The Tragedy of Political Theory (Princeton: 1990, p. 201).
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History works to help the reader bridge this separation by developing a better 
understanding of this relationship through seeing where abstract generalisations 
come from and how they relate to, and be effectively used in negotiating concrete 
particulars. Thucydides does this by telling a story which serves to reveal the 
fragile connection between general concepts and the actual experiences which 
make up human lives.^ Thucydides implies that the nature of man's abstract 
concepts is complex, and their relationship to the concrete world is intimate, 
though not at all straight-forward. The History suggests that a sound, general 
understanding of what human beings are begins with experience. For the reader, 
this includes the experience of 'entering' this past and foreign world, and 
through attention to its particular details, learning to draw general conclusions 
from his "visit." The concrete 'life experiences' which come through a critical, 
attentive reading of Thucydides' words allow them to transcend the particular 
details of the war, and render them useful for making choices in one's own life 
(e.g.. What kinds of reasons did Nicias appeal to in opposing the Sicilian 
expedition? How did Pericles use basic human characteristics such as honesty 
and inspiration to unite and galvanise the Athenians? What fundamental aspects 
of Spartan culture nurtured the attributes of Brasidas?). At the same time, the 
reader sees the necessity of good instruction/leadership as he is led through these 
particular experiences (e.g., the indirect guidance he gets from Thucydides'
^ For an expanded discussion on Arendt's use of story-telling, see Disch, J. Hannah Arendt and the 
Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: 1994, p .lllff).
1 borrow this idea from Arendt's notion of the imagination "going visiting." (Lectures on Kant's 
Political Philosophy, Chicago: 1982 p.43). "Visiting," she claims, provides a broad (and thus 
implicitly, stable) base of experience outside one's own immediate life from which to draw when 
making decisions. It provides one with "enlarged thought," or the capacity to think "generally" 
(where "general" is derived from moving from particular "standpoint to [particular] 
standpoint"). Extensive exposure to human life in its many manifestations allows man to reflect 
on his own inherently partial position, and gives him a bigger picture of what kinds of things 
human beings do—that is, he develops a sense of "reasonableness," or reasonable/or man. The 
idea of "enlarged thought," or a sense of "the general" which is fundamentally bound to 
particulars is important when one gives up the idea that reasonable action originates from 
accessing abstract concepts which are detached from/impartial to actual human life—that is, 
when one forgoes finding an extemal Archimedean standpoint from which to judge.
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deliberate selection of material/^ as well as the more direct 'counser he receives 
from the actual leaders in the war). The History's portrayal of both 'raw ' 
experience and 'leadership' helps man to develop an appropriate understanding 
of the relationship between abstract and concrete—a necessary, though 
insufficient 'condition' for making reasonable choices for creative action in an 
undetermined future.
Man's Use of Abstract Principle and Past Experience
What more does Thucydides' History say about the nature of the general 
principles that man is capable of drawing out of particular situations, and how 
does it prepare him to use them well? Clearly the abstractions embedded in 
Thucydides' text are not akin to Kant's categorical imperative—immutable and 
universal. Can they still provide man with an impartial and neutral standpoint 
on which to base his decisions? Do they allow him to predict accurately given 
the indeterminateness of himself and the world he inhabits? If they do not, and 
we have given up hope for finding an Archimedean standpoint, should man rely 
on precedent in order to predict and plan effectively for his future?
Allying useful and enduring knowledge with certainty in the form of fixed 
abstract principles, which serve both as neutral standards for judgment, and as 
the basis for consistent and accurate predictions for the future, is a line of 
thinking that is fueled by natural science, and proves misguided when analysing 
Thucydides' narrative (and, I would argue, political theory in general). The 
events described in the History indicate that actions performed as the result of 
rigidly applying even the soundest abstract principles do not necessarily achieve, 
much less guarantee, man's intended results.^^ Time and again, the reader
^ The fact that Thucydides does not state his method precisely should not prevent the reader 
from recognising that the history he leaves comes through the filter of an Athenian man who 
lived through the war. Thucydides' periodic self-assertions (e.g., I.l, n.48, IU.25, IV.104, V.26, 
VI.7, VI.51) though perhaps not intended to underlie the text's 'bias', do serve this purpose.
Often this approach to decision making depends on reducing one's experience to its 'essential 
core' ("just the facts") efficiently cutting away the merely 'superficial' aspects. Too often, this 
method does not articulate explicitly what criteria establish 'essential' and 'superficial'. In
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confronts meticulously calculated strategies, based on seemingly reasonable 
principles only to see them utterly distorted when realised in practice/^ Even 
Pericles, the most highly esteemed and overtly praised man in the History does 
not provide a single, overarching theory which can be isolated and used as an 
objective or otherwise omniscient standpoint after his death/^ Surely no one 
could reasonably contend that a close study of his early strategy for the 
Athenians—even understood as the design of the paradigmatic statesman and 
general—could be crystallised into a universal theory which could generate a 
sound foreign policy for a modem nation, or even for Athens ten years later in 
the war.
Thucydides seems to warn against relying solely on concrete precedent or 
current accepted opinion as the basis for sound prediction as well. Connor 
observes that as early as the Archaeology (1.2-19), Thucydides puts forth a 
number of generalisations based on facts of "ancient' history that are plainly not 
substantiated in the detailed narrative that foUows.^^ While the reader is told of 
the increasing power of both Athens and Sparta, Thucydides makes a point to 
highlight the extreme importance of sea power: "the states that turned their
bypassing this important analysis, one can avoid confronting the fact that any reduction 
necessarily involves evaluation, and thus is never neutral.
Arendt argues that the failure to achieve consistently one's desired results when relying on the 
dictates of abstract concepts is(at least in part) the effect of the inherent inefficacy of such 
concepts in confronting unprecedented events which can "ruin our categories of thought and 
standards of judgment" (Arendt as quoted in Disch. Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy 
Cornell: 1994, p.ll2). This will be addressed further in the discussion of Pylos below.
In fact, some of the generals who follow Pericles retain his basic principles yet derive from 
them atrocious policies.
Edmunds draws a nice contrast between Pericles' concept of the city and its values and the 
more traditional ones of Greece. Given his 'untraditional' conception of the polis, and 
Thucydides' clear respect for Pericles, the notion that Thucydides himself was simply 
maintaining conservative values in his History seems unlikely {Chance and Intelligence in 
Thucydides Cambridge, MA: 1975, p. 76ff.). Finley highlights that action based solely on 
precedent yields "disaster," and undermines the policy of one of the most ignoble characters in 
the narrative—Cleon {Thucydides Cambridge, MA: 1962, p.58ff.).
More specifically, Connor remarks that the Pentecontaetia suggests that the power of Athens, 
and naval power more generally, should secure her a victory in the war. That this is not borne 
out reiterates the idea that one cannot predict the future, even given close attention to past 
successes (e.g., Athenian naval success at Salamis) or to present circumstances. This suggests that 
good decisions utilise both abstract and concrete must be used together Thucydides Princeton: 
1984,pp.34ff.).
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energies to the sea were assured of power in the form of revenues and hegemony 
over others...as to land wars, there were none that resulted in the acquisition of 
power"(I.15). Because the reader is likely to be aware of Athens' renowned navy, 
these 'historical' observations do not lead to their 'logical' outcome—an 
Athenian victory. The human capacity to predict accurately is presented as 
imperfect in the History—both abstract principle and precedent can be of only 
limited use. Given this, the ability to predict with certainty, and in this gain 
control over one's future can not be the goal of Thucydides' History—and if this 
is the case, it shares even less with the aims of modem science than has 
sometimes been argued.
Chapter 6: Developing a Sense of Reasonableness and Using It Creatively
As Thucydides portrays human life as indeterminate, no principle or set of past 
experiences will be of guaranteed value in the future. Given this, we must try to 
identify what kind of useful knowledge the History provides. I argue that this 
knowledge is manifested in the ability to harmonise precedent, present 
circumstance, and general principle in order to make reasonable decisions and 
perform creative action. For instance, that which makes Pericles a figure useful 
to men living hundreds, indeed thousands of years after his death, is not the 
specific advice he gives in his circumstances, nor is it solely the general principles 
which underlie his particular policies. Rather, it is his ability to act both 
reasonably and creatively"^^  where a sense of what is 'reasonable' arises out of
My concept of "creative action" is inspired by Arendt's idea of "natality" as presented in The 
Human Condition ed. Chicago: 1998, p. 8). Arendt characterises natality as the condition 
required to "begin something anew...a sense of initiative" (ibid. p.8). Through the condition of 
natality, human beings have the ability "to perform what is infinitely improbable...and 
unexpected" (ibid. p.l78). This is an essential piece of every human life, for each person is like no 
one else—unique, individual and singular—and one's distinguishing characteristics arise in the 
performance of an action (not in the motive behind or the achievement of that action ibid., p.206). 
This manifestation of each man's fundamental uniqueness, i.e., the human capacity to act 
deliberately, underlies man's freedom, and shifts its meaning. Freedom is not derived from 
"mastery" or "sovereignty" from without, but an evolving understanding from within (Arendt 
argues further that choosing to manifest this action in forgiving is the true realisation of human 
freedom, p.236ff. Further discussion on this idea will appear below in the discussion of Pylos). 
Thus, human freedom for Arendt does not come from the power that seems to inhere in applying
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habituation within a particular community and reflection on that experience, 
together with a broad exposure to 'outside' experiences (i.e., lifestyles and 
'stories' foreign to one's own particular tradition). This reflection yields 
generalisations which are never simply accepted, but are continuously tested in 
practice, as one makes decisions to act in the world. By 'creativity' I mean the 
capacity to integrate and act on these critical reflections—that is, a sense of 
'reasonableness'—given the new situations one encounters throughout life 
(creativity is essential to a good leader).^^ This basic framework reveals Pericles 
to have been great in his ability to judge which particulars within his present 
situation were relevant and important, and to act on them innovatively in 
conjunction with his prior reflections and generalisations. However, this is not to 
discount the fact that Pericles did in fact get it right. Nor was his success 
irrelevant to Thucydides.^^ The outstanding general possessed a unique, well- 
cultivated insight that was manifested in the choices he made, the 'risks' he took. 
His judgements and actions often proved his decisions right in the circumstances 
in which he was involved. Of course, just as not all members of Pindar's 
audience could hope to achieve deeds equal to the victors he praised, neither 
could each citizen expect to become a Pericles. Yet still, Pericles' enduring 
merit—his 'lesson' to posterity—arises not only out of the fact that many of his 
particular actions resulted in good outcomes, but of what lay behind those
universal abstract principles to dynamic human life. It is not the capacity to control and 
accurately predict things about ourselves and the extemal world. For this inadvertently destroys 
human freedom. Such an understanding locks man into an infinite causal regress of merely re­
acting mechanically to what has come before in hopes of ensuring a particular, determined, 
chosen future. Instead, Arendt argues, we must see that freedom comes in deliberate action 
itself, not in the consistent realisation of a desired consequence, but from the mere act of creating, 
from doing something new. Man's ability to integrate reasonable generalisations (i.e., those 
derived from reflected experience within a community) with his own distinct perspective can 
potentially release him from being forever trapped in re-acting. That which defines and unites the 
human species therefore is this capacity to interpret experience and "begin" from a distinct, 
inimitable perspective. We will see that realising this capacity fully, that is, vesting "natality" 
with meaning, for both Arendt and Thucydides, can occur only from within a political setting—a 
polis.
Any action undertaken by an individual is necessarily creative because one's circumstances, 
though usually falling into a recognisable kind/type of interaction, are, in their details, unique.
Aristotle too praises Pericles' political acumen, specifically his capacity to see the good for men 
"agatha...dunatai theorem" (NE 1140b8-ll).
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actions. That is to say, Pericles demonstrates that good results are likely to follow 
from honest and concerted attention to both general principle and specific 
circumstance, on a willingness to risk under the guidance of reason—to act on 
one's principles creatively rather than dogmatically.^
Thucydides' text embodies a complex web of men, their motives, actions, and the 
dynamic and uncertain conditions that make up their world. Through the 
narrative, the reader sees that man's actions should not be mechanical rg-actions 
to the dictates of abstract principles, for human abstractions (which is to say, 
those of ethics and politics) are not absolute and, more important, cannot be. 
Human beings are indeterminate (and thus, 'free') creatures. Our abstractions 
are no more (and indeed no less!) than generalisations formed from habituation 
and reflection on past experience.^® Treating them as anything more than this 
endows man with an inflated sense of power, and sustains the illusion that only 
given fixed certainty accessed from 'above' (i.e., abstract concepts which are 
somehow 'impartial' to the value-laden lives we live) can he secure the power 
and stability needed for reasonable thought and action. 9^ A sense of what is 
reasonable for man comes from honest attention paid to the experiences 'within' 
his world. In Thucydides' History, it is equally the men who act on isolated 
principle alone as those without principle at all who are most misguided.
revealing parallel can be drawn between Pericles and the victors whom Pindar praised. 
Pericles, like the great athletes, was exceptional, and not aU members of even the most optimum 
polis would be able to achieve the greatness he did (just as the audience of an ode were not all 
capable, even given the most excellent training, of performing at the level of the athletes Pindar 
exalted). For Greeks, all human beings, though considered by some to be members of the same 
human species, were not endowed with identical potentials. However, this does not make 
training/education irrelevant for those who are, by nature, 'average'. Indeed, I would argue that 
the function of the ideal Greek polis was to allow people to become fully realised, to whatever 
lengths they could be given their individual nature and in light of the polis' good. A Pericles, or a 
great athlete helps to illuminate the boundaries of human excellence, and in this provides 
guidcuice/a framework for all people, not matter how far they, individually, can reach.
Here we might draw some parallels between Wittgenstein's "language games, " and Cavell s 
"shared forms of life" (Philosophical Investigations; Must Vie Mean What We Say, respectively).
If man construes his abstractions as Truth, he gives himself the capacity to create Truth, a 
power that is inappropriate to him in that it disregards his nature/his species" place in the kosmos. 
Furthermore, this deluded sense of power is one which can be—and often has been—used cruelly 
(see Arendt's idea of "truth as construct of power" explored by Disch Hannah Arendt and the 
Limits of Philosophy Ithaca: 1994, p.ll3).
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Ultimately, either extreme is a form of enslavement, as blinding and oppressive 
as a despot's arbitrary rule.
Chapter 7: Arendt and Human Freedom
I will interpret the History as reformulating a common (modem) understanding 
of human freedom, one which is reflected by Hannah Arendt in The Human 
Condition. A  man's freedom, according to Arendt (and, I wish to argue, 
according to Thucydides as well), does not arise out of becoming 'master' of his 
world. That is, freedom does not come about through sheer power and control 
(as stated above, this is often associated with the possession of an objective Truth 
thought to render man capable of infallible prediction and guaranteed 
achievement of ends). This conception of freedom is a distortion when 
associated with human beings, for it is not derived from observation of men as 
they actually live. In fact, it patently misrepresents the nature of man and the 
world he inhabits. Closer scrutiny on the experience of human life (through for 
instance, its representation in poetry and history) reveals human freedom to be 
more elusive than this, and certainly not confirmed by the ability to act and to 
achieve without fail one's desired ends. As Arendt argues, freedom comes 
through the human capacity to "risk self-disclosure" in action and speech within 
a community. Freedom is man acting creatively given a reasonable sense of (an 
educated or well-informed guess as to) what is both possible and good for him. 
This creativity, dependent on and stimulated by a sense of reasonableness, is 
available to man only when from acting within a web of human relationships in 
the world (not from a neutral point outside it). For Arendt, human freedom is 
not realised solely in discreet, isolated achievements, but on well-reasoned, 
creative action amongst others:
It is because of this already existing web of human 
relationships with its innumerable, conflicting wills and 
intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose, 
but it is also because of this medium, in which action alone
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is real, that it "'produces" stories, with or without intention 
as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.*^
Men, Arendt claims, through action and speech, make stories yet, importantly, 
stories over which they have only limited control.®  ^ By paying attention to and 
being honest about one's own story, as well as the 'real' stories others live, men 
can arrive at a "general standpoint" which is necessarily "closely connected with 
particulars" (because it grows out of them).®  ^ This standpoint—due to the 
breadth of its origin, not its detached, neutrality/objectivity—offers men a place 
from which to reflect, and ultimately allows them to shape more freely their own 
lives (the actions of which Arendt believes are tested and judged in the public 
sphere). Through "visiting" the world that Thucydides portrays in the History, 
the reader's world expands, opening new possibilities and ways of thinking.^^ 
At the same time, its stories reinforce the fact that human beings are forever 
embedded within a socio-historical context for which there is no ultimate 
transcendent perspective.
I wish to argue that Arendt's distinct understanding of human freedom has some 
striking parallels with what we find in Thucydides—the History displays a world 
of speech and action, where actions, though perhaps often derailed from actors' 
intentions, do not cease to be worthwhile and meaningful. Meaning is not 
derived solely from the realisation of an intended 'end' (which, Arendt notes is a 
difficult concept to reduce to a particular action, for though perhaps performed 
for a specific reason, every action has an infinite number of consequences that in 
some sense "outdo" it), but out of conscious deliberation and honest reflection 
(reasonableness), and the actual doing itself (creativity). Again, this is not to deny 
the importance of outcomes, it is only to stress a crucial point about political
^ The Human Condition {2^  ed, Chicago: 1998, p.l84).
Arendt claims that each man is the "hero" (as originally conceived in Homer), not the author of 
his story (ibid., p.l84).
“  Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: 1982, p.44).
^ This happens at first on the scale of the war itself. Cogan remarks that the speeches, which give 
the reader a "view" from a multitude of perspectives, expands and deepens his understanding of 
the events Thucydides describes {The Human Thing Chicago: 1981).
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theorising: No political theory can guarantee the sure attainment of particular 
intended outcomes, nor can a single theory guide men through the specific 
details and nuances that make each individual life meaningful (if difficult). To 
expect this would be to misunderstand what man is, for it would ignore the 
inherent indeterminacy of being human. However, a good political theory can 
give the theorist (and hopefully others) a broader understanding of the kinds of 
things that are reasonable for human beings, and in this can increase the 
likelihood, the probability of achieving good outcomes more consistently. ^
Thucydides' story reveals the impossibility of isolating fixed and universal rules 
or principles for men to use rigidly in guiding their own particular lives, and at 
the same time, it trains the reader and broadens his perspective in such a way as 
to help him better understand the general principles he relies on so that he can 
better and more deliberately shape his own particular life. The men we 
encounter in Thucydides' History, and his present readers alike, have only a 
limited view of the kosmos and thus only a limited amount of control over it. They 
can never step fully outside their world, but they can find stability by extending 
its 'boundaries', by engaging honestly and attentively with the many varieties of 
human life.
Chapter 8: The Power to Discern
But then what enables us to act reasonably (as opposed to merely acting)? 
Acting reasonably given this understanding of human freedom demands 
cultivating the power to discern what is important in a given situation. This 
power to discern is what reading (i.e., actively participating in) the History helps
^ A 'good' general was considered good because he increased the probability of achieving certain 
outcomes over others. His insight and reason made him a certain kind of person. This distinct 
character manifested itself in the extemal world through discreet actions which brought about 
specific 'outcomes'. But, the capacity for good action (zmd subsequent outcome) was the product 
of a long cultivated, stable character which, as we have seen, was not invulnerable to extemal 
forces. Given this, the reader must shift from valuing a mechanical and certain attainment of 
goals, to valuing increased understanding, the basis of a 'noble' character. Such a character 
increases the likelihood of doing good consistently. This understanding wLU highlight the 
importance of forgiving and human freedom, discussed more fuUy below.
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to develop in its readers—at any time in history. Man must not (and indeed 
cannot) hope to generate a set of immutable, universally applicable principles, 
but instead must nurture an acute discerning capacity. In doing so, he leams to 
be attentive to and present in the situations in which he finds himself, in all their 
complexity.^ There is no escape into the purity and clarity of a wholly abstract 
world. The power to discern comes from immersion in, not separation from the 
world as it is. Thucydides presents the human world as anything but clear and 
consistent. Its inherent ambiguity requires that man view his abstract 
generalisations in a new light. They do not authoritatively direct action from 
"above', instead they are both stable and tentative, capable of simultaneously 
structuring a particular moment yet flexible enough to 'fit' its distinctive 
elements. Therefore, the rigid dichotomy that much of western culture has come 
to associate between abstract and particular dissolves, and leaves instead the 
evolving ability to discern how they work best together.
The "power to discern" I describe is manifested in a particular and stable 
character or disposition. Cultivating such a disposition demands understanding 
the dynamic relationship between abstract generalisations and concrete 
particulars in the human world. Thucydides presents this relationship to his 
readers. The History reveals both man and his world to be indeterminate, each 
one effecting and being affected by the other.®  ^ Reading the History requires 
engaging in the continuous process of broadening one's understanding through
^ This capacity to discern, I hope to show in Part HI, has many parallels with Aristotle's concept 
of the mean as determined by the prudent man, or phronimos (e.g., NE 1104a5-10, b25-28; 
1106bl6ff; and 1109al3). In Thucydides, this capacity means being attuned to ta deonta -  the 
relevant factors of a concrete situation. For a discussion of ta deonta in Thucydides, see, de Ste. 
Croix Origins of Peloponnesian War (London: 1972, pp.6ff); Edmunds, L. Chance and Intelligence in 
Thucydides (Cambridge: 1975, pp.l67ff); Finley Thucydides (Cambridge: 1942, pp.95ff ).
^ A similar understanding of the relationship between human beings and the extemal world in 
which they act is expressed by Hannah Arendt: "In addition to the conditions under which life is 
given to man on earth, and partly out of them, men constantly create their own, self-made 
conditions which, their human origin and their variability notwithstanding, possess the same 
conditioning power as natural things" (The Human Condition, 2^  ed. Chicago: 1998, p.9). And 
later, "man is always a doer and sufferer" (ibid., p.l90). A similar view is found in Marx's The 
German Ideology: "circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances" (The Marx 
Engels Reader, ed. Tucker, New York: 1978, p.l65).
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experiencing the world from an ever-increasing number of standpoints. This 
inherent openness results in an ongoing and open dialectic—the very crux of 
man's freedom. The reader experiences this dialectic, this freedom, by reading the 
History. There, he engages with the interplay between man's words and actions, 
and the consequences that they have on the world extemal to him, both intended 
and unforeseen.
Thucydides recognises that the unforeseen is a source of uncertainty, and that 
uncertainty is a source of terror for man. In hopes of regaining control and 
escaping the uncertainty inherent in his freedom, man is prone to cling 
desperately to abstract principles (as religious omens, or perhaps, 'fancy words' 
from the mouths of dishonest ideologues). Whatever their form, these fixed 
abstractions share the characteristic of being detached from and elevated above 
the vicissitudes of man's actual life—his political life. This lofty position endows 
them—and the men who claim to 'know' them—with a false sense of power.®^ 
Ultimately, these immutable abstractions divert man's attention, or worse, they 
excuse man from having to perform the infinitely harder task of paying attention 
to, and drawing lessons from the important particular details of life. Thus, it is 
precisely man's freedom, that precious quality that many argue elevates him 
from the beasts, which generates the unstable and insecure condition that causes 
him to seek, hold on to, and often become imprisoned by a false sense of 
certainty. Relinquishing this deceptive sense of certainty forces man to cultivate 
stability elsewhere. Thucydides helps to develop this alternative.
Chapter 9: Custom and History—The Structure and Stability Provided by the 
Palis
This shift from trying to locate security in fixed abstract principles to cultivating 
a life-long "power to discern" leaves the image of man as he emerges from 
Thucydides critically incomplete. Above, I discussed the relationship between
Abstractions come later to embody not only power, but reality, e.g., Plato's "cave" in the 
Republic.
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abstract and concrete, and the need for man to be acutely sensitive to and honest 
about both the generalisations he has made, and the ways they relate to the 
particular situations in which he finds himself. I have discussed the importance 
of broadening one's experiences, of engaging in what Arendt terms "visiting" in 
order to reach a "general standpoint" from which one can reflect. While 
reflection on a wide range of experiences is crucial to man's sense of 
reasonableness (necessary when abstract principles lose their authority), there is 
another important factor which Thucydides (and Arendt) suggests is equally 
vital. We must turn to the role played by the polis in order to help further 
illuminate what is reasonable for man and understand how he accesses it. The 
idea that reasonableness is based on varied experience alone is too vague, it 
leaves man adrift, and in the end, supports a position that is vulnerable to a 
charge of relativism. While the polis cannot supply the certainty of universal, 
abstract standards, it further cultivates the 'middle ground' (the human ground) 
by illustrating how a sense of reasonableness for man arises through being 
acculturated to particular customs and belonging to a larger sense of history.
In the History, men receive instruction/ leadership in two interconnected ways—I 
WÜ1 call them custom' and history'. Thucydides suggests that these are 
accessible to men by living in and habituating themselves to a particular culture, 
developed and sustained in a polis (the space for Arendt's "web of relationships 
and enacted stories"). The polis provides the extemal conditions that men need 
to develop, both physically and intellectually. The polis provides the initial 
'substance' for his thought. Custom and history as experienced through active 
political life give man a sense of who he is. In a polis, he can reflect on and 
critically think about not only what values guide his own actions, but about what 
others like him do and have historically done. He can see the effects of both his 
own decisions and actions and those of others' (Arendt's publicity and plurality). 
Furthermore, the polis, with its laws and mores, gives him stability. Again, this is 
not the stability provided by True and fixed abstractions, but a more 'local', and
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thus importantly, a more accessible (though no less reasonable) form. Custom 
and history, though in ways constricting, give man a base, something to ground 
himself in (if eventually only to react against!). Through direct engagement with 
an ongoing political experience man can begin to flesh out a reasonable sense of 
what kind of creature he is.
Arendt argues that the polis serves as that which can combat the inherent "chaos" 
of the human world (as well as the brute fact of human mortality) by creating an 
arena of "organised remembrance."®® Only by living within the structure and 
security of a polis can men be recognised and remembered by others. Living in a 
polis makes man feel a part of something, and only as a part of something can man 
become an agent capable of meaningful action. Meaningful actions do not 
happen randomly or in a vacuum, but through a medium—again, this is the 
"web" of human relationships, or the political realm. The structure and order of 
the polis generates a broader sense of belonging to an articulatable something 
(which Arendt claims is (in part) derived from the promises we make with one 
another). In such a community, man sees his actions reflected back to him, he 
experiences their effects. Over time, this process develops in him a stable 
identity. This enduring identity allows him to act and assign value to the world 
around him. Actions take on meaning through being both embedded in and 
guided by the structure of man's political sphere, which is itself structured by 
custom and history. Both instruct and guide man as he interacts with the world, 
and shape the way he first relates to it. As such, each one, somewhat 
paradoxically, serves both to constrain man and to free him.®^
The Human Condition (2^  ed., Chicago: 1998, p. 198).
See Hunter, V. (Past and Process in Thucydides Princeton: 1992); de Ste. Croix (The Origins of the 
Peloponnesian War London:1972); Homblower (Thucydides Baltimore: 1987) for discussions of 
Thucydides' own constraints. However, the existence of man's inescapable constraints or 
partiality need not be seen as inimical to good/fair judgement and choice. This point is made 
clearly in Disch's interpretation of Arendt, in which Disch highlights an alternative to judgement 
from an illusory Archimedean standpoint, replacing it instead with "impartial partiality," the 
ability to be critical from within a particular situation (Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy 
Ithaca: 1994, pp. 27ff.). This view has parallels with Aristotle's conception of the polis as that 
which cultivates this capacity. This idea will be discussed further below in Part HI.
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The History's portrayal of different poleis highlights the fact that for Thucydides, 
man can never be simply a passive recipient of an endless stream of sense data, 
but rather is always, necessarily, situated in a concrete context (i.e., living in a 
particular community with its values and at a specific time in history). Thus all 
'extraction' from and reflection on concrete experience has implicit in it an 
ideological framework derived from habitual interpretation from a distinct 
perspective—that is, from living life in one community or another.^o Every man 
will not interpret brute 'fact' identically, in part because his customs and history 
will inhibit or hone his ability to interpret the 'data' he perceives.^^ As these 
interpretations differ, so too do his abstract principles and ideals. This means 
that those concrete experiences to which man is exposed as he lives in the world 
directly impact the abstract principles he develops and employs in his thought 
and action later in life.^  ^ Because of the influence of diverse extemal conditions, 
all men cannot access equally a set of universal ideals above and beyond their 
particular experiences had in their own cultural milieux. Given this, man must
^ The importance of community, and the polis in particular, is evident in Thucydides at the outset 
of the History—in the Archaeology—where Thucydides implies that it is only after a "common 
sense of Greek nationality" is established that human accomplishment is made possible (Finley. 
Thucydides Cambridge, MA : 1963, p.85). In a similar vein. Crane argues that the principle which 
grounds much of Thucydides' History is the idea that success can only come to poleis given 
political stability (Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity Berkeley: 1998, p.l6). The world 
Thucydides describes in the Archaeology is one where small, undeveloped states quarrel 
amongst each other—this lack of centralised power recurs as the war progresses, Athenian 
leadership fragments, and Athens is finally defeated. The importance of the polis is all the more 
palpable in Thucydides' impassioned discussion of the horrors of stasis at m.82-86. Civil strife, in 
destroying the structure/order of a city, makes it impossible for man to flourish. With it comes 
the dissolution of meaningful language, the decay of custom and law, and the rise of selfishness, 
greed and depravity. For an extensive discussion on this theme, see Orwin, The Humanity of 
Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, pp.172-192). It is also in this that we see a potentially misleading 
connection to Hobbes. While both understand the polis as essential to human flourishing, unlike 
Hobbes, Thucydides cannot conceive of 'man' with capacities and habits that are pre- 
socio/political/civil existing outside of it, there in 'natural' form to be constrained by the 
rationality of the contract.
For further discussion on the nature and limits of ideology on man's capacity to judge and act 
reasonably, see Crane Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley: 1998, pp.8-9).
This presumably is what leads Aristotle to claim that it makes "all the difference" into what 
kind of community one is raised. This is not to deny the possibility that there is some form of 
Truth out there, it is only to say that the human capacity to access such truth, if it does in fact 
exist, is not realised in us at birth. This will be addressed further below.
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seek to actively enlarge his experiences, and in doing so, enlarge the ^content' of 
his abstract thought and his potential for reasonable, creative action.
This conclusion leads to a modification of my preliminary account of man as he 
appears in Thucydides—that is, as simply an indeterminate being, capable of 
developing from varied experience a power to "discern," and then able to engage 
in prudent action within his particular environment. While man and his world 
are in large measure malleable', the possibilities available to him are not infinite 
and unlimited, nor can they be understood objectively from an extemal 
standpoint. The customs into which man is raised, and the history he is a 
continuation of, form the constraints he faces as he manifests himself in the 
world through speech and action. However, it is equally the case that custom 
and history serve as the support and security man needs (providing a sense of 
belonging and identity) in order to confront and engage effectively with foreign' 
ways of life, alternative stories', which are necessary to the development of the 
kind of enduring discerning character that allows him to act reasonably and 
creatively in an otherwise uncertain world.
In summary the History suggests that a general understanding of man cannot be 
accessed, much less adequately understood without scrutinising the 
environment into which particular men have been acculturated. Discourse on 
abstractions in isolation of the people and events which substantiate them is a 
mere linguistic game, not good political theory. However, this assumption does 
not bar Thucydides (or present readers) from having an abstract sense of what 
man is—it just qualifies this general sense, renders it open, indeterminate, 
somewhat tentative. The conception of man that appears in Thucydides builds 
on the conception of man found in Pindar in that he appears to be a creature who 
has a peculiar kind of freedom derived from his variable place in a fixed natural 
hierarchy. Ultimately, the History suggests that those qualities and capacities 
which make man uniquely man—for instance, his ability to act humanely—must 
be developed. Man's 'humanity' exists in him only as a potential, and it is the task
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of political theory to identify through what sort of speech and action, and in what 
kinds conditions, this potential is realised.
In exploring and analysing the experience of life in a poZis—specifically through 
its customs and history—we see that each in a different way contextualises man's 
place in his world, shapes his evolving understanding of it, and cultivates his 
discerning capacity. It is only through a sense of where man has come from, 
what he has done, and for what kinds of reasons, that an understanding of what 
is reasonable (and good) for him in the circumstances can emerge. This is not to 
say that man is inextricably bound to the ideological framework of his past or 
present community, unable to progress or change. In fact, Thucydides' History 
implies that precisely the converse is true. However, as we saw with Pindar, 
whose odes embedded even the most awe-inspiring and ground-breaking victors 
in a past tradition, any deliberate and reasonable change demands a sense of 
who or where man currently is. This self-knowledge comes through immersion 
in custom and history, both one's own and those of others. The first allows man 
to see better the range of choices available to him, and to discern more prudently 
the appropriate ones given his own predicament. Broad exposure to a range of 
different customs and histories (i.e., other poleis) helps man to contextualise and 
make sense of his own character because he has a broader base from which to 
critically reflect on his desires and beliefs. This puts him in a better position to 
choose to change, or at least move beyond blind acceptance of the tradition in 
which he was acculturated to. He can develop an understanding of why his 
particular polis endorses the doctrines and practices it does.^^ The 'constraints' of 
history, custom, and character provide the base man needs to realise his
In saying this, I by no means want to imply that Thucydides thought to escape one's 'nurture' 
or habituation was easy given sufficient exposure to different cultures. The idea of a self-made 
man, or the American dream of self-reinvention was no part of the ancient mind. It was the polis 
that made the man, and for both Thucydides, and we will see even more explicitly for Aristotle, 
change, though not impossible, is extremely difficult.
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humanity effectively so that he can prudently use his freedom in reasonable, 
creative action.^^
But isn't this merely pushing the initial issue back a step—or worse, deferring to a 
disguised form of just the line of thinking I hoped to refute? Am I not simply 
replacing "certainty" in the form of fixed abstract generalisations with the more 
ambiguous and muddled "conceptual web of varied experience, custom, and 
history"? I want to use Thucydides' History, with its complex structure and rich 
content to avoid this trap. I wish to argue that the History actively trains readers 
to replace certainty (derived from a detached, neutral—'objective'—standpoint) 
with the capacity to discern, that is, to think reasonably, to reflect on and be 
critical of what has been done, to understand why certain characters did what 
they did. The alternative I propose demands reading the History as a tool—as the 
embodiment of particular experiences, customs and histories—to be used to help 
build a discerning character prepared to engage with the inescapable uncertainty 
of human life, where one must rely not solely on principles, but on principles as 
they relate to (and perhaps are changed by) experience. In this, Thucydides 
provides man with a much more effective and sufficiently (if not definitively) 
well-grounded body of knowledge with which he can think reasonably and act 
creatively, or be humanly free.^^
Human freedom however, is not only limited by the qualities/potentials man 
has because he is a man (and not a god or an animal), particular men are limited 
by the disparate capacities they have by nature as individuals, and by the 
environment in which they are raised. Not everyone can be a Pericles, no matter 
where they are raised, or what calibre of education they receive. Likewise, an 
extremely gifted man who has the misfortune of being raised in a seriously 
impoverished community has little hope of realising fully his potential. Both
Again, "freedom" and "creativity" should be understood in the narrow way I have tried to 
define them, not as they are often understood in the modem, anything-is-possible sense.
In doing so, I hope to show that this sets up a relationship between individual and 
history/tradition/character which is not so unlike Pindar's in that the individual is the vehicle 
for change, but that change is possible only through understanding where one has come from.
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natural ability and environment profoundly, and often permanently, shape the 
characters men become. Yet a deeper understanding of one's beliefs and the 
reasons behind them, even if unable to bring about a pronounced character 
change or political revolution, can nonetheless better prepare man to do well in 
the complicated circumstances he encounters.
Reading Thucydides and taking seriously his aim in writing the History suggests 
the belief that this understanding comes through broadening one's perspective 
through wide exposure to and experience with different cultures, and contact 
with the kinds of characters those particular cultures generate given their 
particular set of values and beliefs. In extending his perspective in this way, man 
improves his chances (increases the likelihood /  probability) of assessing and 
understanding situations in such a way that he can make good decisions. But 
success for man is rare, and a truly admirable man, perhaps rarer (the generals 
who follow Pericles indicate this tragic truth). Still, even lacking a concrete, 
recognisable success—for getting it right is no small achievement for m an- 
human lives can have meaning. To understand this, one must understand the 
kinds of extemal forces that limit man's freedom, that render him incapable of 
realising his good intentions. Thucydides' narrative illuminates just this—his 
narrative shows (though does not tell) his readers why certain characters advise 
and do what they do. The History encourages the reader to think about what 
values certain men were acculturated to, what kinds of "words and deeds" they 
were exposed to, and given this, what kind of characters they became. To what 
extent did they push themselves to understand, or perhaps see beyond their own 
cultures and beliefs? And importantly, to what extent was pushing beyond 
effectively impossible for some men? There are no definitive answers to these 
questions, but learning to ask them, and actively thinking about how to find and 
judge amongst different answers to them is, I believe, an essential element of 
what Thucydides aimed to 'teach'.
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Thucydides' narrative explains why certain characters are to be admired and 
others denounced through representing their experiences. As the History 
progresses, the (active) reader develops a capacity to judge the men in the History 
given the specific situations each particular man confronts together with a more 
general understanding of man (which emerges gradually, through 'extracting' 
from the different experiences Thucydides portrays). The reader, like those 
portrayed in the text itself, cannot 'leam ' how to be successful all the time—this 
would be divine, not human. Developing a deeper, richer sense of the kinds of 
thoughts and reasons that shape man's actions is the aim, and this is within 
man's control. Both discreet achievement and success, and personal and political 
change depend on this preliminary understanding (yet even with it they are not 
guaranteed).
The History helps to cultivate this understanding of man by describing a series of 
events in a variety of styles, reflecting different modes of human interaction 
together with analysis on that interaction. The narrative represents the 
deliberations, the choices and the actions of men, as well as their results: it is 
punctuated by a stylised debate between cities, frank observations from 
Thucydides himself, and, of course by the legendary speeches delivered by 
significant individuals during the course of the war.^^
The speeches in the History aid significantly in illuminating the characters' 
abstract values and beliefs, and in the section to follow, I will examine a 
particular debate to flesh out this point. However, while Finley argues that 
Thucydides' speeches are the "primary vehicle for general truths,"^^ I maintain 
that this is not the quite the case, but accept an interpretation closer to that of 
Cogan—that the "general truths" in Thucydides' History lie in the juxtaposition of
For detailed analyses of the speeches in Thucydides, see Stadter The Speeches in Thucydides 
(Chapel Hill, NC: 1973). There has been extensive debate as to the accuracy of the reported 
speech in the History, but as that discussion is beyond the scope of this study, I will not address it 
here.
Finley, J.H. Thucydides (Cambridge, MA: 1963, p. 76)
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and relationship between speech and recorded events.^® That is to say, 
Thucydides sets out a path for the reader which moves continually from concrete 
to abstract and back, thus ’training’ him to negotiate more effectively the 
relationship between general concepts and the specific people and events which 
substantiate them. Furthermore, due to Thucydides' style, the reader is aware 
that both the speeches and narrative itself are delivered by individuals, each 
from a distinct perspective.^ To reinforce this diffused perspective, the men in 
the History are always understood to be the product of a particular city 
(understood to have its distinct ideals and values). Thus, the structure of the 
narrative constantly forces the reader to shift from one viewpoint to another. 
This casts light on the nature of the abstract generalisations in the text -  it 
precludes the possibility of their being understood as the embodiment of 
"neutral" principles obtained from a single, objective standpoint. The 
flourishing man is he who can make these shifts gracefully and does not grasp 
desperately at only the limiting principles to which he was first habituated. Let 
us now look at a specific moment in the History to observe more concretely some 
of these ideas.
Chapter 10: Cleon's Speech at Mytilene
The debate between Cleon and Diodotus about Mytilene has received much 
attention among scholars and has drawn a great deal of attention to these two 
remarkable speakers.^°° Mytilene, a "privileged" yet disgruntled ally of
Cogan The Human Thing (Chicago: 1981, pp. 173ff.). For an extended discussion of the 
relationship between speech and narrative in Thucydides, see The Speeches in Thucydides, ed. 
Statder, P.A.(Chapel Hill, NC: 1973), especially "Particular and Universal in Thucydides" 
Hammond, N.G.L.; Hunter, V. Thucydides: the Artful Reporter (Toronto: 1973); and Palmer, M. Love 
of Glory and the Common Good (Lanham, MD: 1992).
^ Even Thucydides himself makes his presence known periodically throughout the text (e.g., I.l, 
11.48, IV.104, V.26, VI.7, VI.51). While his introductory words make himself out to be the 
definitive /  authoritative voice on the history he narrates, this confidence reveals a strong, personal 
voice to the reader, suggesting a distinct person, growing out of (even if differentiating himself 
from) a particular tradition.
Connor remarks on the deceit used by both Cleon and Diodotus, and the contrast between the 
reader's relief at the outcome of the debate and the events which immediately follow it, which, in 
some sense, negate it (Thucydides Princeton: 1984, pp.111-112); Raubitschek comments on the
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Athens,^°i with an offer of Spartan and Boeotian support, attempted to unify and 
galvanise all of Lesbos to revolt against Athenian rule (III.2). The rebellion, 
though unsuccessful, caused the Athenians great anxiety—no doubt heightened 
by the strain of an escalating war, the devastation inflicted on them by the 
plague, and recent loss of their great general, P e r i c l e s . ^ ° 2  Additionally, the failed 
revolt brought the potential upset of a successful rebellion into high relief. Thus, 
in a fit of (worry turned to) rage, the Athenians resolved on a savage punishment 
-  they would kill all the Mytilenean men above the age of puberty, and sell the 
women and children into slavery. However, after literally sleeping on their 
decision (and effectively reflecting on it), the Athenians reconsidered -  perhaps 
their proposed punishment was excessive, disproportionate to the deed, or, at 
the very least, directed at those who might not have been responsible (i.e., at the 
demos rather than the oligarchs).
The debate between Cleon and Diodotus occurred as a result of these second 
thoughts -  specifically on the issue of whether or not to punish the demos}^^ 
However, scholars have also characterised it as a dramatised analysis of a
shifting meaning of empire, contrasting both Cleon and Diodotus with Pericles ("Pathology of 
Power in the Speeches in Thucydides" The Speeches in Thucydides, ed. Stadter, pp.28-29); Westlake 
draws a comparison between Cleon and Pericles Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge:1968 pp. 
60-65); Euben contrasts Cleon's rhetoric with that of Pericles' {The Tragedy of Political Theory 
(Princeton: 1990, pp. 177ff.); Crane writes on Cleon's relentless and unabashed promotion of 
Athenian hegemony {Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley: 1998, pp. 167-187); and 
Gomme refers to Cleon's "cynical and ruthless logic" but admits to the practical difficulty in 
realising the strategy of Diodotus {Historical Commentary on Thucydides IQ.40.3, ni.46.4).
c^^ Kagan remarks that the Mytileneans, though seen as "autonomous" prior to the outbreak of 
war, had wanted to secede from the Athenian alliance well before the fighting began, but were 
unable to secure support from the Peloponnesian League {The Archidamian War, Ithaca:1974, 
p.l34).
•^^ See in. 13 for Mytilene's description of Athens' weakness at the time of the revolt. For a more 
comprehensive account of Athens' state at 429, see Kagan The Arichidamian War (Ithaca: 1974, 
p.l54).
103 Orvvin points out that Thucydides keeps the guilt or innocence of the Mytilenean demos 
unclear, thus forcing the reader to focus on "more fundamental issues," e.g., those of justice and 
expediency, the value/efficacy of democratic deliberation {The Humanity of Thucydides Princeton: 
1994, p.l43). Kagan highlights the fact that Thucydides gives the reader only the "extreme" 
positions of the debate, omitting the more moderate perspectives, which, he argues, were most 
certainly voiced at the time {The Arichidamian War Ithaca: 1974, p.l59). I believe that these 
omissions and ambiguities support the idea that Thucydides encouraged and expected his reader 
to participate in the text, to be active.
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common theme in Thucydides; the (often contentious) relationship between 
justice (abstract, theoretical, legal) and expediency (concrete, practical, 
p o lit ic a l) .T h u c y d id e s  reports the arguments of the two generals in direct 
discourse (Cleon from 111.37-40 and Diodotus from 111.42-48). Below, I will 
examine Cleon's speech with an aim to assess how Athenian citizenship (i.e., 
being raised within, and acculturated to the traditions of 5* century Athens) 
plays itself out in different characters. I will examine Cleon's inability to 
negotiate between abstract principle, precedent, and present context, revealing 
how his misunderstanding of this relationship ultimately inhibits him from 
acting reasonably and creatively within the political sphere.
This will begin to bring into focus the nature of a good leader as being successful 
not only insofar as he is capable of achieving his intended particular ends (that is, 
as effectively using practical reason), but as he who can clarify the situation, 
tease out and order its puzzling elements, and orient the demos towards what he 
has discerned as the reasonable and creative action.
Cleon
Before concentrating on some of these issues, I will first sketch a brief image of 
Cleon as he emerges from Thucydides' narrative. Cleon is a particularly striking 
individual in the History for a number of reasons. Perhaps most obvious is 
Thucydides' unqualified negative judgement of him, one which gets 
progressively more pointed and resolute as the History continues. Westlake 
highlights not only Thucydides' initial characterisation, identifying Cleon as the
Crzme discusses the deteriorated relationship of just reciprocity between Mytilene and Athens, 
and the fact that the increasing power (and pleonexia) of Athens made them subject to the lure of 
any expedient action likely to increase her power (Jhucydides and the Ancient Simplicity Berkeley: 
1998, pp. 176-180). Kagan analyses Diodotus' speech pointing to his belief that injustice—which 
characterised Clean's proposed punishment—would in fact not be expedient {The Archidamian War 
Ithaca: 1974, pp. 160-163). Orwin remarks on Diodotus' ingenuity by playing on the structure of 
Cleon's argument which claimed that the harsh punishment was necessary, if unjust. Diodotus 
then argued that even if just, the punishment would be inimical to the Athenians best interests.
In this, Orwin argues that Diodotus provides an argument that relies both on justice and 
expediency {The Humanity of Thucydides Princeton: 1994, pp.l46ff).
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"most violent/forceful of citizens" {biaiotatos ton politon)}^^ but also his striking 
speculation about Cleon's ignoble motives in his actions following his 
appearance at Mytilene.^^^ Additionally, of particular note is Thucydides' 
portrayal of Cleon's death—he dies a coward in battle: "having never 
contemplated taking a stand...and running immediately [upon confrontation 
with the enemy]" (V.10).^°  ^ Such an end, especially given Cleon's own projected 
self image—realistic, tough, and above all, a man of action rather than mere 
words—is undeniably critical, even hateful. His death appears all the more 
disgraceful in light of its striking contrast with Brasidas, the Spartan general 
opposing him at the time. While Cleon runs, Brasidas speaks of the fearful 
Athenian soldiers under Cleon's command with their "shaking spears and 
heads." However, ultimately even the nameless Athenian hoplites showed more 
courage than Cleon, "not giving up until the Myrcinian and Chalcidian cavalry 
and peltasts had surrounded them" (V.IO).
is significant, however, that Thucydides does refer to Cleon as a citizen -  not merely as a man 
-  thus locating him firmly in the Athenian community and tradition (deteriorated though it may 
be).
106 This is especially true of the second debate at Pylos, for which Kagan provides a useful and 
detailed analysis {The Archidamian War (Ithaca: 1974, p. 218ff.). See also, Westlake {Individuals in 
Thucydides Cambridge: 1968, p.71).
lo^ A disgraceful death was particularly shameful for the Greeks, perhaps this is why Thucydides 
does not give details about that of Pericles, who is thought to have suffered the terrible, 
dehumanising effects of the plague. In portraying Cleon in this shameful light, Thucydides, 
effectively, and we can assume, intentionally, marks him for posterity (especially given 
Thucydides' intentions for the permanence of his work).
10® Thucydides' passionate aversion to Cleon leads Homblower to place the excessively hostile 
comments in the context of the more personal grounds that might have motivated Thucydides in 
describing him {Thucydides Baltimore: 1987, pp.l65ff.). However, whether or not Thucydides did 
or did not hold a personal bias against Cleon, his actions in this battle illustrate an important 
point—abstract principle is impotent, if not destructive, if lacking a stable, discerning 
character/disposition to apply them, to make them fit' the situation. For more on the 
relationship between word and action, see Boyd-White When Words Lose Their Meaning (Chicago: 
1984, p. 62ff.), and of the influence of the [words of] histories on one's present actions, see Cogan 
The Human Thing (Chicago: 1981, pp. 182ff.).
1°^  It is important to note at this point that the Athenian hoplites, while perhaps "nameless" were 
not low level, riff-raff in the Athenian polis. The hoplites were often of the wealthier classes, as 
the equipment needed to be a land soldier was expensive (see de Ste. Criox, G.E.M. The Class 
Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquest (London: 1981, p.115); 
and Murray and Price (eds.) The Greek City (Oxford: 1990, pp.59-82)
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Still, even given Thucydides' plain contempt for Cleon, his tie to Athens is 
strong. He is an active participant in the war, and plays a central role in three of 
eight books in the History. Furthermore, he was a leader chosen by the Athenians 
(a fact which casts light on Thucydides' opinion of the Athenian demos—albeit 
under strain in a brutal war). Cleon's connection to Athens becomes even more 
palpable in that his language recalls that of its most distinguished statesman and 
general, Pericles.^^® Equally significant is the parallel between Cleon and 
Thucydides himself. Cleon's speech about Mytilene imparts a message which 
echoes Thucydides' own concerns about man and democracy, specifically the 
ability (or inability) of the demos to be discriminating, or "discerning" in the face 
of skilled, persuasive, yet untrustworthy orators.^^^
What then to make of Cleon? Why is his counsel, despite relying on principles so 
similar to those of the esteemed Pericles and Thucydides' own, so utterly 
abhorrent? And how is it, given such inhumane advice, that he is in an eerie 
way, a persuasive speaker? As a way of structuring my analysis of Cleon and his 
argument, I will try to answer these questions in light of some of the themes I 
discussed above.
See Connor Thucydides (Ithaca: 1974, p.79); Gomme Historical Commentary on Thucydides 
(Oxford: 1945-72, pp.l07ff); Macleod {Collected Essays Oxford: 1983, p.6S); and Andrewes "The 
Mytilene Debate: 3:36-49" {Phoenix 16, p.75) for discussions of verbal echoes. This sharing of basic, 
abstract principles [in word] and resulting divergent actions illustrates a fundamental piece of 
my argument -  that is to say, sound principles do not necessarily generate good action, the 
bridge is experience and reflection.
At 1.21, Thucydides warns against people's tendency to believe what is told them 
imquestioningly, and similarly at 111.38, Cleon condemns people who naively accept the rhetoric 
of skilled orators simply because their message is pleasing. This distrust of the demos persists into 
the philosophy of ancient Greece -  Plato is certainly no lover of the demos, and Aristotle also 
criticises its inability to be discriminating {NE 1105bl6). Even modem democracies seem to hold 
the source of their own power suspect -  e.g., the early structure of American government 
effectively barred the "people" from direct access to government, giving the citizens direct vote 
only for representatives to the House. Today, the United States' electoral college itself might be 
seen as a way of "distancing" the people from decision-making.
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Cleon's Power to Discern (or lack thereof)
Both Cleon's speech and subsequent actions indicate his inadequate grasp of 
abstract p r i n c i p l e s . ^ ^ ^  This deficiency emerges specifically in terms of his 
approach to applying the law, and more broadly speaking, in his understanding 
of Athenian political customs and tradition. Ober, for instance, describes 
Athenian democracy as "not ossified" but capable of being responsive to variable 
external circumstances. The debate on Mytilene reveals that Cleon views 
abstract law as a force external to human life, imposing or compelling action 
from the outside. This is made explicit in two statements, strategically (and 
revealingly) placed at the open and close of his speech: "it is better for a state to 
enforce bad laws that are always obeyed than to have good ones that go 
unenforced" (III.37); and: "they [the Mytilenens] need to be punished whether 
it's fair or not" (111.40).^ ^^  Cleon seems committed to upholding the rules' 
irregardless of the specific factors that might alter their application in the current 
situation (the fact that these 'rules' seemed appropriate to a group of men in a 
state of impassioned rage, makes the general's obstinate stance even more 
reckless and irresponsible).
This incompetent use of abstract principles arises because Cleon lacks the 
capacity to discern what is important in his particular circumstance and thus 
cannot creatively integrate his principles with the present situation in an effective 
way. This crucial deficiency results in Cleon advocating simple, thoughtless re­
action, disregarding completely the deliberative customs of democratic Athens:
“2 The reader is reminded of Sthenelaidas, who plays on the passions of the people, urging 
against deliberation, and instead, encouraging prompt action alone (1.86-87). Just as there is an 
inevitable contrast between Pericles and Cleon, so too in Sparta, between King Archidamus and 
Sthenelaidas.
Ober, J. "Thucydides' Criticism of Democratic Knowledge" in Nomodeiktes ed. Rosen and 
Farrell (Michigan: 1993, p. 82).
This runs counter to what is said later in both Plato and Aristotle. Each implies that rule of 
law alone is insufficient and inappropriate to govern human affairs. See for example in the 
Statesman where it is said that law alone is insufficient because it is unable to "determine what is 
noblest and best for one and all for...nothing in human life is ever at rest" (1294b). Aristotle 
suggests that law's universality makes it unable to deal effectively with certain unprecedented 
"eventualities," which require not dogma, but "experience." {Politics 1287a23ff.).
105
""Get closer to your state of mind when you were aggrieved. Pay them back now. 
Don"t weaken in the passing moment."" (III.40).^^5 He condemns rhetoric, yet 
depends on the demos' quickness in responding to emotion generated in them by 
his inflammatory oratory, on arguments which destabilise a thoughtful response 
that draws on experience. Cleon"s reactive-ness reduces his actions from 
meaningful (deliberate, reasonable) 'creations' to mere 'mechanical feedback', like 
inevitable links in a causal chain. Orwin points to the fact that his speech taps 
into "the two harshest passions: fear and anger...and incites to unrestrained 
bloodlust."^^^ As such, Cleon's words do nothing to distinguish him as a force 
who is capable of illuminating possibilities and clarifying the present situation— 
as a good leader should. Cleon becomes oddly passive, even cowardly in his 
steadfast adherence to carry out the punishment, for he fails to recognise and 
bring to light (much less realise) the other, more honourable possibilities open to 
him.
The notions of honour and bravery get distorted when the Athenians are under 
Cleon"s sway. He states that the ""practice of man"s virtue (andragathizesthai)" is 
only possible when it is safe {akindunou). As the Athenians are all too aware, 
empire is by definition susceptible to revolts, and thus Cleon"s words make the 
practice of virtue and empire mutually exclusive. Given this, he gives the 
Athenians no choice but to advocate brute, unreflective enforcement of 
punitive/ retributive law (in this case, preceded by rash decision). Cleon"s
This is directly counter to Arendt who condemns precisely this kind of reactive, mechanical 
response in favour of "natality." This is the human capacity "of beginning something anew" and 
for Arendt is "the central category of political thought" {The Human Condition 2"^  ed. Chicago: 
1998, p.9).
Orwin The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, p. 144). See also Andrewes: Cleon uses 
"the plain man's prejudice against fancy thinking to prevent any thinking at all " ("The Mytilene 
Debate" Phoenix 16 (1962) p. 75).
In criticising Cleon, I do not wish to imply that empire and virtue are plainly compatible. The 
exercise of political power is never clear-cut. However, power struggles and the possibility of 
virtue are inherent in any political situation, and their harmonisation demands ongoing 
negotiation, constant discourse, and thoughtful reflection. For a discussion on the frailty of a 
magnanimous empire, see Rahe "Thucydides and Ancient Constitutionalism " in Polis and Polemos 
(Claremont: 1997, p. 159ff.). Because Cleon lacks precisely those attributes necessary to 
understand, much less articulate publicly what it would mean to cultivate a "virtuous empire" 
the possibility of one is lost to him, and for a moment, to the Athenian citizens.
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speech seeks to mask reality—that is, the fact that there is a choice to be made. 
Andrews notes that the single option presented by Cleon comes in part from his 
appeal to the need for self-preservation, a requirement that he insists demands 
setting a "paradeigma saphes" (unmistakable precedent).^^® In case he was not 
completely successful in his pressure and deceit, he claimed further that to 
reconsider would be to act childishly, to make a 'game' out of a serious situation- 
-in short, to be weak (III.38). His audience is trapped—either they must accept 
that Cleon's way is the only way, or they are soft, men of mere words. Through 
this we see that Cleon's inability to access a sense of reasonableness at this critical 
moment, to "discern" the situation's relevant, concrete details and harmonise 
them with principle rendered him unable to act creatively and humanely.
In criticising Cleon, however, we must remember that the Athens Cleon 
confronts is not the stable polis it had been at the height of Pericles' rule. The war 
brought about a mild schizophrenia in Athenian citizenship for it forced them to 
acknowledge the conflict inherent in their domestic and 'international' policies: 
they were an imperial force in the larger Greek world, yet their democratic 
ideology, so long a source of pride, still shaped their domestic i den t i ty . ^Time 
and again, Cleon proves himself ill-equipped to grapple with and reconcile this 
split identity, which only intensified during the continuous f ig h t in g .^ 2 0  J q  hope 
for a complete reconciliation' between these two sides was perhaps too 
ambitious an aim given the situation. However, in times when consensus seems 
impossible, a good leader should work to articulate and identify the conflicting 
perspectives and important facts that characterise the present dilemma. In doing 
so, he can better foster the sense of calm and order which comes with broader 
understanding, in this case much needed amidst the manic and confused
Andrews "Cleon's Hidden Appeal" Classical Quarterly 50 (2000) pp.45-62.
The fact that their land had been ravaged as a result of Periclean policy must have added to 
their identity crisis', for they were forced to define themselves more and more abstractly, 
through what they believed, or perhaps wanted to believe, they were.
This capacity to embody two seemingly exclusive characteristics is a feature of both individual 
and polis, and part of what makes scientific theorising' (or theory that is grounded by the law of 
non-contradiction) in politics problematic.
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troops.^21 Instead, Cleon simply seizes upon the Athenian fear and anger. Such 
surface emotions are raw and easy to ignite, yet ultimately, because they are 
without depth—because they do not grow out of reflective experience—they are 
fleeting. His dependence on thoughtless, unreflective emotion discloses Cleon's 
incompetence as a leader. Laws, undoubtedly important to Cleon require brute, 
unreflective enforcement, not thoughtful application and appropriate critique.^^ 
This attitude blocks the capacity to integrate the particular details of actual 
human life into one's choices and actions. Simply put, this kind of non- 
disceming attitude prevents Cleon from performing reasonable, creative 
action.
Cleon tries (and to large extent, is able) to mask his deficiencies, to make his rigid 
incompetence appear tough, the result of thought which is independent of the 
whims of the naive p o p u l a c e . T h e  attempt to raise himself above' the demos 
promotes a political sphere sharply divided between rulers' and 'actors', where 
the rulers stand in isolation from the life and activity of the polis yet cause its 
citizens to act.^^s upon  closer scrutiny, however, Cleon's position is neither 
courageous nor independent; rather, it is cowardly, indicative of an 
underdeveloped mind. The charge of cowardice may seem more apt when
Disch presents an interesting discussion on the importance of publicly acknowledging and 
recording divergent viewpoints when arguments seem irreconcilable {Hannah Arendt and the Limits 
of Philosophy Ithaca: 1994, pp. 204ff.). One could argue that this is precisely what Thucydides has 
done in writing the History.
For further analysis of Cleon and his use of the law, see Andrews "Cleon's Hidden Appeals" 
{Classical Quarterly 50,2000); Orwin The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, p. 142ff.); 
Homblower Thucydides (Baltimore: 1987, pp. 421ff.), and Macleod {Collected Essays Oxford: 1983, 
p.69) remark on Cleon's deliberate attempt to blur the distinction in the case of Mytilene between 
the concept of psephima (decree) and nomos (law)—decrees were traditionally understood to be 
more flexible, while laws firmer and more difficult to change.
123 Cleon represents one side of the distinction made by Aristotle between the self-restrained and 
the obstinate man: the self-restrained man can, with effort, stand firm against passion and desire, 
the obstinate man is opinionated, stupid and boorish (N£1151b7ff.).
124 Orwin remarks that Cleon ingeniously argues that the Athenians have been too trustful of 
their allies, yet insufficiently trustful of him—the leader capable of seeing "what's really going on" 
{The Humanity of Thucydides Princeton: 1994, p. 144). Gomme notes his conspicuous use of egoge, 
signaling his "independence" in the opening lines of the speech. An ego reappears at m.39, 
further intensifying Cleon's egoism {Historical Commentary on Thucydides Oxford: 1945-72).
123 This phenomenon is described by Arendt in The Human Condition (2"‘i ed. Chicago: 1998, 
p.222ff).
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directed at the circumstances surrounding his death and his clear inability to 
apply his stated principles to his own actions, but the debate on Mytilene shows 
how it can be applied more broadly. Cleon is a coward because afraid to '"risk 
[self] d i s c l o s u r e " a  risk inherent in every free action. He is thus enslaved' for 
he is unable to think critically or act creatively, much less encourage and guide 
the demos to do so. Instead he is preoccupied with achieving a particular, fixed 
goal—carrying out the punishment—and cannot act in a way that is more 
reasonable, yet perhaps less conspicuously law-like'. He is unable to reconsider, 
to take into account the full complexity of the situation because he wants the 
glory that inheres in the discreet achievement of a single end.^^^ Thus, Cleon was 
doomed to fail for his conception of achievement was too narrow, excluding the 
fact that meaning and value lie in reasoned, deliberate action itself—whether it be 
the distinct act of punishing, or the more subtle, yet perhaps braver act of 
reconsideration. Macleod notes that the w ord/deed relationship for Cleon was 
grossly distorted so that "words are not merely set against deeds, but linked with 
falsehood."^28 Cleon's claim to be strong and steadfast in his views—"I, for one, 
have not changed my mind"^^^—is only a thin veil for his imprisonment by 
abstract standards to which he himself ultimately cannot stand up in practice. 
Cleon uses words that invoke traditional Athenian ideology, but by isolating 
them from context, he distorts their meaning and in doing so, reveals himself to 
be trapped in a pattern of re-action as opposed to liberated action.^^^
Arendt. The Human Condition (2™* ed. Chicago: 1998, p.lSO).
2^7 Arendt analyses the difference between "achievement" and action (ibid.).
128 Macleod Collected Essays (Oxford: 1983, p. 70)
129 This is one of the Periclean echoes -  Pericles too suggests that he holds the same beliefs as 
before while the demos falters (11.61). However, Pericles' consistency is preferred to the demos' 
vacillation because the shift in their attitude finds its source in an acute grief which "enslaves the 
will" and precludes the possibility of deliberate thought and choice. Cleon, on the other hand, 
seeks to preserve the decision which arose out of anger, using the war, Pouncey argues, to "serve 
his own interests " {The Necessities of War New York: 1980, p.l48). Deliberation, reasoned choice, 
are shunned by this "most trusted" general.
130 Gomme, in remarking on Thucydides' choice of Cleon's language i.e., its similarity to that of 
more "respected" men, notes that the Athenians of Thucydides' generation were characterised by 
a willingness to experiment with "the meaning of words," to deliberately play with context, 
speaker, and situation so as to reveal the flexibility of words—often to exploit their ability to mask 
the ideas behind them {Historical Commentary on Thucydides Oxford:1945-1972).
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Thus, Cleon's detestable character in the History is generated, in part, by his 
dogmatic use of abstract principles. His grip on them is so tight, and so inflexible 
that they are ruthlessly forced in from 'outside', cruelly and brutally imposed 
onto any situation in which he finds himself.^^i He falls into just the trap Arendt 
warns against—(mistakenly) identifying strength as being 'above' political 
activity. Rather than engaging in the far more difficult task of paying attention 
to what is actually around him, and integrating abstract principles into the 
current circumstances, Cleon applies them cruelly, without finesse or reflection— 
without discerning the particular demands of the event he confronts.^^^ Cleon 
uses his rigidity to his advantage in the Mytilenean debate, transforming an 
obdurate, narrow-minded approach to a complicated problem into what seems 
to be, at face value, a forceful, strong disposition. However, upon closer 
scrutiny, Cleon's appeal to 'principles' of power and realism merely hide his own 
deficiencies, specifically, the capacity to creatively integrate abstract and 
concrete. He is unable to understand himself as a part of an ongoing story, 
rather than as a mighty solo actor. This deficiency leads him to promote action 
which is both inhumane, and inimical to Athens'—and indeed to his own—
freedom. 133
Cleon uses the verb "prosthesete" at m.39 when talking about the punishment. The verb 
prostithemi connotes action from without, literally to put onto, to augment or add -  i.e., not 
organic to or a natural part of something.
In this, he stands in direct opposition to Aristotle's phronimos -  described, in part, as he who 
can perceive what is necessary in the moment -  not just the general principles, but the particular 
facts of a situation (see esp.: NE 1141bl4ff, 1142al3ff). In practical philosophy, "universals" have 
a wider application (hoi men kathelou koinoteroi), but they sacrifice greater truüi (alethinoteroi) for 
this broad applicability (NE1107a30). "Universals" alone are therefore insufficient to tackle the 
demands of practical philosophy for they can blind one to relevant, concrete details. There is 
here an echo of Arendt who discusses the cowardice of escaping to the Archimedean vantage 
point rather than face up to the "chaos" inherent in the genuine plurality of the polis (The Human 
Condition 2*^  ed. Chicago: 1998, p. 220; also in Disch Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy 
Ithaca: 1994, p.l73).
Cleon's role is complicated by the fact that some of the ideals that drive his actions may be 
described as "traditionally Athenian," and some of his concerns reflect genuine problems in 
Athens at the time. For example, his worry that the Athenians, gathered to hear his speech, are 
too easily persuaded by fancy rhetoric is supported by Lloyd who claims that Athens was 
undergoing at that time "a natural progression from political debate to sophistic performance" 
(Magic, Reason, and Experience Cambridge: 1979, p.254). I believe that this ambiguity supports the 
idea that principle alone is insufficient to guide action.
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Cleon on Custom, History, Polis, and Empire
Cleon's speech begins with a remark that permeates all that follows—"democracy 
cannot rule over others." While such a statement harkens back to Pericles' own 
observation about the growing Athenian empire at 11.63 where he indicates the 
difficulties in maintaining an identical policy for both national and international 
affairs, Cleon uses this conclusion to condemn Athens' own democracy itself 
(never under threat with Pericles in power^^). Cleon's speech highlights a 
tension Thucydides himself finds in democracy—it gives power to the demos to 
make choices about public policy,^^^ but in doing so, makes an implicit, often 
overlooked demand. Democracy requires that the demos be both capable of and 
willing to engage in critical thought. ^^ 6 in comfortably making this 
pronouncement, Cleon reveals that he has been defeated by this tension and thus
by the challenge of d e m o c r a c y . ^ ^ 7
With this sweeping, anti-democratic premise in place, Cleon can apply it crudely 
to the Mytilenean revolt as a means of justifying the cruel punishment. The 
Mytilenean revolt, he roars, occurred because the Athenians had long been too 
generous with them, allowed them too much freedom, blindly trusted their
It is of some significance that Pericles, after concluding that the Athenians international' policy 
had to be like that of a tyranny Qios tyrannida), he goes on to speak of the natural tendency of all 
things to decay (panta gar pephuke kai elassousthai), and the possibility of having, at some point to 
relinquish some power, even, of Athens' inevitable downfall. All this sharply distinguishes 
Cleon's superficially similar statements. Comme notes that the hos is lacking in Cleon's similar 
statement (Historical Commentary on Thucydides Oxford: 1945-72).
Hansen discusses this power as freedom (eleutheria), in part embodied by the entitlement to 
"participate in the running of political institutions" ("Liberty: Athenian vs. Modem Views" in 
Demokratia ed. Ober and Hedrick, Princeton: 1996, pp.289-313).
Arendt might argue that democracy does provide the preconditions for reflection and critique, 
which are in turn preconditions for realised power and freedom. Indeed, her idea of acting "in 
concert" depends on the "space" created in democracy where "in-terests" can be expressed and 
discussed. The end is not consensus (which is neither desirable nor possible), but the revealing of 
difference and the attempt to hear/see from other perspectives. This is the reality of the human 
condition (The Human Condition 2”‘* ed., Chicago: 1998, pp.SOff.).
137 While Thucydides himself does not reveal a decisive preference for democracy over all other 
forms of government (apparent, for instance in his favourable portrayal of the Pisistratid rule 
(VI.54) as well as his clear respect for certain Spartan leaders), he does not yield because of its 
inherent difficulties. Rather, he suggests that any form of government requires good leadership -  
that is a discerning, honest character. Cleon does not fit the bill.
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goodwill. The Mytileneans should be executed because they made fools of the 
Athenians/^® and the qualities that allowed this to occur, Cleon insists, are 
endemic to Athenian democracy itself, which is characterised by both trust: "You 
go fearlessly along from day to day without suspecting each other, and you have 
the same attitude towards your allies" (111.37) and public debate: "You [the 
demos] are to blame...You like to watch debates and hear about actions" (111.38, my 
italics).^®  ^ With this, Cleon creates a false, yet oddly intuitive dichotomy, where 
generosity, trust and open discussion are seen as naive, and set in direct 
opposition to strength, security, and realism. And with this rigid dichotomy in 
place, man's capacity for innovation (and collective power) is stifled. 
Furthermore, his comments imply a narrow definition of action. While the demos 
may indeed have been passively entertained by "watching" and "hearing" the 
debates held in Athens, there is the broader implication that thought and 
reflection themselves (which, under good circumstances, might be prompted by 
watching and hearing a debate) do not constitute activity. '^^^
Cleon's condemnation of public debate (and by implication, critical/ reflective, or 
active thought more generally) misleadingly played on the demos' distrust of 
sophists. Rather than try to illuminate an honest correspondence between word 
and deed—a relationship the sophists were indeed capable of masking—Cleon 
became sophistic' himself and spoke so as to pit the Athenians against one 
another in an attempt to preserve his own authority and destroy the possibility 
of a critical political body that might depose' him. While both Pericles and
Arendt recognises this fear of "being made a fool of" (akin to Rorty's fear of humiliation as 
described in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Cambridge: 1989) as one of the risks of human 
action, of self-disclosure. There is always the chance that our actions will backfire, or be misread 
by others. However, this fear is softened, if not totally dissolved, if we realise equally with our 
capacity to act, the power to forgive, and in this, release others (and ourselves) from actions gone 
awry.
Cleon's statement implying that the demos is passive is ironic given the fact that his mechanical 
and uncritical application of rules' seems to me to be a much more dangerous and insidious form 
of passivity (like that of a robot who is unresponsive to a changing environment), whereas as 
watching and hearing can at the very least, help one to be active in the future by expanding one's 
perspective.
For more on Cleon's distortion of the relationship between word and deed, see Macleod 
(Collected Essays Oxford: 1983, p. 70).
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Thucydides himself seemed to share a certain distrust of the capacity of the 
'masses’ to make reasonable decisions (a capacity which further degenerates in 
war), neither one strove to stifle debate as a means of warding off these potential 
problems. Yet Cleon did.^^  ^ The demos may have been in some sense 
'underdeveloped' in its capacity for critical thought, perhaps prone to being 
disproportionately swayed by passion, especially in the throes of war, but 
Athenian citizens were not always seen as innately incompetent thinkers.^^^
For Thucydides, it was the function of the good leader (whether politician, poet, 
or historian) to make the citizens competent thinkers. His success rested, in part, 
on the ability to bring out the most noble human qualities in the citizens of a 
polis. A  group of people living together in a polis, united and inspired by a good 
leader, was the precondition for realising man's sense of reasonableness, his 
capacity to discern—in short, his humanity. Thucydides' conception of a 
flourishing polis seems to have something in common with Arendt's public 
space—it involved a group of people who had to engage with one another and 
constantly reflect on how best to live.^ '^  ^ The style in which Thucydides writes 
(i.e., his deliberate juxtaposition of narrative and argument from many 
perspectives) and his high ambitions for the lasting use of his text indicates quite 
clearly his attitude toward discussion and debate. The whole of the Histoiy 
seems to encourage it.
Kagan remarks that this speech "was a breech in the common front that had informally existed 
between the moderate supporters of Pericles and his own more aggressive followers" 
{Archidamian War Ithaca: 1974, p.l59). Farrar also notes Pericles' goal of developing and 
sustaining "common decision " amongst the citizens, despite their differing needs (The Origins of 
Democratic Thinking Cambridge: 1988, p. 160). The petty attempt to "divide and conquer" then 
illustrates Cleon's deficiency in the skills necessary to a good leader —he should have the ability 
to effectively unite a diverse and potentially conflicting population.
One need only read the Funeral Oration to see the faith and confidence Pericles had in the 
potential of the Athenian citizenship (see especially 11.41).
143 Again, I would like to draw a parallel with Disch's Arendt. In discussing Arendt's 
understanding of political judgement, Disch emphasises the necessity of public dispute. Such 
dispute becomes the means of "achiev[ing] a multi-perspective understanding of the particular 
situations in which I want to act." Ultimately, it is "not abstraction but considered attention to 
particularity that accounts for enlarged (my "reasonable") thought" {Hannah Arendt and the Limits 
of Philosophy Ithaca: 1994, pp.152-153). Diodotus himself expresses this viewpoint in his speech 
at ni.42.5-6.
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Pericles cites debate and openness as two of Athens' core virtues in his famous 
funeral oration. A good leader does not mechanically impose rigid laws on the 
people from without, nor does he allow them to act thoughtlessly on passing 
whims. He guides the people by illuminating possibilities and encouraging a 
course of action which, through reflection on experience and principle together, 
he has the foresight to perceive. A condition for this foresight is attention to and 
a certain respect for the attitudes and opinions of the demos itself (which is 
distinct from a sycophantic and unprincipled "resignation of all direction to it"
11.65). The views emerging out of open debate in the assembly help to balance 
and counteract the potential dogmatism or narrowness of vision of the leader— 
"Athenians," Ober claims, "simply assumed that political truth was dialectical."^^ 
Public expression of the unique and varied experiences of individuals living 
together (in a political setting) collide and spark innovation. A good leader can 
channel these ideas into a definitive course. This is the prime virtue of a well-led 
democracy—debate and discussion provide the raw material necessary for 
reasonable creativity, and leadership provides the structure needed to act on this 
material constructively and wisely. Thus, in stifling debate, Cleon renders 
barren the very ground necessary for creative action. Because he does not have 
the skill necessary to unite and guide the people, he cannot use language to aid 
in revealing options and facilitating progress. Without strong, unified 
leadership, poleis fall into factional strife and lawlessness (anemia). Thucydides 
writes despairingly of this insidious deterioration at III.82ff..
Additionally throughout his speech, Cleon seeks to reinforce the mutual 
exclusivity of rule either by virtue or by law: "you will prevail because of your 
strength and not because of their high opinion of you (III.37)...either give up your 
empire, or practice manly virtues where it's nice and safe" (111.40). This attitude 
becomes even more evident in Cleon's discussion of the three qualities he sees as
144 "Thucydides Criticism of Democratic Knowledge" Nomodeiktes Michigan: 1993, p. 82). A 
related issue arises in Aristotle's Politics when he discusses the benefits of both judgements of the 
many and of the one (3.11),
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most dangerous to an empire; pity, pleasure in dispute and leniency/humanity 
(III.40). These are three qualities that Arendt might identify as the preconditions 
of all free action and progress, and without which, men are reduced to the 
likeness of robots, mechanically reacting to 'external' stimuli, and thus prevented 
from acting reasonably and creatively.
Cleon: Reasonableness and Creativity
Given Cleon's position as explored in the previous section, it is no surprise that 
critical thought and reflection are capacities which seem to be particularly 
abhorrent to Cleon. Deliberation and reconsideration mark the weak, or worse, 
the unprincipled and 'lawless' man. Here we see that Cleon, Pericles, and 
Thucydides, while sharing a similar scepticism about the demos as a reliable 
decision making body, and holding a high regard for strong leadership and law, 
each seems to have a distinctly different idea of how law should be implemented 
and 'lived' by. In deriding reflection and debate, Cleon implicitly condones a 
traditionally Spartan way of life, where questions and critique have no place. At 
the same time, he plays on some prevalent worries in Athens at that time, 
specifically the fear of being publicly 'fooled' or 'duped' by good speakers. 
Cleon draws from this fear the false conclusion that if man is vulnerable to being 
misled by fancy talk, the way to avoid this is through rigid dogmatism backed by 
punitive, coercive force.
Cleon's anti-democratic stance floes naturally from his understanding of polis 
and empire (discussed a b o v e ) . U n d e r  good leadership, both empire and polis
Orwin makes an important point about the complicated role of the polis in the History: 
Thucydides' conception of the "right" political structure or the "best" regime or constitution is 
muddied by the fact that, in dealing with concrete history, specifically with the intei-polis events 
of the Peloponnesian War, he must contend with 'international' politics (unlike, for instance, 
Aristotle and Plato). His disinclination to posit theories of ideal poleis perhaps stems from the fact 
that an ideal polis is decidedly harder to conceive when not understood as a self contained 
"organism," but rather as exposed and vulnerable to the poleis around it -  both ideologically and 
militarily. Athens might have been able to sustain a democracy internally, but externally, she 
was tyrannical (even in the eyes of Pericles: 11.63). Thucydides must not only contend with the
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alike should aim to embody those practices which structure the political sphere 
(whether 'domestic' laws or 'international' treaties). They order community, and 
regulate discourse about it, but never thwart completely the possibility of change 
and innovation. Thus, they require constant (re)interpretation, and because of 
this, they are relatively easy to codify yet extremely difficult to put effectively 
into practice. Cleon, it appears, was not up to the challenge. He viewed the laws 
(and public decisions more generally) as all-powerful and permanently binding. 
With this conviction, he effectively condemned reflection and reconsideration— 
for ultimately there was nothing about which extended deliberation was 
necessary. Laws were understood to be external, from 'above'—they embodied 
the power of he who was in command (at Mytilene, of course, this was Cleon 
himself). Thus debate had to be portrayed as suspect for it threatened his own 
power (and p r i d e ) . T o  protect himself, Cleon cast anyone who questioned and 
critiqued political decisions as either weak and childish men or dangerous 
citizens: "Intelligent people are the downfall of cities...ordinary people don't 
believe in their own intelligence, and they regard themselves as less learned than 
the laws" (III.37). By saying this, he avoided making hard choices and 
guaranteed the extension of his authority.
Cleon, out of fear and narrow self-interest, was stuck on a mechanistic 
understanding of the world, where 'right' meant that orders dictated from above 
should result in blind submission below. Political power and strength, Cleon 
assumed, arose out of consistency and regularity, maintenance of the status quo, 
not out of the establishment of a public space which encouraged critical thought 
and aimed at allowing people with diverse interests to flourish together.^^^ 
Cleon's attitude underlies a quasi-scientihc, strictly logical understanding of the 
world which values a certain kind of discreet achievement, but completely
relations between citizen and citizen, but between polis and polis {The Humanity of Thucydides 
Princeton: 1994, pp.l72ff.).
One can assume that Arendtian story telling too, as it provides people with alternative 
examples of how people live would also be seen as a threat to Cleon.
This is Arendt's conception of action "in concert" (On Violence New York: 1969 p.44).
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disregards the importance of another kind of activity. It admitted no 
deliberation, no sensitivity to the force of the particulars upon abstractions. In 
dogmatically affirming this ideal of power from the top down, Cleon parted 
company with Pericles, who most certainly was no less a leader.^^ While the 
latter undoubtedly saw the need for consistency,^^^ it was not consistency for its 
own sake. Consistency, for Pericles was the general result—a likely consequence- 
-of actions which proceeded from reflection and attentive deliberation about 
what was reasonable for man to do.
Final Remarks on the Coherence of Cleon's Argument
Cleon's argument, though perhaps compelling in the fact that it sets up neat, 
stark contrasts, has some blatant flaws internal to it. He characterises the 
Mytilenean revolt as a flagrant demonstration of disrespect, for all the Greek 
world to see, made even worse given their privileged' position among Athenian 
allies. It was a deceitful act aimed at actually trying "to destroy" (diaphtheirai
111.39) the A t h e n i a n s . C l e o n  blames the revolt on Athenian democracy, the 
ideals of which he sees as ineffective and weak (the alternative view—attempting 
the difficult task of good leadership amidst diversity, i.e., reconciling and uniting 
the conflicting elements of a democracy—was too much for him). Given his 
simplistic view, he insists that a shift in attitude is required from that endorsed 
with Pericles 'at the helm'. The harsh punishment of the Mytileneans will serve 
as an affirmative sign of Athenian force, as well as a public admonition—a
Both Ober and Forde write about Pericles' leadership. Ober argues that close analysis of 
Pericles' rhetoric in the Funeral Oration reveals him to a leader who is in many ways inimical to 
democracy—extolling the ideals of democracy in speech, and rousing the Athenians to feel pride 
in their distinctive form of government, yet in his actions promoting an authoritative regime 
("Thucidides' Critique of Democratic Knowledge " Nomodeiktes Michigan: 1993, pp. 92ff.). In 
contrast, Forde argues that Pericles "consciously strove to make himself transparent to the 
Athenians " ("Ambition in Thucydides and Plato" in Politikos II ed. Rubin, Pittsburgh: 1992, pp.
15).
i^ A^t n.61, Pericles uses his own consistency to reveal the error in the mindset of the Athenians 
who have become angry with him. They are overcome with grief, an emotion that distorts much 
in the same was as the anger (orge) which prompted the decision Cleon advocates.
Cleon's sensationalist language describing the Mytilenian revolt is particularly ironic given the 
fact that it is to precisely such fantastic rhetoric that he directs his most pointed contempt.
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paradeigma to others. After all, if the punishment is not carried out, what is to 
prevent other 'allies' from trying similar tactics without fear of negative 
repercussions?
And perhaps the careful reader must admit that the Mytilenean revolt did 
indicate disrespect for and cause injury to Athens. Joining forces with the 
Spartans and Boetians further amplified their overt betrayal, especially given 
their special place in the Athenian alliance. One could even legitimately argue 
(in line with Cleon) that the calculated action taken by Mytilene—timed to 
coincide with Athens at her weakest—was an exceedingly malicious exploit, 
effectively raising it to the level of conspiracy and rebellion (epebouleusan te kai 
epanestesan) rather than mere revolt {apestesan)}^^ But, if part of what the 
punishment is aimed at doing is, as Cleon claims, to discourage further rebellions 
among the allies, the reader need not work too hard to challenge this 
superficially persuasive argument—for Cleon does it himself. He undermines his 
own logic (and supports Diodotus' at in.45) by declaring that the Mytilenean 
revolt itself proved that they "learned nothing from the sufferings of their 
neighbors who rebelled and were taken firmly in hand" (III.39). If this is the 
case, then why is this punishment so important if it has proven, on his own 
account, to be an ineffective deterrent? Indeed, why is setting an example 
important at all?^^^
The punishment and its effectiveness as a deterrent, while an interesting debate 
in itself, points to a bigger issue. As Book in  goes on to confirm with the events 
surrounding Plataea and Corcyra, this reactionary, tit-for-tat association amongst 
Greek poleis yields no victor, but only further traps both sides in a destructive 
causal chain. The way out of this regressive and reactionary behaviour is
Andrews highlights Cleon's use of epanastasis to indicate not merely a revolt (apostasis), but a 
"conspiratorial uprising against the ruler" ("Cleon's Hidden Appeal" Classical Quarterly 50.1, 
2000 p.48).
It is interesting to note here that the punishment Cleon supports not only seems to be, by his 
own logic, ineffective, but it has no precedent in Athenian history (Kagan Outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War Ithaca: 1969, pp.116-119; and The Archidamian War Ithaca: 1974, p.l57).
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stymied by Cleon due to his incompetence in deliberation and discernment, and 
the resulting (cowardly) respect he has for external' laws. Though his dogged 
adherence to abstract law may successfully disguise his deficiency in 
(reasonable) speech—perhaps even make it look like a strength—it does not stand 
up so well in action (as seen in Cleon's less than virtuous death, discussed 
above).
The above discussion of Cleon highlights the importance of both good leadership 
and a structured polis for Thucydides. It is the polis, and importantly, not 
exclusively a democracy, that enables men to develop a discerning capacity 
which then prepares them for reasonable decision making and creative action. 
Orwin brings out this point in his discussion of what happens when the order 
necessary to a polis disappears, e.g., in times of stasisA^^ Only in the context of a 
polis, i.e., acting with others according to (or fighting against) laws as 
implemented by a discerning leader, are the conditions necessary for human 
flourishing to be present. The laws do not, as Cleon assumed, rule absolutely. 
Rather, in being sensitively applied by a discerning leader to specific 
circumstances, they structure man's actions and in doing so, render seemingly 
isolated actions coherent, a part of a bigger picture, or narrative.^^ The role of 
the leader in a political community is thus complex, and the varieties of 
leadership the reader finds in Thucydides helps illuminate it. Farrar brings
153 The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, pp.l72ff). Kopytoff, in a slightly different vein, 
writes on the function of culture (here, a condition growing out of shared life in a polis), arguing 
that it achieves order (and thus meaning) through imposing "distinct areas of homogeneity 
within the overall heterogeneity [of human life]." Without culture, (in this case, without the polis) 
human beings would be confronted with an "endless array of singular things" and thought and 
reasonable judgment would be rendered impossible. (Kopytoff, I. "The Cultural Biography of 
Things" p.70 in The Social Life of Things, ed. Appudarai, Cambridge: 1986).
154 On the importance of narrative for cultivating and sustaining meaning, see MacIntyre, A. After 
Virtue (London: 1981).
155 For example, Pericles and Hermocrates had the capacity to discern, cmd could thus act 
prudently. Athenagorus and Cleon do not. Euben, in comparing Pericles and Cleon, suggests 
that with the former, Thucydides presents a leader who "enhances the power of discernment." 
Pericles is both frank, and inspiring. His speeches are more than merely tactical -  they openly 
address the difficulties inherent in the human world (he speaks after the devastation of the 
plague, and later to appease the Athenians' rage at having their homes ravaged), yet still 
reinforces its beauty and potential. Part of Pericles' message rests on developing the human
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out what I understand to be Thucydides' conception of good leadership when 
she describes a leader as one who provides "a purely and persuasively public 
perspective, interpretive abilities, the capacity for self control and the personal 
qualities needed to inculcate both/'^^^ Here we can draw a parallel with Pindar's 
victor in that he too illuminated new, unprecedented possibilities to those who 
heard the odes, yet himself grew out of a specific tradition with its own local' 
values and practices. All this indicates that the polis is the source of both stability 
and change—it must continually shift and adjust—both the leader and the demos 
must check each other and fill in where the other falls short.
There is yet a final parallel to be drawn, this time between Hannah Arendt, 
Thucydides, and Pindar. Arendt paraphrases Democritus in describing the art of 
politics as that which "teaches men to bring forth what is great and radiant."^^^ 
While this immediately recalls the victor in Pindar as he who performed 
"radiant" actions which "illuminated" new possibilities and inspired the 
audience to act, the notion of radiance when applied to a strife ridden political 
situation invokes another metaphor which is appropriate to Thucydides. The 
great Thucydidean leader is 'radiant' like Pindar's victor in that he introduced 
and made accessible to his audience (the demos) a world beyond that which was
capacity to see beyond one's own self-interest and mere material survival, beyond a particular 
life and the needs of a single individual. Cleon, on the other hand, seeks to increase only his own 
power, and in this, does not fulfill the potentials of his own species. This narrow perspective 
reveals a character who is not fully human, for men have the capacity to show compassion and 
have mercy, but Cleon does not (chooses not to?) exercise it. (A similar idea is expressed by 
Aristotle who claims that a bad man is far worse than any 'logos lacking' animal could be). 
Cleon's myopic self-interest, his need to play on low level' (i.e., unreflective) emotions such as 
fear and anger skews his ability to negotiate wisely between abstract and concrete, and leads to 
actions which are neither prudent nor successful (see Euben, P. The Tragedy of Political Theory 
Princeton: 1990 pp.l79ff.).
156 Farrar, C. Origins of Democratic Thinking (Cambridge: 1988, p.l68). Thucydides implies that 
without good leadership, the demos simply goes for "more" rather than for what is "good."
Finley raises a similar issue, citing both Thucydides and Aristophanes, who imply that populists 
in ancient Greece were often expansionists {Thucydides Cambridge, MA: 1963, pp.165-166) One 
can perhaps draw a modem parallel -  in the US, for instance any talk of value in government is 
seen as an inherent affront to individual "freedom of choice." Due to this, the (illusorily neutral) 
market has come to be the unacknowledged arbiter of what is good, which is by default (or 
deteriorates into), simply more.
^^^Arendt The Human Condition (2''‘* ed., Chicago: 1998, p.206).
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known to them in their individual households, and hopefully motivated the 
demos to perform reasonable, creative and noble actions. But he is "radiant" in 
another important sense as well: the good political leader "shed light" on 
complicated, muddled situations. This 'light' did not always (in fact rarely) lead 
to a decisive, permanent resolution where all parties were equally satisfied. 
However, in lieu of such a neat resolution, the radiance of a good leader brought 
to light the many sides of an argument publicly, and encouraged people to see its 
constituent conflicting parts, rather than just their own. This wider perspective 
invited the demos to reflect on their predicament from a broader outlook.^58 
Cleon plainly failed to embody this virtue of "radiance" and discouraged it in 
others in his explicit contempt for reflection and the belittling of "intelligent 
men" (sophoteroi). Politics, he insisted, should not involve deliberation at all, the 
demos should not "dissect arguments" /  "pull a speech to pieces" (III.37), but 
should simply obey.
Chapter 11: Investigating Pylos
The following section will look at the events at Pylos in Book IV. I hope to show 
that these events undermined many pre-war ideals and, more broadly speaking, 
basic categories of thought. In doing so, this episode forced both actors in the 
war and readers alike to think and actively participate in the situation Thucydides 
describes. The ideological 'disruption' at Pylos forces the reader into what 
Arendt calls an "unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of reality" 
where decisions must be made and action taken in absence of past categories and 
theoretical i d e a l s . I n  this, the challenge posed by freedom of choice is brought 
into especially high relief. The issue of human freedom latent in this particular 
moment' is further intensified by the Spartans' peace offer following the battle. 
This highlights an important human capacity for Arendt which I have yet to
For an extended discussion on the importance of bringing out (and recording) all sides of an 
argument publicly, see Disch Hannah Arendt and the Limits ofPhilosoph y (Ithaca: 1994, pp.204ff.). 
The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: 1958 p. xiv).
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discuss, that is, the faculty of forgiving. I will discuss this concept briefly before 
moving onto a more detailed discussion of Pylos and the peace offer.
Freedom and The Power to Forgive
In my earlier discussion, I hope to have shown that for Arendt, the precondition 
for reasonable and creative action (i.e., the realisation of human freedom) is not 
the certainty which seems to inhere in fixed abstract principles, but the freedom 
from needing such certainty in the first place. Arendt argues that human beings 
are free when they are not caught in a mechanical action-reaction relationship 
with one another—much like a natural causal chain (a mode of interaction to 
which men are particularly prone in times of war). This can arise from acting 
dogmatically according to abstract rule/principle alone (or re-acting), and often 
entails using these rules/principles to serve vengeance. She suggests that the 
escape from the imprisonment of this infinite regress comes through forgiving.^^ 
Only in the act of forgiving are human beings truly opening the possibility of 
free choice. In forgiving, men stop merely re-acting to external stimuli and 
instead open space to create something new. They can progress into uncharted 
"territory.'
Such uncharted territory is both exhilarating and terrifying. For Arendt, it 
highlights the fact that every action involves a risk, and with each risk taken, 
men further manifest themselves in the world: "in speaking and acting, men 
show who they are, reveal actively their unique, personal identities, and thus 
make their appearance in the human world."^^^ This "appearance" exposes men
The Human Condition ed., Chicago: 1998, pp.236ff). The relevance of Arendt's "faculty of 
forgiving" to Greek poetry, drama and history is apparent when one recognises the misfortunes 
which befall those who make decisions based on bitterness and revenge rather than forgiving.
For instance, the suffering of both Achilles and Agamemnon in the Iliad, Medea's feeling of 
dustalaina after vengeful feelings lead her to take the lives of her own sons. There is almost a 
sense of hubris which underlies vengeful feelings, a belief that one's own losses must be 
registered on a "cosmic scale" and that one's own power can somehow make things right. Below, 
I will suggest that Athens' abrupt decision to vote against peace after Pylos locks her into a 
reactive causal chain which is perhaps the first definitive step towards her downfall.
The Human Condition (2P^  ed. Chicago: 1998, p.l79).
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to the praise and blame of others. While one can increase the likelihood of actions 
earning praise, ultimately the many repercussions of each "human performance" 
are not within the actor's control. Therefore, the potential for blame 
(humiliation, shame, dishonour) always looms. Abiding dogmatically by fixed 
external rules helps to reduce the daunting sense of responsibility that 
accompanies the personal disclosure inherent individual action. Yet this 
submission to 'rules' limits human freedom and the potential for creative action. 
Arendt argues that with proper value given to forgiving, men are more apt to 
risk acting innovatively (i.e., creatively given a sense of reasonableness) because 
the blame which failure incurs is neither fixed nor permanent (as are abstract 
rules/principles).
For Arendt therefore, the intrinsic indeterminate nature of all human life renders 
all people inescapably vulnerable to making mistakes. Too often error is taken to 
be an indelible mark on the actor, which invokes an inflated sense of shame 
(dishonour, humiliation, etc.). This can stifle man's tendency to risk acting 
freely, that is to say, paying attention to and harmonising abstract principle and 
particulars as best he can. Arendt insists that men must not see the making of 
mistakes as "irreversible," for then risking action would be too great. As erring 
is a fact of human nature, men must leam how to work with it more 
constructively. This begins with the "faculty of forgiving," which guarantees 
them the "constant mutual release from what they do...and [allows them to] 
remain free agents." Given this, men must resist the crude power Cleon found 
by inflexibly sticking to his decision, and leam to value, to actually see strength in 
"a willingness to change their minds and start again." ^^ 2
The future is transformed by exercising our forgiving faculty -  it becomes an 
arena where men are implicitly encouraged to take risks, rather than to fear 
them. This is not to imply that all failed outcomes are immediately absolved, 
and the actors exonerated without punishment or rehabilitation, but it ensures
The Human Condition ed., Chicago: 1998, p.240).
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that ultimately men will be forgiven sufficiently for them to be encouraged to try again. 
Forgiving for Arendt, and not the awesome power to eradicate error, is what 
unlocks human freedom. Men are free when they engage in deliberate, 
reasonable action with others, as opposed to mere reaction, when they risk acting 
creatively, and do not define success in discreet achievement alone. Man's 
fallibility demands that men be humane, that is, that they accept that as human 
beings they will err, and given this, they must also be ready to understand and 
forgive when actions go wrong.
Thus, in continuing to flesh out the conception of a "discerning character" which 
I seek to develop here, we must not forget that discerning does not free man 
from making mistakes. Even the man with the most finely tuned' capacity to 
discern is susceptible to error. Thucydides presents men acting within a world of 
other things and other people. This is the Arendtian condition of "plurality," 
and by definition, it generates an infinitely complex environment for men, where 
in every situation, every decision, there is always a myriad of factors beyond 
their control. Pericles, for example, endowed with an incredible power to both 
discern and foresee, encouraged the Athenians to leave their homes and cram 
into the tiny space behind the city's walls. This, one might argue, was a prudent 
move for the Athenians, one might even argue that it was the primary factor 
which enabled them to sustain their power in the early years of the war. 
However, this exodus from the country, though perhaps effective in that sense, 
had other consequences. For example, it almost certainly exposed more people 
to the plague than would have been otherwise (11.52).^  ^ The advice given by 
Pericles (and chosen by the Athenians) had ambiguous results—both positive and 
negative repercussions ensued (as is the case with every human choice). 
Forgiving Pericles for the bad repercussions of his advice effectively released the 
Athenians (and, had they stuck to his strategy, perhaps would have allowed
In the Gorgias (515), Plato argues that Pericles, whatever his good intentions, had an overall 
negative effect on the Athenians. In a similar vein, Aristotle, in discussing the origins of 
Athenian democracy, states that while Solon perhaps provided the necessary preconditions, the 
resulting democratic government was not his intention (ou....prohairesin).
124
them to prevail in the war). Forgiving is crucial when men admit that everyone 
will misjudge, misinterpret, and perform actions that have consequences they 
neither intend nor desire. This must be acknowledged to be an inescapable 
feature of the human condition to which even the greatest men are vulnerable 
(though of course for Thucydides, this vulnerability, though common to all men, 
was not the source of their greatness!).^^
In arguing that fallibility becomes a real threat to human freedom only when we 
lose the power to forgive, Arendt provides another framework in which to 
analyze the work of Thucydides. The human capacity to forgive (as opposed to 
seek vengeance) is, Arendt argues, that which secures human freedom. In 
forgiving, men find freedom from the "vengeance, which encloses both doer and 
sufferer in the relentless automatism of the action process, which by itself need 
never come to an end."^^ Therefore, men escape the infinite causal chain of 
action-reaction—characteristic of animal life—through forgiving.^^ The act of 
forgiving makes creation (Arendt's "natality") and finally progress possible. 
This willingness to forgive, to forgo the base, animalistic desire for vengeance 
will be highlighted when I discuss the peace offer at Pylos below.
The Novelty of Pylos
Book IV of Thucydides' History describes the events of the war occurring 
between the years 425-423BC. This section will focus on the battle at Pylos, the 
Spartan peace offer, and the Athenian reaction to the offer (roughly chapters 1-
Recall that Pindar, in writing of the glory of some of the most esteemed and revered men in 
the Greek world also reveals not only their fallibility but that of even the almighty gods.
Arendt The Human Condition (2*^  ed., Chicago: 1998, p.241).
166 This role of forgiveness runs counter to the foundation of Greek, as well as much of modem 
Western science, grounded in Newton's 2*^  law of motion: "For every action, there is an equal 
and opposite reaction." Scholars have written extensively on the relationship between the 
scientific and moral worlds of ancient Greece and their gradual integration (see, Lloyd Polarity 
and Analogy Cambridge: 1966, pp. 421ff.; Vemant Myth and Society in Ancient Greece New York: 
1980, pp. 203ff). Indeed, perhaps our earliest extant Greek philosophical writing invokes and in 
doing so, encourages this general truth about the balance of opposing forces (Anaximander). 
Given this, forgiveness demands an enormous, paradigmatic' shift.
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23). Pylos was an unusual battle wherein Spartan and Athenian forces clashed 
resulting in the capture and surrender of approximately 420 Spartan soldiers.^^^ 
Following the surrender, the Spartans make a peace offer to the Athenians, 
which is turned down. Below, I will examine the series of events leading up to 
the offer, drawing attention to the peculiar reversal of traditional Athenian and 
Spartan roles. This will serve as an example of a fundamentally disruptive 
situation which demands action based on a sense of reasonableness and 
creativity. Additionally, (as stated above), in discussing the peace offer itself, I 
will aim to bring out the Arendtian premise that the precondition for human 
freedom is forgiving.
Finley refers to the Spartan peace offer in Book IV, just after the Athenian victory 
at Pylos as the ^^dead center" of the H i s t o r y And indeed, it does seem to mark 
a distinct turning point in the war. This moment in the narrative is of particular 
relevance to this project because it overturns traditional Greek identities which 
might have helped to guide judgement and action. The 'upheaval' of the battle, 
the remarkable surrender of Spartan men and subsequent peace offer, reveal an 
atypical Spartan voice. The Athenian response to Sparta through these events is 
also unusual: it highlights the evolution of post-Periclean leadership and the 
deterioration of those ideals which had once differentiated Athens from other 
Greek poleis. Some of Athens' actions at Pylos seem to be rather 'Spartan' in 
character, and those of Sparta, reminiscent of the Athenians. Due to this, it 
requires the persistent involvement of the reader if he hopes to make sense of 
and gain insight from the situation.
a thorough (if controversial) discussion of this battle, see Comford's discussion of Pylos in 
Thucydides Mythistoricus (repr., Philadelphia: 1971, pp. 182-109), As I explain in more detail 
below, I disagree with Comford's main thesis, i.e., that Thucydides' narrative here illustrates the 
force of Luck or the Irrational as the primary agent determining the course of events. Rather, I 
argue that it is those men who are attuned to their specific and concrete surroundings, rather 
than those who maintain abstract principles for the sake of consistency, who prove themselves 
successful. This is especially important when events are erratic and illogical as they undoubtedly 
were at Pylos.
Thucydides (Cambridge, MA: 1963, p.l93).
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In this conspicuous reversal and upheaval, Thucydides demands the reader's 
participation, testing his capacity to think critically and make judgements, 
without having the "banisters" of precedent and tradition. In this case, I use 
'banisters' to refer to the analytical support provided by customary perceptions 
of Athenian and Spartan identities which had so long defined and ordered the 
Greek world. Prudent action at Pylos could not be determined by an appeal to 
these general, abstract 'characters' for they no longer adequately represented the 
imprecedented events going on at that time. Concrete events in the war made 
these once useful abstractions 'unfit' for effective engagement in the current
s i t u a t i o n . 1 7 0
Pylos thus presents the reader with a highly unsettling situation, a kinesis in 
miniature. Until this point, the reader has seen Sparta and Athens in terms 
which, more or less, substantiate the images drawn of them in Thucydides' 
earliest descriptions of the two poleis (Athens at I.6ff, and Sparta at I.18ff). These 
descriptions carry the two major Greek powers fairly consistently throughout the 
first books of the Hzs ton/—Sparta proves herself to be a mighty yet guarded and 
cautious land power, and Athens, a daring, naval one. At Pylos, these familiar 
roles shift, and with this divergence comes, in Arendt's words, "the challenge of 
an unprecedented event."
i^ ’"Thinking without banisters" is a term used by Arendt meant to describe thinking without the 
guidance of our "traditional concepts...categories and formulas." There are times when current 
events render our abstractions(derived from past habituation) ineffective. They cease to guide 
and structure thought, but distort reality and consequently mislead (see Arendt "Understanding 
and Politics" Partisan Review (p.379); also Finley, J.H. Thucydides Cambridge, MA: 1963, pp. 160- 
161). Additionally, Disch explores the "banister" metaphor in Hannah Arendt and the Limits of 
Philosophy (Ithaca: 1994, pp.143-145).
1''° Boyd-White suggests that the Corcyrean debate marks a time when the failure of conventional 
discourse to "fit its [changed] world" results in collapse, "a failure of order and meaning" (When 
Words Lose Their Meaning Chicago: 1984, p.90). Arendt poses a similar point, suggesting that Nazi 
Germany effectively undermined the conceptual framework that had been prevalent in western 
thought. The capacity of concrete events and actions to destroy our intellectual categories 
directly leads to my central thesis -  political theory must be allied to history -  in doing so we 
become familiar with the kinds of things man has done, and become trained in being attentive to 
our actual surroundings.
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However, 'challenging' is precisely what one expects from Thucydides. By Book 
IV, Thucydides has prepared the attentive reader for this demanding situation, 
where, given the destruction of past categories and definitions, options still must 
be perceived, deliberations undertaken, decisions made, and finally actions 
pursued. Cleon's specious reasoning at Mytilene revealed how destructive (and 
inhumane) abstract theory can be when it alone is applied to concrete 
circumstances without thought or reflection about what makes the particular 
here-and-now unique. At Pylos, now acutely aware that theory alone cannot 
direct action effectively, the reader experiences a situation which shatters past 
theoretical foundations at the outset. As such, Thucydides demands active 
engagement of both the actors in the History and of the reader himself. Each 
must exercise the peculiar human capacity to discern what is reasonable, taking 
into account both the concrete situation and abstract generalisations, in order to 
determine sensible, prudent action, that is to say, to be reasonably creative.
In analysing Pylos, the reader must remember that when Thucydides describes 
the war as a kinesis, he implies a capacity to disrupt and upturn—it was a force of 
change and instability. The war acted on cities and men not just physically, but in 
such a way as to disrupt their most basic ideas about the external world and their 
places in it. This intrusion from without' thrust men's ambiguous nature to 
the fore—they had to both adapt to those interferences they could not control, and 
shape as best they could, those which lay in their power. The war forced the 
Greeks to reassess their most basic generalisations and see themselves and their 
place in the world in a new light. Did the Athenians have the awesome power 
implied in the abstract theories of the sophists' arguments and the advancements 
of science? Were the Spartans right in structuring their state so as to produce an 
invincible war machine? Or, were both merely at the mercy of larger cosmic 
forces? The answer, though perhaps unsatisfying, lies somewhere in between
Kitto draws attention to and analyses Thucydides' use of pathemata (Poiesis Berkeley:1966, 
p.274).
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and Pylos helps to further flesh out this fluctuating 'place'. There, the concrete 
and historically specific present eclipsed previously accepted abstractions and in 
doing so compelled the men involved to innovate when making their decisions, 
rather than merely apply past rules mechanically to a new situation.
What then made Pylos such a distinct break from the past? Broadly speaking, at 
this point in the war, conventional identities were collapsing. That is to say, 
general ideas about who the Spartans and Athenians were, where their strengths 
lay, and what their vulnerabilities were no longer applied to the present 
situation. The result of this breakdown brought about what Thucydides himself 
refers to as the most surprising event in the war {"para gnomen te de malista ton 
kata ton polemon"lUAO).
The Situation Summarised
Connor calls Thucydides' description of Pylos (and in fact the whole of Book IV) 
the "least convincing" section of the entire work, and indeed, there are some 
conspicuous holes. For example, there is no direct explanation of
Demosthenes' role in the war at the opening of Book IV, nor is there explicit 
clarification of how the Athenians and Messenians coordinated with each other 
in battle. Later, there is no one speaker named who offers peace on Sparta's 
behalf, nor a description of the debate which presumably followed the 
monumental offer. Given these omissions (and arguably many others) together 
with the emphasis on the role of luck and chance Thucydides attributes to this 
episode, scholars have speculated about the personal reasons for Thucydides' 
ambiguous description: perhaps his distaste for Cleon, (and quite possibly for the 
plainly un-Periclean Demosthenes) led him to be rather vague about the source 
of the Athenian success.^^^ By amplifying the role of luck and chance, the insight
Connor Thucydides (Princeton: 1984, p.108). For further discussion on Pylos through the theme 
of "focalisation," see Homblower A Commentary to Thucydides vol. 2 Oxford:1996).
Homblower uses Thucydides' suggestive comment about what Cleon "knew" at Pylos to 
support the argument that Thucydides was personally opposed to this Athenian general
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of these two Athenian generals could not help but be diminished. However, 
rather than try to put together Thucydides' 'unwritten agenda', I will limit 
myself, as best I can, to analysing what Thucydides actually leaves the reader 
given the framework I set out above. For instance, in what way do the 
'omissions' train the reader to be critical, reflective—a prudent deliberator? What 
role might 'holes' play in what I understand to be the bigger aim of Thucydides' 
work—that is, cultivation of the capacity to act reasonably and creatively given 
man's inherently limited perspective?^^^
Whether due to luck or foresight, Thucydides is clear that Demosthenes' plan to 
fortify Pylos was not popular. With campaigns in Sicily and Corcyra 
(presumably) weighing heavily on Athenian minds, Demosthenes' fixation on 
this point on the Peloponnese must have seemed random, even blatantly 
irresponsible given the more pressing and immediate concerns the Athenians
{Thucydides Baltimore: 1987, p. 166). In contrast to his vagueness about Athenian leadership at 
this time, it is interesting to note that Thucydides' explicit respect for the Spartan Brasidas, even 
despite his defeat at Pylos (and, I argue, his lack of reasonable creativity there) prevails in his 
description of Brasidas' success in both Megara and northern Greece. This general of both 
intelligence and noble character is the image of Brasidas that Thucydides promotes most in the 
History, not the fallen man at Pylos.
^^K)rwin, writing on the Diodotus' speech at Mytilene makes a similar point, stressing the fact 
that Thucydides "writes not for a popular audience, but only those few whose primary concern is 
the truth" {The Humanity of Thucydides Princeton: 1994, p.l62). The find the truth demands effort 
and work on the part of the reader. Farrar expresses a similar view in her discussion of 
Thucydides {The Origins of Democratic Thinking Cambridge: 1988, p. 126ff). Kitto also advocates 
this reading of the History (that is, one which assumes that Thucydides' "omissions" serve a 
bigger purpose than personal vengeance). In doing so, he promotes an understanding of 
Thucydides which takes into account the written nature of the work. Kitto argues that the text 
was written over a long period of time, and most likely not intended for oral performance 
(Thucydides himself says that it is "not for display"). Thucydides, Kitto claims, "expected his 
book to be read and reread" {Poiesis Berkeley: 1966, p.289), and cites examples of how actions 
later in the book recall and demand reference to earlier comments and actions. The fact that 
Thucydides leaves out certain facts that we, as modem readers expect (e.g., his sources, an 
explicit account of his method), should not be taken as mistakes or omissions, but as a reflection 
on who Thucydides thought his audience would be -  that is, who human beings were then, are 
now, and will be into the future. Kitto suggests that the enduring characteristics of man the text 
hints at through these "omissions" lie in his capacity to "take the factual accuracy for granted and 
collaborate with him elsewhere -  in seizing the significance of these to-and-fro references." 
Thucydides demanded that his readers use their imagination and not solely their "intellect." (ibid. 
p.349).
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had at the time.^^  ^ The fact that Thucydides leaves no record of Demosthenes 
'unveiling’ his plan publicly suggests that he too was concerned about his 
capacity to persuade the assembly. This worry is substantiated when 
Demosthenes sets sail. At this point, Thucydides indicates that even the 
commanders with whom he left were less than enthusiastic about the proposed 
fortification. In fact, both Sophocles and Eurymedon seemed overtly disdainful 
of the plan; it was a waste of time, and quite probably an undue financial drain 
on Athens (IV.3). However, despite this lack of public support, even without 
himself being an acting strategos}'^  ^ Demosthenes succeeded (with some help 
from a passing storm) in carrying out the fortification. This aggressive tactic 
attracted the attention of the Spartans then fighting in Attica, and soon the 
Athenians were confronted with a belligerent fleet of ships, prepared to fight 
fiercely for their home soü'. The battle ended with roughly 420 Spartan hoplites 
trapped on the nearby island of Sphacteria, an outcome that prompted a Spartan 
surrender and peace offer.
What to make of this startling and uncharacteristic offer and the events which 
preceded it? How did the two sides fare in battle? How was the battle itself 
conducted? What can we conclude about the Athenian response to the peace the 
Spartans propose? Again, in attempting to answer these questions, I will seek to 
draw out the human capacity for reasonable thinking and creative action, even in 
a time rife with contradiction and inconsistency. When man's abstractions and 
categories cease to apply to the world he faces, with reference to what criteria
By this time, the escalating war and the plague had taken its toll on the Athenians and their 
image in the Greek world. Kagan writes of the Athenians' need to "restore prestige" in Sicily, 
which was teetering towards Spartan domination. Corcyra, he writes, was also close to "falling 
into enemy hands" at the time. {Arichidamian War Ithaca: 1974, p.220) Connor also states with 
confidence that the fortification of Pylos must have "seem[edj a distraction." (TTzwcydides 
Princeton: 1984, p .lll)  Gomme calls it "a rider to the main decree" {Historical Commentary on 
Thucydides Oxford: 1945-72, p.438). Though Thucydides does not draw direct attention to the 
insight behind Demosthenes' plan, I hope to show that his actions showed a sense of reason and 
creativity.
Demosthenes was at this time a "private citizen" {onti idiote), and was not therefore acting 
general of his ship (IV.2). However, probably due to the trust generated from his success in 
Arcania, he was given 'use' of a ship.
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does he deliberate and act? As above, I will assume that ^reasonable' derives 
from honest reflection on a wide range of experiences^"  ^ (i.e., attention to the 
actions of men and their poleis, as well as to the recurring cycles of nature) and 
the ability to 'spot'^^® the order and continuity inherent in these experiences. 
'Creativity' implies the capacity to integrate this broad understanding of human 
and natural patterns (a sense of reasonableness) with the present circumstances 
and the individual(s) involved. The result of this integration is a deliberate act in 
the world—a c r e a t i o n . ^ 7 9  Success at Pylos went to those who showed both 
imagination and daring in the moment, yet were also attuned to (and thus 
simultaneously constrained by) a sense of reasonableness, manifest in the more 
regular, recurring patterns observed in human lives and nature.
My analysis, in stressing the important role of man at Pylos, contrasts with the 
view of Comford, but falls in line with those like Kagan's.^®® The interpretations 
put forth by these two scholars mark distinctly different understandings of the 
battle -  Comford, as noted above, understands it to be a situation in which Luck 
or the Irrational enters and dominates as a discrete force, an autonomous 
agent. 8^1 Kagan, on the other hand, locates the primary source of Athenian 
success in deliberate human action—specifically the keen eye' of Demosthenes.
177 wide range of experiences" is analogous to Arendt's sense of "enlarged mentality" (which 
is, in turn, derived from Kant's "world citizen"). It implies that the capacity to be critical comes 
from "contact with other people's thinking," which is not merely to empathise, but to actively 
"move from standpoint to standpoint." The "general" is not a purely "neutral" perspective, but 
one which holds and attempts to harmonise many particular perspectives (Arendt. Lectures on 
Kant's Political Philosophy, Chicago: 1982, pp.40ff.).
This capacity to "spot" (a term suggested to me by R. Sorabji at a seminar at King's College, 
London) will arise again in the discussion of Aristotle to follow.
Each human creation' is a risk, which is, again, made bearable by the assumption that 
forgiveness will follow failure. This understanding of action, i.e., as the once potential/private 
self realising itself in the public world and in doing so, coming into 'contact' (and often conflict) 
with others' 'selves' is similar to Hegel's conception of the manifestation of one's will in the 
world as described in his Philosophy of Right.
Kagan is just one example of many scholars who find fault with Comford's thesis (see also, de 
Romilly and Gomme, Crane, and Doyle (as well as much of the 19* century scholarship that 
preceded him).
Gomme makes an important point in noting that Thucydides' use of tuche and its derivatives 
need not be a reference to luck, but contemporaneousness, or fortunateness (A Historical 
Commentary on Thucydides Oxford: 1945-1972, pp.488-489).
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Kagan goes further to enhance my own analysis when he focuses on the critical 
role of '^initiative and daring"^®^ for this success, and in doing so also echoes 
Arendt (whose ideas will continue to play a structural role in my analysis). With 
this basic distinction in mind, I will look first at the battle leading up to the 
surrender and peace offer, drawing a contrast between Brasidas and 
Demosthenes: how does each one deal with the breakdown of traditional 
identities at Pylos? I will argue that Demosthenes shows a willingness to take 
reasonable risks, while Brasidas clings to past abstractions that no longer apply to 
the present circumstances. Next, I will look at the Spartan peace offer and the 
Athenian response to it. In what way did the offer mark an act of reasonable 
creativity for the Spartans, and how did it challenge the Athenians to act 
likewise? How might this have been an opportunity to break out of a pattern of 
reactive vengeance, and become an arena for liberated creative, reasonable 
action?
Upheaval at Pylos -  Brasidas
Through Thucydides' description of Brasidas and Demosthenes, two distinct 
examples of the transgression of 'traditional' Athenian and Spartan roles at Pylos 
are revealed. Despite being shown to be an able and brave general at other 
points in the war (and generally commanding the respect of Thucydides), 
Brasidas' orders to his naval officers indicate his inability to be both reasonable 
and creative in this particular case.^^ He is unable to break from the past, and 
persists in a destructive reliance on 'outdated' generalisations.^^
Upon arrival at Pylos, Brasidas is described by Thucydides as the "most 
conspicuous of all" (panton de phanerotatos Brasidas egeneto)A^ At lV.11-12, the
Archidamian War (Ithaca: 1974, p. 231).
Homblower explores Thucydides (perhaps unjustified) praise of Brasidas in A Commentary on 
Thucydides vol.2 (Oxford: 1996).
Orwin notes also Brasidas' decidedly "Athenian inclination" towards empire: IV.122-123,35 
(The Humanity of Thucydides Princeton: 1994, pp.78-86).
For further discussion of Brasidas, see Cogan The Human Thing (Chicago: 1981, pp. 81-85).
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reader watches as Brasidas instructs the Spartans to run their ships aground 
(anagkasas...okeilai) as a means of combating the Athenians who held Pylos from 
land. In doing this himself, Brasidas is seriously injured and drops his shield in 
the sea. While Gomme calls this a '"brave action," I suggest that it might also be 
interpreted as a reactive reinforcement of Spartan identity, long conceived as a 
polis of exceptional land soldiers whose highest praise came through death in 
battle. Brasidas" orders to ""run the ships aground"' seems to have arisen at least 
in part from this basic abstract characterisation of Sparta as land-based fighters, 
no doubt derived from his past experience of his mother city. Reference to this 
"truth" encouraged Brasidas to act mechanically at this decisive moment. His 
orders seemed to promise an insured success. After all, failure to get to land 
safely might result in death in battle, a feat deserving the utmost glory in Spartan 
ideology. However, the actual result of the battle revealed this conception of 
success to be outdated—the Spartans, with a dwindling population could not 
afford to lose so many men in battle, no military glory could make up for their 
very real dearth of much needed soldiers. In this, Brasidas" orders reflect a 
dependence on inapplicable, "passé" abstractions and a lack of reflection and 
reasonable creativity.
However, Brasidas was in no easy position at Pylos. The number of plausible 
alternatives available to him at that time was, no doubt, small. There can be little 
doubt that the chaos of the fight, the fear and rage at the Athenian invasion 
intensified Brasidas" desire to reach the familiarity of land, of home. ^^ 7 There, 
Sparta's crown jewel—her hoplite army—could fight in a well-known
Brasidas, however, is no Cleon. The fact that he too seems 'afflicted' with a similar sensibility 
here, might be explained in part by a closer look at the context of each reaction. Cleon 
discouraged debate at a time when debate was scheduled to happen. There was no immediate 
enemy threat, and thus presumably, there was at least minimal time to think. Brasidas, on the 
other hand, acts instinctively (according to past ideas/concepts/categories) in the midst of the 
chaos of a difficult battle.
Note that these are just the emotions that led the Athenians to their hasty and ill-conceived 
punishment of the Mytileniéins. This might indicate one of Thucydides' 'lessons' -  the capacity 
for fear/anger to distort decision-making. This is precisely what Hobbes, translator and 'student' 
of Thucydides, transposed to the 'state of nature'.
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environment. On land, Brasidas had long mastered the rules of the game’. 
However, this need for familiarity in a time of commotion, however 
understandable, seems to have dictated his orders, and led directly to the 
Spartan defeat.^ ®® That is to say, it was precisely Brasidas' reliance on old 
generalisations which had succeeded in the past yet were inadequate in his 
present circumstances that resulted in the capture of Spartan men on Sphacteria 
(as well as his own serious injury). The outcome of the battle—again, a 
devastating 420 Spartans "trapped" on the island (apelambanonto en te neso)— 
illustrates the obstacles that arise if man is unable to work effectively with both 
what he knows (generally) from experience and what he has directly in front of 
him—inconsistent though they may be. Man's abstract ideas must always be 
connected honestly to experience. Brasidas' inhibitions at Pylos, his inability to 
act reasonably and creatively, result in the devastating detention of Spartans on 
Sphacteria—the troops are literally 'imprisoned' by their past.
The surrender of the Spartan soldiers completes the break with the past. Never 
before in recorded history do we have the Spartans, a people whose primary 
virtue is embodied in their military might, and the pride which accompanies it, 
offering such a compromise, including the actual surrender of men alive.^ ®^  The 
Athenian reaction to this offer will follow a discussion of Demosthenes' role in 
the battle: how did he contribute to the Athenian success? How was he, unlike 
Brasidas, able to reason creatively given this 'new' situation, and how did his 
capacity to negotiate between abstract and concrete help him to do so effectively?
In Brasidas' defense, the Spartan position did not offer him many alternatives. Demosthenes 
himself uses this fact to highlight the disadvantaged position of the Spartans and to encourage 
the Athenians -  when coming off of ships, he says "everything has to be just right" (IV.IO). Recall 
too that Pindar embedded the 'new' deed of the victor in a familiar form (the ode) and further 
couched it in well-known myths. If it was the assurance of the known that made the risking 
something new possible, perhaps Brasidas had no choice for he lacked secure grounding in 
anything well known.
While such a surrender was uncharacteristic of Sparta, a polis which placed such value on 
military honor, demanding soldiers be killed rather than return from battle defeated, their 
decreasing population, especially those of the Spartiate class, might help explain this turn 
around.
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Upheaval at Pylos -  Demosthenes
Upon encountering Demosthenes at Pylos, the reader sees an immediate contrast 
with Brasidas. The Athenians, long known for their sea power, find their 
strength on land at Pylos due to Demosthenes' bold encouragement: "If we stand 
and fight, the ground will be an ally (summachon)."^ '^  ^ This break from tradition 
indicates that he is able to forego past conceptions about the Athenians (and thus 
presumably the Spartans), and work with the circumstance in front of him.^^^ 
this short but effective speech, Demosthenes challenges the reluctant and 
apprehensive troops now under his command. One cannot help but see his 
advice in almost direct opposition to that of Pericles, the quintessential Athenian 
general, who had encouraged the Athenians to give up their land at the start of 
the war, to forego their farms and beloved homes, and equip their navy instead
(1.143). Pericles also discouraged increasing the size of the empire while at war
(1.144)^ 93 Much of Book I, especially the Archaeology and the Pentacontaetia, 
leads the reader to believe that sea power was essential to success and empire. 
Athens had been defined, indeed power itself had been defined, by control of the 
sea -  and here we have Demosthenes confidently recommending land as an 
(unlikely) "ally." Whom do we trust?
At Pylos, the reader finds that both the Athenians and the Spartans face a thorny 
dilemma—as we saw with Brasidas, the Spartans were literally stuck out at sea.
For further discussion of Demosthenes' strategy at Pylos, see, Cogan The Human Thing 
(Chicago: 1981, pp. 239-241); in comparison to Pericles, Pouncey The Necessities of War (New York: 
1980, pp. 117-118)
^^ ^While Thucydides' understanding of man's role in the cosmos is larger than that of Pindar, his 
personification of forces other than human (here land) serves to highlight not man's supreme 
dominance, but as one force among many, able at times to control, at others, to be controlled.
While "allying" with the land rather than the sea is uncharacteristic of Athens, the idea of 
building forts secured by naval support continued Periclean policy as described at 1.142.
As Thucydides' admiration for Pericles is undeniable, this direct opposition to his strategy 
might be understood to be an indirect indictment of Demosthenes. I believe however, that such a 
reading would be short sighted. It does not highlight the shortcomings of Demosthenes so much 
as the demand that men be aware of their concrete, present circumstances, and to let them, rather 
than past "norms" guide policy decisions.
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They were forced to fight from this utterly unfamiliar " t e r r i t o ryDemos thenes  
inspired the Athenians to take charge on land: "After Demosthenes spoke, the 
Athenians plucked up their courage and took up positions right down on the 
beach" (IV. 11). This situation marks an acute contrast to conventional roles, and 
highlights Thucydides" ability to make the reader wary of investing too much in 
"types' or rigid classifications of men who are (somewhat) free to shift and 
change given the right circumstances. Demosthenes' capacity to stray from what 
his past generalisations of "what an Athenian is" (based on a narrow 
interpretation of her traditional roles and ideals) allowed him to engage with and 
benefit from the unique elements of his present situation. It was this that helped 
make him successful at Pylos, and well deserving of acclaim.
Demosthenes" inclination to fortify Pylos however, did not arise out of thin air. 
While he forewent reliance on old categories of identity, he turned to another 
source of stability and continuity—nature.^^^ The push for fortification rested in 
large measure on an informed assessment of its natural r e s o u r c e s . T h i s  
concern for resources echoes Thucydides" own attention to natural cycles: he 
used them to mark time in the History, and, more broadly speaking, to offer some 
continued regularity and consistency given the instability of war. Thucydides' 
references to the land and nature in the opening chapters of Book IV emphasise 
this awareness and in this, underscore the strength of Demosthenes" insight at 
this point in the war. At chapter 1, Thucydides marks time with reference to the 
"ripening grain," at chapter 2, again, time is measured by the "height of the 
grain," and at chapter 6, the Spartans run out of food because they invaded 
Attica too early: "when the grain was still green." These references at the
The Spartans had, of course, relied on their sea power before. However, it was used to 
introduce an element of the unexpected (in.30-32). Again, it is noteworthy that the tactics of the 
Spartans, though presumably a last resort, had their ships ramming into the sea bottom, 
desperately trying to get to(familiar) land (IV.ll).
Demosthenes again uses his experience of the land in aiding Cleon in the capture of the 
Spartans on Sphacteria IV.30 -  a victory which Cleon effectively attributed to himself.
For support on Demosthenes attention to natural resources, specifically forests, see 
Homblower Thucydides (Baltimore: 1987, p. 158).
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opening of the book are significant in that they call attention to the overarching 
importance nature, and the need to harmonise one's actions with her consistent 
rhythms, especially at times which are otherwise volatile and unstable.
Thus the reader sees a parallel—Demosthenes' reasons behind his enthusiasm for 
the fortification of Pylos reiterate Thucydides' own attention to nature—Pylos is 
important for its timber and stone, and the fact that it was "strong by nature." 
His reference to natural resources marks both an awareness of the concrete 
reality at hand, and the capacity to use nature to his advantage, to actively shape 
his world. Demosthenes was not swept up in the rhetoric of battles far away at 
Sicily and Corcyra (which proves to be especially misguided, the "gateway" to 
Athenian defeat). Instead he saw the specific needs of the Athenians here and 
now, and could ground these particular, concrete facts in the broader, regularity 
of nature. Later when he was selected by Cleon to help fulfill the "crazy 
promise" he made to the Athenians, Thucydides reminds the reader that it was 
the fire on the island of Sphacteria that convinced Demosthenes that the 
Athenian attack has some potential for success (IV.30). His assessment at 
Sphacteria derives from his own earlier experience in Aetolia where he had been 
defeated due, in large measure, to heavy, obscuring brush. The fact that 
Sphacteria had been cleared out by fire made Cleon's seemingly absurd plan 
appear plausible to Demosthenes because he could access past experience and 
ultimately use it in a creative way.
When Demosthenes speaks to the soldiers before the imminent battle, he again 
reveals an uncanny sense about what is needed in the immediate situation, even 
if it runs counter to what has been known and done previously. The reader sees 
him recommend tactics that seem utterly un-Athenian—specifically, discouraging 
lengthy reflection on and deliberation about what to do (IV.IO). Instead, 
Demosthenes calls for immediate action. However, while the reader is 
undoubtedly reminded of Cleon, he cannot force Demosthenes into the mould of
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the hateful man at Mytilene. To discourage the Athenians from entering in long 
discussions and debate at this point in the war was necessary given the plain fact 
that the Spartan ships were already on their way. Lengthy debate at this point 
would have been misplaced for there was nothing to debate about, there was no 
choice to be made. Action was the only reasonable response to the quickly 
approaching fleet; Demosthenes saw this and encouraged his men to act on that 
brute fact. Cleon, on the other hand, sought to prevent discussion and debate on 
a matter about which there were a variety of possible actions to take. 
Demosthenes saw the situation clearly as it was, and spoke to the army's 
immediate concerns, showing them that at this precise point, freedom to choose 
one path over another was not a real possibility. The fact that Thucydides 
highlights these two events in close succession, is of course due to the time line of 
the war itself. But, as with the telling juxtaposition of Pericles' funeral oration 
followed immediately by a description of the ghastly plague, he sets up an 
important contrast which brings to light subtle, yet vital differences in political 
leadership and the recognition of what must necessarily be done, as opposed to 
situations where there is a choice.
Demosthenes did something else in his speech; he inspired the men listening to 
him to act. This was achieved in part by first recognising the legitimacy of their 
fears—with the fast approaching Spartan fleet the Athenians were indeed in a 
"pinch...surrounded by t e r r o r s . I n  doing this, Demosthenes allied himself 
with his men, and empowered them by acknowledging their emotional state. 
However, their troubles were not dwelt upon; once having granted the grounds 
for fear, Demosthenes worked to raise his men out of it. His encouragement of
In the following chapter, we will see that distinguishing those areas where man can make a 
difference and those which are fixed and necessary and thus invulnerable to human conduct, is 
an important issue for Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.
This recognition and implicit legitimation of where the 'audience' is psychologically helps 
create a sense of belonging and solidarity which might serve to empower them to risk acting in a 
new way. There is perhaps a parallel here with Pindar, who also 'grounded' his audience by 
referencing familiar customs and stories, before introducing the extraordinary (new) feat of the 
athlete.
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''high hopes" (euelpis) seems to break with Thucydides' more common view that 
portrayed hope as destructive, often leading to hubris and a false sense of power. 
However, on closer scrutiny, the reader sees that Demosthenes' reference to hope 
was based in reality—the landing would be difficult, if not impossible for the 
Spartans. A landing like the one the Spartans would be forced to make required 
that everything "go just right" (polla ta kairia dei en te thalasse). Such precise 
conditions, the reader is now well aware, were difficult to guarantee at any time, 
much less during war. The true advantage thus lay with the Athenians, despite 
the small size of their fleet. Their ability to place themselves strategically on the 
peninsula to make sure the conditions the Spartans required were not met was 
handled with seeming ease by Demosthenes. This speech, short though it is 
(another im-Athenian characteristic), is perceptive and sensitive to the here and 
now .i^
The Spartan Peace Offer
When the Spartans made an offer of peace to the Athenians after the battle at 
Pylos, the "upheaval" of the preceding battle continued in that such a proposal 
was not characteristic of Sparta.^oo In an important sense though, the peace offer 
did something more. It demanded that a distinct and explicit choice be made. 
Action was momentarily frozen and both the reader and the Athenians were 
placed at a crossroads. At this point, the war had escalated, most likely much 
beyond what either side had anticipated upon entering into it.^oi There had been 
serious losses to both the Athenians and Spartans, losses which I hope to have
However, perceptive as Demosthenes was at the time, his strategies do seem to lack a sense of 
the "long-term." He is something like an ancient "trouble shooter," putting out fires, yet not 
building monuments. But, perhaps through his successes, Thucydides sought to illustrate the 
varieties of good leadership, and the inability of man to rigidly classify even that character type. 
Different strengths are important at different times. One might even speculate that Pericles 
himself would have been defeated at Pylos.
200 poi- further analysis of this offer, see Orwin The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994, pp. 
ISlff.); Crane Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley: 1998, pp. 187ff.).
201 Pericles promised a quick victory at the outset of the war, implying that the Spartans would be 
unable to sustain a long war (1.141). Roberts notes that until this, wars -  even against the 
Persians -  had been "decided in a few decisive engagements" (in History of the Peloponnesian War 
trans. Blanco, New York: 1998, p.xv).
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shown above, severely eroded the fundamental identities of the two 
"superpowers." Given this, what can we make of the Spartan offer, and the 
Athenian rejection of it? What tools can the actors (and reader) use to make 
reasonable judgments given a situation which offers little in the way of 
"banisters?" To answer these questions, I will again turn to Arendt, specifically 
to her conception of forgiving as a way to structure and derive meaning from 
this event.
Disruption Continues
I claim that the Spartan peace offer was "disruptive' like the battle which 
preceded it for a number of reasons. It continued to play out the atypical 
behaviour of the Spartans and Athenians: for instance, the Spartan ambassadors 
open their speech by saying that they will talk at length.202 Despite insisting that 
this is "not contrary to their normal practice," both ancient and modem reader 
alike are well aware that "wordiness" is not an adjective traditionally ascribed to 
the Spartans. Additionally, as Finley points out, the Spartan warning against the 
danger of ceaseless expansion echoes Pericles' own admonition to the Athenians 
at the outset of the war.^o^ Thus both the length and the content of the speech 
were peculiarly Athenian in character. The Athenian response was also 
surprising—in large measure because almost no details about it are reported in 
the narrative. Had Cleon's influence crushed the practice of open discussion, 
once fundamental to democratic Athens? Whatever actually happened following 
the offer, Thucydides' choice not to describe the debate which might have taken 
place as to whether or not they would accept the terms of the Spartan offer is 
revealing. Simply stating that Cleon persuaded the people who were already 
bloated with an inflated sense of confidence and greed for more (pleonos
While it is perhaps not unusual for a group of ambassadors to deliver such a plea, the fact that 
Thucydides makes no link to an individual in command at this decisive moment is conspicuous. 
Although it has been made clear that Brasidas has been badly injured, the fact that such an 
important speech, delivered at such a crucial moment in the war is delivered by a vague, 
undistinguished group is conspicuous.
Finley Thucydides (Cambridge, MA: 1963, p.l94).
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oregontoY^ to present the Spartans with an "alternate' plan shows a marked 
change in Athenian habits.^os
To Accept or to Refuse?
As stated above, the framework I will employ in analysing this incident seeks to 
explore the Arendtian "faculty of forgiving" and the corresponding freedom it 
confers. In order to explore the Spartan offer and the Athenian reaction to it 
fruitfully, it will be helpful to take a closer look at the speech itself in which the 
Spartans make their appeal. As noted above, it was a long speech for the 
Spartans, lengthy because it hoped to drive home a maxim they believed to be a 
fundamental "truth" of human life: good luck runs out, it is "uncommon" 
(adoketos), and a good future is always uncertain (amphibolon). Perhaps they 
hoped that this "truth" would be taken in light of the recent misfortunes suffered 
by the Athenians; e.g., the events at Corcyra, their defeat at Aetolia, the relentless 
suffering from the plague. Understood thus, the Spartan portrayal of the 
situation—that man's control over the world, especially in wartime, is tenuous— 
would surely be underscored and their advice heeded.
However, while the Spartan lesson would surely have had resonance under 
ordinary circumstances, perhaps even be a truth to which the Athenians 
themselves would ascribe independently, the reader might legitimately question 
the shrewdness of using such a premise given the psychological state of the 
Athenians at the time. Against the odds, the Athenians had just triumphed over 
the Spartans, not only triumphed, but brought about a surrender heretofore 
unheard of in Greek history. No doubt, this left them supremely confident.
20^  Kagan points out that, despite the fact that Athens was in bad shape at the time of the truce 
(recent plague, low rations), such a success might have an inspirational effect which would lead 
them to believe that they could easily have more {Archidamian War Ithaca: 1974, p. 233).
205 1 put "alternate" in quotes because most scholars agree that the Athenian counter offer was 
realistically no alternative at all, for it could not possibly have been accepted by the Spartans. 
Kagan details the "inconceivableness" of the Athenian demands in Archidamian War (Ithaca: 1974, 
pp.235ff). Gomme remarks that Cleon's offer was one which Sparta was "bound to refuse" as it 
was dishonourable (Historical Commentary on Thucydides Oxford: 1945-72).
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reveling in their unexpected victory. Though undeniably a sound account of the 
unpredictability of good fortune for men, attributing Athenian success to mere 
luck was surely not a description readily received by the victors. That is to say, 
even if the Spartan explanation of the situation was accurate, it was remarkably 
ill-timed and ineptly presented to the Athenians who might rightly have been 
taken it as indicating disrespect, a final (and in this case, fatal) insult before 
forced submission.
If we take a closer look at the situation from the standpoint of the Athenians, 
their victory, surely made all the more radiant amidst the mayhem and agony of 
war, would not have been seen as the result of a "lucky break." Athens was, 
after all, the mighty sea power of the Greek world, the bastion of freedom and 
democracy, and their daring and skill surely warranted this victory. Pylos might 
be interpreted as a sign of Athenian power restored to its "true" glory despite the 
misfortunes she encountered earlier in the war. A "lesson" learned through a 
comparison with the Spartan experience, specifically from "their present 
misfortunes" would surely have fallen on deaf ears. No one who has just 
overcome odds wants to be cast in the same light with those who have just been 
defeated.2^^
Ultimately, both the Spartan and Athenian interpretations have some merit. 
Each one drew a distinct yet contradictory conclusion from the same body of 
Tacts,'207 and both sides were overconfident about the validity of their own view- 
-the Spartans about Athenian capitulation, the Athenians about their triumphant 
future. Given this, why advocate forgiving on the Athenian part? This answer is 
apparent when we refer back to the effects of forgiving as outlined by Arendt.
206 That the Spartans did not see this, illustrates the importance not just of message (content), but 
of its presentation (form). Further it indicates a certain lack of social ability perhaps indicative of 
the Spartan tradition.
202 Thucydides underlies this fact, i.e., that men can look at the same Tacts' and find different 
conclusions, in his descriptions of battles where both sides declared victory (e.g., 1.54,1.105). This 
suggests that his historical method and conclusions are not modem science' but rather 
situa tionist'.
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By choosing to decline the Spartan offer, the Athenians locked themselves into 
the continuation of the war, and thus into an animalistic, reactive (i.e., un-free ) 
revenge mode of interaction.^os They continued the war with irrational ideas 
about what they could achieve (irrational because narrow, seemingly limited to 
their own immediate experience). By renouncing the Spartan viewpoint, as well 
as their own past experiences and the advice of Pericles, the Athenians ceased to 
be "attached" to concrete reality, but lived according to the (illusory) abstract 
image they had of themselves. Forgiving the Spartans and opting for peace 
would have been a decision based on a multi-perspective standpoint, and thus 
would have grounded the Athenians more firmly in the actual circumstances in 
which they were enmeshed.
The Athenian advantage came quickly to an end. Almost immediately after 
rejecting the offer the situation revealed the extent to which they were caught, 
forced into a vengeful, re-active stance. As winter approached, the Athenians 
found that they could not continue to blockade the island through the months of 
severe cold, yet if they abandoned their posts, the Spartans would be free. 
Thucydides makes the panic that this realisation has on the Athenians clear: "The 
Athenians didn't know what to do when they found that their army was in dire 
straits, while food was getting in to the men [Spartans] on the island. They 
became afraid that winter would overtake their garrison, seeing that it would not 
be possible to get the supply shipments around the Peloponnese." Thucydides 
emphasises the desperate position of the Athenians with the revealing words like 
"fear" and "regret" {ephobounto, metemelonto). Calm, reasonable thought slipped 
from the Athenian grasp, and a sense of panic and desperate, false hope went on 
to permeate many of their future decisions.
208 This is similar to Athena's warning about the dangers of an endless cycle of revenge avoidable 
by implementing justice and persuasion (Aeschylus Eumenides, 823ff.).
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Chapter 12: Concluding Remarks
I hope to have shown that through a close reading of episodes in Thucydides' 
History (i.e., through immersion in stories displaying particular customs and 
traditions, animated through the words and actions of unique characters), the 
reader gains insight into how individual men have acted at a particular time in 
the past, and for what kinds of reasons. How, for example, did different men in 
the Peloponnesian War negotiate the complex web of the abstract and the 
concrete inherent in human life situations—both successfully and unsuccessfully? 
This exposure to particular, substantive lives and the choices made when such 
choice was a possibility to guide action, (and not merely to neutral abstract 
principles) expands the reader's own limited perspective and, from this 
broadened perspective, he can start to generate stability (grounded in a sense of 
reasonableness given the circumstances) firm enough to replace the absolute 
certainty thought to inhere in abstractions.^^ Through this historical exposure, 
the reader of Thucydides can begin to fill out what man is as a kind of creature, 
and in this, he can begin to engage in the process of determining what counts as 
reasonable for himself. Settled and strengthened by a sense of the kind of being 
he is, the reader will ideally be more able to risk creative action in his own life, 
not least by distinguishing circumstances where choices to act in one way or 
another can make a difference, from those circumstances where to act is 
necessitated and not open to choice. Thus, through immersion in actual life, by 
giving honest attention to views from varied yet particular, (i.e., partial) 
perspectives, and not through a retreat into neutral abstractions, people are 
better qualified to understand where their freedom lies and to use their freedom, 
being more able to make reasonable choices in the inevitable 'unprecedented'
2*^  This is directly parallel to Arendt's notion of "going visiting" mentioned above -  the idea that 
through exposure to others, we expand our own sensibilities, we gain a critical, though in no 
sense detached, perspective, and with reflection, we (have the potential to) become prudent 
judges.
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situations that confront each human life. 210 Freedom to choose without a realistic 
sense of what kinds of things are possible for us and in what conditions is no 
freedom at all, but veiled constraint. What is possible for men cannot be 
generated from "pure' abstract principles, but rather must begin with men 
themselves—from honest and concerted attention to their history and the varied 
experiences of others.
It will be important to recognise that in giving up the certainty of immutable, 
abstractions and instead, relying on varied experience, custom and history we do 
not lose the ability to access reason, that is, to make reasonable judgments/or us. 
My hope is that the reading of Thucydides that I present does not slip out of a 
false notion of objectivity into a sea of relativism. While we must give up the 
abstract (and illusory) Archimedean standpoint and replace it with a perspective 
concerning what has been concretely experienced and judged, we are still 
reading Thucydides as a normative political theorist. The "should" embedded in 
his text seems to lie in a demand to cultivate the capacity to be both in a situation 
and impartial about it (i.e., able to judge it reasonably and act creatively). This 
idea, I hope to have shown, is well described by Hannah Arendt, who it appears 
thought she learned it from Thucydides! She argues that human beings can 
never achieve pure objectivity, nor, she suggests would it be useful to them in the 
political realm if they could .211 They can however create a false image of 
certainty and use it cruelly (and inhumanely, for such certainty is inhuman), and 
the totalitarian ideology which fueled Nazi Germany was just this. Thus, Arendt 
posits that it is precisely the human susceptibility to blind faith in false.
2^ 0 As both man and his world are open and indeterminate, that which remains, that which is 
permanent, is the human capacity to effectively deal with "newness" inherent in any age. This 
comes in large measure from broad exposure to how human beings act and have acted in the past 
and the recognition of the limits of one's autonomy and responsibility when faced with the 
distinction between what is necessary and what is possible.
The goal of 'neutral objectivity' has fallen out of favour with some modem psychoanalysts as 
well. Renick, for example, sees it as both a futile and destructive goal in the analytic setting. See, 
Renick, Owen's article, "The Perils of Neutrality."
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immutable abstractions which blinds men to reality, and in doing so, enables 
them to commit the most monstrous crimes all in the name of abstract Truth.
Thucydides leaves his readers a written record of the realities of the 
Peloponnesian War as it occurred from his own concrete, particular perspective. The 
events Thucydides describes are selected—he meticulously and deliberately 
chooses to write about certain experiences and not others. In this, his narrative is 
not a universal, definitive account of the war. Yet still it represents and 
preserves an important truth, one which is embodied in a distinct, human 
viewpoint—objective insofar as it represents an individual's perceptions of 
'objects' in the world .212 Such a truth' provides the reader with neither false 
objectivity—Truth—nor the equally illusory 'neutrality' thought to be fixed in 
abstract generalisations. Instead the reader of Thucydides' History gets a 
recorded account of an objective historical event which stretches his own 
experience and expands the bounds of his imagination. His engagement with 
this foreign event cultivates his capacity to discern prudent choices in his own 
life and encourages reasonable and creative action.




My aim in this final section is to return, given this richer sense of man, to the 
work of a philosopher -  Aristotle -  in order to reconsider his distinct kind of 
political theorising. More broadly speaking, I will look at the nature and role 
of abstract political theory given this broader conception of what man is, and 
how poetry might benefit his capacity to engage in effective political thought.
Chapter 1: Aristotle and Theory
In the opening pages of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: "it will be 
satisfactory if we can indicate the truth roughly and in outline" (NE 1094b20). 
This statement, anticipating his approach in the work that follows, puts the 
more traditional understanding of truth on the line. "Rough" is not generally 
predicated of truth -  truth is exact, unchanging, universal. In facing ethical 
dilemmas, 'm odem 's' have come to seek clear and precise 'rational' (which is 
to say, neutral) rules which guide choice and action to a clean, indisputable 
resolution.^ Neither Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics nor his Politics, however, 
provides such exacting rules to follow. In fact, Aristotle states explicitly that 
the very nature of ethics and politics prevents either one from yielding 
principles specific enough to be simply and dogmatically applied across the 
board -  while there are moral truths according to Aristotle, they do not 
provide a precise guide for each individual's conduct (NE 1094bl5-25). 
Instead, he insists that 'the right' or 'the best' in ethics and politics be 
presented as a broad framework -  based on an understanding of the kind of 
creature man is -  suggesting general "rules of thumb"^ which the well- 
cultivated, and properly habituated citizen must integrate with the particular 
culture into which he was bom  and raised. Both this general framework and 
an awareness and understanding of one's own concrete circumstances are
 ^Much contemporary liberal theory relies on 'neutrality' as the precondition for fairness (and 
thus for justice): "the main task of political theory has been to construct an abstract defence of 
impartial principles which should regulate the distributions of benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation" (Impartiality, Neutrality, and Justice ed. Kelly Edinburgh: 1998). This is largely 
the result of post 18* century philosophy collapsing the separate moral universe of discourse 
into the scientific one.
2 See Salkever, Finding the Mean (Princeton: 1990, p. 140).
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essential elements of deliberate human action. In harmonising these two, man 
can actualise his (limited) freedom prudently, he can be virtuous in his actions 
not by applying arbitrary or mechanical rules, but by engaging his reason and 
creativity in the particular circumstances in which he finds himself in order to 
achieve the goal of responsible, right action.
Though Aristotle does not provide anything so certain as Kant's categorical 
imperative or the utilitarian principle, he uses abstract ethical concepts to 
guide and frame human action. Aristotle seems to have a firm sense of what 
m an is as a species, and regularly alludes to a hum an 'best'. Where do these 
abstract concepts come from? And how does Aristotle relate them to and 
integrate them with the every day life of individuals? Aristotle is explicit in 
the fact that his ethical and political theory draws on and incorporates many 
different elements: an abstract conception of human nature which grows out 
of his explanation of human psychology and biology, appeals to both 
common opinion, and recognition of the views of 'experts'. He also pays 
close attention to the particular details of each individual's actual life (this 
includes both an understanding of one's own culture and tradition, as well as 
an awareness of and exposure to others).^ I will argue that Aristotle's 
approach (which works dialectically from engagement with the actual lives of 
men to a general sense of Man and back again to particular lives) can provide 
us with a stable base for political theorising providing a substantive sense of 
w hat living well for hum an beings entails.
Aristotle's ethical and political theories generate abstractions which are, in 
some sense, both fixed and flexible. This comes from the fact that his 
conception of hum an nature (i.e., what man is as a kind of thing), though itself 
unchanging in definition, gives rise to probabilities rather than necessities
 ^In examining the work of Aristotle, I must qualify the term 'others.' He did not think it 
productive or wise to study the communities who are vastly different from "us" (i.e., those of 
'barbarians,' or non-Greeks). Aristotle was not an anthropologist -  he was looking to 
discover the best in an already realised 'best' or actualised deliberative political community -  
his own.
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when applied to concrete lives -  ethics and politics, he claims, are ^'inexact 
sciences."^ This is the case because human beings are themselves 
indeterminate, and live their lives making choices about the best actions to 
engage in /refrain  from in a world of contingent events and probabilities. The 
abstract concepts he uses in both disciplines operate in (and are in fact 
derived from) a thorough examination of the vast range of possibilities in 
individual hum an lives, and the particular choices made and actions taken 
therein. The political and ethical generalisations which help to guide 
individuals in making choices about action in this peculiarly hum an 'space' 
retain a certain fluidity,^ demanding that men be competent not only in 
grasping the general concepts, but in applying them creatively to their own 
indefinite and particular lives.^ This means weighing and deliberating 
options, choosing and acting amidst contingencies, and taking responsibilities 
for those actions once taken.
In this, we see that the actual lives lived by men play a distinct and important 
role in theorising for Aristotle -  active experience precedes and continually
 ^See NE1134b28-31,1154b24; Po/.1332a38ff. This is in contrast to true or scientific episteme 
(e.g., theology and mathematics) which deals solely with objects which are universal and 
unchanging. This is discussed further below in the section on Rational Soul and Intellectual 
Virtues.
 ^"The conception [general (theoretical) background] is not immune to revision even at the 
highest level; and this revision may come from perceptions embodied in new experience ..the 
general conception is not inclusive of everything that is of relevance -  for some relevant 
features are non-repeatable." (Nussbaum. Fragility of Goodness Cambridge: 1981, p.306). For 
further discussion of this theme, see also Gadamer. The Idea of the Good In Platonic-Aristotelian 
Philosophy (New Haven:1986, p. 167).
 ^This is not to deny that for Aristotle there is a good for man, just that, given the vast world 
of actual men, it can be manifested in an infinite number of situations and so it cannot be 
articulated in rules or principles which fit precisely in each situation (See Rorty, A.O. "The 
Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. 
Rorty Berkeley: 1980, p.383). Evidence supporting Aristotle's belief that there is in fact a fixed 
definition of man (and thus a distinct good for him) emerges in a number of forms, for 
instance, through his discussion of the human function (ergon): NE 1098al-15, NE lllGa26, NE 
1170al7-21, Pol. 1334bl6. His understanding of "human nature" also emerges more 
indirectly, in statements which assume characteristics of mankind as a whole:
a) "everybody..." (pontes): NE 1168a23, NE 1168b9, NE 1174a5, Pol. 1331b39, Metaph. 980a22
b) "each person..." (autogar malisth'ekastos houletai t'agatha): NE 1159al2-15;
c) "no one" (outheis): NE 1169bl8, Rhet. 1378b4,1388bl
d) "our [human] nature": (autai phusikai): Poetics 1448b5
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informs ethical and political theorising, for theory is always "extracted' from 
practice. Understanding what man 'ought' to do in order to live well does not 
come from simply conforming to a set of universally applicable rules which 
can be learned in the classroom -  the varying particularities of individual 
lives are the 'substance' of the human condition, and only through active 
engagement with these irreducible details can man come to have a general 
understanding of the kind of creature he is. Equally important, through an 
active and reflective life with others, man gains clarity about himself in 
particular (i.e., his own distinctive personality, desires, temperament). 
Ongoing engagement -  habituation -  within a community of others with 
certain practices /  traditions, together with accumulative, honest self- 
awareness and reflection play a permanent role in m an's continued attempt to 
understand how to live well. This is a continuous and inherently active 
process. While Aristotle's ethical concepts are permanent and enduring, they 
do not automatically trump any experience/'instance' which falls outside 
them: precisely because of their abstraction they are imprecise and so cannot 
be applied mechanically to man's concrete, determinate circumstances. 
Rather Aristotle's abstract ethical and political concepts require delicate skill 
in their interpretation and application, constant consideration of the unique 
circumstances and characters (i.e., the moral habits and dispositions) of each 
person in vo lved .^  These particularities (even direct exceptions) are not shed, 
or deemed superfluous because they fall outside the 'general rule'; rather they 
themselves dictate how abstract concepts are to be applied, and good 
application depends on a character who is well habituated (through guided 
experience) in both those specific cases and general theory relevant to the task 
at hand. Such responsive and attuned application is difficult, and lacking 
exact and precise rules but with only general guidelines and sketched 
frameworks to go on, the margin of error expands and some stability and 
control is undoubtedly forfeited.
 ^I will argue that this balancing of abstract and concrete, the activity of trying to discern as 
best one can the relationship between the two is part of what human virtue is.
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While giving this degree of authority to the particularities of contingent 
hum an life opens up a degree of instability in the realm of 'pure ' theorising, it 
has some positive effects which I believe help to compensate for the (false) 
certainty lost. For instance, man cannot merely resort to blind and mechanical 
rule following when he is engaged in acting well with and towards others. This 
sort of thinking requires only minimal attention to the details of his particular 
life and thus does nothing to increase his ability to deal with complicated 
conflict when it arises. Aristotelian ethical and political theory demands that 
man both pay close attention to and reflect on the multifaceted life he leads 
with agents of like kinds (i.e., humans) as well as maintain a more general 
idea of what the good life for man as the kind of being he is entails. In 
encouraging active participation in the value laden elements of his unique life, 
this kind of theorising confers recognition and significance to man, and this in 
turn gives rise to motivation and a drive to act wilfully, to be an effective 
agent amongst others (not a 'tyrant' over things). Ideally, once actively 
engaged, a sense of self and belonging develops which enables him to explore 
other ways of life with a strength and security.® Foreign cultures, conflict 
lacking neat resolution, simply making mistakes in one's personal business, 
all cease to be threatening to man's understanding of the world. Instead, the 
(sometimes incompatible) variations confronted in living life are understood 
as an inescapable part of what it is to be hum an and, if reflected upon and put 
to active use, become an important stimulus of public discourse.^ For
® Below we will see that such a sense of belonging came before entering the poUs. It was, 
according to Aristotle, something one acquired in the household (though importantly, in a 
household set in a polis, i.e., a moral community of a distinctive kind).
 ^Note Aristotle's method of presenting accounts of beliefs which he believes to be mistaken, 
even dedicating large portions of his analyses to examining them -  for instance, other regimes 
as in. Book 2 of the Politics. (However, I would like to reiterate that the degree of "openness" 
many modem readers have to other cultures was not shared by Aristotle who seemed to have 
had a more limited definition of what constituted a "civilized" polis. I refer here to something 
like Arendt's (modem and liberal) understanding of the imagination "going visiting." 
{Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: 1982, p.43); also Disch, J Hannah Arendt and the 
Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: 1994, pp.204ff.). Though I hesitate to call Aristotle a proponent of 
'tolerance', I suggest that it is worthwhile to consider the idea that certainty and precision are 
not the necessary starting point of ethical and political theory, and in fact, might be replaced
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Aristotle, men are always reinterpreting the values of others against their own 
habits; active and honest engagement in this process is what it is to gain a 
political and ethical understanding of the world with the aim of getting to 
'fine' opinion, and not relativism. I will argue such an approach to ethics and 
politics originates in generalisations from observation of values we perceive 
in the world, to what we, as human beings, in fact are.
In what follows then, I aim to show that with Aristotle, we find a theorist 
whose ethical and political discourses do not simply 'level' human beings so 
that they can be neatly (linguistically) subsumed under an almighty, yet 
severely impoverished abstraction to be manipulated with ease in a political 
'equation.' Rather, to theorise with Aristotle about ethics and poHtics 
demands a rich, complex (i.e., accurate) sense of the kind of creature man is.^° 
It entails constant negotiation between abstractions (which secure identity) 
and fluctuating particulars (which fuel discourse and are the vehicle of 
change /  progress). In short, his "inexact" sciences require continual 
engagement with and commitments to others, and result not in perfect 
knowledge, but in risking creative action (based on the most informed -  
reasonable -  opinions about the world we can get hold of). This ongoing 
process builds on and stretches our understanding of the world allowing us to 
live life as best we can given the kinds of creatures we are. 1 believe that the 
image of man that appears in Aristotle's theory will point towards the 
conception of man we saw in Thucydides and Pindar -  a being who can make
with critical tolerance {not relativism). This might allow compromise and compassion to 
cultivate expansion in one's understanding of one's character so that one can, through 
discourse alone, perceive the world from a dijferent moral perspective and live that difference 
in another culture.
As abstract theorizing follows from attentive experience, i.e., living, acting and reflecting 
on human life, Aristotle himself required that those attending his 'social science' lectures be 
older, and thus experienced in life, i.e., already having moral characters/dispositions formed 
by their own cultures and ready to (re)interpret and analyse the values in which they have 
been raised (NE1095a3-9). Such experience, I argue, can be (and perhaps, must be) 
augmented by engaging with one's own culture's historical and literary works which provide 
a kind of 'guided' experience and an arena for active participation on the part of the 
reader/observer.
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reasonable choices which lead to creative action within the indeterminate, 
imprecise and imperfect world.
Given all this, Aristotelian political theory demands cultivating a peculiar 
kind of thought, based on acquiring a broad sense of 'reasonableness' 
grounded in a sense of belonging to a group which points to a good beyond 
one's own self-disclosed preferences. This provides the structure and 
continuity needed for creative action. This understanding requires experience, 
part of which comes through engagement with texts often thought to be 
outside 'rational' discourse (though I will argue that they play an essential 
role in developing the capacity to act reasonably). As this conclusion emerges 
out of my interpretation of some Aristotelian texts, I will begin by making 
these interpretations explicit. The chapter will be divided into three sections 
as follows:
Ethics: Definition of Man and Method
The first section will begin by analysing Aristotle's definition of man as a kind 
of creature -  a reasonable (political, mimetic) being -  whose 'good' is realised 
in a life of virtuous activity. As man's access to what hum an beings are as a 
species (i.e., abstractly) comes from observation of and reflection on concrete 
men who vary according to the particular details that characterise different 
personalities and cultures, the foundational 'data ' required to derive ethical 
generalisations is itself indeterminate -  based not on necessities, but on 
probabilities, on opinions, not facts. A life of virtuous activity demands that 
man leam  to consider and analyse these probabilities so that they can be of 
use in his particular and contingent life; he must leam to settle on conclusions 
and take action based on the ongoing interpretation of 'better and worse' 
opinions, not the rigid application of 'true and false' facts/principles. In this, 
there seems to be no solid ground from which abstract concepts -  and thus 
ethical theory itself -  can spring. Yet for Aristotle, this does not render the 
study of ethics an incoherent mass of relativism, nor does it reduce it to blind
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faith in a single tradition or particular set of local' customs. It simply means 
developing a different kind thinking, a richer concept of what 'reasoning' 
about hum an beings entails.
Examination of just what 'virtuous activity' entails for Aristotle will help to 
clarify this kind of reasoning. I will argue that for Aristotle, virtuous activity 
means constantly and deliberately harmonising an abstract idea of Man (itself 
derived over time given what men, through their culturally distinct, value­
laden practices, reveal their common ergon and teles to be) with those 
concrete, particular men in one's own contingent and specific circumstances. 
This is possible given practical wisdom {phronesis), which is acquired through 
broad experience living as men naturally do -  in poleis -  being habituated to 
live according to laws which aim at a general good and compel practices 
which promote that good. The ability to balance and negotiate an abstract 
conception of a 'hum an' good with those concrete particular desires and 
needs which make up an individual life cannot be taught or learned by rote. 
Men develop this 'w isdom' through observation and perception, through the 
imitation of others, and through independent trial and error. Virtuous 
activity therefore demands an environment which provides men with laws 
which, through compelling a certain kind of behaviour and providing 
'exemplars' to observe and imitate, orient citizens towards a substantive 
good. Far from constraining them, this rich 'context', entrenched in values 
and manifested in the culturally specific practices of a particular social milieu, 
gives men the framework necessary to become active virtue practitioners in 
their own right, who may, over time and given wide and varied cultural 
exposure, become staunch critics of their 'homes'.
I hope to show that practical wisdom is the base of a kind of theory which, far 
from offering definitive answers to political and ethical dilemmas, has much 
more to do with how the contingent beliefs and practices of a culture fit 
together in a stable and coherent value system which is oriented around an
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abstract understanding of 'the good life for man', yet remains both "practical 
and open" -  critical -  in light of it.^  ^ Such a dynamic 'system' must educate 
men competently to sustain a harmony between those abstract concepts 
which order and thus imbue life with meaning, and those concrete, contingent 
circumstances which animate it, and motivate men to act. This demands that 
men continually reflect on and discuss their beliefs and actions, remaining 
responsive to and active in the situations they find t h e m s e l v e s . ^ 2  
Furthermore, a system which is "practical and open" encourages (in fact 
requires) men to take (reasonable) risks in 'new ' situations which demand 
independent creative action (rather than the kind of imitation appropriate to 
children). Thus I will argue that practical wisdom, for Aristotle, although 
'directed' by an abstract conception of what is good for man, is not realised in 
the mechanical application of rules which 'fall out' of this concept, but 
requires reasoned creativity, the capacity to blend what is both abstract and 
concrete innovatively and independently in new circumstances. Ultimately, 
this will hinge on defining a flourishing human life, which is to say, a life of 
virtue, as being manifested in reasonable choice and creative action. Fuller 
grasp of the way in which reason and creativity are integrated requires an 
analysis of the method Aristotle uses to arrive at the ethical abstractions he 
uses and how they are maintained (and extended) given attention to and 
active participation in the world of concrete particulars.
Politics: The Role of Law in the Cultivation of Man
Aristotle understood the political organisation of a polis to be the necessary 
precondition for living a human life; without a polis, he claimed, man is either 
"god or beast."13 A polis should be structured by a secure constitution -  
ideally, a set of laws which define and explain citizens' actions in light of the
11 SaUcever, S. Finding the Mean (Princeton; 1990, p,138). For Aristotle, I will argue, this 
abstraction is most accurate when 'empirically' -  biologically/psychologically derived. 
i^This awareness of one's surroundings and sensitive activity given it (discussed more fully 
in the section on the Politics) itself cultivates friendship, an essential element to living a 
flourishing Life.
13 Thus his claim that the polis is logically prior to the individual.
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hum an good, and aimed at cultivating and realising m an's potential for more 
than mere survival (i.e., sustaining physical life and satisfying personal 
desires), but for his ability to "live well" (i.e., virtuously -  to act reasonably 
and creatively with and for others) and, under ideal circumstances, to be 
eudaimon. More precisely, the polis exists in order to provide the environment 
necessary for proper hum an development whereby appropriate habits are 
formed, and good character is firmly established. Good character implies a 
love for w hat is truly fine/noble, which serves to empower men by stabilising 
their desires and preparing them to develop the discerning and deliberating 
skills which allow for reasonable choice and creative action (i.e., one which is 
responsive to the relevant and unique details of the particular situation, and 
how they might 'participate' in finding the right means to a fixed end).
Just as Aristotelian teleology conceives of a 'best' man (in fact, because of this) 
Aristotle posits that there is also a 'best' regime/constitution. That is, the best 
polis is best precisely because its particular laws serve to cultivate the 
(objective) best in man. In an ideal world of course, the laws of the polis are 
the 'right' ones, i.e., those which correspond to Aristotle's abstract conception 
of man (as defined by the human species) in such a way as to cultivate fully 
flourishing polis dwellers. However, when doing political theory, Aristotle is 
acutely aware of the fact that there exists a wide variation in actually existing 
poleis {Pol. 1290a5ff), the regimes of which grow out of and correspond to 
those who are in fact being governed -  in practice, clearly, we observe many 
'deviations' from the ideal polis (Pol. 1310a2ff.; 1317a33ff.). Such departures 
from the ideal cannot be merely suppressed, but instead must come into play 
in the attem pt to understand and improve existing political life: "for w hat is 
proper to those who govern themselves in the best way is...to do the best from 
what is available to them" {Pol. 1323al7-19). Whether approaching the ideal 
or deviating from it, a working regime is for Aristotle, necessary for both
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m an's understanding of himself and the full development of his nature.^^ We 
will see that the polis is the place where 'stronger' can become 'better/ where 
'change' can become 'progress.' It is the environment in which hum an beings 
discover, through acting with others, what justice is. It is this political 
interaction that provides the communal and discursive environment 
necessary to transform mere living into living well.
While the polis makes a virtuous life possible, its laws and practices do not 
simply issue precise orders which, if followed diligently, transport each 
individual man directly to this end. The polis provides the space in which 
m an leams what it is to act for reasons in order to achieve a common good -  to 
aim at this common good is not to sacrifice his own, but rather it is to realise 
what is in fact best for man. Therefore, rather than simply aiming to satisfy 
his own personal desires, in the polis, man is trained to act deliberately with 
other men, taking into account not only his own perspective and preferences, 
but the different views and varied needs of other citizens as they relate to an 
overarching, and again, common good. This entails working together and 
communicating so as to find a harmony -  justice -  between the different parts 
of the polis. Men begin this process by following rules and imitating others. 
Eventually, through extensive experience, reflection and critical discourse, an 
active political life yields a broad sense of reasonableness, which can then 
inform and guide (and, in a sense, constrain) independent and creative 
action.i5 A good or virtuous life does not come through mechanically 
applying general laws with no regard for the distinguishing details of the
laws, universally/"naturally" right or not, serve to structure human action, connecting 
actions and beliefs to other actions and beliefs and thus creating a contextual web/network 
which cultivates a sense of meaning and reasonableness. Thus, Aristotle makes it clear that 
even bad law is preferable to no law at aU (see: Rhet 1375bl9-22,1376b9-13, and Bodeus 
Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics trans. J.E. Garrett (Albany: 1993, p.55).
By "independent and creative" I do not mean individualistic action, aimed at a 
personal/private preference or goal. Rather, "independent and creative action" is action 
taken in circumstances which are unfamiliar, despite aiming at a common and known end. 
The creativity and independence comes in the attempt to find the right concrete means to that 
fixed end, which are always particular and unique and thus demand independence and 
creativity.
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concrete situation at hand, nor does man meinifest virtue by following his 
inborn instincts like many low er' animals (must) do. To live virtuously as a 
hum an being is to make reasonable choices and to risk creative action that aim 
at the common hum an end from within and given attention to the contingent 
and indeterminate elements of one's circumstances. This ongoing 
process/activity is the peculiar human endeavour.
Given this, we must investigate how the polis helps man come to see what sort 
of life is good for him as the kind of thing he is thereby precluding the 
possibility of judging successful a life directed by the incoherent, disjointed 
pursuit of his own immediate personal preferences and desires. This raises 
some interesting questions: How does the polis organise men in such a way as 
to reveal a world of substantive value as opposed to plain fact? If (certain) 
men emerge from the household to enter the political realm as equals, what is 
the 'content' of their discourse and the nature of their relationships that 
results in understanding the good life as opposed to mere life? In other 
words, what is 'added ' to the human interaction in the polis which is not 
present in the household that results in the capacity to conceive good and bad, 
just and unjust? How does an abstract concept of 'the good life' inform the 
laws and structure the polis, yet also serve the contingent circumstances of 
hum an life as it must do? How does man leam to use a standard which is 
itself indefinite?"^^ What kind of 'space' is a polis such that it can create an 
environment where man, through reason, is both oriented/directed towards a 
fixed and general notion of the human good, yet simultaneously 'trained' to be 
discerning, able to make the right choices and take the proper (creative) action
To strive for a life excluding the political element altogether would not only be impossible, 
but in some sense even hubristic, an insult to the gods, for it implicitly assumes that men can 
be equal to the highest beings in the cosmos. A belief which Aristotle states plainly, is absurd 
(atopon), NE 1141a21.
1137b29-31, here Aristotle cites the example of the lead standard in Lesbian budding, 
which is not fixed, but adapts itself to the stone on which it is being used.
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in terms of the particular means to this end?^® If properly performed, 
reasonable and creative action will yield greater clarification about and result 
in the fuller realisation of the human good.^^ How then does the polis create a 
space for men where freedom is realised in being constrained by the value­
laden ends it promotes? 1 will aim to answer these questions by examining 
the role of law.
Poetics: Experiencing the Human Good
The education necessary to realise man's potential for reasonable and creative 
(which is to say, virtuous) action will be the subject of the final section of this 
chapter, and will in a sense point back to the two preceding chapters on 
Pindar and Thucydides. Through an examination of the Poetics, and given its 
focus on serious hum an action, 1 argue that poetry (in the broadest, and 
seemingly un-Aristotelian sense of the word^o) should be seen as an essential 
element of an ethical and political education. Poetry helps man better to 
understand and order more systematically the 'illogical' factors that play a 
role in human life (e.g., passionate, emotional attachments, conflicting desires, 
diverging loyalties, powerful external forces) -  in short, those elements which 
science (and much contemporary abstract political theory) tries to 'reason 
away'. However, these 'meddlesome' qualities of hum an life are essential to it,
Because in any life, this process involves concrete circumstances which are inherently new 
and contingent it demands some creativity in human action, however, this creativity is 
always confined to the means, and limited/constrained by the fixed human end.
^^The possibility that this good might be mis-defined, by a polis is addressed in Aristotle's 
discussion of regime change. While he does not advocate any individual's critique of his 
polis, he does discuss change in regime generally, why and how it comes about (Po/.1301al9- 
1304bl7). He notes in this discussion that the virtuous, though most justified in starting a 
faction that might initiate change, are least likely to do so. Presumably this is because they 
know that laws, even imperfect ones, provide the stability necessary for the cultivation of 
virtue amongst citizens. Goldhill addresses the tricky balance between critique and stability 
in "Civic Ideology and the Problem of Difference" (Journal of Hellenic Studies vol. 120 (2000) 
pp. 34-56).
1 will use the term 'poetry' to embrace all constructed narratives -  even historical ones. 
While this seems at face value to contradict Aristotle's degradation of history in Poetics 9 ,1 
would argue with, for example, de Ste Croix ("Aristotle on History and Poetry" in Essays on 
Aristotle's Poetics pp. 23-33) and Yanal ("Aristotle's Definition of Poetry" in Nous vol. 16 (1982) 
pp. 499-225) that in referring to history as "less philosophical" than poetry, Aristotle has in 
mind the kinds of history that are composed of mere annals/lists, and not the rich and 
evocative kind of history writing we find in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War.
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and thus cannot be cleverly obscured or discarded in favour of neat and 
precise abstract language. Poetry recognises these elements and weaves them 
into m an's sense of himself as a moral character. In doing so, it reveals ways 
in which hum an life can come together as whole and unified, meaningful and 
beautiful, despite its less than 'logical' elements.
Men are bom  into existing communities governed by distinct standards and 
values -  in the midst of an ongoing discourse. Thus, the difficult task of 
learning how to act reasonably and creatively requires getting oriented from 
this spot in the 'middle'. This demands structured and guided experience of 
hum an life, beginning with observation and imitation of older, wiser 
'practitioners' in one's own polis. However, a hum an life is not (and indeed 
cannot be) composed simply of imitative actions. As men mature, they must 
confront new and 'unprecedented' situations independently. Through 
exposing men to paradigmatic human situations (i.e., those which do not shy 
away from contradiction and inconsistency, but which present irreconcilable 
conflicts, and force man to work to identify the extent of his power and 
responsibility within such a realm), poetry helps to prepare men for these 
kinds of encounter in their own lives, and even helps them understand how to 
proceed given mistakes.^i Reasonable creativity comes from a broad sense of 
what is possible in the 'history' of human choice making and action -  this 
does not come from within one's own individual psyche, but through wide 
experience and exposure which poetry helps to provide.
New situations open up the possibility of innovation and progress, but also, 
of error. Errors, in taking men off their intended paths, threaten to disrupt 
their sense of their lives as whole and unified, and undermine their sense of 
their own responsibility. This can result in the loss of agency. The
The poetic historian must be able to construct speeches that a certain kind of moral 
character could have made-even if he did not. Thucydides' Periclean funeral oration is 
therefore poetic' for Aristotle (although most of Aristotle's examples in the Poetics are from 
Homer, or later distinguished tragedians).
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inevitability of miscalculation (hamartia) given the limited scope of m an's 
knowledge and the powerful role of 'external forces' in a hum an life is made 
more palatable through poetry because there it is shown in its proper 
perspective, as a natural part of what it is to be human. The ongoing cycles of 
"reversal" (peripeteia) and "recognition" (anagnorisis) in poetry allows m an to 
construe his own errors in a new light -  as opportunities for greater 
understanding and deliberate change. This is not to suggest the absurd 
conclusion that all mistakes are in fact hidden goods, only that as essential 
elements of hum an life, mistakes must be made useful/practical to the extent 
they can be. Without this understanding, man will surrender under the 
awesome pressure of disproportionate expectation and responsibility -  life 
will cease to make sense as its causal connections seem to dissolve. All risk 
becomes far too dangerous if man cannot see errors and the unexpected as 
themselves contributing to the pattern/structure of his life. For men, life is 
not a choice between total control and utter predetermination -  hum an beings 
live somewhere in between: "however apparently fragmented, ill-shaped and 
even terrible our lives may seem to us in the living, they form a single activity, 
a patterned, structured whole.
Given this, man must seek 'experiences' which reveal him as he is in all his 
complexity, acting for the kinds of reasons he does and in doing so, revealing 
the kind of 'whole' a hum an life is. Engaging with poetry provides a kind of 
guided, instructive experience that complements that which is provided by 
the structure of the law. Through its exploration of life in context, poetry 
brings to light where m an's opportunities are and where his weaknesses lie; 
the regions over which his reason has little, or indeed, no control, as well as 
those areas where he can in fact make a difference. Perhaps most important, 
good poetry uncovers the blurry area in between -  the space where m an has 
limited control and limited freedom, but where he must nonetheless see
^  Rorty, A. "The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy" in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics 
(Princeton: 1992, p. 18).
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causal connections, make reasonable choices, and take creative action. 
Understanding this place and learning how to contend with it successfully is 
greatly aided through the active experience of and engagement with poetry.
Chapter 2: Ethics: The Definition of Man
The world, for Aristotle, is composed of many different kinds of things. Each 
kind of thing is defined by and distinguished from other kinds of things by its 
essence or nature -  those qualities or attributes that make it uniquely what it is. 
Essences are immanent in their physical manifestations; therefore, while 
abstract, they are not a part of an independent, transcendent reality -  essences 
are not Platonic forms.^^ Yet unlike their concrete expressions, they are 
immaterial and do not change: "such things [essences] are neither 
independent of matter nor can be defined in terms of matter only" (Phys. 
194al3). To be one kind of thing and not another (or simply to be not at all) is 
"non-negotiable' -  the 'cosmos' is as it is, and it is up to hum an beings to come 
to understand the kinds of things that compose it as accurately as they, being 
the kinds of creatures they are, can. Aristotle argues that hum an beings can, and 
in fact by nature do come to grasp essences (i.e., group particulars into 
collections of like kinds) and can describe them in l a n g u a g e . ^ ^  Such 
descriptions are definitions: "a definition is a statement of a thing's nature" 
(PostAn 93b28-9, Top.l01b37), or a linguistic account of what it is to be one 
kind of thing and not another. Through the medium of language then, 
Aristotle thought that humans have the ability to express abstract accounts of 
'kinds' or 'types' which articulate permanent and fixed essences.
Gadamer highlights the distinction between Plato and Aristotle's understanding of essence: 
"For Plato, eidetic or noetic constructs,..are to be separated from phenomenal existence...For 
Aristotle, the physei onta are inseparable from their ti estin (what-it-is)," The Idea of the Good in 
Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy trans. P.C. Smith (New Haven: 1986, p. 132). For some 
examples of Aristotle on essence, see: Topics 101b20ff, PostAn.73a3Aff, Metaph.l029bl3ff.
Coleman stresses the point that "unique occurrences are unknown to us...we can know and 
name only 'occurrences' or particulars which form a class." {History of Political Thought vol.l 
Oxford: 2000, p.l30). See also, Kopytoff, I. "The Cultural Biography of Things" in The Social 
Life of Things (ed. A. Appudarai Cambridge: 1986, pp.64-91).
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Deriving a definition of man comes through the perception, memory, and 
experience of men as they live and act in the world. A definition of man 
should indicate what a human being naturally is, and given Aristotle's 
teleology, this also reveals what the best human life looks like. ^  The 
preliminary general conception that grows out of experience is then improved 
upon and honed by way of dialectical a n a l y s i s . 2 6  However, no person bom  
into the world begins this process alone, nor does anyone start at ground zero 
-  rather human beings (thankfully) are bom  into communities of people and 
practices through which they inherit the accumulated knowledge of their 
elders and ancestors. As we will see, examining hum an beings dialectically 
given what they are and the 'knowledge base' from which they begin will 
yield less precise 'results' than, for instance, an inquiry concerning the axioms 
of geometry.
In either case however, there are different levels of comprehending and 
defining something -  ranging from mere description (identifying the 'that') to 
causal knowledge (understanding the ' w h y ' / ' b e c a u s e ' ) . ^7 A good ('rational') 
definition -  what Frede terms "an appropriate notion" 28 -  does not merely 
describe man's immediate perceptions of the world, nor does it articulate only 
those attributes he observes different 'kinds' to have in common: "The whole 
universal," Aristotle writes, "...marks the beginning of art and science." That is
2^  Aristotle sees the world through a' teleological lens', and assumes that there is an 
overarching order and goal to nature or the 'cosmos' (the Greek word itself can be translated 
as "ordered adornment"). Nature, he presumes, does nothing in vain: see e.g., "There is a 
purpose in what is and what happens in nature" {Phys. 199a3-4), "whatever is natural is 
naturally in the finest state possible" (NE 1099b23), "that which comes into being according to 
nature does so for an end" (Protrepticus B13). Thus there is a sense that 'is' for Aristotle, 
implies 'ought'.
2^This process will be described below in the section on method.
27 Aristotle describes two kinds of definitions, one tells you "the meaning of [some particular] 
phrase," and another "is a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing's existence" (PostAn 93b30- 
94a20; also 71b9-13. In what follows, my use of the term 'definition' will refer to the latter). 
For a thorough discussion of the process by which human beings go from grasping "the that" 
(specifically in terms of ethics) to the fuller understanding which embraces "the because," see 
Bumyeat, M. "Aristotle on learning to be Good " in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty 
(Princeton: 1980, pp 69-92).
28 Frede, M. "Aristotle's Rationalism" in Rationality in Greek Thought eds. Frede and Striker 
(Oxford: 1996, p. 164).
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to say, to grasp the '"earliest universal from a number of logically 
indiscrirninable particulars" is not the end of hum an knowledge, but its 
starting point (PoAn 100a6-16). From this shared property, men must go on to 
derive a more general definition which, given the common, picks out the 
critical -  "salient and relevant" -  features of the kind of thing in question. In 
terms of humans, such a definition indicates not only what a kind of thing 
man is, but the conditions necessary to bring about his well being. Having 
apprehended these 'significant' features, men can make enduring 
connections, relating new experiences to other beliefs and actions (both past 
and anticipated) and through this process, continually refining and building 
on their understanding and knowledge. By fitting into this larger 'web', a 
definition serves to explain and not simply label and describe the kind of thing
it designates.29
Though 'universal' and abstract in the sense that definitions identify and 
isolate something common to each member of a kind, the definitions men 
grasp are induced from, and thus dependent on both the particulars which 
embody them as well as the men who think about them. As compound 
'mixtures' (i.e., 'extracted' from a combination of sense perceptions, 
memories, experience, and imagination) man's definitions are constructed 
concepts which can be proven wrong (DA 428bl0-429al0). They are hom e 
out and sustained by their positions in a larger and already existing network 
of interrelated beliefs and concrete 'facts' which have been experienced, 
described, used over time by many, and rigorously tested by older and wiser 
men. While growing out of and representing the external world, all
Frede stresses the point that grasping what it is to be a human being, for instance, is not 
simply a matter of identifying a quality common to all men and women, rather it is the larger 
and far more complex ability "to grasp something which figures prominently in the 
explanation of human beings and their behaviour." He concludes that "our notions" must 
relate that common property in question to other properties and experiences in such a way as 
to form a "coherent and appropriately structured system" which allows men to expand on 
and further enrich their knowledge of the world. Frede, M. "Aristotle's Rationalism" in 
Rationality in Greek Thought ed. Frede and Striker (Oxford: 1996, pp. 164-171). For a similar 
interpretation, see Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp.247-249). For a 
modem, epistemological perspective, see Goodman, N. Ways of Worldmaking (Indiana: 1978).
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definitions are 'man-made' linguistic representations which are subject to 
revision and change. That is, because these abstract concepts are derived by 
hum an beings who are neither omniscient nor immortal, they m ust be 
continually checked with, and if necessary adjusted to better fit the world as it 
continues to reveal itself to be. The inherent limitations and 
indeterminateness of hum an beings (importantly, not that of the natural world 
itself) makes their definitions 'tentative', and they must retain this 
'unconfirmed' and 'open' quality if they are to be effective in organising and 
explaining the cosmos and man's distinct position in it -  this is especially true 
in terms of ethics and politics.^o
Given this, what does Aristotle say about the definition of man? 
Understanding man comes through examination of the hum an ergon 
(function, work, activity) and telos (end, purpose, aim, or its ergon realised). 
The function of some kind of thing must be unique to that kind and make a 
difference in its active life (and thus in its relations to other things). 
Furthermore, a function does not indicate merely a "special property" (idion) 
which belongs to a category of things alone but "may possibly belong to 
something else" (e.g., the capacity of men to leam grammar. Top. 102al8-31; 
DA 417bl; NE 1099al-5). An ergon and telos must point out what it is to 
behave as a particular thing actually and naturally does. Because of 
Aristotle's teleological understanding of the world, an ergon and telos not only 
identify a kind of thing, but also designate its particular good. That is to say, 
to realise fully one's ergon -  i.e., to perform one's function -  be it that of a tree, 
a knife, or a man -  is to achieve one's telos {NE 1097b24-30), and this done 
excellently is one's good. The ergon of an eye for instance, is to see, the act of
For a discussion on the "requirement of flexibility" in our abstract concepts, see Nussbaum 
The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp.298-306). The quality of 'tentativeness' need 
not destabilise abstract principles, just as 'ruling and being ruled' need not destabilise a 
democracy.
31 For more on ergon and telos, see Metaph. 1050a22.
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seeing is an eye's telos, and the good of an eye is to see well.32 To determine 
m an's ergon and telos then not only provides a descriptive (i.e., rudimentary) 
definition of man, but it also points to what a good hum an life should look 
like (the ergon and telos illuminate not only what man is, but what he should 
be).
Aristotle however, does not begin the Nicomachean Ethics by stating precisely 
what the human ergon and telos are, rather he begins his ethical investigation 
by presenting a basic (i.e., descriptive) account of what, generally speaking, a 
good is: "that at which every craft, investigation...action and decision aim" 
{NE 1094al-3). He narrows this to the good for man by stating that the 
hum an good will be an activity, rather than a product (e.g., a shoe or a house) 
or a possession (e.g., having, yet not exercising a certain disposition). As 
political science "rules" or is "inclusive of all the goods pursued in action" 
(e.g., the peculiarly human activities such as rhetoric, household 
management, education, warfare), its end will in fact be the hum an good {NE 
1094b7-9).33 Generally speaking, he concludes that "we" believe that the aim 
of politics and thus the good for man is eudaimonia -  flourishing, or 
living/faring well. ^  This is Aristotle's first basic assumption about the 
highest human good and it frames his discourse on ethics.^^
32 "...the good of any living thing consists in its possessing and exercising unimpededly, in a 
normal mature life for a member of its species those natural capacities that are distinctive of 
its particular life form among aU the others." (Cooper, J. "Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral 
Value" in Rationality in Greek Thought ed. Frede and Striker (Oxford: 1996, p.99). See also 
Bostock, D. Aristotle's Ethics, Oxford: 2000, pp.15-20; and Reeve, C.D.C. Practices of Reason, 
Oxford: 1992, pp.123-128).
33 Understood to be under the aegis of political science -  the science of human life -  Aristotle 
can conclude that the best (perhaps even the only) human activity (which is to say the human 
good) is necessarily performed within the environment proper to human beings -  a polis.
34 This approach, that is, to begin with "what is known to us" (NE 1095a28-b4) and then to 
work towards "first principles" by way of induction and dialectic, represents Aristotle's 
method in his study of ethics and politics and reveals why a good upbringing is so crucial to 
Aristotle. After all, given his belief that man's definitions (and thus his basis for 
understanding the world) begin with his perceptions, just where and with whom he starts 
perceiving (i.e., the conditions of his upbringing) will largely determine what and how he 
thinks. Whenever theorising, one must begin by agreeing on certain initial premises, 
embodied in this case by our own experiences (given the practices we engage in) as well as by 
ta endoxa (the tested opinions of the many and wise which are in current use. See for example.
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Aristotle attempts to fill in this framework by reviewing some existing beliefs 
about what eudaimonia actually consists in, and quickly finds disagreement. 
After all, while most people may agree that "living well" is the highest good 
for man, they have different and often conflicting views about just what it 
entails: some for instance, claim that it is a life of pleasure, others, of honour, 
and others still, claim that eudaimonia is best achieved in a life of study or 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n . 3 6  After taking into account these 'common' beliefs, Aristotle 
looks at the more 'reputable' opinions of some other philosophers -  'the wise' 
-  and finds those too to be insufficient to resolve his present impasse. He 
progresses by qualifying his general account of the human good further, 
stating that it must be something that "we wish for because of itself" (not as 
the means to some other end) -  thus it will be both complete (teleios) and self- 
sufficient (autarkes) ( N E 1 0 9 7 b l - 1 5 ) . 3 7  Given the disagreement in existing 
opinions about the specific content or means to achievement of eudaimonia,
NE 1172b35ff). Roche stresses the importance of including in our understanding of ta endoxa 
the sense of "reputable things" (those concepts which "cannot be abandoned") as well as 
"common ideas." That ta endoxa must not be taken to be merely common beliefs is essential if 
one wishes to preserve Aristotelian ethical justification without an appeal to a metaphysical 
foundation ("On the Alleged Metaphysical Foundations of Aristotle's Ethics" in Aristotle's 
Ethics, ed. Irwin (London: 1995, pp. 71-72); see also Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness 
(Cambridge: 1981, pp.245-63).
^^From this outline', the definition of the human good can be developed so as to go from 
being merely a description (which identifies something common to 'good's) to an explanatory 
definition which can be related to other concepts and used in life -  that is to say, to help men 
become good rather than simply know the good. Whether eudaimonia is an 
"inclusive/comprehensive" end (i.e., one which includes political action and contemplation) 
or an intellectualist one (merely contemplation) is still debated amongst scholars (see, for 
example, articles by Nagel and Ackrill in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics pp.7-33; also Depew 
"Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle's Ideal State" in Companion to Aristotle's 
Politics ed. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: 1991, pp. 346-80), Reeve Practices of Reason (Oxford: 1992, 
pp. 138-49).
Roche refers to such beliefs as "surface endoxa" i.e., those opinions which "purport to give 
substantive answers to ethical questions." These he opposes to "deep endoxa" which provide 
the framework within which those answers are to be sought, e.g., that the good is complete, 
self-sufficient, and that at which all things aim. ("The Alleged Metaphysical Foundations" in 
Aristotle's Ethics ed. Irwin (London: 1995, p.73).
^^ In Roche's terms, self-sufficiency and completeness would be "deep endoxa." There has 
been substantial scholarly debate about what Aristotle means by "complete" /  "most 
complete" virtue. Ackrill argues that complete implies all the individual human virtues 
("Aristotle on Eudaimonia" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics). Cooper disputes this interpretation 
in Reason and the Human Good (Cambridge, MA: 1975) and Reason and Emotion (Princeton: 
1999). However, his own position about eudaimonia shifts and softens in the latter, and 
suggests that "complete" is an attribute of/reference to a single virtue and not the "sum total" 
of all virtues {Reason and Emotion pp.222-224).
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these features help to illuminate in more detail "a target to aim at" (NE 
1094a23) as the investigation continues.^®
However, as it stands, accepting that eudaimonia, or living or faring well in the 
most complete and self-sufficient manner possible for man, still does not 
provide information adequate to adjudicate between the different opinions 
about what actually constitutes the good life. Without this being further 
fleshed out, Aristotle cannot achieve his purposes in the Nicomachean Ethics 
which is not to know the good but to become good (NE 1 1 7 9 b l - 4 ) . 3 9  Given
Aristotle's attempt to discover and justify what kind of life man ought to live may be 
prohibitively circular (or simply too narrow) to be of use to many modem ears. There is still 
debate amongst scholars as to the metaphysical criteria he uses (or does not use) in 
legitimating his ethical beliefs. No doubt, Aristotle assumes a level of agreement that many 
today would find uncomfortable in accepting. What is good 'for us' Aristotle assumes, is 
based on our common human psychology/biology revealing man to be a kind of thing, with 
a definitive good. Just as there is rarely debate on what makes a person physically healthy, 
Aristotle seemed to think ethical and intellectual well-being, for Üiose properly raised, would 
leave little room for debate: "we do not deliberate about ends, but about means." He is clear 
that the proper students for his Ethics are those who already share a general sense of the good 
(ta kalon), thus implicitly precluding the possibility that there will be vast disagreement on it -  
or rather, supposing that such vast disagreement is either inhuman or dishonest/misguided 
in some way. Ultimately, Aristotle's aim is not to convince a sceptic, but rather to pursue a 
discourse aimed at finding (through reasonable discourse and creative action) the means or 
conditions necessary for men who live in societies/po/ris similar to his, i.e., an association of a 
certain moral kind, to actualise a notion of the good that has already been accepted: "We 
cannot satisfy the sceptic's demand for external purity; we can ask him to accept our 
fellowship" (Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, p.253). See also 
Salkever, S. "Aristotle's Social Science" Political Theory vol. 11 (1981) pp.495-503.
This statement is however, potentially misleading -  it seems unlikely that Aristotle does 
not want his 'students' to know the good. Therefore I understand him to be presupposing a 
distinction between higher and lower kinds of understanding, roughly speaking, description 
as opposed to explanation. His intention is thus that men should aim at the latter so that their 
conscious understanding can consistently make a difference in their lives -  this is however, 
given the discrepancy in natural human abilities and acquired external goods, a ambitious, if 
not impossible goal. However, given the 'select' audience for the Ethics, I still maintain that 
its aim is not merely to describe the human good, but to explain it in such a way that his 
students can relate it to and hopefully realise it in actual human life. (This reading supports 
Bodeus' view that the Ethics and Politics are primarily for the would-be legislator). Coleman 
points out that as the definition of man is fixed, it is not normally a part of ethical discourse 
which is practical, dealing with choices about things which could be otherwise (History of 
Political Thought vol. 1 Oxford: 2000, p.l43). However, she is equally clear that this fixed 
definition is neither impotent nor irrelevant. Among other things, this "a priori background" 
increases man's sphere of responsibility. This becomes clear when Aristotle claims that a polis 
which does not cultivate good character does not excuse man from becoming virtuous. 
Despite the particular culture one is bom into, there still exists some truths about man, and he 
has within him the tools to access these irrespective of his immediate environment (though
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these conflicting opinions, Aristotle has still not seen through his present 
aporia, puzzle or perplexity. As a way out, in order to identify correctly the 
good life for man given the many differing conflicting endoxa that exist, he 
turns to the hum an ergon and telos as an "external' standard.^o Aristotle will 
critique his collected 'data ' (i.e., the range of existing beliefs about the good 
life) by evaluating it in light of his understanding of the natural structure of 
the human soul.^i His account of human psychology therefore must discern 
and characterise the fixed human ergon and telos in such a way as that he can 
judge between the conflicting opinions under consideration, and hopefully, to 
the extent it is possible, "save the phenomena." Aristotle moves from 
common and reputable opinions to 'empirical' data and back again. This 
leads to the 'function argument', and it is at this point that Aristotle considers 
systematically the human ergon and telos.^ As the function of man is 
determined by the nature of his soul, this line of enquiry leads Aristotle to 
explore hum an psychology.
Chapter 3: Psychology: The Human Soul
As a living thing, man is " en so u led ."^ 3 Like plants and other animals, the 
matter of his physical body is 'permeated' with certain potentialities which 
when realised correspond to certain activities. ^  Those activities which grow
Aristotle does concede that this is exceedingly difficult in the wrong or impoverished 
environment).
There is some debate as to whether Aristotle's appeal to psychology entails/implies a 
broader appeal to a metaphysical doctrine in his Ethics. For example, Irwin argues that such 
an argument is linked to Aristotle's ontology, while Roche sees the ergon argument as 
dependent on nothing more than appeals to what 'we' say or believe ("Aristotle's Method in 
Ethics" in Studies in Aristotle ed. O'Meara, D. (Washington: 1981); and "The Alleged 
Foundations" in Aristotle's Ethics ed. Irwin (London: 1995), respectively). One could argue 
that the 'we' does accept Aristotle's ontology as background knowledge in poleis like ours -  
there is no (post-Humean) pluralism (i.e., scepticism) here.
After aU, he insists that the human good is not primarily concerned with the goods of the 
body, but with "the goods of the soul" NE 1102al5.
^  For discussions on Aristotle's 'function argument', see Reeve Practices of Reason (Oxford: 
1992, pp. 123-128); Whiting, J. "Aristotle's Function Argument -  A Defense" in Aristotle's 
Ethics ed. Irwin (London: 1995, pp.189-205).
43 DA 412bl0-413al0.
44 It is important here to recognise the broad sense of 'activity' Aristotle employs. Activity is 
not merely physical nor even practical or political action, but includes the most elevated
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out of the natural structure of the human soul indicate the hum an ergon 
(function, work, activity) and when performed (or 'actualised') they embody 
the hum an telos (end, purpose, aim). Exercising thoroughly and excellently 
the capacities (both physical and mental) latent in a human soul over a 
lifetime is the natural (immutable and enduring) hum an good. What then are 
the potentials of the human soul? With what capacities did Aristotle think 
hum an beings to be naturally endowed?
Aristotle's account of the human soul is complex: it classifies man not merely 
as alive (for in this respect he is no different than a houseplant, as both lead 
lives of nutrition and growth), but also as a "sentient" (aisthetike) animal who 
acts in the world given his perceptions of it. However, Aristotle claims that 
man is a special kind of animal for unlike oxen, or even "gregarious" bees, his 
soul has something beyond sense perception, beyond even the rudimentary 
memory and experience which allow one to prepare for and organise one's 
future at a basic level (as some other animals also have) -  the hum an soul has 
reason (logos) . T h i s  elusive characteristic -  reason -  designates man's 
species.^6 Therefore, he is the only animal whose life ought to be manifested in
kinds of theoretical 'activity' human beings are capable of as well -  e.g., contemplating the 
harmony of the cosmos, grasping geometric principles. Bostock emphasises that Aristotle 
intended to emphasise the fact that human life is embodied by action, and to distinguish 
activity which expresses a certain disposition/condition from mere possession of the 
disposition itself, which might remain unrealised as in sleep (Aristotle's Ethics, Oxford: 2000, 
p.l9). On the importance of activity in human life, see Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness 
(Cambridge: 1981, pp. 323-324).
As will be discussed further below (notably in reference to Frede), the modem  
understanding of reason/rationaHty (itself ambiguous) must be laid aside in order to grasp 
the many nuances of the Greek word logos, which ranges from argument/account, to ratio 
and proportion, to speech/discourse, and even extends to analogy. Keeping this rich 
definition in mind, the claim that man is a rational animal takes on some interesting and 
important connotations -  as speech/discourse, reason seems to depend on more than one 
person, as a ratio, it is a kind of balance or harmony, as argument, it entails persuasion 
(presumably based on reasonable/explainable premises), and as analogy reason demands the 
capacity to see one thing as another, to move beyond the strictly literal, yet remain in the 
bounds of the comprehensible and sensible. All this points away from both a narrow 
substantive and a strictly instrumental understanding of reason/rationality, and towards a 
much richer, more complex, non-mechanical yet inherently practical sense, which must work 
with perception, memory, and experience to enlarge man's understanding of the world.
^  To expand on the qualities that are unique to human beings, and thus indicative of their 
nature, Davis points out that for Aristotle: "we are political animals in the Politics (1253a2),
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actions guided by reason.^^ Aristotle then states m an's ergon precisely as: "an 
activity of the soul which follows or implies a rational principle/reason" (NE 
1098al-5). If to act (in the broadest sense of the word) rationally or as reason 
directs is what it is to achieve the human telos, then the hum an good can be 
determined directly from this. Recall that Aristotle has already claimed that 
the good of something is the excellent performance of its particular function. 
Therefore, the hum an good is: "the active exercise of his soul's activities [the 
performance of the hum an function, i.e., activity which expresses reason] in 
conformity w ith/expressing excellence or virtue, and if there are several 
excellences or virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete...in a 
complete life" {NE 1098al5-18).'^® This means that the hum an good is not to 
perform any activity one happens upon excellently, but rather the hum an 
good is excellently engaging those activities which express virtue (through 
reason) and are "best and most complete.
However, this does not yet provide a good definition of man, for we have not 
yet grasped the structure of the human soul such that it explains him, clarifies 
why he acts as he does. To say that all hum an beings possess reason (to a 
greater or lesser extent), and to add that actions expressing reason in 
conformity with the highest virtues available to man throughout a complete
rational cinimals in the Nicomachean Ethics (1098a3), and mimetic animals in the Poetics" 
(1448b5) {The Poetry of Philosophy Indiana:1999, p.95). He argues that the reader should thus 
understand how these three important features fit together to give a more complete sense of 
what human beings are: "understanding our nature as mimetic proves to be an interpretation 
of our nature as rational, which in turn is the same as our nature as political" (ibid. p.4).
Again, Aristotle's teleology pervades his ethics and implies that because man has reason, he 
should use it -  the cosmos/nature does nothing in vain: "There is a purpose in what is and 
what happens in nature" (Phys. 199a5ff.).
Bostock illuminates the ambiguity of the term 'virtue' in the NE {Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 
2000, p.20). Virtue is complex because there is a sense in which it is used adverbially -  
excellently/well, irrespective of what is being done, whether it be playing the flute, arguing, 
or writing laws. However, this is too broad an understanding for Aristotle's use of virtue in 
other places, for it also has a substantive sense, more akin to the modem sense of the word, 
i.e., moral excellence, though also extending beyond that to include theoretical wisdom as 
well. This will be discussed further below in my discussion of ethical and intellectual virtue.
Merely satisfying one's desires does not constitute a flourishing life: "complete fulfilment 
of desire is a necessary condition of eudaimonia, but not a sufficient one. For, on A's theory, 
those desires must be directed at worthwhile goals" (Kraut, R. "Two Conceptions of 
Happiness" Aristotle's Ethics ed. Irwin London: 1995, p.88).
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life surely describes (or labels) the human good (and thus something common 
to all men or 'universal'), but it does not explain observed hum an behaviour. 
While reason is indeed natural to Man, men do not act according to it 
instinctively and automatically. For human beings, what is natural is not 
necessarily realised: "with us...there is such a thing as what is natural, but still 
all is changeable" (NE 1134b28-31).5° Observation reveals that man has the 
capacity to choose to act reasonably, but he is not reasonable out of necessity -  
indeed, he can choose incorrectly, or indeed, even to choose not to be 
reasonable at all.^i
This choice defines the realm of human freedom, the uniquely hum an 
capacity to deliberately choose to live one way and not another. Human 
freedom can be better understood through examining the structure of the 
hum an soul (psychology), and its relation to action (NE 1176all). We will see 
that freedom for Aristotle is not the unimpeded liberty to pursue and act on 
whatever one desires at the moment, nor is it even a slightly more qualified 
version: freedom to do whatever one desires provided that no one is hurt in 
the process. For Aristotle, man's freedom can only be realised in looking 
beyond his immediate whims and impulses, and seeing instead what it is to 
be fully and genuinely hum an -  that is, to perform the peculiarly hum an ergon 
-  deliberate virtuous (reasonable and creative) activity. However, this is not 
to deny the central role of desire in reasonable action -  no hum an action arises 
from reason a l o n e . ^ 2  In fact, good actions depend on desire, but a specific, 
cultivated, reasoned desire.
See also Pol. 1332bl-3, "some qualities that are by nature, can change by way of habits." 
"When Aristotle makes reason the distinguishing mark of men, he is referring to reason, 
right or wrong" (Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals Ithaca: 1993, p.69). This Sorabji 
contrasts with the activity of noesis which is defined, in part, by its infallibility -  it is a 
'success-verb." For further discussion on the human choice to be reasonable, see Rorty, A.O. 
"The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (pp. 6-9); Gadamer. 
The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (New Haven: 1986, p. 144); and Salkever, 
S. Finding the Mean (Princeton: 1990, p.69).
"Thought/understanding (nous)," Aristotle claims, "moves nothing" (DA 432b26-433a9).
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This conclusion pushes Aristotle's enquiry further into hum an psychology. 
How do men's desire and reason come together to form a harmony -  a 
character with stable dispositions who enjoys doing virtuous actions? At NE 
1102a28, Aristotle, having assumed reason to be the defining characteristic of 
man, examines complex hum an psychology in order to determine the 
relationship between reason and the other parts of the hum an soul. He 
divides the soul in two: one part rational, the other, irrational.^^ Each part of 
the soul will have different functions and different corresponding virtues; 
virtues of thought on the one hand, and those of character on the other. These 
two categories of virtue are distinct from each other in a number of 
fundamental respects, yet they are also closely related, and even at times 
overlap. This is due to the fact that Aristotle's division is not so neat as his 
initial bisection suggests -  both rational and irrational parts of the soul are 
divided again, and with this second division comes a remarkable conception 
of man and what the good life for him entails. In the following section, I will 
examine Aristotle's divisions of the human soul and their parallel virtues, 
both their most distinguishing attributes and their more ambiguous areas of 
intersection.
The Irrational Soul and Ethical Virtue
One element of the irrational part of the human soul is merely 'nutritive' (to 
threptikon). This part is common to all animate things (including plants). As 
such, it is a property that is shared by all men, but is not an explanatory 
("salient and relevant") feature of the human species. The other part of the 
irrational soul however is both more revealing of 'human-ness' and 
considerably more complicated. Aristotle calls it: "the seat of desires and of 
appetite in general {holos orektikon)" (NE 1102b31). Its proper virtues therefore 
will have to do with excellence in these areas. But what does it mean to speak 
of 'excellence' of desires and appetite? Before exploring this question, let us
See also NE 1139a6.
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look first at the relationship Aristotle recognises between desires and appetite, 
action, and character.
Aristotle believed that a man's appetites and desires are important because 
they play a major role in determining the kinds of actions he chooses to 
perform: very generally speaking, men choose to act given the desire for a 
particular good, either apparent or genuine. Repeatedly performing certain 
kinds of actions will in turn determine m an's character Qiexis, or "well 
entrenched disposition"): a person who does just actions, for instance, will be 
just; likewise, the doer of brave actions will be brave; kind ones, kind, etc.. 
For Aristotle there seems to be a continuous cycle in hum an psychology 
whereby 'agency' d e v e l o p s , ^ ^  beginning with actions based on 
im m ediate/inborn desires (usually aimed at pleasure), moving through 
actions which imitate 'valued' members of one's community (aimed at what 
that particular community has deemed good), and over time producing a 
character whose desires, having been shaped by performing these imitative 
actions (and cultural habituation/education more generally), now acts not 
imitatively, but independently, with reason and creativity. This process 
stabilises an enduring identity -  a hexis, or character -  which is dynamically 
oriented towards (though not necessarily consciously understanding) an idea 
of what a good life entails. Because Aristotle believed that a m an's desires 
were not fixed from birth but could be 'trained' -  shaped and moulded given 
the kinds of activities he engaged in, he insisted that hum an character too was 
not predetermined, but rather was established by and revealed through the 
actions (he was brought up to) and then deliberately chose to perform. 
Therefore a man's character was for Aristotle, largely up to man himself: "our 
ethical dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities...it is 
incumbent on us to control the character of our activities" {NE 1103b20-23).^^
^  By 'agency' I refer to someone who, given a situation with more than one possibility for 
action, deliberately chooses to do one thing rather than another.
The claim that man is responsible for the kind of character he has because he can control 
the kinds of actions he performs sets up a tension in Aristotle's understanding of ethical
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Conceived as indeterminate and malleable, character itself becomes an object 
of choice -  men, for Aristotle, are voluntarily virtuous or v i c i o u s . ^ ^  Because 
man is responsible for the kind of person he is, he can be praised or blamed 
for his character. What then, according to Aristotle, makes a m an's character 
praiseworthy? Here we return to the question posed in the opening 
paragraph of this section: What makes human desires and appetites excellent? 
The answer to this question reveals what is distinctive about the hum an 
appetite as opposed to that of other animals. Clearly other sentient creatures 
have emotions and desires, but those of human beings are unique because of 
their special relationship with reason. While m an's appetite does not have 
reason in itself, it can (and should) participate in reason: appetite, Aristotle 
claims, can "listen to" and "be persuaded by" r e a s o n . ^ 7  When informed by
virtue. On the one hand, man, he states, is free to choose his activities (and thus his character) 
for he can voluntarily do virtuous actions, or not. On the other hand, Aristotle says that it is 
man's environment that makes "all the difference" in terms of the character man has (NE 
1103b24-5). How can these two claims be reconciled? To what extent is man responsible for 
the kind of character he has? Vemant claims that Aristotle was not concerned by this issue. 
His point, Vemant says, was: "essentially a moral one, so it is enough to establish the link 
between the character and the individual seen in the round the intimate and reciprocal link 
that is the basis for subjective responsibility of the agent" (Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece 
New York: 1988, p.69). That is, man is responsible to the extent that his actions have their 
origins and cause in himself, i.e., are not constrained by his external conditions.
Aristotle's main discussion of voluntary/involuntary acts is in Book IQ of the NE. For 
further analysis of this concept, see Vemant, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 
1988, pp. 65-69); Ackrül, J.L. "Aristotle on Action" Essays on Aristotle's Ethics Berkeley: 1980, 
pp.93-101). Voluntary acts can be praised or blamed, while those that are involuntary deserve 
pity or pardon. Roughly speaking, an act is involuntary if a man is compelled by an external 
force -  something that has "its origin outside the person himself" (NE 1110bl8) — to perform 
it, or if he does something wrong due, by no fault of his own (i.e., drunkenness) to ignorance 
of the particular details of the situation, and not because the end ("the universal") has been 
misidentified (NE l l l la l ) .  Voluntary action is defined by "what has its origin in the agent 
himself when he knows the particulars that the action consists in" (NE llH a22).
Though initially Aristotle states that it is the irrational part of the soul which is divided into 
two, the fact that the appetitive/spirited part can share in (obey) reason leads him to say at 
NE 1103a2-4 that one should also classify this part as part of the rational soul, though not 
possessing reason in itself Appetite is thus both rational in the sense that wish (boulesis), 
desire (epithumia) and spirit (thumos) are capable of listening to reason, yet also irrational, for 
man's feelings do not inherently possess reason, nor do they automatically obey its orders (as 
in the akratic man).
As wUl become clearer from the discussion of practical reason below, there seems to be 
substantial overlap between irrational and rational soul. Bostock for example argues that 
wish (boulesis) itself has reason (Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.34) and Hardie indicates
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correct reason/right rule {orthos logos, NE 1103b33), m an's desires are 
themselves deemed "correct," and these 'corrected' desires then point 
consistently to the 'right' ends in specific circumstances (the "mean") so that 
the ethically virtuous man is: "fond of what is fine and objects to what is 
shameful" (NE 1179b30-3). To act according to right reason -  to be ethically 
virtuous -  therefore, implies that man's appetites have been trained by and 
through this, permeated with reason so that they aim at the right things, 
making the agent want (which is to say, actually take pleasure in) those 
activities which are noble/fine.
Because Aristotle understood the penetration of reason into desire to be 
largely the result of experience, or habit (ethos), he calls the virtues or 
excellences of this part of the soul ethical virtues. The transformation of 
appetite by reason which serves to re-focus m an's 'natural' desires so that he 
is ethically virtuous (i.e., has a stable character who, desiring and taking 
pleasure in the right things, acts well consistently) comes through habituation 
within a particular social milieu of practices and behaviours (which is to say, 
not through classroom t e a c h i n g ) . Therefore, while not fixed at birth, men
similarly that boulesis, when a wish for the highest human good, is "not in the province of 
ethical virtue" (Aristotle's Ethical Theory Oxford: 1980, p.219). Additionally spirit (thumos) 
takes on a more complex, rational role when one examines Aristotle's use of it in the Politics 
1327b37-1328a6. For an extended discussion on thumos and its relation to reason, see Cooper, 
J. "Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value" in Rationality in Greek Thought ed. Frede and 
Striker (Oxford: 1996, pp. 90-95). In my view, there is a sense in which the appetitive part of 
the soul extends from the 'upper' irrational part (i.e., the non-nutritive, feeling and desiring 
part) to the 'lower' rational part (i.e., the deliberating part, discussed below) .
Aristotle does say that there is such a thing as 'natural' (inborn) virtue, but makes a 
distinction between natural and 'full' virtue; natural being the general disposition one is bom  
with, e.g., some people seem to be bom courageous or kind (NE 1144b4-6). Natural virtue is 
having the right desires but lacking the habituation necessary to secure them (for vicious 
practices can corrupt inbom character). Additionally, the fragile character with which one is 
bom clearly has no intellectual component, it involves no reason/understanding and thus is 
vulnerable to poor habituation. Full virtue on the other hand, is a state in which one's natural 
virtues are permeated and stabilised by reason providing a more profound understanding of 
why being good is in fact good. This degree of virtue is more secure, experience and 
reflection have revealed the reasons behind it. (Aristotle uses both nous and phronesis when 
describing this state, but seems to emphasize phronesis NE 1144bl3-24). Bostock notes the 
ambiguity of Aristotle's notion of natural virtue at aU, for Aristotle has said previously that all 
virtues must be cultivated /  acquired. He resolves it by positing that Aristotle understood 
there to be three 'levels' of virtue -  the first, natural (an accidental, merely appetitive quality).
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are not entirely free to pick their desires (and character) as they choose. The 
desires men have and the kinds of actions they (want to) do are largely 
determined by the environment in which they are raised -  the cultural 
practices into which they are habituated. For instance, the man brought up in 
a polis where conflicting values are voiced and openly debated will act 
differently, will in fact have desires and capacities quite unlike the one who is 
raised in a place where all discourse is restricted and censured. As all 
(properly termed) human beings are raised in communities structured by 
certain value-laden practices, the environment into which men are 
acculturated plays the major role in their character formation, specifically in 
the cultivation of virtue or lack thereof: "it [environment] is of supreme 
importance" {NE 1103b25). And one brought up with no community at all 
would fail, in Aristotle's eyes, to be a human being except in form, and would 
act like an animal or a god {Pol 1253a29).
While Aristotle did not believe that human beings were bom  (fully) ethically 
virtuous, he calls it a state which men are "naturally endowed to receive" {NE 
1103al4-26). Generally speaking however, young people do not 'naturally' 
enjoy what is truly good/noble -  most are bom  with strong inclinations to 
pursue those pleasures which promise immediate gratification (which if 
pursued recklessly over time, cannot contribute to a unified, stable, 
reasonable life). Therefore, men must be 'trained' to see beyond their 
personal, spontaneous desires and leam to take pleasure in what is best for 
members of the hum an species: "we need to have the proper upbringing...to 
make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things." This comes through 
repeated, guided (not random) experiences within a community structured by 
laws which serve to promote certain values endorsing a particular way of
the second, the acquired virtue which leads to the right actions but without real 
understanding of why they are good ("in accordance with, but not yet with correct reason"), 
and the final is full virtue, which is virtue with correct reason, with phronesis (Bostock, 
Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.86). See also, Bumyeat, M. "Aristotle on Learning to be 
Good" {Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty, Berkeley: 1980, pp.69-93).
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life.59 Backed by the force of law, men in such communities -  in poleis -  are 
compelled (for fear of shame and punishment) to repeatedly perform the 
kinds of actions deemed good by their community. This means imitating the 
actions of men already considered to be virtuous. While difficult at first, this 
repeated, imitative practice in a particular polis provides young citizens with a 
pool of experiences that (ideally) cultivate the desire for the good endorsed by 
that community: "habit makes them [difficult activities] pleasant" (Rhet. 
1370al2).60 This good, though initially merely accepted in the process of 
guided imitation as a child, over time grows to be a general state of proper 
orientation which frames man's character so that he: "knows what he is 
doing, chooses it and chooses it for its own sake, and...does it from a firm and 
permanent disposition." {NE 1105a26-33) An ethically virtuous disposition is 
engendered by older, already good practitioners' own behaviour to be 
imitated, and is confirmed by their teachings within the structure of a polis.^^
The concrete good in a specific situation that is desired by the ethically 
virtuous man is what Aristotle terms the "mean" -  a genuine good, yet one 
which is "enmattered" and thus contingent on the individual involved and 
his immediate circumstances. The vast variation in people and circumstances 
make this situation-dependent "mean" impossible to codify in precise abstract 
terms. Thus Aristotelian ethics aims to establish and promote the kind of 
character who is able to determine this mean without a fixed rule to follow or
'Guidance' comes through many aspects and at many different levels of polis life: the laws 
set up the overarching structure and provide the conditions necessary for education (hence 
legislation is the achitectonic practical virtue, NE 1141b25). And it is the wise, whose teachings 
Aristotle parallels to the demonstrative truths of scientific knowledge, who act as standards 
for those learning to be virtuous (NE 1143bll-3).
^  A (reason directed) 'wish' (boulesis) for that which is good generally develops by acting on 
this good particularly (the 'mean' in a specific situation). On the function of the polis as the 
proper 'director' of desires, see for instance, Aristotle's discussion of Phaleus' regime: he must 
not level possessions, but desires. Po/.1266b28-31.
^^Note that teachingybPows habituation, repeated experience: "what Aristotle does insist on 
repeatedly is that habituation and experience are a necessary prerequisite for teaching" 
(Sorabji "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty 
Berkeley: 1980, p. 217). A more complete discussion of the polis and its role in developing 
virtue will follow in the section on Aristotle's Politics.
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principle to promote. Repeatedly performing actions which promote the right 
ends in particular circumstances will over time evolve into this kind of 
character -  one who actually takes pleasure in the right things, one who 
consistently desires what is fine/noble. Ideally therefore, even before 
understanding abstractly what the good for man is, men come to enjoy acting 
virtuously -  for the person of ethical virtue, the right actions are done without 
internal conflict or struggle (NE 1104b3-8), but as though they were "second 
n a t u r e . E t h i c a l  virtue then is precisely that state in which m an's desires 
have been directed by reason towards what is genuinely fine/noble (to kalon) 
in such a way that he consistently desires and acts to aim at the "mean" in the 
particular, contingent situations which make up his life. One might say that 
in some sense, the peculiar telos of the hum an appetite rests in its being 
permeated with and steered by reason.
In cultivating a harmony between reason and appetite, men shift from being 
driven to act on erratic and unpredictable pleasures and pains, to being 
guided (and stabilised) by reason. Viewing the world through the lens of 
reason as opposed to appetite alone will point man beyond his individual, 
spontaneous passions and narrow personal preferences to indicate that as a 
kind of thing (i.e., as a member of the human species) he has a general good.^3
NE 1147a21-22, quoted in and expanded upon in Bumyeat's "Aristotle on Learning to be 
Good" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty (Berkeley: 1980, p. 74). The idea of acting on 
"second nature" will help to illuminate a key difference between the ethical and intellectual 
virtues -  the ethically virtuous person, e.g., Pericles, seems to have acted well almost 
automatically given his 'empirical' perceptions (empeiria) of his circumstances, yet could not 
teach his sons what he knew. He developed habits which enabled him to see and understand 
his experiences in a certain light, which though perhaps unarticulated, framed his 
understanding of the world. What Pericles did not have was a unified explanation or theory 
of what he was doing, therefore, he could not teach (though importantly, he was still a 
practitioner to imitate). The person who is capable of teaching 'why' is Aristotle, as ethical 
theorist. A good practitioner should not, and indeed cannot be expected to take Aristotle's 
job away! See Bostock: "People are brought up to know that this or that is the virtuous way 
of acting, and they do as a result develop a disposition to act in this way, but they usually 
cannot supply the 'reasoning' which -  it is alleged -  would show why this way of acting is 
indeed the right way" {Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.44).
Salkever suggests that the grasping of the first principles of 'social science' (i.e., the human 
good as flomishing/eudaimonia), requires that we must first recognize that "there is a human 
good which is somehow different from our spontaneous pleasures and pains...The
180
This recognition of himself as not merely an individual, but as a member of a 
group serves to stabilise a man's identity -  without this sense, his 
intuitive/instinctive whims and immediate desires frequently conflict, 
resulting in confusion, anger and even violence. ^  Having a sense of a 
general, stable human good provides man with the goal towards which his 
own particular choices and actions aim, thereby providing coherence and 
unity in his individual actions, and this can dissipate internai turmoil and 
ward off violent, or otherwise vicious outbursts. The abstract hum an good 
that is derived from an explanation of the specific function (ergon) of the 
hum an species is not something that floats 'above' human life, rather it is a 
good that man, because of the kind of creature he is, and because he functions 
in the way he does, has a responsibility to realise as best he can in the 
particular, indeterminate situations he confronts by making well-reasoned, 
deliberate choices and acting on them.^
This means that the psychological state which constitutes ethical virtue cannot 
be simply explained and learned as for example, geometric theorems are, nor 
can people be persuaded through mere argument to actually become good 
(NE 1179b5ff).^ Ideally, the practices of a polis serve to steer its citizens
indispensable starting point for social science is a sense of the difference between a 
personality or way of life which is flourishing and one which is not" ("Aristotle's Social 
Science", Political Theory vol. 111981, p.498). Recognising and aiming to realise a life of 
(human) virtue — flourishing — has the additional benefit of protecting man from the forces of 
luck, for the goods of virtue, unlike our individual and immediate desires, are aimed at those 
ends which are most under our control (see White "Aristotle's Favorite Tragedies" in Essays on 
Aristotle's Poetics ed. Rorty (Princeton: 1992, p.226). This explains Aristotle's insistence that 
his students be older and experienced, properly oriented towards what is fine/noble and not 
simply m pursuit of their immediate desires (NE 1179bl3). See also. Kraut, R. "Two 
Conceptions of Happiness" Aristotle's Ethics ed. Irwin (London: 1995, pp. 82-89).
^  For instance, Pentheus in Euripides' Bacchae.
This, as I will attempt to explain below, ultimately comes with practical wisdom.
However, the harmony of appetite and reason manifested in the stable and enduring 
disposition that is ethical virtue is a necessary component to practical wisdom.
^  The fact that moral virtues are acquired through habituation and intellectual virtues through 
teaching {NE 1103al5) is an important distinction between these two kinds of virtue. The 
objects of intellectual virtue are constant and regular (e.g., the stars, mathematical axioms), 
while those of moral virtue are indeterminate and admit to being otherwise (the substantive 
lives of human beings living together in differently organised communities). The latter
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(forcibly, if necessary) to desire a life that embodies the true good for man. 
However, Coleman makes the important point that force is only the last 
result. Citizens are presumed already to be ethical characters from family 
guidance and imitation (not from their having been beaten into it at home). So 
too, coercion behind the laws is an ultimate threat for those who have not 
internalised the reasons for acting according to laws, or who have been ill- 
habituated for a range of reasons.^^ This means that man must be first raised 
within a community where he can directly experience others living according 
to substantive rules which express ideas of what a good and bad life looks 
like. Over time, this serves to orient his emotions, if initially uncritically, so 
that he is habituated to act according to reasons in light of an established good, 
or as the Virtue practitioners' of his community already do.^ ® A community 
(specifically a law governed polis) is that environment that promotes reason to 
penetrate and inform the appetite -  the polis is thus a necessary condition for 
establishing and securing ethical virtue.
Aristotle is clear that ethical virtue, understood as being cultivated in a 
political community (by definition organised according to an abstract 
conception of what a good human life should look like, and more concretely, 
this good realised in the community's laws which 'frame' individual best
require deliberation and judgement given specific circumstances, and deciding what is better 
or worse, the former, on the other hand requires knowing what is true or false.
Professor Coleman made this point to me in our correspondence about this dissertation.
As this (or any) orientation comes only after experience living as humans do, Aristotle 
insists that the proper student for ethical discourse is not a young person, but rather someone 
who has actually participated in "the actions of life" {NE 1095a2). Even more specifically, he 
must already be a lover of what is good and noble though not necessarily conscious in the first 
instance -  rather, simply having acquired trained emotions conjoined to certain habitual ways 
of behaving. Theoretical discourse does not teach the ends of ethics, it presupposes them and 
then works dialectically to explain, hone and refine them through practice and reflection. The 
fact that moral virtue involves practical reasoning (phronesis), which demands understanding 
the relationship between particulars and universals (discussed more fully below), also 
explains Aristotle's respect for the old -  they have had experience in particulars (which has 
given them "the eye") and yields the "origins" for theoretical discourse on ethics and politics 
(NE 1142al0-25). Thucydides also notes the rashness of the young and their inability to 
control their immediate emotions (11.21). In this light, Cleon's words and actions in regard to 
Mytilene, despite being an adult, seem manifestly childlike (or the result of ill-habituated 
desires such as natural' anger and impetuosity).
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practitioners" behaviour to be imitated) is necessarily informed by theory. 
However, acquiring ethical virtue is not the same as "pursuing philosophy" 
(i.e., it is not a theoretical demonstration of truth). Rather its actualisation is 
actually being virtuous -  doing good actions in particular situations. While 
Aristotle says that ethically virtuous people act from a state of knowing {NE 
1105a32 -  eidos), this is not the same kind of knowing appropriate to "science" 
{episteme, discussed below). The knowing involved in ethical virtue is correct 
orientation which repeatedly points desires to the right goals so that 
appropriate actions are taken in particular situations. Action is prior to ethical 
knowing and ethical virtue: "The virtues we acquire by first having put them 
into action"/""virtue results from the repeated performance of just and 
temperate actions" (NE 1103a30; 1105b3-6). Thus, in speaking of the 
development and function of ethical virtue, it is the actual conditions of action 
that are extremely important, while abstract principles (e.g., that the hum an 
function is virtuous action informed by reason, or that eudaimonia is the 
highest human good) are "of little or no avail."^^
Furthermore, ethical virtue -  acting well because one has developed a stable 
character which desires the good in concrete situations -  precedes the capacity 
to think abstractly/theoretically about the general good for man: "The soul of 
the student [of philosophy] must first have been prepared by the cultivation 
of habits for noble pleasures and aversions, just as the land is prepared to 
nourish the seed." (NE 1095b4). A state of "full virtue" will involve knowing 
not just that this action is right in these circumstances (i.e., "doing just and 
temperate actions as the just and temperate man would do" NE 1105b5-7 
which is to say, by imitating), but also why such an action is virtuous and 
making a deliberate choice (prohairesis) to do it for its own sake.^^ Ethical 
virtue itself begins with and remains connected to action -  the imitation of 
good actions at first, and progressively moving through this experience to
For example, the man who knows the abstract truth that light meat is healthful, but not 
which meats are actually light is not able to act on his knowledge.
Reeve argues that full virtue requires nous, which provides the 'first principles' of ethics 
needed to understand the why {Practices of Reason Oxford: 1992, p.89).
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include an understanding of the reasons that they are virtuous, and 
continuing to perform them in new situations which demand creativity.
A state of ethical virtue does not provide men with principles that can elevate 
them to an Archimedian perspective, able to judge and anticipate each new, 
contingent circumstance objectively -  indeed, denying the use of such an a 
priori standpoint was the heart of his rejection of Plato's idea of the Good (NE 
1096b26ff). Nor is ethical virtue the acquisition of precise, abstract ethical 
rules to be applied mechanically to concrete situations ensuring intended 
results. No 'level' of ethical virtue can guarantee the consequences of hum an 
action -  ethical virtue cannot make men invulnerable to the influence of 
fortune, or forces outside their control.^^ An ethically virtuous character 
however, will increase the probability that life will go as planned -  an 
'appetite' which has been penetrated by reason and directed towards a stable 
good is by nature more regular and more enduring than one that pursues 
only the individual's passing whims. Furthermore, as itself growing out of 
direct experience in the variability and unpredictability of hum an life, the 
ethically virtuous person will recognise the inherent vulnerability of man, and 
come to be compassionate and forgiving, able to use error, rather shrink from 
it. In short, his expectations and goals will be reasonable, not insofar as they 
can accurately predict and control the future, but insofar as they are 
appropriate to the subject at hand -  human beings.
The kind of reason proper to the ethically virtuous person is one which grows 
out of the discernment of certain patterns and probabilities in hum an behaviour 
which can, given time and reflection, be seen in a larger framework of values, 
practices and beliefs. The capacity to recognise these patterns is derived and
It is a truth about human nature that there can never be a guarantee for man that his 
actions will turn out as planned, no matter how well deliberated, and mapped out. Though 
Aristotle understood individuals to be responsible for their choices, all human action is 
inherently a risk. See Vemant, J-P. Myth & Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 1988, pp.32- 
34); Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp. 318-342); Salkever, S. 
"Teaching the Questions" paper given at Bryn Mawr College, 9/2001 (p.21).
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sustained only given extended experience within the flux of human life, 
specifically activity in a polis7^ The ethically virtuous disposition, itself 
cultivated and developed by imitating doers of virtuous actions (Virtue 
practitioners')/ evolves by continuing to perform like actions in similar 
situations (at first with little understanding^^) and results in a general state 
involving both the desire (the internalised impulse) for what is good and the 
capacity to act virtuously oneself in new situations. As the circumstances 
men encounter in life are infinite and unique, there is no definitive 
preparation to ensure success in each unique and open-ended situation, "we 
are cognitively at the mercy of each new e v e n t . " ^ 4  To be ethically virtuous 
implies the ability to meet the challenge of novelty, and this means a distinctly 
un-codifiable kind of reason -  each action entails a kind of calculated risk, for 
it demands being inventive, acting creatively, rather than mechanically (which 
is in a sense, to be not fully responsible^^) given new contingent situations 
where external conditions can change even the most well thought out 
course.76 And this capacity develops only through experience. In this way 
the ethically virtuous person goes from being an im itator/rule follower in 
youth (performing actions as the result of guided, yet uncritical habituation), 
to an innovative reason-er in old age. At this point, the impulse to act on w hat 
is noble/fine, the guidance of the natural impulse towards the pleasurable
One might argue that the polis itself is not only that which sustains and allows these 
patterns to be recognised, but is in fact, that which creates them. Thus while there is a best 
polis, any polis is necessary to ensure that patterns in humam life emerge and are sustained.
Bostock distinguishes this by emphasising Aristotle's claim that man goes from acting "m 
accordance with correct reason" to "with correct reason" (Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.86).
4^ Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, p.298). This is not to suggest that 
there are no recurring patterns in human life, but only to emphasize the fact that 
understanding the patterns alone (deriving laws, principles, etc., from them) is to deny an 
important piece of what it is to be human. This piece requires man to be responsive to the 
individuality and unique-ness of human life.
On the misconception that mastering ethics is like mastering a technical art which, given its 
precise rules, reduces individual responsibility, see Gadamer. H.-G. The Idea of the Good in 
Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (New Haven: 1986, p. 168).
On the importance of creativity and innovativeness, see Gulley, N. "Aristotle on the 
Purposes of Literature" Articles on Aristotle vol. 4 (New York: 1973, pp.167-76); Salkever, S. 
"Tragedy and the Education of the Demos" in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory ed. Euben 
(Berkeley: 1986, pp. 274-303); Depew, D. "Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle's 
Ideal State" in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics ed. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: 1991, pp. 347- 
380); Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp 298-306).
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initially being imposed so that the noble becomes what is pleasurable, is 
internalised and works as a fixed motivation in the ethically virtuous person 
(thus ethical virtue in a sense, makes men more self-sufficient). This is the 
state/condition of the phronimos, explored in the following section.
The Rational Soul and Intellectual Virtue
Before discussing practical wisdom -  phronesis -  which we will see itself 
depends on ethical virtue, I will examine the other elements of the rational 
part of the soul. Like the irrational part of the soul, the rational part is also 
divided in two. This leads to two broad categories of intellectual virtue, each 
kind with a distinct object and end, thus demanding two kinds of reasonable 
thought.^ At 1139a5-13, Aristotle distinguishes these two elements in the 
rational soul: one part contemplates things which are necessary and 
unchanging (the epistemonikon), the primary virtue of which is sophia or 
philosophic wisdom, and the other deliberates about and leads to action on 
things which are contingent and admit to variation (the logistikon), the 
primary virtue of which is phronesis or practical wisdom {NE 1144al-9).7® 
However, these two parts of the rational soul are alike in that they both have 
reason in themselves (and thus are distinct from the appetitive part of the soul 
which, as was said, can listen to and obey reason, but does not possess it 
innately). The most refined kind of knowledge available to human beings 
belongs to the epistemonikon -  it considers unconditional, necessary truths -
^  Bostock raises an interesting point about the kinds of thinking involved in 'scientific' and 
practical reasoning: he suggests that while their objects and aims may be different (one about 
necessary truths and knowledge for its own sake, the other about contingent beliefs/opinions 
and right desire with a view to action), the actual kind of thinking involved in each one is the 
same {Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.79) I would argue that while perhaps at its core the 
reasoning process seems to be the same for both parts of the rational soul, focusing on this 
parallel threatens to obscure the fact that practical reason needs to take into account both 
universal and particular, while theoretical reason involves only universals. Additionally, as 
Lord states: "TTieoretical science serves no purpose beyond knowledge itself, or the pleasure 
that accompanies it; practical science is for the purpose or in the service of action" ("Politics 
and Philosophy in Aristotle's Ethics" Hermes vol. 106,1978 p. 337).
They are however, 'primary' in different senses: sophia includes episteme and nous (NE 
1141al9), while phronesis is included in / the foundation of other practical virtues, the most 
controlling of which is political wisdom (specifically legislative wisdom, or nomothetikes).
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valid for everything, everywhere, always -  and the connections between those 
truths.
For Aristotle, episteme, or 'scientific' knowledge generally refers to theology, 
mathematics and physics.^^ In these disciplines, men can contemplate 'first 
principles' (truths which are apprehended by nous), and can thereafter deduce 
demonstratively from them (this is episteme, narrowly defined). The 
actualisation of nous and episteme together -  that is to say, full knowledge of 
first principles and a grasp of what follows from them -  is sophia, the highest 
kind of knowledge accessible to human beings {NE 1141al7ff).80 This "most 
honourable/exalted (timiotaton)" form of knowledge demands no choices be 
made that result in conduct. The activity proper to, and thus the function of 
this 'theoretical' part of the rational soul is a specialised kind of reasoned 
contemplation -  syllogistic demonstration by way of deduction -  about those 
'objects' which are impervious to human intervention.^!
The idea that physics, as a part of theoretical knowledge, works with only invariable, 
necessary truths might strike some as implausible. Hardie explains Aristotle's inclusion of 
physics as theoretical knowledge as a discipline which concerns not only invariable 
'universals', but also what can be true for the most part (to has epi to polu). Thus he states, it is 
"a kind though not the primary kind of theoretical knowledge" (Aristotle's Ethical Theory 2"^  ^
ed. Oxford: 1980, pp.222-3). Reeve raises a similar point in Practices of Reasons (Oxford: 1992, 
pp.Slff). De Ste Croix discusses the issue of those things which exist/are true for the most 
part as it relates to his understanding of the use of history, and highlights that Aristotle's 
distinction between universals and particulars is better understood as threefold ("Aristotle on 
History and Poetry" Essays on Aristotle's Poetics ed. Rorty Princeton: 1992, pp. 23-32).
Bostock writes that sophia, in Aristotle's "unnatural/restricted" use of it, is best understood 
as "the virtue of the theoretical part of the soul" and episteme is the kind of knowledge that 
deals with universals (Aristotle's Ethics Oxford: 2000, pp. 76-77). Both involve the capacity to 
deduce from first principles the necessary conclusions which follow from them (NE 1139b33- 
35, NE 1141al6-20). This process, which moves from permanent and fixed truths to what 
necessarily results given them as explanation and consequences, is Aristotelian 
demonstration, and has nothing specific to do with human action. Aristotle maintains that 
first principles are induced and spotted/ intuited by mind (nous): "it wUl be nous which 
apprehends the primary premises" (PostAn 100bl3). To count as knowledge (true definition), 
these 'primary premises' must be known in the deeper/non-accidental way -  i.e., their cause 
must be known (PostAn 71bS-10). At V I.ll, Aristotle calls sophia and phronesis the respective 
virtues of the two parts of the rational soul -  the former concerned with necessary truths, the 
other with practical probabilities.
Reeve highlights a distinction between "plain" and "unconditional" scientific knowledge 
and its relation to Aristotelian ethics (Practices of Reason Oxford: 1992, pp. 7-22). He concludes 
that the first principles of ethics, derived from the matter-less, yet definitively human nous, do 
in fact qualify as "unconditional" scientific knowledge (i.e., ethics involves "demonstrable
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The fact that the virtues of the contemplative element of the rational human 
soul are concerned with invariable first principles (and deductions from 
them) means that they can be "communicated by teaching...and must be 
leam t" (NE 1139b24-6).®2 Given this, the habituation so fundamental to the 
acquisition of ethical virtue (i.e., the training of feelings and desires) is largely 
irrelevant to these theoretical intellectual virtues. In fact, Aristotle claims that 
even young men who (necessarily) lack the "eye of experience" can excel in, 
for instance, studies of astronomy or geometry (NE 1142al3ff.). Though 
growing out of nous's unique perception of and one's further capacity to 
engage in induction from concrete particulars to abstract universals, scientific 
knowledge qua scientific knowledge does not employ individual, tangible 
things -  again, its concern is 'universals', or the invariable abstract principles 
of the most honoured disciplines. As episteme does not involve 
influencing /  persuading anything beyond a grasp of those 'universals' it 
contemplates and deduces from, its knowledge can be said to be the most self- 
sufficient and complete kind of knowledge -  its objects are the most stable 
and perfect things in the c o s m o s . ® ^
principles that are unconditionally necessary" ibid. pp. 27-8). While one might grant that 
there are first principles in ethics, this should not lead to the conclusion that these principles 
of human nature, as objects of nous, join theology, astronomy, and geometry as one of the 
most elevated objects in the cosmos (NE 1141a20).
However, we will see that the practical virtues of the rational soul do require prior 
habituation, i.e., proper character development, or most simply stated, ethical virtue (hence 
Aristotle's claim that young people are not appropriate students for ethics and politics — they 
have not yet had the guided experience, and the practice in induction necessary to make more 
theoretical teaching worthwhile. See Sorabji "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" 
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty Berkeley: 1980, pp.214-218). Whereas knowledge 
of/virtue in relation to concrete, particular objects cêm only be had through experience and 
habituation, abstract theory/scientific knowledge works with the universal 'extracted' 
(through language) from particulars. This universal, crystallised in language, is unchanging 
and unaffected by human emotion, and as such, it can be learned.
^  And, given the discussion below, we will see that unlike practical knowledge (phronesis), 
episteme need not negotiate between universal and particular, and thus has no direct parallel 
to 'equity'. Reeve, however, argues that there is in fact an 'analogue' to equity in the 
development of a science, namely acumen (agchinoia). He is careful to distinguish these two 
capacities however: "whereas equity finds the best match between the universal and the 
particular, acumen finds the explanatory universal in the particular" (Practices of Reason 
Oxford: 1992, p. 78).
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Chapter 4: Phronesis
The calculating/deliberative part of the rational soul is considerably more 
complicated for my purposes, for it is here that we find the overlap between 
the rational soul and human character and action -  between intellect and 
appetite. The "excellence' or virtue of the logistikon which relates directly to 
hum an conduct is practical wisdom, or phronesis, and its full realisation differs 
from the virtues of the epistemonikon in both its object and end.^ The objects 
of phronesis are not the invariable truths of pure 'science', but rather all the 
elements -  both abstract and concrete -  involved in virtuous human conduct, 
in reasoned choice and creative action. More precisely, phronesis is concerned 
with negotiating the dynamic relationship between the theoretical concepts 
which characterise and define the human species (e.g., man is a rational 
animal, the hum an end is eudaimonia realised in virtuous activity) and the 
concrete factors that make up a human life (e.g., the culture into which one is 
bom  and raised, the specific abilities and attachments one has as an 
individual). Phronesis considers ethical abstractions as they relate to and 
frame the actual conditions in which man must determine the best means to 
attain the concrete good (the "mean") in his environment.
The end of phronesis is not the demonstrable knowledge of episteme, but the 
actions which constitute a secure and flourishing, or eudaimon life for man, 
i.e., the performance of reasonable and creative actions which aim at what is 
fine/noble for man.^s Phronesis is a broad 'state of knowing' which is by its 
very nature connected to human conduct and all the incommensurable 
elements that go into it, and not the attainment of certain, logically consistent, 
purely theoretical knowledge for its own sake.®  ^ This means that unlike the
In discussing the practical part of the rational soul, Aristotle first distinguishes between 
virtues corresponding to things made (production) and things done (conduct) -  between craft 
knowledge (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis). My concern in what follows is with 
phronesis, therefore I will not discuss techne here.
As the polis is that which provides this environment, Aristotle claims that legislation 
(nomothetike) is the "directing" (architectonic) form of phronesis.
86 "The person of practical wisdom or prudence -  results not in the statement of a rule but in 
the creation of a metaphor -  the metaphor of the mean -  whose function is to clarify problems
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other intellectual virtues, phronesis can effect change in the world. But what 
precisely does this 'knowing state' involve, and how can it, as an intellectual 
virtue, effect change? Furthermore, if it is concerned with particulars, 
specifically about doing well in concrete situations, how does phronesis differ 
from ethical virtue?
At NE 1140b20, Aristotle describes phronesis as "a true and reasoned state or 
capacity to act with regard to human g o o d s . A s  such, it is a 'compound' 
state which is capable of making deliberate decisions and "issuing orders" 
which lead to actions promoting the good.®® I say that phronesis is compound 
because it includes both ethical virtue (the disposition acquired through 
proper habituation which orients a m an's appetite towards what is good 
generally and, through repeated imitation of virtue practitioners, sustains an 
enduring desire for this good so that the specific good in particular situations 
-  the "mean" -  is desired and acted upon consistently), as well as the capacity 
to apply calculative reason towards finding the best course of action needed 
to attain the particular good that ethical virtue identifies in the situation at 
hand {NE 1144a28ff). This means that in any given particular situation, 
ethical virtue gives phronesis its end, and calculative reason shows it the best 
way to achieve it -  phronesis embraces them both. Unlike episteme, phronesis 
operates in the realm of "enmattered" and variable particulars, and unlike 
ethical virtue, it demands a deeper and broader exposure to and 
understanding of hum an beings and the good for man generally. With this
of personal choice, and not to resolve them" (Salkever. Finding the Mean, Princeton: 1990, 
p.117).
®^ Like aU Aristotelian virtues, phronesis is fundamentally a state, and not a capacity or feeling 
{NE 1106al2). I understand phronesis to be by its very definition, directed towards the actual 
human good. This seems justified in light of Aristotle's identifying it with not only logos, but 
orthos logos (NE 1144b28-9). Note also the shift in his definition o( phronesis at 1140b6, and 
then shortly thereafter at 1140b20-l: phronesis is qualified further and goes from being 
concerned with what is bad and good for humans, to being concerned solely with what is 
good. Phronesis, it seems, is "end specific" -  its 'orders' though specific to the concrete 
situation at hand, are legitimated and recognised in light of the (unconditional) human good. 
This is in contrast with cleverness, wish, and decision, all of which can be well or poorly 
directed (see Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals Ithaca: 1993, pp.67-71).
®®Just as phronesis is distinguished from mere 'cleverness' because it implies ethical virtue, it is 
the issuing of orders which distinguishes phronesis from mere 'understanding'.
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extended experience comes the potential for a more secure grasp of abstract 
ethical concepts which allows the man of practical wisdom to reason in a 
creative and independent way, rather than in an imitative and mechanical 
one.89
Looking at phronesis in this way, we see that there is more to it than just 
instrumental reason. Phronesis is 'end specific' -  its aim is good, and not 
merely effective action. Aristotle is clear that the desire for the proper end 
which activates phronesis grows out of and thus depends on ethical virtue: "We 
cannot be prudent without being good" (NE 1144a31). Lacking the end 
desired by the ethically virtuous agent, phronesis, deteriorates into mere 
cleverness {demotes 1144a23ff.), the capacity, given any end, to determine the 
best means to that end, whether virtuous or vicious, As stated above, the
®^ This is not to say that the phronimos must always act according to a conscious conception of 
the abstract human good. At the same time, phronesis is not only appetite "in harmony" with 
reason -  this is ethical virtue. As Hardie rightly points out, the bad man who desires a 
perverted end may be able to reason his way there, and in doing so, harmonize (calculative) 
reason/cleverness and appetite (Aristotle's Ethical Theory ed. Oxford: 1980, pp. 225-228).
To avoid this conclusion, he suggests that one must infer that for Aristotle, the 'particular 
end' desired by the phronimos in fact involves (or grows out of) an "intuitive thought of the 
end" determined by intellect, specifically nous (ibid., p. 227). See also Reeve, C.D.C.. Practices 
of Reason (p. 79).
As Aristotle refers to phronesis as the primary virtue of the deliberative/calculating part of 
the rational soul (NE 1143bl5), that it could be indistinguishable from cleverness, or 
"headless," is unlikely (again, see Hardie Aristotle's Ethical Theory 2"<^ ed. Oxford: 1980, pp. 
226ff; Reeve Practices of Reason Oxford: 1992, p. 79). Hardie notes that identifying phronesis 
with instrumental reason (cleverness) given an end results from too narrow a reading of the 
Ethics (Aristotle's Ethical Theory ed. Oxford: 1980, p.226). Similar to Bostock (Aristotle's 
Ethics Oxford: 2000, p.86), he points to the different 'levels' of practical wisdom one can have 
-  from the good sense of an individual who has been 'trained' in ethical virtue, to the 
understanding of the human end attributable to the good legislator. The concept of demotes is 
useful in that through it, the reader is forced to acknowledge the ways in which phronesis, in 
its most perfected and complete state, involves, not only ethical virtue, but mind/intellect 
(nous) as well. There is a temptation, given Aristotle's division of the rational soul to restrict 
the influence of nous to the contemplative part of the rational soul. However, upon closer 
examination, it seems to play a role in both contemplative and practical parts of the soul -  it's 
at the beginning and end. The phronimos, or possessor of practical wisdom, is aware of the 
right end -  which, though sustained by right desire (ethical virtue), is in fact determined by 
nous: "in practical inferences it [nous] apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact" (NE 
1143a35ff). Nous is involved in practical wisdom because it works with both particulars and 
universals, it apprehends both "beginning and end" (NE 1143bl0). That is, it begins with 
particulars, but results in 'spotting' the universal immanent in them, i.e., it identifies the 
universals accurately. The 'universals' spotted by nous (which includes the human good) are 
manifested in the teachings of the older, wiser, reputable men in a community. Therefore,
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ethically virtuous man consistently desires the right end -  the mean -  in a 
particular situation, and does this because he has been habituated to want 
w hat is good by imitating older, already virtuous people.^^ Once the desire 
for the good is a stable and secure part of m an's character, the ethically 
virtuous man can, with the help of the intellect, come to grasp more 
consciously and understand more deeply the abstract conception of the 
general human good (which grows out of what man is as a kind of thing) that 
frames his 'trained' desires. These desires are met because of the other crucial 
component of phronesis -  instrumental reason -  a capacity which is 'neutral' 
but essential in that it indicates the best means to arrive at the desired ends.
Thus, phronesis is a form of theoretical knowledge that is not prior to, but in 
fact follows from the performance of good actions (and the emotions 
necessary to prom pt them).^^ Only given the active experience necessary to 
secure ethical virtue, can phronesis be cultivated and come to play an active 
role in one's life. However, dependent though they are on one another, 
phronesis and ethical virtue are distinct, the latter allows man to move beyond 
imitation, and to act reasonably and creatively in new s i t u a t i o n s . ^ 3  Both
they inform the training involved in ethical virtue. Practical wisdom then "must include the 
intuitive thought of the end as well as the intellectual powers required for the discovery of 
the means" (Hardie. Aristotle's Ethical Theory ed. Oxford: 1980, p. 227).
The ethically virtuous man's appetite has been penetrated by right reason {orthos logos) 
implying a fixed orientation towards, though not necessarily a conscious understanding of 
what is fine/noble (to kalon, the abstract good). This results in the consistent desire for what 
is good in a particular situation (the mean). Recall that human action is triggered by desire, 
and that it is the appetitive part of the soul which has to do with desire and feelings more 
generally. Recall too that excellence in character -  ethical virtue -  means having the right 
'appetites' (specifically desires 'penetrated by reason' so that they are aimed towards what is 
genuinely good) and not merely directed at attaining one's most immediate whims (for 
instance, instinctively avoiding pain and indiscriminately pursuing pleasure). As desires 
prompt action, ethical virtue is tiiat state which consistently results in good actions (good 
because these actions are motivated by an enduring disposition possessing the correct desires) 
but not necessarily an awareness of why those desires are correct.
This order -  action before knowledge -  indicates why the polis is essential to ethical virtue: 
without a community, men lose the opportunity to imitate others who are already virtue 
practitioners, and as a result, have no access to ethical virtue.
At NE 1144b28-9, Aristotle equates phronesis with orthos logos, that which is said to be the 
guiding principle of those 'corrected' desires -  the mark of ethical virtue. In this, ethical 
virtue and phronesis are presented by Aristotle as dependent on one another, neither can 
function properly without a harmony between them: "it is not possible to be good in the true
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ethical virtue and phronesis are enduring states of properly oriented desires 
which result in good action, but the latter allows for more independence and 
autonomy, encouraging innovation and growth.
Phronesis therefore might be understood as a highly developed, critical, and 
reflected upon level of ethical virtue, the primary difference of which is 
manifested in the capacity to deal not only with decisions which fall clearly 
into a type, and thus require basic imitation, but with new situations, i.e., 
those in which virtuous activity demands the reasonable and creative 
application of principles. But what is added to ethical virtue to result in this 
capacity for reasoned creativity? Aristotle claims that a more profound 
understanding of the state of knowing that is phronesis comes through 
observing the actions of those who are already practically wise, the phronimoi. 
From what has just been said, the phronimos is the man who is already 
ethically virtuous, and deliberately chooses to do the best action in his 
situation. The action of the phronimos grows out of both the awareness of 
what is good generally for humans integrated with a responsiveness to the 
demands of the particular circumstances at hand. But to ascribe these 
capacities to the phronimoi implies a whole range of related abilities and 
virtues, all of which come together to form an agent who is ""flexible and 
responsive,"" able to negotiate the relationship between particular and 
a b s t r a c t / u n i v e r s a l . ^ 4  i Y/iU. attempt to look at them in detail below, beginning 
with what prompts practical reason in the first place.
To "trigger" the action natural to phronesis, the phronimos must confront -  i.e., 
perceive -  a contingent and indeterminate situation in which he can make a 
difference: ""the phronimos is trying to solve a problem. He is searching for a
sense without prudence, nor to be prudent without ethical virtue." There is a continuous 
circle whereby phronesis and ethical virtue are further actualised and sustained: "they [the 
virtues] cannot exist without phronesis" (NE 1144b20-l).
Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, p.306).
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way to act well or achieve eudaimonia in this particular s i t u a t i o n / ' ^ s  This 
indicates that phronesis is concerned first with the perception of those 
particulars over which he can have some influence -  with making decisions 
about how to achieve a specific good given these concrete circumstances, at 
this particular point in time.^^
How then does he decide which actions best promote the goal established by 
virtue? Aristotle claims that phronesis involves "deliberative excellence" 
{euboulia: "correctness that expresses what is expedient for promoting the 
[right] end" NE 1142b31-3).9^ In order to deliberate well, the phronimos must 
have understanding (the familiarity required to make sound judgements 
about things which are variable; NE 1143al-18), and consideration/equity (the 
acute sensitivity to the particular details of a concrete situation which might 
demand "tinkering' with a general rule; NE 1143al9-24.).^® Like ethical virtue, 
they involve "things which could be otherwise" -  therefore, each one evolves
Reeve. The Practices of Reason (Oxford: 1992, p.69).
96 "Perception of particular cases takes precedence, in ethical judgement, over general rules 
and accounts" (Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness Cambridge: 1981, p. 294). While there is 
undoubtedly a shift when making ethical judgements that increases the force of the concrete 
particular -  a particular situation might demand that a general rule be overridden (thus the 
need for equity). This does not mean that the universal/general concept in ethics has only a 
small role to play, human beings need abstract concepts. Nussbaum highlights the fact that 
human beings are not always "good judges...operating ethically as well as we should" (ibid., 
p. 304) -  it is this human imperfection that gives rise to the need for rules/general principles.
Deliberative excellences (euboulia) is end-specific, it aims at the true good. This makes it 
unlike demotes (cleverness) which is simply calculative reason aimed at any goal (NE 1142b28- 
31). This well directed deliberation reinforces the central role ethical virtue plays in phronesis 
-  it provides the proper, if incompletely understood, end to the part of the soul which 
deliberates.
^®This makes the phronimos the quintessential equitable/decent man (epieikes). For Aristotle 
on equity, see: NE 1137a31-1138a4; Pol 1267b7; Rhet. 1374al8-b22, and for more general 
analyses, see Brunschwig, J. "The Aristotelian Theory of Equity" in Rationality in Greek 
Thought eds. Frede and Striker (Oxford: 1996, pp.l 15-55); Sherman, N The Fabric of Character 
Oxford: 1989). This means that equity is not an egalitarian/democratic principle. For 
Aristotle, people are judged and valued differently, according to their worth in /to  the 
community. While this may seem problematic/distasteful to the modem ear, I suggest that 
recognising the essential equality of all human beings and disregarding their actual differences 
(even with the well-intentioned attempt to be fair and give due respect to each person's 
'dignity') can cripple those who are, in reality, disadvantaged. Even if we grant humanity's 
essential equality (while remembering that Aristotle would not), we must recognise that the 
equality is potential, and it is our concrete circumstances which prevent or cultivate its 
realisation. Thus, Aristotle's treatment of people seems to have the benefit of acknowledging 
and being attentive to their individual and particular situations.
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out of experience and cannot be taught to and learned by the very young. 
Both understanding and consideration imply a level of expertise -  an 
awareness of both "ultimate and particular" (NE 1143a28-9) which transforms 
mere reason to the right reason, vital to the effective work of the phronimos 
who must consistently judge soundly and make good decisions appropriate to 
the circumstances he encounters.
However the phronimos does more than just make decisions, he acts. Aristotle 
claims that phronesis, unlike understanding (sunesis) and 
considerateness/ decency (gnomen/epieikes), must be able to "issue orders" 
which result in the actual doing of virtuous deeds. That is, the phronimos must 
not only be aware of the relevant Tacts' with a sense of what would be decent 
given their unique qualities, but he must apply this sense to his present 
situation and act. The action of the phronimos, informed by his understanding 
and guided by his consideration, is initiated by a deliberate choice 
(prohairesis). Prohairesis does not listen to injudicious passion, nor is it simply 
the act of deliberation itself. Rather, prohairesis is a decision which grows out 
of a special kind of wish (boulesis) -  special because it has been penetrated by 
reason so that it is directed at a genuine good. This good is particular and 
practical -  it aims at the concrete end (the "mean") in a specific, contingent 
situation that demands making a choice and taking action. Phronesis raises 
the probability (though never ensures) that man will attain the specific good 
in the variable situations he confronts.^^ Realising the hum an good -  using 
reason to act in conformity with virtue -  comes through making a deliberate 
choice aimed at attaining a specific good in a contingent situation and, equally 
important, performing the action that follows from such choice.
^  Nussbaum claims, rightly I believe, that there is always "a gap between being good and 
living well" (The Fragility of Goodness Cambridge: 1981, p.322). Given the kind of creature 
man is and the world he inhabits, there is only so much even the most virtuous man can do to 
ensure that his actions wül have the results he intends.
See Vemant, J-P. Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 1988, pp.55-60).
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Thus we see that phronesis, though an intellectual virtue, is concerned with 
concrete, virtuous action. The "universaT, or abstract sense of the hum an good 
the phronimos has is important insofar as it is that in light of which he can 
determine the proper action to take in a particular situation. The phronimos 
therefore has the capacity to integrate an abstract sense of "the good life in 
general "with the particular, concrete situation at hand, and needs both to 
determine the right action and the best way there.^®  ^ The sense of the general 
end suggests that the phronimos, though indeed primarily concerned with and 
activated by the particular situation (NE 1142a23-30), does also have a 
conception of the "universal' end .^^2 xhis abstract conception of the hum an 
end however, unlike the abstractions of mathematics and theology, is not 
rigidly fixed, but is, in a sense, dependent on the contingent situations in 
which it is manifested and must be recognised: "The situation is a source of 
illumination; the illumination becomes the source of a new general account to 
the human good. In this sense and to this extent, the particular is prior."^03 
Given this, the method in ethics will also differ from mathematics, and it is to 
this method that I will now turn.
Chapter 5: M ethod
As in all the other cases, we must set out the appearances, 
and first of all go through the puzzles, and in this way, we 
must prove the common beliefs {ta endoxa)...ideally all the 
common beliefs, but if not all, then most of them, and the
This is not to imply that the phronimos must always consciously refer to the general human 
good before making and acting on a particular decision in a situation, but one might expect 
that some general "set of ideas about how to live" does influence each decision man makes 
(see Sorabji, R. "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. 
Rorty, Berkeley: 1980, pp.207-208). Suppose, for example, that one faces a situation which is 
parallel to circumstances one has already encountered and effectively acted upon, this 'store' 
of knowledge might come into play almost automatically, having been already judged in light 
of a general good. One might argue that phronesis should be defined more narrowly, as that 
capacity which is used in only those situations where one must consciously reflect on general 
good and concrete "mean" - 1 however see no evidence of this interpretation in Aristotle.
Just as philosophical wisdom qua philosophical wisdom does not employ particulars, but 
needs them to get to the universals it works with, so too does practical wisdom need a sense 
of the 'universal' to get to the 'correct' particular though is not itself concerned with this 
universal in isolation, NE 1144a25-35.
103Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, p.317).
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most important. For if the objections are solved, and the 
common beliefs left, it will be adequate proof. (NE 1145bl-4)
So the thing to do is to make adequate use of what has been 
discovered while trying to find out what is still missing. {Pol. 
1329b34-5)
How does Aristotle suppose that men come to form a conception of what man 
is so that they can competently engage in ethical and political dialectic? 
Dialectic starts with commonly held opinions -  existing beliefs about the 
nature of the world. While dialectic can prove existing beliefs wrong, it does 
not aim to refute them, but rather to deepen man's understanding of his 
values, to grasp the reasons behind them.^^^ This not only intensifies man's 
understanding, but allows him to adjudicate reasonably (through persuasive 
argument based on articulatable evidence) between those beliefs that conflict. 
Dialectic makes no claim to certainty, its 'answers' are inherently open, acting 
as footholds in an ongoing process which aims to continually expose and 
check what lies behind men's opinions. Given that it is an ongoing process, 
dialectic begins by accommodating incommensurable values (though only in 
the beginning and not at the end), for rarely can any one belief be renounced 
categorically; persuasive argument can bring it back to the fore. In this, 
disagreement and variation amongst men, though undoubtedly difficult, do 
not pose impenetrable impasses, but rather can act as opportunities to expand 
and extend one's perception of the world so that it is more accurate. This means 
that Aristotle is not a relativist or perspectivist. There is a fixed truth towards 
which dialectic moves, and some, i.e., the more experienced and wise, can 
come closer to it.
While Aristotle does not have a blind faith in any one society's current beliefs, his aim is 
not to prove common beliefs wrong solely for the sake of 'winning' an argument (as was the 
sophists' primary aim). In fact, Aristotle maintains quite the contrary. Common beliefs, he 
argues, are likely to possess at least some degree of truth for: "men have a sufficient natural 
instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth" {Rhet. 1355al5). All people, 
Aristotle claims, "say something true about the nature of things" and though each individual 
contribution may be negligible alone, together "a considerable amount is amassed" {Metaph. 
993bl-3) Therefore taking stock of what mankind has passed down is a good place to begin, 
and especially referring to the most experienced and wise, historically, even cross-culturaUy.
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The process of dialectic requires testing commonly held opinions against 
further experience, reflection, and counter-opinion so as to make connections 
between beliefs, phenomena, choice and action. The web of beliefs that 
results from this process constitutes man's knowledge. As suggested above, 
this begins by perceiving the 'common properties' of kinds of things (through 
both direct perception and acceptance of the opinions of others), to 
apprehending those features which explain and relate objects and thoughts to 
each other and one's own cognitive and emotional p ro c e s s e s .G e n e ra lly  
speaking, men come to grasp not merely the 'common properties' of things,^^^ 
but their "salient and relevant" (i.e., connecting) features through a natural 
process which begins by simply perceiving the world (given life in a political 
community) and establishing a store of memories given a rich pool of retained 
p e r c e p t i o n s .  107 Memories of perceptions give rise to experience -  that which
105 In the NE for example, Aristotle is setting out the reasons behind why we think certain 
behaviour is virtuous. He is, according to Bumyeat, explaining "how they fit into a scheme of 
the good life...[providing] an articulation of a mature scheme of values under the heading of 
the good" ("Aristotle on Learning to be Good" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty 
Berkeley: 1980, p.Sl). Bumyeat argues further that in ethics and politics the understanding 
embodied by this 'scheme' or web of beliefs "provides motivation for virtuous conduct" 
(ibid.).
1^  ^This corresponds to Bumyeat's interpretation of Aristotle's 'the that' ("Aristotle on 
Learning to be Good" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty Berkeley: 1980).
1^  ^Frede argues that the human access to essences does not come through a "mysterious 
quasi-mystical power" which somehow "intuits universals." Rather, human beings are 
naturally endowed with the capacity to "discriminate perceptively and remember." Human 
reason acts on these perceptions and memories (i.e., experiences) to find, not merely the shared 
qualities of like things, but "the salient universal in experiential truth." Given the extensive 
experience needed to forge an understanding of how beliefs and facts fit together, reason will 
enable men to "characterize reality quite generally." Frede maintains that coming to and 
understanding universals is the natural (even inevitable) result of living a human life (though 
it develops to a greater or lesser extent in different people given their natural capacities and 
circumstances). This means that through perceiving and remembering and the accumulation 
of rich experiences, together with reasoned reflection and induction, man can fit his 
experiences together into a system/scheme/web. Almost automatically (because of their 
biological/psychological make-up), men tend to induce general ideas from their experiences 
and make rudimentary connections about them. Rationality/reason is that capacity which 
allows men to develop and enlarge this dynamic 'web' of abstract and concrete by continuing 
to constructively and coherently test and use it, connecting more and more experiences and 
general ideas. Thus, Frede advocates something like a coherence theory of truth/justification 
in Aristotle, but one which avoids relativism by accepting certain 'empirical' facts about 
man's psychology (and the 'good' it prescribes) as well as a specific understanding of the 
function of human reason. Man's psychology naturally endows him with the potential to be
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forms the basis of practical, technical, and scientific knowledge. However, 
perception, memory, and experience (which are predominantly passive) 
cannot establish the kind of 'high level' definitions that fit into the larger, 
practical network of beliefs. Alone, they are insufficient to account for man's 
ability to articulate and derive definitions which explain the world in such a 
way that the categories he forms and connections he makes can be used 
effectively in deliberating about his own choices and actions. For Aristotle, it 
is through the active application of hum an rationality/reason to concrete 
experiences that men can come to know essences and articulate definitions 
which serve to explain and organize the world in which they carry out their 
lives.
Aristotle seems to have understood human beings to be biologically disposed 
to engage in this kind of thinking -  i.e., the kind of reasoned/rational thought 
which forms categories and then makes connections between things. 
Rational/reasonable thought happens naturally, is acquired as men live and 
act in the world.^^® That is, he suggests that men are naturally endowed with 
the capacity (and are even unconsciously and automatically inclined) to 
perceive the world -  the 'facts' or phenomena, remember them, reflect on
reasonable, and through life (given sufficient 'exposure', and time for attentive reflection), 
this reasoning ability can be actualised. In summary, Frede argues that Aristotle understood 
reason to be that naturally acquired disposition which is cultivated through living life (i.e., 
through perception, memory and experience) and which serves, given sufficient familiarity 
with a subject, to fit relevant experiences together in a coherent system that deepens and 
expands one's understanding of the world ("Aristotle's Rationalism" pp. 157-173 in 
Rationality in Greek Thought). For similar interpretations, see also McDowell "Eudaimonism 
and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics" in Aristotle and Moral Realism ed. Heinaman (London: 1995, 
pp.213-218); and Roche "On the Alleged Metaphysical Foundations" in Aristotle's Ethics, ed. 
Irwin (pp.65-76). From the perspective of understanding specifically ta kalon in terms of 
coherence, see Cooper, J. "Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value" in Rationality in Greek 
Thought (Oxford: 1996, esp. pp.102-13: "the specifically moral value then...is constituted by the 
order, fittingness and harmony of whatever possesses it"). In his discussion of virtues, 
Bostock too indicates a similar interpretation (Arsitotle's Ethics London: 1995, p.88). These 
interpretations of human nature, and specifically human reason/rationality supports my 
understanding of reason not only in Aristotle (examined further below), but also in 
Thucydides and Pindar as an acquired capacity (and thus needs a certain environment to be 
well developed) which can negotiate and harmonize our concrete experiences and abstract 
concepts so as to explain and organise the world.
See Coleman. History of Political Thought vol. 1 (Oxford: 2000, pp.131-2), also Nussbaum. 
The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp. 244-245).
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them, induce generalisations and draw connections between them. To 
continually and consciously use (and be open to adjusting) those connections 
throughout a human life is what it is to be reasonable. This 'web' of 
definitions forms no 'neutral' theory, it grows out of the inherently evaluative 
way human beings perceive, explain and use the world around them. 
Therefore, given the proper environment, men seem to be predisposed to 
grasp essences and articulate definitions which they can use (in both 
theoretical discourse and concrete actions) as they work to understand, 
explain, make choices about and take action in the world.
What effect then does this conception of dialectic and hum an reason have on 
ethical and political theory? We have seen that both Pindar and Thucydides 
presented men as creatures who live amidst contingencies, in circumstances 
which are often out of their control, nonetheless can act with a degree of 
autonomy in the world. Aristotle too premises his ethics on this observation 
of human life, and reminds his 'students' that "one must not demand more 
precision than a given subject allows."^^° In the case of men, beings who can 
make deliberate choices for a range of reasons to do one thing and not 
another, exacting precision is impossible -  there are simply too many possible 
variations a single hum an life can take. These variations multiply when one 
considers that Aristotle calls men "political animals" -  they live together in 
communities of other 'semi-autonomous choice makers' and therefore in an 
environment where any one action will necessarily proliferate into a myriad
Again, Frede argues that this is human rationality. And with him, I understand Aristotle's 
conception of human rationality to be the capacity (and in fact the natural predisposition) to 
classify objects into groups, to determine causal/explanatory connections between them 
given attention to the way they interact, and from this, to make generalisations about them 
which serve to illuminate how the world is and organise it where possible ("Aristotle's 
Rationalism" in Rationality in Greek Thought ed. Frede and Striker Oxford: 1996, pp. 157-173). 
This interpretation supports the understanding of reason I have endorsed in the preceding 
chapters on Pindar and Thucydides -  that is, as an ability to harmonize and negotiate abstract 
and concrete so as to allow man to act with a sense of 'reasonableness' in the world, rather 
than a substantive set of truths or a rule to be mechanically applied. However, in order for 
men to realise their natural potential for reason, they must live as men naturally should, i.e., 
in a structured, moral (i.e., evaluative) environment, specifically a political environment. This 
will be expanded upon below.
110 NE 1094bl2-15,1104al-5
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of outcomes which stretch far beyond even the most well thought out 
intentions.^^i
The intrinsic indeterminacy of human life does not, for Aristotle, discount the 
fact that there is a theoretical "best' for man -  man is by nature a certain kind 
of thing which means that he has a particular way to be best actualised. 
However, it does lead him to concede that this abstract "best" is very hard to 
actually hit upon consistently over a life time, and it takes continuous effort. 
Dialectic is the mode by which this process of evolving understanding 
proceeds. The hum an good is gradually understood through dialectic and it 
is actualised in a life of reaching for and manifesting this ideal as best one can 
in the circumstances: ""we can do fine actions even if we do not rule the earth 
and sea.""ii2 Yet given the average hum an life, there can be no guarantees -  
men are not gods, despite the fact they have some rather divine capacities. As 
this is the case, all hum an action is inherently a risk for men, even actualising 
the reason natural to them cannot provide absolute certainty about their 
world. The "margin of error" generated when dealing with the probabilities 
and not necessities leads Aristotle to recognize the hum an need to be 
compassionate towards themselves and others, to forgive small deviations 
from the right path when they occur (NE 1109b20). Man must therefore live 
reasonably and compassionately, acknowledging that the process of acquiring
Aristotle regularly emphasizes the vast range of 'particulars' in men's lives and the 
impossibility of systematically classifying them aU (e.g., NE 1109a24-30,1110b7, Rhet. 
1355bl0-14). Recall too that the unpredictability of human action because of the uniqueness 
of each life was an important element of Arendt's ethics as well {The Human Condition repr., 
Chicago: 1998, p.l90).
NE 1179al-5. Davis argues that human beings are in a peculiar position of being 
inherently "imperfect" in that to actualise the best of their nature, they would have to "jump 
classes" and become gods. {The Politics of Philosophy Lanham, MD: 1996, pp.21-22). As 
Aristotle calls mind/ intelligence {nous) immortal {athanaton) at DA 430a23 and in the NE 
refers to mind /understanding {nous) as that which is best {aristo) most akin {sungevestato) to 
the gods, I would still argue that to conceive of human beings as Davis does is to miss the fact 
that Aristotle classifies them as beings who have a particular nature which can itself be 
perfected (see NE 1103a25-26, Irwin's translation). It is a human perfection, which is to say 
different from that of the gods and so cannot be compared to a divine' standard. There is an 
extensive scholarly debate about the role and status oi nous in Aristotle, but even without 
taking sides, one can surely posit that he saw men as being different from though capable of 
knowing about divine (necessary and invariable) things.
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knowledge involves acting with incomplete knowledge -  one cannot sit down 
and leam  everything and then enter the world fully prepared to act 
perfectly.113 The use of human reason and dialectic greatly reduces (though 
never entirely eradicates) the possibility of error/failure (and its 
accompanying shame and humiliation). Even the most 'finely timed' man 
cannot generate substantive knowledge of a fixed and invariable set of ethical 
truths which, if applied systematically, result in sure consequences. Rather, in 
developing a broad web of knowledge, man must be creative in his actions -  
he must reflect upon what others have said and done and then himself build 
on what his experience and has shown. This allows him to be deliberate, to 
understand (and, if necessary, articulate to others) why he chooses as he does. 
This understanding gives both himself and the world he acts in a sense of 
unity and coherence which is strong enough to encourage deliberate 
(reasoned) and creative action in light of a general sense of what is good for 
hum an beings which endures (or rather, itself incorporates) the inevitability 
of risk and error.
For Aristotle then, human reason in ethical and political matters manifests 
itself in a particular kind of character who accepts opinions and then 
dialectically tests them so as to form a web of belief and practice, through 
which he can act deliberately (with reasons) and creatively with a sense of 
compassion. Such a character develops and is sustained by operating in a 
world of constant fluctuation and change. No hum an attribute (even the 
quasi-divine reason/rationality) can alter the nature of the cosmos or m an's 
place in it, but with proper 'training' man can activate the potentials he is 
naturally endowed with to better contend with the 'piece' of the world he
"...you need also to be guided in your conduct so that by doing the things you are told are 
noble and just you wiU discover that what you have been told is true." (Bumyeat, M. 
"Aristotle on Learning to be Good" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty Berkeley: 1980, 
p.74). Such truth, however, comes only in poleis with good practitioners and good laws that 
suit men's potentials for actualisation.
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inhabits.i^'* Human reason (especially as it relates to ethics and politics) is not 
omniscient, but: "like the eyes of bats in the blaze of day", it cannot see clearly 
all that really is, rather it corresponds to a sense of 'reasonableness' which 
entails a general moral framework and a sense of how to harmonise this w ith 
the concrete and particular circumstances one confronts in life {Metaph 993b8- 
10). It is a kind of good sense embodied in an organised and structured 
perception of the world especially of other moral agents in relation to oneself, 
honed through dialectic and the ability and sensitivity needed for reasonable 
creative action.
But how does man's natural faculty of reason, his ability to harmonize 
abstract thought and concrete experience together, result in the ability to 
discern the proper action to take in a given situation? What does dialectic, the 
discerning tool in the domain of ethics and politics, where hum an beings lack 
necessary principles, but are still held responsible for their choices and 
actions look like in action? How can it be sensitive to the fluctuation and 
variability inherent in the particular situations which make up hum an life, 
and be simultaneously authoritative and stable? In making decisions and 
acting, men must leam to draw on the evolving web of beliefs, composed of 
probabilities and likelihood's (true opinions and not necessary truths) as 
"banisters" for judgement, choice and action.
As fruitful dialectic works to find a balance (and not negate one of two) 
between opposing claims, it requires that men be able to argue both sides of a 
question. No contested proposition will be accepted without honest 
reflection on and attention given to its alternative: "we must not only state the 
true view, but also explain the false, since an explanation of that promotes
It is futile, Aristotle says, to try to change what is natural -  nothing can make a dropped 
stone float up or a fire bum downwards {NE 1103a20). Nature can be contrasted to the laws 
of men in that it has "the same validity everywhere alike" whereas laws change from polis to 
polis {NE 1134bl9-21).
Topics lOSbl. Evans notes the importance of analysing contrary views in Aristotle's EE 
1245bl3-18 (quoted in Ansfot/e's Concept of Dialectic Cambridge: 1977, p.55).
203
confidence/'(NE 1154a23). So, a dialectical inquiry begins with tentatively 
positing those opinions men currently have weighed against other factors 
(views of the wise, and perhaps a broader scope of relevant data) to find a 
temporary harmony and stability. Ethical dialectic is not demonstration, or 
'pure logic'; it must be attentive to the actual human limitations specific to its 
audience (the shortcomings of their current beliefs) as well as to their 
particular circumstances, which are open to variation and therefore are not 
necessary or unchanging. Ultimately the understanding that dialectic 
develops should cultivate virtuous characters motivated to act nobly.
Dialectic in ethics and politics proceeds from human perception of the world and 
the actions that follow from this perception (and thus the world qualified by the 
filter of human faculties and indeed those values which position our 
perspectives). Dialectic in ethics and politics is not about the world itself 
(which is the concern of pure/scientific episteme).^ '^  ^ However while dialectic 
is different from these 'higher' studies, it must be distinguished also from 
sophistry in that whüe its activity "does not reflect an analysis [of Being qua 
being]" it begins from a plausible opinion of what being is (and not whatever 
opinion might be more persuasive at the moment). It is the distinction 
between dialectic and sophistry which highlights the fact that not anyone can 
take on the task of ethical dialectic. The student conditioned to engage 
successfully in this kind of reasoning has been habituated in the right 
environment and thus focused in the right direction. He is aware of, and 
actually already loves the noble and good, but does not understand why this 
is the case. He has acquired this correct orientation by living in a polis 
structured by the right laws and thus according to what people of the best 
sort around him commonly believe. Thus, Bumyeat claims that the starting 
point of the study of ethics is an (uncritical) awareness and love of "the
"understanding...will itself provide new and more reflective motivation for virtuous 
conduct" Bumyeat, M. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good" in Essays on A's Ethics, ed. Rorty 
(Berkeley: 1980, p. 81).
11^  Evans, J.D.G. Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge: 1977, p.6).
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'th a t'/'11® Habituated experience through engagement in the practices of a 
particular community and becoming aware of the values inculcated therein is 
a legitimate, indeed the only 'starting point' for ethical discourse and hence, it 
matters most to be in a community where best practitioners set the standards
for habituation/19
Chapter 6: Politics: The Role of Law in the Cultivation of Man
In w hat follows I will examine the polis and its role in cultivating m an's ability 
to flourish, where 'flourishing' is understood to consist in a life of virtuous -  
that is, reasonable and creative -  activity. Specifically, I will look at the law 
and its role in the development of practical wisdom -  phronesis. As discussed 
above, phronesis is constituted by a coherent yet evolving system of thought 
and action oriented around an accurate conception of what man naturally is, 
and therefore, his ultimate good. The possessor of phronesis, the phronimos, 
m ust be ethically virtuous -  that is, because of proper habituation, he m ust 
consistently do what is fine/noble for man given the indeterminate situations 
he finds himself in because he in fact loves the (abstract) hum an good. The 
habituation that cultivates ethical virtue (a precondition for phronesis) comes 
only through living in a polis, which is to say, through actively participating in 
the practices its laws direct. Because of the guidance provided by law, 
citizens (should) not only come to know 'rationally' what a good hum an life 
consists in, but they should develop the right desires and motives (i.e., those 
directed at 'living well'): "what is in question is the need for authoritative 
structures and motives as a means to forming moral virtues, to eliciting those 
elements of character that can make life d e s i r a b l e . " i 20
Bumyeat, M. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good" in Essays on A's Ethics, ed. Rorty 
(Berkeley: 1980, p.71),
^^ 9 Of course, it is not the only way to begin an analysis. Aristotle lists: "induction, 
perception and others still." It is however the originating point which is proper to ethics (NE 
1098a32-b4).
2^0 Salkever. Finding the Mean (Princeton: 1990, p.ll8). Emotion/appetite and reason must act 
together in man's deliberate choice (prohairesis), which Aristotle claims is "thought combined 
with desire or desire combined with thought" (NE 1139b5). Habituation through law affects 
both. That is, the right motive/desire, i.e., acting out of a love of what is fine/noble, is
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The law is then essential for man's moral development. Only it can cultivate a 
virtuous disposition, where (roughly speaking) m an's reason knows the 
abstract human good and his appetite and desires long for it.^ i^ Knowing 
what virtue consists in is thus secured by an enduring orientation towards 
and desire for the good (as defined by the polis). The laws of any polis define 
and endorse a general idea of what living well is, and aim to instil a love for 
this kind of life in its citizens through the education it prescribes and the 
habits it develops. Ideally, men then leam to apply this abstract 
understanding of 'living well' equitably to the concrete details of their own 
lives (that is, given a general sense of the proper hum an end, they leam to 
determine the means to it in specific, contingent situations). As such, the laws 
of a polis do not offer the same kind of certainty as those of episteme (or, to take 
two m odem  examples, Kant's categorical imperative or the utilitarian 
principle). Rather, it serves to "urge people towards virtue and exhort them 
to do what is fine" {NE 1180a6-8), but does not provide explicit steps for 
applying this general understanding.^^
acquired by first being compelled by the laws (fear of punishment), and subsequently 
developing the personal desire to act as they direct.
The need for more than reason in the form of good arguments based on/employing 
abstract ideals is apparent in Thucydides' account of Pericles' famous funeral oration: "the 
greatest gift to the city is not in public speeches, but in daily beholding her power in action, in 
being like lovers to her" (2.43, my italics). A love for the polis, its constitution and those values 
it upholds, is vital to a flourishing city. Both feelings/passions and reason must be 
integrated, directed towards a common end. For Aristotle, this comes through law.
This is not to imply that the law is a gentle much less passive force, simply indicating the 
good and hoping that the people will accept it. The law, Aristotle claims, "has the power to 
compel" {NE 1180a22). This compulsion comes through a system of reward and punishment; 
through sanctions, penalties, corrective treatments on the one hand, and through the praise 
and respect of one's peers on the other. The desire for praise and the fear of blame seemed to 
be for Aristotle a (if not, the) primary motivation for good behaviour'. Though perhaps 
initially painful, once accustomed, i.e., once habituated, the ideals inherent in the law and the 
practices which fall out of them will become 'natural' to citizens. Their characters, 
indeterminate at birth, will be formed by the polis. This can be seen in direct opposition to the 
modem liberalist view in which the state should have no say in the moral development of the 
citizens. Morality is inherently private for each citizen to decide him/herself. With this, 
'public value', because necessarily 'neutral', comes to be defined numerically and materially, 
the good = more stuff.
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The abstract good of the polis is manifested most perfectly in the actions of the 
phronimoi, men whose ability to deliberate well and act appropriately in 
particular circumstances itself depends on internalising the law through 
reward participation in the practices and education provided by the polis.^^ 
Because these circumstances are contingent and unique, determining the 
proper means to the law ful' end is not mechanical. It demands more than 
rule following or rigid application of the law -  that is, it calls for responsive 
attention to the specific details of the circumstances, and the capacity to see 
precisely how they fit into the polis' more general conception of the good. 
Finding the right particular means to this common end thus entails 
c r e a t i v i t y Developing the capacity to be creative (in this limited sense) is 
aided through engagement with poetry. As such, an analysis of Aristotle's 
Poetics will follow the discussion of law below.
The Law and Reason
"Culture serves the mind by imposing a collectively 
shared cognitive order upon the world, which, 
objectively, is totally heterogeneous and presents an 
endless array of singular things. Culture achieves 
order by carving out, through discrimination and 
classification distinct areas of homogeneity within the
overall heterogeneity."^ 25
This internalisation presupposes experience which yields the capacity to use justly the 
general principles in the concrete world he inhabits. The Aristotelian phronimos is an 
abstraction of a particular kind of man -  like Pindar's victorious athlete and the exceptional 
leader of Thucydides, he exists between beast and god, but is himself inescapably situated 
(limited by the experiences his city affords him), and thus is, in a sense, a more humble being 
than the one portrayed by the two earlier authors.
In "The Philosopher vs. The Citizen" (Political Theory vol. 4 (1998) esp. pp.147-56) VUla 
argues persuasively that Arendt understood the acceptance of fixed principles and rules (and 
the kind of "mechanical thought" which grows out of them) to lead to totalitarianism. The 
need to cultivate "independent judgment" and "deepened moral integrity" through active 
thought and continuing questioning was thus, for Arendt, imperative. I am very much 
influenced by, indebted to, and in accord with this premise, though the extent to which 
Aristotle would encourage such critique, much less "independent judgement" is undoubtedly 
slim (especially anything resembling a modem, liberal's understanding of this).
Kopytoff, I. "The Cultural Biography of Things" in The Social Life of Things ed. A. 
Appadurai (Cambridge: 1986, p.70).
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Kopy toff's "culture" performs a function similar to the Aristotelian polis, 
though the structure imposed by the polis does not aim only to make things 
ordered and thus, comprehensible, but has a definitive role to play in moral 
development -  it cannot be 'neutral'. The laws of a(ny) polis presuppose a 
particular conception of the human good, and aim to instil and actualise it in 
its c i t i z e n s .^26 positing such a good, the law provides a stable and 
enduring framework that is essential for the cultivation of reasonable thought 
and deliberate action. By being raised according to the laws of a polis, citizens 
are gradually 'evaluatively oriented' -  they come to understand a particular 
conception of living well, and their appetites are 'trained' through repeated 
practice to desire this view of the good life.i27 in light of this general notion, 
they can, over time leam to connect coherently and integrate smoothly their 
conduct and beliefs, revealing (and actually creating) a sense of unity in both 
their own identity and the world external to them. Man, Aristotle claims, 
needs to leam to "connect together propositions in an orderly way" (NE 
1147a22) in order to understand and effectively (deliberately and with reason) 
realise 'the good life'. The law provides him with the means he needs to 
establish this order.
7^6 Many modem, pluralistic democracies claim to be 'neutral' in terms of an overarching, 
substantive good, suggesting instead that society is better organised when all citizens are 
granted some basic rights aimed at guaranteeing their freedom to choose and realise their 
own conception of the good life. This, however, is a false freedom. Stated neutrality in 
politics does not destroy the fact that every political organisation aims at a good (for it is this 
good, no matter how 'thin', that forms the basis for the organisation in the first place). Failure 
to make this good explicit leads to 'default' goods guiding (and often distorting) policy 
decisions. Furthermore, granting rights in a society which claims to be neutral in terms of 
'the good' is powerless to ensure that the duties which complement those rights and actually 
allow them to be exercised, be performed (For further discussion, see O'Neill, Onora. Reith 
Lectures, no. 2,2002: BBC Radio 4).
This is a long process, indeed, Aristotle says the need to live according to laws lasts a 
lifetime (NE llSOalff.). Only given this kind of ongoing 'political'/law guided experience can 
men's appetite and reason come together such that knowing results in action. Without this 
'comprehensive' kind of knowing (i.e., knowing which embraces both desire and reason and 
thus results in using the knowledge NE 1146b33-35), men can perhaps "string [the right] 
words together," but will not consistently act well (NE 1147a20). This is the root of one of 
Aristotle's critiques of Phaleas' regime, which aimed to redistribute material wealth on 
egalitarian principles. Merely equalising the goods amongst the citizens is parallel to 
knowing words but lacking the desires necessary to realise them. "Desires," Aristotle says, 
"need levelling more than possessions, and that is not possible without an adequate 
education under the laws" (Po/.1266b28-31).
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Contrary to (much modem) intuition then, Aristotle did not take the 'good' 
endorsed by a particular polis to be a constraint on hum an freedom but in fact 
saw it as a necessary condition of exercising it .128 Living in a 'value-laden' 
political community, being (morally) educated under its terms and 
participating in those practices it deems worthy, is precisely that which gives 
man those (stable, yet flexible) points of reference beyond his own (impulsive 
and often illogical) personal wishes and desires. A flourishing political life is 
a necessary condition for the development of virtue: "the law," Aristotle 
claims, "instructs us to express each virtue and forbids us to instruct each 
vice" (NE 1130b24-25).i29 xLe structure imposed by the laws, grounded in the 
values they endorse, and manifested in particular customs and practices, 
guide human 'appetite' and subsequent behaviour in such a way that patterns 
appear, causal connections emerge (probabilities which can be generalised) 
into which men's actions and the reasons behind those actions can fit -  to be 
investigated, accepted or critiqued. Public/external, commonly held values 
develop the (ever-expanding) 'web' of belief and practice that man needs to 
articulate the reasons behind his own desires and actions, as well as to 
understand those of others.^^^ This broader, public 'viewpoint' (and the
This depends on one accepting the premise that freedom to pursue one's spontaneous and 
erratic desires cannot yield a unified sense of self necessary for deliberate agency and thus 
does not constitute human freedom.
Here virtuous activity and "flourishing" imply at least some level of inter-polis peace -  
i.e., not the militaristic 'flourishing' of Sparta Pol.1334a22ff.), nor even the 'flourishing' of 
Periclean Athens which placed such great weight on courage and empire. Aristotle is clear 
that political life should prepare men for leisure (schole) above work and war: "while there is 
need to be capable of engaging in occupation and going to war, there is more need to be 
capable of living in peace and being at leisure." The former activities are useful, the latter, 
noble (Po/.1333a42ff; 1337b31-1338a24). Salkever argues that both Plato and Aristotle 
attempted to counter the potential of the polls to have an "excessive commitment to...love of 
victory and rule" {Finding the Mean, Princeton: 1990, p.l91). There is a sense in which modem  
"democratic" societies which revolve around free market economies are analogous to war -  a 
constant competition, but which have no definitive end, only an ongoing attempt for 'more'. 
130 Davis argues that to live according to laws provides, paradoxically, the 'sovereignty' 
necessary to exercise human freedom: "Freedom to do what one wishes, and do so self­
consciously, requires that one articulate the idiosyncratic principles according to which one 
lives, but this means ordering one's life according to certain principles" (The Politics of 
Philosophy Lanham, MD: 1996, p.l03). Though I would argue about Davis' use of 
"idiosyncratic principles" (which, as private, would seem to provide little support), I too
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capacity it cultivates to see and communicate reasons for acting/thinking one 
way and not another) is a precondition for the development of ethical virtue 
and the exercise of practical r e a s o n . ^ ^ i  And almost paradoxically, the 
structure imposed by law is precisely that which equips men with the tools 
they need to critique the laws and the conception of the good that shapes 
them -  to be a reasonable and deliberate actor, man needs external values to 
build on and react to.^32 Men can only develop an abstract sense of what man 
is and what is good for him as a kind of thing by living, as humans naturally 
do, amongst other men in a political c o m m u n i t y .  ^ ^3
Just as there is a definition of man for Aristotle, so too is there is a definition 
of the polis. In its most basic terms, the polis is a "naturally' occurring 
community of people united by the shared goal of "living well."^34 Por
maintain that without some structure to their beliefs, men jeopardise their freedom, for 
random, unreflected beliefs are more vulnerable to external forces/chance as there is no 
defence when they are challenged.
The capacity to grasp a common property is one of the things that separates man from 
beast -  men can understand (and use!) 'universal' (kathalou) concepts, whereas lower animals 
have only "appearance and memory" {NE 1147b5). Because the polis revolves around a range 
of activities and institutions which aim at the good life generally for all citizens (i.e., "not at 
some advantage close at hand, but at advantage for the whole life" {NE 1160a22-25) -  law 
courts, public education, festivals, centres of commerce -  man can see his actions as an 
important contribution to, though only a part of, a much larger whole, each part contributing 
in a different way to the realisation of a common conception of the good life (see Sherman, N. 
Fabric of Character Oxford: 1989, p.l33).
That the law educates man so that he can, in a sense, transcend it is apparent from 
Aristotle's comment that the law, "having educated rulers for such eventualities [situations 
that the law does not seem to cover adequately], hands over to them, to be managed and 
decided by their most just opinion, the things it leaves out. It allows them further to set 
things right wherever, as the result of experience, they deem something else to be better than the 
existing laws" {Pol. 1287a23ff., my italics).
133 Over time (and with the privilege of some leisure for reflection), the guided experience a 
'legal framework' supplies will cultivate practical reason, phronesis, which, as discussed above 
involves a 'general' abstract conception of what a good human life looks like which is 
balanced with a responsiveness to the particular situation at hand. The laws of the polis 
provide the conditions necessary for the development of phronesis, because they offer a 'stage' 
in which men can act where rules and practices reveal and in fact, create patterns of human 
behaviour. Perception of such patterns is the basis for abstract thought -  an element 
fundamental to phronesis which can be used in understanding and making choices in the 
concrete situations which compose one's own life. The laws of the polis illuminate man's 
sphere of responsibility, thereby increasing his autonomy and accountability. For further 
discussion, see Vemant, J-P. Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 1988, pp. 45-48).
Pol. 1252b31. However, with Yack {The Problems of a Political Animal Berkeley: 1993, pp. 88- 
108) and Coleman ("Neither the Ethics nor the Politics is a biological treatise. The polis is not
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Aristotle, there is a 'best' polis (structured by the best 
regim e/law s/constitution -  politeia): "one system [of government] is by 
nature the best e v e r y w h e r e .  " ^ 3 5  xhe laws of the best polis are best because 
they are established and designed according to what man by nature is, 
seeking to provide those conditions necessary for the exercise of his proper 
function (ergon) -  encouraging him (sometimes through coercion and force) to 
perform "activities of the soul in accordance with complete virtue." Through 
laws (and the ensuing practices, habits, and customs) a polis should strive to 
cultivate all the potential virtues/excellences (aretai) in the hum an soul 
(citizens should be "fully stretched'^36) which means securing the environment 
necessary for utilising those capacities which are peculiarly hum an and 
motivating men to do so. The two entities -  man and polis -  therefore share a 
distinct and interdependent relationship in Aristotelian thought: the polis 
derives its proper structure from man's essential nature, but men can realise
an organic body, but like one" History of Political Thought vol. I Oxford: 2000, p. 193), I believe 
it is important to regard the polis as 'natural' in a way that is different, not so purely 
'biological/organic' than that of human beings, and even further still from the 'natural-ness' 
of plants: "The Aristotelian polis takes its natural character...from human attributes and ends, 
not from some inherent potentiality for a completed and perfected form of its own" (Yack The 
Problems of a Political Animal Berkeley: 1993, p.90). The "natural-ness" of the Aristotelian polis 
has led to some debate amongst scholars: Davis for instance, argues that Aristotle's ethical 
and political texts imply a belief that men and their poleis are most often (perhaps even 
always) flawed, which directly opposes his understanding of nature generally. He argues 
further, and wrongly I believe, that a perfect man would be a god {The Politics of Philosophy 
Lanham, MD: 1996). For Aristotle, men can be "godlike" in being blessed/happy, and in this 
be worthy of congratulations rather than praise {NE llOlblOff..) But they are essentially 
different than gods: their lives are embodied by deliberation, choice, actions, friendship, etc.- 
all things which Aristotle claims are foreign to divinity and which make the human end 
distinct from the divine one {NE 1178b7ff.). Yack addresses the tension created when one 
questions how consistently imperfect poleis can be said to be natural, and thus something 
which, according to Aristotle's understanding of nature, should come about 'always or for the 
most part' (P/zys.l97a32). He resolves this apparent contradiction by saying that the polis, 
though natural, is not a "natural whole" for it lacks its own "internal principle of motion." 
Building on a distinction from the Physics (192b30-6), Yack claims that an Aristotelian polis 
does not have a nature, but exists by/according to nature The polis comes about because of what 
men are, through the habits of men, because someone, at some point chose to "put one 
together" and many continued to perpetuate it. Furthermore, he claims that the polis exists 
not for itself, but for the sake of securing the good life for men and, so long as it secures such 
a Ufe for some of its citizens. Yack argues that it is performing its natural function. Because a 
polis is not a "natural whole" with an "internal principle of motion," nor an end for itself, it 
cannot be required to fulfil Aristotle's criteria for a natural' entity {The Problems of a Political 
Animal Berkeley, 1993, esp. pp.88ff.).
135 JVE Ii35a5. See also, Pol 1269a3ff., 1282b7; Rhet. 1368b8-10,1373b5-9.
136 This is a term I borrow from Coleman who used it in a seminar on Aristotle at the LSE.
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their proper natures (and in fact, can come to access and understand this 
nature) only through active life in a polis. In other words, a polis should grow 
out of an accurate understanding of what man abstractly is, yet coming to 
understand this, much less actualising this latent hum an potential itself 
depends on participating in polis life, and paying attention to others living in 
concrete, particular poleis.
Despite Aristotle's claim that there is a best polis, observation reveals that 
existing poleis are based on a diverse range of ideas of what the good life for 
man is and have been structured accordingly -  are they, for example, ruled by 
laws, by rich men, by men who are almost gods, by labourers or s o l d i e r s ? ^ ^ ?  
Clearly, some political communities will be closer to the 'tru th ' than others, 
i.e., some will have laws which grow out of an accurate understanding of 
what man is, and will aim to realise his distinctly hum an potential for 
virtuous activity. Others however, will misidentify the hum an good to a 
greater or lesser extent (thinking it, for instance, a life of physical pleasure, or, 
like the Spartans, courage and strength in war, or perhaps a life aimed solely 
at individual gain). Is there any hope for citizens of a misguided polis? If, for 
Aristotle, it is of "supreme importance" where man is raised because the 
desires he has and the abstract ideas he comes to grasp about the proper ends 
for a human life are derived from his concrete experiences of living life 
amongst other men, the customs and practices into which he is acculturated, 
how can a man brought up in a less-than-perfect polis come to be ethically 
virtuous, much less, a phronimos?
In Politics III, Aristotle discusses three 'ideal' regime types: monarchy, aristocracy, and 
polity; and three derivatives from them: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The derivatives 
are "deviant" because in no case do they rule, whether by one, few, or many, with a view to the 
common good. This is what distinguishes the ideal types: "all regimes that look to the common 
advantage turn out, according to what is simply just, to be correct ones, while those that look 
only to the advantage of the rulers are mistaken and are all deviations from the correct 
regimes" (Pol 1279al7ff.). In both ideal and deviant regimes, the citizen is most simply 
defined as one "having a share in judgement and rule or office" (Po/.1257a22ff.).
212
We have seen that Aristotle believes that man is responsible for his 
character.138 in this is the implicit belief that while undoubtedly very difficult, 
it is not altogether impossible to "transcend' a bad upbringing. The capacities 
developed by Hving in a community structured by laws which provide 
(public/external) reasons for doing one thing and not another can provide 
men with the basic tools necessary to act and communicate productively and 
effectively with others. Laws provide citizens with a common and accessible 
standard/goal which serves to structure thought, judgement, communication, 
and debate. Even less than perfect communities neither prevent abstract 
thought nor fail to "train' desires to follow reason (and not personal 
preference) -  they simply do not cultivate the best thoughts or d e s i r e s . ^ ^ 9  B u t  
being raised to act according to laws, even if they are not the "best' ones, 
performs an essential task in man's intellectual development: it teaches 
citizens what it is to act in light of and with others towards a common good, 
and provides them with explicit, articulatable reasons which can be 
communicated to and understood by other citizens.
Aristotle's Politics reveals his conviction that a flourishing polis requires a 
secure identity in order to ensure the stability and continuity necessary to 
cultivate hum an virtue: "Whatever is lawful is in some sense just" (NE 
1129b l3).^4o Part of this can be explained by the fact that to become virtuous.
1 3 8  Though the capacity for deliberate choice (the basis for happiness) does depend on some 
external goods, it does not demand "supreme power" -  that is, it is available to most men {NE 
1176bl7-19).
Exposure to better' communities either directly or through for instance, literature, history, 
even sophistic debates, might serve to re-orient an individual towards a good not endorsed by 
his particular community (for Aristotle, this 'exposure' is limited to better/worse Greek poleis, 
and most surely not a random, inclusive selection of any contemporary states, most of which 
he would deem unworthy of analysis, much less emulation). Again, this is extremely rare 
and enormously difficult, but possible if one has been given a framework from which he 
leams how to judge and critique. Generally speaking, it is the specific laws of a polis that 
generate such a framework. Therefore, simply living in any polis seems to be insufficient to 
reveal what is truly the best life for man. But the laws' ability to reveal consistency and 
structure amidst the indeterminacy of human life perhaps develops in citizens the 'tools' they 
need to reason morally, to argue, debate, and discuss what is or is not just.
^^ (^ This stability however, cannot come from any source, as, for instance, the arbitrary, might- 
based rule of a tyrannical regime At Pol. 1285b33ff., Aristotle reviews the reasons why total
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man needs leisure (scholia) , a n d  leisure is possible only given a certain level 
of stability. The law provides this. Furthermore, an enduring political 
structure demands establishing laws that have an existence and force apart 
from the men who both create and are guided by them.^^z While men tend to 
feel resentful if they feel another person is inhibiting their choices, Aristotle 
claims that this is not the case with law. The law, unlike hum an beings, is 
impersonal and as such, it can compel without being oppressive (NE 1180a23- 
25). It is "reasoned speech (logos) that proceeds from prudence (phronesis) and 
intellect (nous) of some sort" (NE 1180a22). As individual men are inclined to 
be motivated by passion rather than reason in their lives, the time-tested, 
abstract laws of the polis provide guidance and a sense of permanence given 
the contingency and uncertainty inherent in the concrete world.^^3 xhe
kingship is not properly termed a political community. A kingship is similar (though not 
identical) to a household {oikos) but on a bigger scale in the sense that the father, like the king, 
does not share his rule. However, unlike the king, the father will keep the good of the entire 
oikos in mind and further, will have the 'external' values of the poUs as constraints on his 
decisions. A community of people ruled by a single, all-powerful man, while stable in the 
sense that dissent can be immediately silenced, runs the risk of losing those qualities which 
are unique to a polis: there can be no deliberative choice, no reasoned discourse among equals 
— brute force is the ultimate arbiter and benefit for the ruler is the primary goal of the 
community. All decisions are simply up to the king, whether it be reason or emotion guiding 
them -  no outside force can regularly check nor even inform his whims. A ruler can judge 
nobly only "when educated by the laws" (Po/.1287b26-7). In response to the argument that an 
individual is better equipped than general law to tackle particular problems, Aristotle 
maintains that a resolution of any concrete political dilemma demands a "reasoned" 
understanding of "the universal" {ton logon ton kathalou). Therefore, in either case one needs 
both general and particular, and with a single person in charge, a polis runs a greater risk of 
corruption by overblown, 'untamed' passion/emotion/appetite. Even when discussing 
decency and justice at NE 1137al0ff., specifically those situations when the law needs to be 
'fitted' by decree {psephismatos) to a particular case, Aristotle maintains that the fault is not 
with the law per se, but "the nature of the object itself." Some exceptional matters make it 
impossible to legislate by general law, but even those demand a framework from which one 
can deviate. For further discussion on Aristotle's understanding of "decrees ", see Salkever 
{Finding the Mean Princeton: 1990, pp. 136ff.).
141 is agreed that a polis that is going to be nobly governed must have leisure from doing 
necessary things" (Po/.1269a34) and later, "there is need of leisure both for the generation of 
virtue and for political activity" (PoZ.1328b38). To assume, like the Spartans, that virtue 
comes only in war, is misguided (Po/.1334a40ff.).
^^Laws, though the primary stabilizing force in a polis, come from human beings and thus 
can change. See for example, Pol. 1287a24 for ways in which law is trumped by experience, 
also in his example of doctors in Egypt who could change their treatment if an illness ceases 
to subside (1286al3-15).
143 Thucydides also recognised the need for stability and continuity as conditions for life 
which included more that mere material survival (1.2-7).
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continuity provided by law frames the varied communication and interaction 
within the polis and is essential for the development of virtue and the exercise 
of practical reason in concrete circumstances.^^ Therefore, while laws are the 
artefacts of men, for Aristotle, they are also natural to (and indeed essential for 
actualising) human life.^ '^  ^ Men without laws cannot be fully hum an for an 
unlawful (apolitical) life is reduced to the attempt to merely survive, rather 
than to live well -  i.e., virtuously. As essentially "political animals," hum an 
beings must be c i t i z e n s .^ ^ e
If there is a right way for a polis to be structured, a 'best' set of laws (with its 
following system of education, adjudication, etc.) and if this can be accessed 
and understood by men, why does Aristotle spend so much time exarnining 
'alternative' and imperfect regimes in the Politics? Why not merely set out the 
ideal for less-than-perfect cities to try to emulate? What can this approach tell 
us about Aristotle's understanding of abstract law and the cultivation of 
reason? Aristotle is clear that even if a regime is not absolutely just, all poleis 
succeed at some level if they set out laws to which the citizens are 
acculturated and subordinate.^'*^ This, I believe, should not be taken to imply 
that Aristotle is a relativist. As in his other works, the Politics begins with 
w hat actually is (in this case, many diverse and imperfect poleis). From the 
particulars, he 'extracts' a general understanding, and does not jump 
(arbitrarily) to a detached ideal of what should be. However, I believe that 
Aristotle's investigation of 'deviant' poleis implies something even more 
important: his approach suggests a conviction that all hum an beings require 
engagement with particular moral 'content' (i.e., with other men and their
144 Though individual care (e.g., in health, or education, etc.) is undoubtedly preferred, 
Aristotle is clear that doing what is right for the particular individual requires knowledge of 
the general/common goals/ends -  the universal terms involved {NE 1180bl3ff.).
Nussbaum identifies the authority of the law in the fact that it is a "summary of wise 
decisions," While this in no way undermines its importance and legitimacy, it does indicate 
the limitations of law in dealing with new situations ("The Discernment of Perception" in 
Aristotle's Ethics ed. Sherman Lanham, MD: 1999, p.l59).
146 P ol 1253al-18,1278bl7
147 P ol 1282bl0, Po/.1337all
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cultural values, historical traditions, enduring habits, and ongoing practices) 
in order to "activate' their critical c a p a c i t i e s .  ^ ^8
Thus the logic behind the Politics becomes more apparent -  the capacity to 
critique, analyse, and evaluate soundly one's way of life comes from an 
examination of a variety of different existing regimes, each with their own 
specific cultural standards and practices. But any critical analysis must begin 
by first living and actively participating in a particular social milieu oneself -  we 
must start from where and what "we are."i^^ Over time, an engaged and 
responsive life shared with others can show men how reasoned speech 
reveals common goals and ends, and provides the means to express explicit 
reasons to act for and towards this shared end, rather than simply pursuing 
personal /  private goals. In living with others, men must compromise, but in 
doing so, they leam  to see beyond immediate survival to a long-term sense of 
"a complete and self-sufficient life which, we say, is living happy and nobly" 
(Pol. 1281 al-3). Aristotle's polis, in direct contrast to the m odem  liberal one, 
unapologetically promotes a substantive sense of what is good -  law is moral. 
Men must leam to negotiate, listen, observe, and act together not only for 
"exchange and mutual utility...but about what each other's character should 
be" (Po/.1280a34ff.). By doing so, they move from a myopic concem for their 
own private preferences to a commonly shared understanding of the human 
good from w hich/into which their personal needs/w ants grow/fit.^^o xhis
These capacities, though general and without definitive content, cannot be developed in a 
neutral space. The human capacity to be (somewhat) impartial/neutral is the result of being 
first engaged with specific (i.e., partial) ideals and values: "Rules and general procedures can 
be aids in moral development, since people who do not yet have practical wisdom need to 
follow rules that summarize the wise judgments of others" (Nussbaum "The Discernment of 
Perception" in Aristotle's Ethics ed. Sherman Lanham, MD: 1999 p.l63).
^^^Recall that to act deliberately for (abstract) reasons within a particular external web of 
other deliberating actors is an essential part of human life, and thus virtue must fit into this 
mould. By living and acting in a polis, men see abstract ideas/reasons actualised -  they can 
see the effects of their actions, both considered and unexpected on themselves and others. 
And perhaps most important, they leam how to communicate their reasons effectively. 
Seeing this, experiencing and participating in deliberation, choice, and action in the world 
first hand is the only way to get a substantive sense about what human virtue consists in.
150 Despite this importance of firmly establishing the common/shared good of the polis, 
Aristotle is quite aware that people will be most concerned with what is theirs -  this comes
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general sense of what living well is, and the shared attempt by citizens to 
realise it ensures a level of continuity and stability in men's lives, and 
provides a context that gives richer meaning to thought and action.
The laws of a poUs work to orient citizens (through a range of means, and over 
a lifetime) towards a common good, striving (though rarely, if ever, 
succeeding completely) to nurture a citizenship who freely choose to act in 
harmony with the aims of the particular polis -  whatever those aims may be. 
By being habituated to act according to law, men leam  to be reasonable, to 
organise their thoughts and particular actions in light of a general sense of 
living well. This habituation affects the whole of their psychology -  i.e., being 
raised under laws directs and cultivates not only their reason, but their 
emotions and appetites. Through an upbringing and education prescribed by 
law, people 'receive' an external 'impulse' (or, more bluntly stated, they are 
forced) to act as the polis deems right. Over time, they are habituated to the 
rules and practices of their society and with luck, are 'trained' in such a way 
that they desire what it deems good.
Initially this motivation (desire) is not natural, nor is it particularly 
comfortable for most c i t i z e n s . ^ ^ i  To be raised in a polis is a process by which 
an external impulse (provided in the oikos by the father and in the polis by the 
laws) is internalised, so that a genuine desire to do virtuous actions for 
themselves motivates such actions in the first place (rather than fear, or 
simply a passive/ignorant acceptance of rules): "What you may begin by
up in his critiques of the polis described in Plato's Republic: "people care most about what is 
their own...or only as much as it touches them" (Po/. 1261b32), see also in the NE. Therefore it 
is better, he says, "for possessions to be private, and to be made common in use" {Pol. 
1263a38-39). Respectful common use of private possessions depends on legislation which 
cultivates virtuous characters. Furthermore, being unified by a 'common good' does not 
eradicate political difference -  the polis for Aristotle: "a city is made up not only of many 
human beings but also of human beings who differ in kind" (Po/.1261a22ff.), presumably with 
different ways of manifesting 'living well'. Thus the common good is a general good which is 
shared by all members of the polis, yet not all realise it in a 'common' way. These differences 
lead to the need for reasonable creativity.
"Hence laws must prescribe [the youth's] upbringing and practices; for they will not find 
these things painful when they get used to them" {NE 1179b34-36).
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taking on trust, you can come to know for yourself."i52 life guided by laws, 
creates an environment where particular men are habituated to act on 
publicly recognised -  common -  values and principles. Communication 
about how to best realise these values given the inevitability of changing 
circumstances (for instance, as citizens change in ruling and being ruled) 
ensures that the polis is not a stagnant entity of autmata, but a discursive, 
reflective community.^^^
While the polls governs all citizens by a common set of laws, it is made up of 
individual men making particular choices and performing concrete actions. 
This makes even the most ideal law governed polls a contingent and variable 
environment. No matter how fine/noble the constitution, men will regularly 
confront new situations which do not fall neatly under one law or another. 
Therefore, while law may indeed point to a fixed good, providing men with 
reasons to act one way or another, men must also leam  to be creative in their 
attempts to realise that good.^^4 Because "[laws] must be written in universal 
terms, but actions concem particulars" (Po/. 1269all-12) men must leam not 
only the word of law, but must understand them in such a way that they
^^^Bumyeat, M. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics ed. Rorty 
(Berkeley: 1980, p.74). As mentioned in the preceding section, this understanding of how a 
polis works depends on certain beliefs about human psychology. Emotions and desires 
according to Aristotle can be trained, and the polis' laws serve to do this.
This raises the issue of whether the "good citizen" must also be a "good man." Kraut 
argues persuasively, despite Aristotle's claim at Po/.1276b29 that "the virtue of the citizen 
must be relative to the regime," that these two must be seen to have some overlap. He 
suggests that the good citizen is one who tries to "moderate the defects of [his deviant] 
regime." In doing so, he does not fall headstrong into line with defective, yet authoritative 
practices. Rather he exercises moderation, and uses his "right opinion on practical matters" 
(which Kraut argues is common to all citizens) to critique and balance out where his regime 
goes astray -  and the net effect of this is stabilisation (Kraut Aristotle Oxford:2002, pp.368-373). 
154 direct tie between reasonableness and creativity opens men up to making errors in a 
way that is different than an error in a mathematical calculation -  it involves a risk which is 
not present in a problem where the variables are fixed. Men must earn some praise for the 
risk of taking reasonable, creative action itself, and there must be a broader willingness to 
forgive if such an action leads somewhere unexpected and unintended. This does not mean 
that all faults are automatically excused, only those which "deviate a little in excess or 
deficiency from doing well" (NE 1109b20). Generally, one may assume that well- thought 
out, deliberate choice, and one's best reasoned guess as to what to do in a particular situation 
will lead to deviations of this magnitude. For a longer discussion on the 'conditions of 
pardon' (see: NE 1136a5ff.).
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desire, and act on the right things, at the right time, in the right way. This 
calls for creativity, and thus distinguishes ethical and political discourse from 
that of pure science {episteme), and will be key to explaining why 
political/ethical theory is improved by incorporating poetry. This difference 
also indicates why a sense of reasonableness in ethics and politics has its 
source not in a precise and exacting rule which can be mechanically applied 
universally, but rather in a 'well entrenched' disposition -  a general quality of 
character which is realised in its ability to use 'universal' laws so that they can 
fit with, rather than trump particulars.^^^
How can an abstract law be moulded effectively to individual circumstances, 
in such a way that it both takes into account the particularities of the situation 
at hand, and maintain the authority of the law? There seems to be a conflict 
between codified law and those indeterminate men it is meant to govern. On 
the one hand, law must be fixed (ideally, in accord with hum an nature) -  
above and beyond both the forces of human whim and m an's raw emotions 
and p a s s i o n s . On the other, its application must be equitable and 
compassionate, rather than dogmatic and mechanical. This means that a polis 
must strive to cultivate competent judges, men who do not apply law rigidly, 
but responsively and thoughtfully. Citizens in general are men who are 
capable of "deliberation and judgement" (Pol. 1275bl7-18), and who are 
justified in holding office because they have been educated/habituated in 
such a way as to be sensitive to the infinite particularities inherent in life, yet 
capable of finding a harmony with such particularities and the rule of law. It 
is precisely such responsiveness to particularities understood in light of the
155 ^  grammarian, Aristotle writes, is not someone who produces something grammatical 
"by chance or by following someone else's instructions...[but by] expressing grammatical 
knowledge that is in [him]" (NE 1105a22-26). The same is true for virtue. This indicates 
where 'creativity' comes into play in virtue, i.e., a virtuous person is not simply one who 
follows the right rules, but one who can apply them appropriately (i.e., creatively) in his 
circumstances.
Yet, for Aristotle, the 'passionless reason' which is the law must be attuned to the reactions 
the concrete passions of men evoke. Law can only be effective because it has first recognised, 
understood, and valued those emotions it aims to control. Passion may be absent in law, but is 
a key element in informing it.
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general law that results in sound judgement and substantive and enlightening 
debate and discussion.
If then both the law and the particularities it is meant to organise and guide 
have some authority, from where can the polis derive its stability? Without a 
rigid hierarchy between the two, is the political realm rendered chaotic, and 
judgement in i t  a r b i t r a r y ? ^ ^ ?  Aristotle is clear about the order in the hierarchy 
between man and law in the polis: "it is preferable that law rule rather than 
any one of its c i t i z e n s . A t  the same time, he acknowledges the tension that 
arises if this belief is grasped and applied too rigidly: "aU law," Aristotle 
claims, "is general (kathalou), but in some areas no general rule can be 
correct," and again he insists that "some things cannot be embraced under the 
law" (Pol. 1187a20; 1187b20). In any polis, it is not the law which judges m an's 
actions, but people (those in political office, e.g., judges) -  particular men must 
evaluate specific actions against the background of the law. Man is at once a 
member of a species, a certain kind of thing with a fixed telos out of which 
good laws grow. At the same time, each m an's life is unique, more than those 
common features which have been 'extracted' and distilled in law.^59 
Practical wisdom implies an ability to balance the two.
To be a 'fully stretched' human being, one must observe what hum an beings 
do (and have done) and then actually do it -  a m an's general understanding of 
hum an life comes after he has himself acted in particular circumstances. 
Thankfully, each new bom  does not have to start from scratch. Men inherit 
the cumulative knowledge of their ancestors, most of which is embodied in
This tension is highlighted in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle discusses 
the relationship between decency and justice. At the level of the individual, one can find a 
similar problem in regards to particular judgements -  should one's present experience change 
one's general belief, or should the situation be understood in terms of the general.
158 Pol 1287al7.
159 law "is a general statement and...takes into consideration the majority of cases."
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the laws and customs of their poleis}^ Establishing for and in oneself a 
reasonable and general idea about what man is and (therefore) what is best 
for him comes after 'activity' -  i.e., ongoing habituation -  in a structured, 
political environment. Actual participation in polis life gives man the 
experience required to stabilise his character (hexis), and with this firm 
'foundation', he can then start to understand further and 'extract' and 
articulate abstract concepts and principles about the kind of creature he is. 
These abstract conceptions of what man is and how he ought to live arise out 
of m an's varied and particular, yet not chaotic political experience (it is not 
chaotic, in part, because laws provide reasons for behaving one way and not 
another and thus provide the necessary structure needed to discuss justice).
Once enshrined in law, these principles/conceptions about how man ought to 
live are a source of stability -  they continue to teach virtue through the 
practices and institutions they prescribe -  training citizens' passions to act 
consistently in accord with right reason. At the same time, once public, they 
are also made vulnerable, exposed to conscious reflection, critique, and 
debate, and this reasonable discourse is part of what hum an virtue is. The 
law is therefore one of the 'external goods' that man needs to exercise virtue. 
This is because, for Aristotle, virtue is not embodied by tyrannical rule of 
brute strength (or some other 'accidental' source of power) aimed at securing 
individual gain and satisfaction of personal preference, but rather through the 
use of language, the ongoing attempt to communicate and manifest hum an 
excellence through reasoned speech (logos) with others.
The huge variation found in human life makes it impossible for any general 
law (nomos) to apply directly to all similar or related c a s e s . B u t  this does 
not indicate an inherent fault in law.^^^ Determining the best course of action
160 P q I  1264a!: "there is need to pay attention to the great amount of time and the many years 
gone by...for pretty well everything has been discovered."
Pol. 1269a8,1282b6, Rhet. 1373b30. See also Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness 
(Canbridge: 1981); Poetic Justice (Boston: 1995); and Love's Knowledge (Oxford: 1990).
1137bl5-20. In fact, Aristotle states explicitly that a law whose scope is intended to be 
universal but falls short of including a particular circumstance, it the legislator who errs in
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does not come from applying even the most just laws mechanically -  this 
would misunderstand both the nature of law and that of the men it is meant 
to govern. The law needs people capable of using reasoned speech to 
recognise and incorporate into their judgements those particularities which 
do not conform neatly to the abstract generalizations of law. Being responsive 
to and respectful of these subtle, yet significant nuances acknowledges what it 
is to be human, capable of more than mechanical adherence to rules: "Ruling 
according to written prescriptions is...a foolish thing to do in any art" {Pol. 
1286al0). The law however, having been constructed through having given 
attention to recurring hum an events over time, should not be denounced for 
its inability to apply universally -  to demand this would be to misunderstand 
the very nature of law, like demanding that men be immortal. Instead, 
Aristotle contends that the law must be supplemented by decrees 
(psqjhismatoi) determined by "decent/equitable" (epietkes) citizens (serving as 
officials in government), who, precisely because they have been brought up 
according to laws, can build on them and innovate creatively when a particular 
situation demands it: "The law, having educated rulers [not legislators] for 
such eventualities [i.e., situations where the law, as written, does not apply] 
hands over to them to be handled and decided by their most just opinion the 
things it leaves out."^^ However, issuing 'decrees' is not the norm of a 
flourishing polis -  if such a practice were used recklessly and irresponsibly, it 
would undermine the stability of the polis.^^ And it is precisely this stability 
that is needed to cultivate the kind of prudence necessary to issue just decrees 
in the first place. In summary, men leam by first living according to fixed 
laws how to do more than mechanically apply them.
making the law universal in the first place. The remedy is to do "what the legislator would 
have said himself if he had been present" (NE 1137b23-25).
163 P q I  I287a23ff; also: 1269a8ff; 1286a7ff; 1282b5ff.. For a discussion on similar issues in the 
NE, see 1137a32ff. and Rhet. 1373bl7ff. For an interesting discussion on the analogous roles 
played by "decency/equity" (epiekes) in ethics/politics and" acumen" (agchinoia) in episteme, 
see Reeve, The Practices of Reason (Oxford: 1992, pp. 77-78).
Kraut notes that "it is typical of a tyranny to rule by a series of edicts rather than by a 
stable system of law." Justice, for Aristotle, he claims, lies in developing a "stable body of 
customs and norms, and a coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and 
unpredictably" {Aristotle, Oxford: 2002, p.l06).
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The tricky relationship between individual men and general law highlights 
Aristotle's understanding of virtue as an enduring disposition which involves 
both a cognitive understanding of and an emotional love for those general 
ends which define man as a species. This deep rooted psychological- 
intellectual harmony, cultivated through habituation, yields not only the 
capacity to judge and act in particular situations which correspond to one's 
already accepted principles, but also to think reasonably and to negotiate 
unprecedented situations creatively (i.e., with reference to established abstract 
principles (e.g., the law), though not blindly subordinate to them). This 
capacity for attentive judgement entails not merely knowing "what the laws 
speak of... but knowing how just actions must be done, and how distributions 
m ust be made" (NE 1137al0-15).^^5 Education under and respect for (good) 
laws provides the conditions necessary to cultivate the kind of deeply 
ingrained character with the capacity to act reasonably and creatively—i.e., for 
articulatable reasons, perceiving what the right goods are at the right times 
and seeing the right ways of pursuing them even in situations which fall 
outside the norm.^^
A flourishing polis then needs the structure of law to educate its citizens to be 
practically/politically rational, for political rationality (manifested in 
characters capable of taking reasonable, creative action) can only take root
Because justice "is found among those who...can have an excess or deficiency of 
[unconditional goods]" {NE 1137al2-30) man must first leam (often through coercive force 
based in law and supported through time-tested customs) what the proper 'amounts' of 
goods are for him generally, and how to determine the proper means of achieving them in 
particular circumstances. There is a sense in which acting according to the laws of a polis is a 
kind of training/preparation to act in accordance with the something 'beyond' one's own 
desires. Ideally, this is to act as a fully stretched human being and exemplar of the species.
One might be tempted to argue that a city would be better governed by only 'decrees', 
tailor-made especially for each unique situation. This would destroy the stability necessary to 
a polis and would lead to the rise of demagogues decrees would start to resemble "tyrants' 
edicts" {Pol. 1292a23). In speaking of democracy, Aristotle makes this point clear: "where 
laws do not rule there is no regime (politeia). For law ought to rule over everything...and if 
democracy is one of the regimes, clearly the sort of establishment where everything is 
managed by decrees is not even a democracy in the authoritative sense" {Pol. 1292a32-36). 
Nussbaum makes a similar point in terms of ethical rules -  "necessary," she says, "because 
we are not always good judges" {The Fragility of Goodness Cambridge: 1981, p.304).
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and grow out of a publicly recognised organised web of values, manifested 
most clearly in established law. In this way, character works in conjunction 
w ith the written law, yet also grows from it so as to be able to apply general 
law attentively and responsively in concrete situations: "flexible, context 
specific judging is not a concession to the irrational, but the most complete 
expression of the politically rational.
Developing this capacity does not come from committing the laws of one's 
polis to memory, nor can it be acquired by amassing a kind of encyclopaedic 
knowledge of the laws of many poleis. Though study of both is undoubtedly 
important, it is not, despite what the sophists may teach, sufficient: "...they 
[sophists] think it easy for anyone to legislate who had made a collection of 
well-reputed laws. For they suppose it to be a matter of selecting the best 
ones -  as if the selection did not need understanding and as if reaching a 
correct judgement were not, as it is in music,^^ the most important thing" {NE 
1181al7-20).i^^ The capacity to effectively integrate abstract and concrete -  so 
as to be capable of correct judgement {to krinai orthos) and virtuous action -  
comes first through experience and habituation. This ongoing process 
(including a continued reflective and critical examination of life) yields a 
much more profound level of comprehension which allows man not only to 
theorise about m an's good in the abstract, but to act virtuously in his present 
circumstances. That is, man leams to be sensitive to the relevant details in his 
current situation, and act with reasoned creativity. Aristotle claims that to 
become skilled in legislation demands extended and ongoing experience {NE 
1180b33-1181a20). While he is clear that legislation "is not a job that can be
167 Nussbaum. Poetic Justice (Boston: 1995, p.80).
1681 believe that this mention of and regard for music might be understood as directing the 
reader to the Poetics.
169 Though Aristotle suggests at the end of the NE that a study of the collection of political 
systems would be useful {Pol. and Constitution of Athens), he also says that a mere gathering of 
information wül be of no benefit to the man who lacks experience {NE llSlblO; see a similar 
view in Heraclitus on 'polymathy' and how it cannot teach insight DK22B40), From 
Aristotle's discussion of the "proper audience" for the NE, it is likely that his intended 
reader/listeners had the requisite experience.
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done by everyone" (NE 1180b25-27), presumably all should strive to be 
exemplars in their community, or at the very least, be able to distinguish 
between truth and sophistry. Thus citizens should seek some understanding 
of w hat the good life consists in generally -  they should try to attain a sense of 
"what is good for everybody.. .advane [ing] from particulars to general 
principles" (NE 1180bl4-25). Knowledge of political, i.e., hum an "universals' 
-  even a vague notion that there is something more to life than satisfying 
one's own individual preferences -  can benefit all men, even if not all can 
share equally in discussions on the science of legislation/politics, much less 
be good legislators. Understanding (and believing) that there is a general, 
substantive, common good comes through political experience -  discourse, 
judgement, action amongst others -  and through this m an's passions and 
reason find their proper harmony, allowing virtue to take root. Below I will 
argue that poetry is a form of such 'experience', and thus should both precede 
and continually augment and support ethical and political theory. Aristotle's 
Poetics then, though clearly a text on and about the art (techne) of poetry itself, 
should also be seen as a work which is closely connected to the Politics and 
Ethics, in that engagement with poetry plays a vital role in citizens' capacity to 
develop and actually use political theory.^^o
Chapter 7: Poetics: Experiencing the Hum an Good
W hat role might poetry, broadly defined, play in political theorising? How 
might it be especially well suited to serve man, a creature between god and 
beast, as he strives to flourish as a member of the hum an species? We have 
seen that Aristotle understood man to be a creature who is "not simple, but 
has more than one constituent part" (NE 1154b22ff). On one hand, he is 
divine in his capacity to grasp and contemplate the simple, eternal facts of the
Below I will argue that one important link between these texts comes from Aristotle's 
belief that a tragedy must represent a "serious" action (Poetics 6) -  this points directly to his 
claim in the Nicotmchean Ethics that a virtuous human life must consist in serious, not merely 
trivial/ amusing activities (NE 1177a3-5). Another is his emphasis in all three works on 
action. These issues wiU be discussed below. For an analysis of the Poetics as it relates to 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, see Hussain, M. Ontology and the Art of Tragedy New York: 2001).
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cosmos. He can (and thus, ought to) access and study these permanent truths: 
''as far as we can, we ought to strive towards immortality (endexetai 
athanatizein), and to go to all lengths to live a life that expresses our supreme 
element" {NE 1177b33ff). A life including contemplation, according to 
Aristotle, is the best hum an life, for contemplation manifests the "divine 
element" in m an's nature (NE 1177al5-25; also DA 3.5).^^  ^ Yet man is also 
mortal, and like other mortal beings, he is a sentient, appetitive creature with 
a physical body living on the earth. He is thus subject to the laws of nature, 
vulnerable to the unpredictable forces of chance, and inclined to indulge his 
immediate desires and p a s s i o n s .  still, man is held responsible for his 
decisions and a c t i o n s . ^ 73  This responsibility arises from his 'dual' nature: 
while forever and inescapably in the physical world, Aristotle believed that 
man is capable of gaining an understanding of the objective and unchanging 
hum an good, allowing him to stretch his sight beyond his instinctual desires
1 say "including contemplation" (and not simply "of contemplation alone") because, 
despite his clam that man should try to be "as immortal as possible," Aristotle's distinction 
between man and god is definitive, and a human life cannot, like a divine one, consist in 
contemplation alone. Though man has a "divine element" in him, a life according to this 
alone, would not be human, but "superior to the human level" (NE 1177b27). Aristotle makes 
this clearer when he states that a "happy" human being "needs external prosperity also, for 
his nature is not self-sufficient for study" (NE 1178b33-35). For further support of this view, 
see Broadie who writes "Something might be counted as a glorious good and be also to some 
extent practicable by us; but that does nor make it our good, and a human end.,.theoria...is best 
because it is divine" {Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford: 1991, p.400). The division between man 
and god is reiterated in different ways throughout the Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle says that: 
"Human beings become gods when they are of exceedingly great virtue" (NE 1145a23 my 
italics). And later he states that no one "chooses to become another" even if it is a god (NE 
1166a20). If two things are the same, one cannot 'become' the other. Additionally, when 
speaking of friendship, Aristotle claims that the separation between man and god is too great 
to account for any such relationship between them, if a friend becomes a god, he says, that 
friend would cease to be a friend to man (NE 1159a3ff.). In speaking of human nature, he 
distinguishes the variability of men from the immutability of the divine (NE 1134b28-31). 
More on this below.
Crotty writes that for ancient Greeks generally: "the mortal condition is presented as 
subsuming both members of an opposition. Men are both wise and ignorant, both similar to 
the immortals and dissimilar" {Song and Action Baltimore: 1982, p.2). I will argue that because 
poetry can capture man's conflicting qualities at once, it is an important tool for political 
theory which must build on an accurate conception of what human beings are. See also 
Vemant, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 1988, pp.29-48); and Euben 
Corrupting Youth (Princeton: 1997, esp. chapters 2 and 7).
Aristotle not only holds men responsible for their choices and actions, but for the desires 
which precede them: "appetites for fine things are praiseworthy, and appetites for shameful 
things are blameworthy" (NE 1175b27-30).
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and most basic survival needs, if  he chooses}'^^ It is imperative therefore that 
m en find effective means of seeing and coming to understand their good in 
such a way that they not only know it, but actually want it, and thus will 
continually act in ways that manifest it.^^s An understanding of the hum an 
good that is integrated with the desire and the capacity to realise it comes 
through a lifetime of good habit-forming and guided experience, through 
critical reflection and discourse with others -  as discussed above, man is, for 
Aristotle, a political animal.
W hen Aristotle calls man political by nature, he implies that for a hum an 
being to become fully realised -  to both understand and deliberately strive to 
realise his telos -  he must interact politically with other men. That is to say, he 
m ust live in a polis, ruled by laws that aim at a common good. Only through 
the process of active engagement in civic life -  i.e., moral activity -  can man 
observe, imitate, and manifest the human good. I have argued that this good, 
in general terms, is manifested in reasonable, creative action.^^ô Man's 
capacity for reasoned speech (logos) is 'activated' and integrated into his 
character through participation and accrued experience in those ongoing 
practices and traditions which are inherent in a shared, law governed life.^^
"...whereas all other living things strive for their proper good instinctively, human beings 
are special in that they choose theirs, using reason" (Gadamer, Aristotle's Critique of the Idea of 
the Good p.l44). Similarly, see Hardie: "Man differs from animals not primarily in being a 
natural metaphysician, or a natural artist, but rather in being capable of planning his own 
life" (Aristotle's Ethical Theory 2 ^  ed. Oxford: 1980, p.26).
Part of this comes in understanding how one's particular life -  one's own choices and 
actions -  fits into a world of other 'actors' with different choices and actions. Recognising this 
inter-connection and differentiation generates a sense of what is good for man generally, and 
balancing this abstract idea with one's concrete life requires the capacity to think critically 
about particular and universal, and make reasonable inferences. Below, I will explore the 
ways in which engaging with poetry helps man leam how to do this.
This means man must leam to be sensitive and discerning; he must hold onto a sense of 
what is good generally, but must also see what is relevant/significant in his particular 
situation. This means that his understanding/grasp of the common/general good must so 
permeate his character that he can use it creatively to act well given his own concrete 
circumstances.
Ideally, in the attempt to cultivate and sustain justice in his polis, man leams to act 
deliberately -  according to good reasons, and with the creativity his particular circumstances 
demand -  thereby realising a harmony in his soul so that his desires and reason work 
together in order to aim at the good common to all men.
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The logos that polis life demands allows man's soul to achieve its proper order 
(i.e., he can acquire a virtuous character/  disposition where his desires aim 
where his reason directs). Given the structure of political life, m an is 
habituated to recognise, and actually want a 'higher', common good, thus 
bringing his intellect and desires into accord. This alters the character of his 
choices and actions; unlike animals, man can know that there is something 
more to being hum an than the satisfaction of his own desires/appetites, he 
can do more than voice what is immediately "advantageous and harmful" -  
he can also articulate and understand a sense of justice, and furthermore, he 
can deliberate reasonably as to how to best achieve it and then act creatively 
in his particular circumstances.
However, while distinct from animals, man is also unlike the gods. Divine 
intellect is not 'em bedded' in the contingent world, and is therefore beyond 
the influence of contingent external factors that might upset 'rational plans'. 
Gods, for Aristotle, are immune to error. The inherent fallibility of hum an 
beings makes m an's good one which requires constant reflection, honing, and 
development -  the good for man is an ongoing activity (NE 1102a5-6) pursued, 
though rarely fully achieved, throughout a lifetime.^^^ Above I discussed how 
the 'guided' experience of being raised in a polis -  i.e., a community governed 
by law -  provides man with the conditions necessary to acquire and sustain 
this kind of virtuous activity. Part of this comes from seeing in his own 
community what a virtuous life actually looks like, and then striving to be like 
those 'virtue practitioners' he observes. In short, man gains a richer, more
Aristotle does admit to the fact that there is a 'higher good' for "inferior animals" too (NE 
1173a4-6), but presumably because man is capable of knowing/understanding his good, he 
can choose it deliberately and is thus held accountable for what he chooses to do. For a 
discussion of animals' logos, see Cooper Reason and Emotion (Princeton: 1999); Sorabji Animal 
Minds and Human Morals Ithaca: 1993).
179 "When Aristotle makes reason the distinguishing mark of men, he is referring to reason, 
right or wrong." This is different from nous, which by definition/its very nature is accurate in 
what it "spots". Sorabji Animal Minds Human Morals (Ithaca: 1993, pp.68-69). Nous, Aristotle 
claims, is the divine element in men (DA 3.5). Salkever makes a similar point in noting that 
for Aristotle, reason is not identical to virtue, nor does it necessarily imply it. Rather he calls 
the human good a "prohairetic hexis" virtue's indispensable foundation but not its universal 
guarantee" ("Teaching the Questions" paper given at Bryn Mawr 9/2001, p.27).
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deep-rooted, and ultimately, a more 'practical' understanding of the abstract 
hum an good through paying attention to and imitating concrete (and 
necessarily, imperfect) examples of it.^ o^
Given this, I will argue that poetry,i®i as an imitation of action and life, is a 
vital tool for man in his endeavour to understand and attain his species' 
good .182 It is an essential element in a political education, playing a key role 
in the moral development/character formation of citizens. The issue I will 
investigate below is then: how might poetry, as defined by Aristotle, help men 
-  creatures between god and beast -  to see more accurately, and realise more 
completely the objective human good? More specifically, how might poetry, 
like the law, be a necessary condition which aids men not only in theorising 
about, but in realising the fixed human telos in the concrete and variable
180 This again supports the idea that the actual lives lived by men play a crucial role in 
theorising for Aristotle -  we must start from where 'we are'. Active experience precedes and 
continually informs ethical and political theorising, for theory is always 'extracted' 
from/accessed through practice.
181 As stated above, I will use the term 'poetry' broadly. Though the Poetics indicates 
Aristotle's respect for Attic tragedy above other kinds of poetry (mimesis), I believe that the 
goals he attributes to tragedy can be achieved through other genres; Pindar's odes, for 
example, as well as the History of Thucydides. Both construct 'plots'(muthoi) which 
encourage the audience to think critically and make inferences. While finding something 
akin to a 'plot' in Pindar may seen far-fetched, his use of familiar myths, even if disjointed 
and not fully protrayed, would almost naturally be filled in by members of the audience. This 
active process of 'filling in' -mental /  intellectual exercise -  might even be understood as 
important and beneficial to the audience. Crotty notes the parallel between Pindar's odes and 
Aristotle's tragic plot, focusing on the fact that in odes, we must look for the "coherence of an 
action [not an essay]" (Song and Action Baltimore: 1982, p. 8).
182 Halliwell writes that poetry treats "the fundamental patterns of human life" -  character 
(ethos) revealed in action (The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel HÜ1, NC: 1987, pp.32-33). These 
patterns can only be derived from life with all its contradictions and idiosyncrasies, and thus 
cannot be captured effectively by abstract theory alone. Poetry (broadly defined) presents (or 
represents) to man an alternative way to understand himself -  one which falls between on the 
one hand, the generalised (and thus necessarily stark and impoverished) conception of man 
provided by abstract theory and, on the other, an 'unfiltered' account of the myriad of 
concrete details of a single, individual life (which becomes an unintelligible chaos when 
viewed in isolation). Given this need to expand and flesh out our understanding of man, 
Davis looks beyond the more traditional Aristotelian definition of man as "rational" or 
"political animal" and uses Aristotle's conception of man in the Poetics -  a creature who is 
"mimetic" by nature. The natural tendency to imitate, to represent "this as that," Davis 
continues, reveals man to be a creature with an "uncontrollable urge to see past the surface of 
things" (The Poetry of Philosophy Indiana: 1999, p. 3). When he imitates/represents, man must 
look at the many details of his life -  "the surface" -  and then he must impose order on/find  
meaning in it (he must make inferences and abstract from life). More on this idea below.
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world? In what follows I will argue that given an environment which offers 
probabilities but no certainty, abstract theory alone cannot prepare man to 
"live well," and that poetry is essential for man's evolving ability both to gain 
a more profound understanding of, and to actualise the hum an good.
I have argued that Aristotle understood human beings, as a kind of thing (a 
particular species), to have permanent truths about their nature (i.e., man has 
a distinct ergon and telos)A^ Good law builds on an accurate understanding of 
this nature. However, given the vast diversity and contingency of the hum an 
world, m an's nature is manifested in countless different ways. Recall that this 
makes 'fixed' hum an nature unique: "With us, though presumably not at all 
w ith the gods, there is such a thing as what is natural, but still all is 
changeable; despite the change there is such a thing as what is natural and 
w hat is not" (NE 1134b28-31). The 'changeability' of men makes those 
perm anent qualities which define man abstractly impossible to use as rigid 
standards when judging people's actions -  and thus even the most just laws 
cannot be applied with mathematic-like precision to each and every concrete 
circumstance. Given this, I have aimed to show that becoming virtuous
For the human species as object of contemplation see, Rorty "The Place of Contemplation 
in Aristotle's NE" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: 1980, p.379). Like Aristotle, both 
Thucydides and Pindar too believed in a fixed human nature. Recall that Pindar was 
reluctant to represent individual men apart from their communities -  even the exceptional 
victors were never 'cut loose' from their poleis -  quite the contrary! -  they owed their 
individual success to the training provided by their communities, and finally to the gods they 
worshipped and who blessed them. Though Pindar did praise the glorious actions of 
particular athletes, his aim was not to elevate and isolate the individual victor -  this would 
promote the misguided idea that such an action could be attributable solely to an individual. 
An essential aim of the odes was to indicate that any success in a specific man's ability to 
transcend what was previously known or achievable was ultimately due to his being part of a 
particular family, in distinct community /po/zs, which itself occupied a particular place within 
the cosmos. The odes served equally to praise the exceptional act of the victor that pushed 
beyond past boundaries, setting a new precedent, and also to warn of the dangers inherent in 
disregarding man's naturally 'embedded' nature, which gave him a set of practices and 
traditions in which to manifest his talent and success. Thucydides' conception of man was 
also definitive (if not stated explicitly) -  his History would be of use to posterity precisely 
because the actions of men could be seen as roughly repeating patterns. Though individuals 
in Thucydides were more fleshed out than those in Pindar, they too were closely tied to 
community, and fell on misfortune when they perceived themselves as too independent, 
merely concerned with their own, private goods/principles and blind to the relevant details 
of the world embracing them.
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means being reasonable and creative (i.e., understanding how to deliberate in 
light of a common good, to choose well, and to perform the action appropriate 
to a specific situation). This requires ongoing habituation and not simply 
memorising the 'fixed truth ' of law -  virtue is not the 'possession' of 
knowledge, nor is it a mechanical method which, if followed rigidly, yields 
definitive control and a capacity to make only accurate predictions.^^ Rather, 
virtue is grounded in a broad understanding of what kinds of things are 
likely/probable given the kind of creatures human beings are. It is manifested 
in an engaged, reflective process, involving the ongoing activity of 
harmonising both reason and emotion, balancing an abstract conception of 
w hat is good for m an with the concrete details of the situation at hand.^^s
Below, I will examine two ways in which poetry, as understood by Aristotle, 
can aid in cultivating m an's virtue, and prepare him to live well as the kind of 
creature he is. First, I will argue that poetry helps man establish, through 
concrete examples with which he can identify, a broader, more comprehensive 
understanding of w hat a good human life looks like in p r a c t i c e . ^^6 That is, 
poetry represents, in an engaging and directed/ordered way, the often 
paradoxical interaction of human reason and passion as man makes choices
Roughly speaking these two extremes find parallels today in those theorists for whom the 
'neutral' method of science is the appropriate model for ethical and political theory (e.g., the 
rational choice theorists who, in the name of freedom, think a market economy should be the 
underlying structure of a state/society), and those, who hold fast to a fixed, substantive 
notion of Üie human good which allows for no plurality/dissention/debate (e.g., those on the 
religious right). Both, in different ways, silence discussion, discourage open communication 
and, stifle human flourishing by making critical reflection unnecessary.
185 There is perhaps a parallel to be made between the process by which human virtue is 
cultivated, and the one by which poetry developed: Aristotle claims that poetry progressed to 
find its proper telos through improvisation {autoschediasmaton 1448b24); human virtue, I have 
argued, needs not only reason, but creativity as well. For a discussion on the process of moral 
education, see Sorabji, R. "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" in Essays on Aristotle's 
Ethics ed. Rorty (Berkeley: 1980, pp.214-216).
186 Poetry plays a role similar to that of friendship in the cultivation and understanding of a 
good human life -  it allows man to see himself and 'humanness' from a vantage point not 
exactly his own. See Salkever on friendship, "Teaching the Questions" (paper given at Bryn 
Mawr, 9/2001, p.21)
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and acts in the contingent, uncertain world.^^y Without concrete, identifiable 
examples that illuminate at one and the same time both hum an strength and 
frailty, man is too easily inclined to assume that he is simply defined by one 
or the other extreme of his nature (perhaps in an attempt to avoid the 
logical/ scientific contradiction he seems to e m b o d y ).^ 88 Representations 
which incorporate the opposing pulls of reason and desire through, for 
instance hamartia, or irreconcilable hum an conflict, or the incommensurability 
of life's goods, allow good poetry to exemplify some of the kinds of conflicts 
men encounter, and the responses different kinds of characters are likely to 
give.i®  ^ The circumstances portrayed in good poetry are those which engage 
m an's emotions, offer him a choice, and so demand his reason, but suggest no 
wholly satisfying answers.^^ Poetry, especially tragedy, represents examples 
of where 'rational choice', construed solely as instrumental reason, can lead
Gellrich interprets Aristotle to claim that "poeisis [is the] ability to systematize 
relationships between character and event, so that the likelihood of a certain kind of person's 
performing a certain deed is perspicuous. Poetry takes indeterminate, random accidents and 
makes them into calculable, intelligible possibilities" {Tragedy and Theory Princeton: 1988 
p .lll) .  Gardner makes a similar claim about art generally: it is, he says "essentially serious 
and beneficial, a game played against chaos and death, against entropy" (On Moral Fiction 
New York: 1978, p.6),
188 Vidal-Naquet stresses the fact that the tragic hero is someone "in between" -  one who 
embodies seemingly incompatible opposites (in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece New York: 
1988, pp.349-350). The fact that the human condition is itself embodied by a kind of 'in- 
between' status makes it difficult to incorporate man's decision making process, and his 
ethical/political theory more generally, into a systematic and consistent 'logic of man'. 
Therefore, man must leam to negotiate attentively between abstract and concrete. Aristotle is 
clear that' the facts'(concrete) supersede theory (abstract): "any conflict between arguments 
and perceptible [facts] (aisthesin) arouses contempt for the arguments" {NE 1172a35ff). 
However, he discriininates between good and bad facts, e.g., when discussing pleasure, 
Aristotle acknowledges that there is much disagreement amongst men about what is 
pleasurable. This lack of consensus does not lead him to the conclusion that there is no 
definitive answer to the aporia. Rather he insists that one must look, as always, to' the facts' as 
manifested by/according to the good man: "what really is so is what appears to the excellent 
person...what appear pleasures to him will also be pleasures" (NE 1176al7-20; 1176b25ff.). In 
representing men in their paradoxical natures, poetry helps men to recognise exemplars and 
understand better their actions.
This means that Aristotle did not think the best poetry was a vehicle for the author's 'inner 
expression' -  his 'poet' was not the quintessential Romantic one. Poetry, though deliberately 
constructed (and thus creative in a way that history is not), is always constrained by what is 
necessary and probable {Poetics 7 and.9), i.e., by a reasonable sense derived from experience, of 
what people, given their dispositions, are likely to do in certain situations (Poeficsl454a26-28).
The vital need to use reason to improve, if not to solve conflict definitively and neatly is one 
of the primary lessons of poetry. Poetry offers resolutions which are "practical," though not 
necessarily "rationally satisfying" (Gellrich Tragedy and Theory Princeton: 1988, p.l55).
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m an astray. The audience cannot rely on this kind of mechanical thought, 
appropriate for those cases that fall tidily under the (necessarily 
impoverished) "norm'/universal. Instead, they must use their reasoned 
creativity, always reflecting critically on the ways in which 'universals' might 
fail to address all the relevant details of particular situations.^^^ Through 
poetry, man sees that he can, and indeed often he must, choose to act amidst 
the conflict and ambiguity that 'concrete details' entail, and that his actions do 
not always yield neat resolution. However, even more important, he sees that 
such choice while not 'scientific', is not therefore random  or without a sound 
evaluative/norm ative b a s i s . Aporetic situations call for deliberate, 
reflective judgement and choice rather than mechanical and reactive answers. 
They are transformed by poetry into opportunities to flourish as human 
beings, i.e., to find meaning through reasonable and creative actions that are 
responsive to both universal and particular.
With Else and Halliwell, I do not believe that Aristotle's aim in the Poetics is 
solely "existential," designed to show that poetry reveals the "secrets of life," 
or the essential tragic nature of man's existence, e.g., that in some general 
sense: "suffering is entangled in even the finest strivings of hum an a c t i o n . " ^ 9 3
For further discussion on knowledge and the relationship of particular to universal in the 
OT specifically, see Euben, Corrupting Youth (Princeton: 1997, pp.179-201).
According to Aristotle's teleology, this 'right choice' will promote what is natural.
Halliwell argues that for Aristotle, poetry itself grew out of "the discovery of a potential 
which existed 'naturally' which is to say, it was not the spontaneous and arbitrary inventions 
of individuals" {The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel Hill, NC: 1987, p.82). However, one who is 
sceptical of/bristles at the thought of a human telos, might consider Euben's idea that through 
poetry, men can see a kind of truth which is not embodied by "logically consistent truths 
informed by a rigorous collection of data, but [one which comes through] surprise and 
disruption...push[ing] us against our interests and inclinations to deeper and wider 
understanding of who we are and what we know and how these are related" {Corrupting 
Youth Princeton: 1997, p.l99). The human good lies first and foremost in a deeper 
understanding of the ways in which we can get stuck -  our limitations -  and demands that 
we continually challenge and analyse ourselves and our beliefs.
Else The Argument (Cambridge, MA: 1957, pp.304-306); Halliwell The Poetics of Aristotle 
(Chapel Hill, NC: 1987, p.92) respectively. White, in speaking of Aristotle's treatment of 
moral luck in the Oedipus Tyrannos, understands its emphasis to be not on the power of forces 
outside human control that lead to inevitable suffering, but to man's response to such "curve 
balls." This stretches man's realm of responsibility and control and gives him greater room to
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Rather, in part by way of his careful attention to the technical structure of 
tragedy, Aristotle indicates that human action and life can be, and in fact, 
must be seen as unitary and whole, meaningful, ordered, and beautiful, 
despite involving profoundly unsettling situations. This understanding can 
deepen from active engagement with poetry. Through poetry, man can come 
to be in a better position to find order, structure and even beauty, in his own 
life. Poetry thus has a practical, and not merely a theoretical (or less, an 
amusing) aim.
The second part of this section then will explore this more practical side of the 
Poetics, specifically, how poetry might help man, having given him a richer 
understanding of the hum an good, to realise it in his actions. The 
precondition for activity expressing the hum an good is an ongoing 
"conversation' within man himself and with the others of his community and 
' t r a d i t i o n ' . ^ 9 4  'conversation' is manifested in many different ways, but
always involves m an's active participation. Broadly speaking, it is the 
'habituation' which shapes his character. Abstract theory that is rooted in the 
axioms of logic cannot provide men with such a 'conversation' for it cannot 
effectively account for those inevitable contradictions that arise in the specific 
details of any hum an life, and so does not call for the same kind of reasoned 
debate. Therefore, by itself, abstract theory is insufficient for an adequate 
political education because it cannot teach most men how to become virtuous: 
"W ords/ arguments... " Aristotle writes, "appear incapable of inciting the 
many toward becoming gentlemen" (NE 1179bl0-ll). To be virtuous is to
deliberately construct his life ("Aristotle's Favorite Tragedies" in Essays on Aristotle's Poestics 
Princeton: 1992, pp.222-225).
For Aristotle, the human good is an abstract understanding of what man at his best is. It is 
therefore something that men strive towards, not something they attain definitively, or 
become. Individual men cannot become Man. However, they can communicate with one 
another, use their virtues (practical and intellectual) to deepen their understanding of human­
ness, and then work together to develop the conditions needed to actualise the human good 
more completely. Modem social scientists/political theorists who look for "neutral" 
solutions as ways to avoid conflicts over values are misguided, for they are trying to end a 
conversation whose continuation, however challenging, is itself a manifestation of what we, 
as human beings, are.
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deliberately choose to perform activities that express m an's good. This 
depends on not just knowing, not even on just doing the right things, but also 
on actually desiring them and engaging in the critical thought necessary when 
choosing how to realise them.^^^ Men are ready to theorise only after they 
desire what is good. Virtue means a harmony between m an's potential to use 
reason and his inclination to yield to strong, unreflected emotions/ appetites. 
Poetry can aid men in finding this harmony, and furthermore, it helps to 
develop a distinct sensitivity, an instinct to perceive the relevant details of the 
situations he faces where he must choose and act in the absence of certainty.^^^ 
Aristotle states that: "it is those who have experience of any particular thing 
who can judge correctly the works it produces and by what means and in 
w hat way these are brought to completion and what harmonizes with what" 
{NE 1181a20ff.). Poetry supplements 'direct' experience, and where it lacks in 
providing personal involvement, it makes up in its capacity to distil and 
impose order and intelligibility. ^ 7^
As discussed earlier with Pindar and Thucydides, it will be important to note 
that experiencing poetry is not passive. The conflict and paradox that poetry 
embraces invites discussion and debate (logos). Poetry acts as a kind of 
deliberately designed experience that develops the critical capacities of its 
audience/participants by encouraging them to be actively i n v o l v e d . ^ ^ s  
Through the 'spectacle' of concrete yet paradigmatic cases which present 
compelling yet unsettling narratives, men are encouraged to ask questions 
and think critically, and gradually, to 'extract' from specific stories, a more
See Aristotle's distinction between the continent, incontinent, temperate, and intemperate 
characters in NE VII.
Gadamer claims that Aristotle gives us a "target" in his ethical and political texts, but adds 
that: " taking aim does not constitute the whole of archery...whoever wishes to profit from 
practical philosophy must be trained for it in the right way...to size up things insofar as it 
makes it easier to recognize in what direction we must look and to what things we must pay 
attention" Aristotle's Critique of the Idea of the Good p.l64).
For further discussion, see Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, pp. 378- 
391).
Aristotle states that man has a natural inclination to imitate/mimic as a way to leam, and 
furthermore, he takes pleasure in "mimetic objects" -  both of which make poetry an effective 
(because engaging) medium for an education about human life {Poetics IV).
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general and profound understanding of what it is to be human, and see ways 
in which m an's good is, or fails to be, realised in his complex world. ^^ 9 The 
ability to abstract effectively/infer from particulars is not a potential that 
arises in m en fully formed at birth, and poetry gives men a kind of training 
that helps to actualise this complex capacity .200
Unlike much of w hat we today call political theory, poetry does not try to 
squeeze hum an life into a mould inappropriate to it in the attempt to find a 
final and authoritative answer to ethical/political questions -  it does not try to 
make ethics and politics into metaphysics or science. Rather, it represents 
hum an life in such a way as to stimulate probing questions which demand 
effort, bu t ultimately do no more (and no less) than to open men up  to a 
broader understanding of who they are and what they are capable of.201 To 
engage w ith poetry is to participate in the active process of finding sense and 
value in a web of varied actions which are not one's own. With these skills 
developed however, they can then be turned to one's own life. Finding sense 
in one's own life is exceedingly difficult to do without good models. The 
'm odels' poetry provides are easier for men to engage with because they are 
concrete w ithout being personal. There is less at stake and thus more freedom 
to explore/analyse in deliberating/m aking hypothetical choices in stories that 
are not one's own (recall that in the NE (1169b34), Aristotle says that man is
Aristotle says that "everyone is moved in passion along with the imitations to which they 
are listening" {Pol. 1340al0-14). However, this "movement," should not be solely a result of a 
grand theatrical performance. HaUiweU notes Aristotle's "equivocal" judgement of 
'spectacle' {opsis/hos tes opseos kosmos) {The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel HiU, NC: 1987, p.93). On 
one hand, he caUs it an essential element of tragedy (1450a3-5), on the other, he gives it little 
attention at the close of chapter VI, and warns later that plot, and not spectacle should do the 
vital work of arousing pity and fear (chapter XTV, 1453bl-3).
200 Man is personally drawn into plots by their arousal of his pity and fear, and with luck, he 
undergoes a catharsis whereby his emotions come into their proper psychic order. Through 
this, he gradually finds the harmony natural to the human soul, through which he can act and 
generally, live well.
201 Salkever, S. "Teaching the Questions" (paper given at Bryn Mawr, 9/2001, pp.14-15). 
Poetry for Aristotle is not a direct representation of life, the poet must pick and choose the 
events so that they form a whole, yet always constrained by the standards of necessity and 
probability {Poetics 9). See also Vemant {Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece New York: 1988); 
and Euben {The Tragedy of Political Theory Princeton: 1990). More on this below.
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better able to observe his neighbours than himself). Without examples, the 
actions which make up an individual hum an life tend to seem erratic and 
disparate, rarely admitting to neat resolution or unity. Through poetry, man 
leams to see himself and his lives as whole and unified: "fiction, like equity, 
renders the individuality of experience more demonstrable and therefore 
more k n o w a b l e ."202  Without a sense of his own life's unity/m eaning/order, 
mem is likely to develop a splintered and disjointed sense of self, incapable of 
performing deliberate, responsible actions (or alternatively, entirely 
unmotivated to do so). Through the problems poetry raises and the 
engagement it demands, man can leam  to characterise better his life as a 
single, significant narrative of which he is the primary author. Ironically, this 
sense of 'self '/individuation is accessible only with the recognition that he is 
embedded in a history, a place, a tradition that he himself did not choose. 
Poetry makes man better able to work effectively with both what lies within 
and outside his power, and through this, it helps him to gain a better 
understanding of the realm of his responsibility. Through poetry, man can 
leam  ways to re-evaluate and transform those paths that seem to have led him 
astray so that they are not paralysing, irrevocable missteps, but parts of a life 
which he can reconsider in light of a bigger 'history' of hum an action, and 
value in terms of a good which is his own without being narrowly 
individualistic. Just as poetry represents concrete and universal, the human 
good is a good which is both deeply personal, yet common to, and realised 
with other men.
Understanding the Human Good
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle calls the hum an good 
"flourishing" (eudaimonia). In Book X, he examines eudaimonia more closely. 
There, he (in)famously identifies it with study: "flourishing" he states.
202 Eden, K. Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition (Princeton: 1986, p.54). Redfield, 
though not referring to the Poetics in particular, notes that in Aristotle, we find the attempt to 
see men as unified, not an "open field of forces" (Nature and Culture in the Iliad Durham: 1994,
p.21).
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'^extends just as far as study/contem plation extends" {NE 1178b28ff.). 
However, this identification becomes somewhat puzzling when applied to 
man because Aristotle is equally clear elsewhere that a life consisting solely in 
study/contem plation would not be human: "such a life [of
study/contem plation alone] would be superior to the hum an level" {NE 
1177b28-29). Only the gods, who take no part in political action (e.g., making 
contracts, displaying bravery, exchanging currency, etc.) or production (e.g., 
building houses, preparing food, cultivating land, etc.), are capable of 
continuous study/contem plation -  to think of the gods doing such things is, 
according to Aristotle, plainly ridiculous {NE 1178b8-17). The good for man 
however, must grow out of the kind of thing he actually is, and even the most 
cursory observation of hum an life reveals that man is more than his 'divine' 
mind. Aristotle says that he requires a "healthy body, food, and other 
services" (NE 1178b33ff), and more generally, argues that men need a range of 
external goods in order to flourish. These goods come only from being active 
members of a functioning ethical community, a polis (Po/.1252b271-53a6). 
Only there can men leam to actualise their reason, to deliberate and judge in 
light of a common good. In short, only in a polis can men act virtuously and, 
when all material needs are met, can they dedicate time to contemplation. 
Therefore, Aristotle's conception of the human good must incorporate 
political action and production. As he claims that man's good is a life of 
virtuous activity ("the aim of studies about action, as we say, is surely not to 
study and know about each thing, but rather to act on our knowledge" NE 
1179blff.), in what follows, I will assume that for him this means 
contemplative and poUtical.^os
Human eudaimonia is thus better understood as inclusive of, yet not exhausted by a life of 
study and contemplation. Man's capacity to contemplate is itself dependent on having first 
secured his more 'animal' needs (e.g., one cannot think clearly when terribly hungry or tired). 
Man is distinguished from animals by his logos, and from the gods by the fact that this logos 
must be integrated with his material/emotional needs in such a way to construct an ordered 
and meaningful ethical/political life. No matter if one 'side' of this nature is 'better' or 
'higher', man's nature includes both, and thus so must his good. See Broadie, Ethics with 
Aristotle (Oxford: 1991, pp. 399ff.), Sherman Fabric of Character (Oxford: 1989, pp. 94ff).
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What then are the kinds of activity that might exemplify 'flourishing' for 
Aristotle? More specifically, how can poetry help to expand man's 
understanding of the hum an good, specifically, how is it manifested as 
virtuous activity in the polis? Part of w hat poetry can do is 'fill out' the 
framework provided in the NE  and Politics.'^^ After reading these works, the 
reader undoubtedly has a strong general sense of how he "ought to live." 
From the NE, for instance, he leams about virtue; both of character, and of 
intellect, and he knows that for man, virtue lies in acting on the "mean" 
between extremes. From the Politics, he leams that his individual good is 
properly understood as a common one, realised not through 
acquisition/private preference maximization, but through reasoned speech 
and action with others. My intent here is not to give a comprehensive account 
of what these two rich works offer, but rather to note that while the reader has 
a much better understanding of the good for man generally after reading and 
reflecting on them, he has few examples of what, specifically, a good human 
life might actually look like in practice. At some level, Aristotle's ethical and 
political discussions introduce as many problems as they r e s o l v e . ^ ^ s  But, with 
Salkever, I believe that the 'openness' that persists after reading Aristotle's NE 
and Politics must be understood as intentional -  after all, Aristotle himself 
repeatedly calls the NE an "outline" (NE 1094b2-21), and insists that it is the 
mark of the wise man who gives his subject matter only the precision its
204 idea of 'filling out' works of ethical and political theory is somewhat backwards, 
according to Aristotle's own idea of how an education should progress. Those listening to 
lectures on the NE and Politics, should not be "youth" (NE 1095a3), but men who already love 
the good. This implies extensive life experience, which is part of what I believe poetry can 
offer. However, as I will argue below, poetry offers a more structured, guided kind of 
experience than mere life does. Furthermore, Aristotle believes that an ethical/political 
education is not "completed", but continues throughout, and is in fact constitutive of a good 
life (NE llSOalff). This means that engaging with poetry during one's life, whatever the 
age/stage in development, is beneficial.
Because neither the Politics nor the NE yield a precise formula for living well, Aristotle's 
ethical and political works raise questions at the same time as they provide answers. Hardie 
argues that the questions and ambiguities Aristotle raises about the human end, though 
lacking clear and decisive answers, are nonetheless important and pressing questions, which 
compel our ongoing reflection and debate (Aristotle's Ethical Theory p.357). This is similar to 
Salkever's claim that political theory should aim to be "practical and open" (Finding the Mean 
Princeton: 1990, p. 138, my italics); see also his "Teaching the Questions" (paper given at Bryn 
Mawr, 9/2001).
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nature allows. However, this openness is not relativity, but a kind of clarity, 
effective in re-framing m an's experience of the w orld/narrow ing his focus so 
that he is attuned to, and more capable of discerning the right questions to ask 
given those situations which demand attention, reflection, structured debate, 
but yield no definitive answers to guide action.206 Even further, I believe that 
the kind of purposive and fruitful debate that the NE and the Politics initiate 
and make possible itself constitutes (at least a part of) m an's good.^o^ Poetry 
works with and builds on this openness by providing concrete examples -  
representations of hum an life -  which can act as further 'data ' that men can 
use to hone and enrich their understanding, so that ultimately, 'knowing' is 
more likely to lead to 'doing'.
For Aristotle, man is (largely) responsible for his life, and not merely the 
product of factors (internal or external) which are outside his control. If 
Aristotle defines the hum an good as virtuous activity, then understanding this 
good fully must involve the capacity to characterise and identify m an's 
actions; i.e., how the deliberate choices he makes relate to and interact with 
his actions so as to form a unified individual life for which he can be held 
accountable. I have suggested that the NE and the Politics indicate that human 
flourishing is realised in developing a virtuous disposition, manifested in the 
capacity to choose to perform reasonable, creative action -  but how does man 
leam  to apply this general idea to life? How does he leam to discem and act 
consistently on the mean between extremes? In the previous section, I argued
This again points to a distinct understanding of logos, man's defining feature. Aristotle 
comments that the plays of Aeschylus were a sign of progression in poetry in that he gave 
speech (logos) the leading role (1449al6-18). Logos however, does not mean pat answers to 
life's questions (significantly, Aristotle distinguishes logos from dianoia in Poetics 6, and 19, he 
says the latter is better left to rhetoric). Neither is it as 'modem's' might have it, solely 
instrumental, "tied to calculation and material self-interest" (Koziak Retrieving Political 
Emotion Pennsylvania: 2000, p.3). Rather it is itself an end which is realised in man's reasoned 
speech and performance of virtuous action with others. We wiU see below that one should not 
understand Aristotle's claim that a tragedy is about 'one action' to mean that it is therefore 
about the life of a single individual.
Such debate does not require excessive material wealth, or political power and so fits with 
Aristotle's belief that eudaimonia is found in (though perhaps not completely secured by) 
virtuous activities (NE 1176bl5-20; 1177a9-ll).
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that this comes through guided experience, specifically, through living an 
active life in a polis and being educated and directed by its rules and laws. At 
this point, my claim is that poetry should be understood as a variation of 
political experience -  a guided, structured form, which presents hum an action 
in a particularly illuminating way. Unlike one's own particular activities in 
the polis, poetry presents men with an 'action' that is at once concrete and 
universal. This is because poetry represents "people in action" (Poetics 
1447b30) yet in a carefully crafted way. The 'constructed' experiences that 
constitute good poetry provide men with concrete examples of possible kinds 
of hum an action, effectively showing them ethical and political thought in 
practice. Though representing genuine and plausible hum an activity (and 
thus necessarily the paradox in man's capacity for both reason and virtue 
together with his vulnerability to the external forces of necessity, and the 
internal pulls of his 'baser' appetites) poetry nonetheless suggests that the 
actions which make up a hum an life can be woven together so as to come 
together as unified, meaningful, and good. How is this so? And what is the 
nature of poetry according to Aristotle such that it can provide such an 
illuminating picture of hum an life?
Broadly speaking, poetry falls somewhere between the demonstrable truths of 
episteme and the chaotic minutiae of endless particular things.^o® In Book I of 
the Poetics, Aristotle calls all poetry "representation" (mimesis). M imesis comes 
in various forms which differ in three basic respects: media (melody, rhythm, 
and meter), object (various objects in the world), and m ode/m ethod (e.g., 
music, painting, dancing, spoken word, etc.). Though Aristotle mentions a 
range of poetic modes, in the majority of the treatise he focuses on narrative 
and drama, with most attention to t r a g e d y A g a i n ,  the work of the
208poetry represents those truths which are true not eternally and without exception or 
variation, but "[the] as a general rule" ([to] has q)i to polu). For further discussion on this term, 
see de Ste Croix "Aristotle on History and Poetry" in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics ed, Rorty 
(Princeton: 1992, pp. 23-32). More on this below.
Halliwell notes the significance of this narrowing—Aristotle seems most concerned with 
those modes of poetry which represent human beings making choices and acting in the world
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dramatic poet (i.e., his "object") is to portray "people in action who are of a 
higher or lower character type" (1447b30-1448a2).2io However, he does not 
merely report indiscriminately all that he observes -  the poet deliberately 
constructs a plot in such a way that it forms a "unified and beautiful" whole, 
and expresses a "universal" truth.211 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is
(The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel Hill, NC: 1987, pp.73-74). This suggests that, for Aristotle, the 
most significant kind of poetry might have had a practical ethical and political function.
In ch. 6, Aristotle makes the claim that tragedy is the imitation not of men, but of life 
(1450al6ff) and further, that it can lack character (ethos) altogether, but cannot lack plot 
(muthos/sustasis pragmaton) (1450a20ff). Belfiore argues that praxis in the Poetics should not be 
understood as essentially or necessarily ethical/moral, but merely as an event ("Aristotle's 
Concept of Praxis in the Poetics" in Classical Journal v.79 1983 pp.l 10-124). If this is the case, 
we must note that Aristotle makes some other statements that qualify this bold (and 
somewhat perplexing) assertion. For instance, he says that the cause of an action are ethos 
and dianoia (1449b38ff.). To understand something is to grasp its cause (Metaph. 981al5- 
981b9), and thus, that which gives meaning to an action and increases the audience's 
understanding of human life involves not just an action/event, but also an awareness of its 
cause -  i.e., the character of the agent performing it. However, this 'cause' (i.e., man's 
character) need not be explicit in the play -  the audience must infer from the actions they see 
represented what kinds of character the actors have. A good plot, Aristotle says, is 
'whole'/'complete when it has portrayed a change, from good to bad character, or the reverse. 
The 'work' needed to understand such a change is part of what makes poetry effective for 
political theorising. Thus, while Aristotle is explicit that tragedy can, in its barest form, exist 
without characterisation, and with no indication of the cause of the actions it portrays, it 
becomes more fruitful and can promote the understanding which is the basis of 
ethical/political theory when such a cause (i.e., the moral disposition of the agent) is present.
Aristotle's focus on praxis over and above ethos (and dianoia) might be understood as a way of 
refocusing the audience from an individual centred view to a broader, more inclusive 
perspective where man's actions must be seen as they connect to others, and how all these 
actions can come together in a meaningful way. See ch. 14 where Aristotle discusses the tragic 
situation, involving relations between people, not one person in isolation; also in ch.9, where 
he distinguishes tragedy from the straightforward, comprehensive chronicle of a single life. 
Additionally, the tragedies and kinds of plot structure that Aristotle explicitly picks out as 
exemplary are those which provide the audience with characterisation.
Despite Aristotle's disparaging view of history, one cannot help but think of Thucydides 
here and his explicit aim to present only what was relevant after having 'filtered through' the 
raw data he collected (1.22). His aim was a work of "permanent value" -  permanent because 
it revealed patterns (or 'general rules') of human behaviour. (This might be seen in contrast to 
Herodotus, who claims to have written so that the great deeds of particular Greeks would not 
be forgotten (Histories, bk I.) Pindar, though in no way a tragedian, also carefully selected 
and constructed his odes, using bits of myth and familiar stories which I have argued would 
stimulate the active participation of the audience, encouraging them actively to build on 
Pindar's provocative words revealing an illuminating and accurate sense of man, while 
simultaneously engaging the critical capacities of the audience.
Though I believe that much of what Aristotle thought to be the goals of tragedy could be 
achieved in modes he disparages, in what follows, unless explicitly noted otherwise, when 
speaking of poetry I will be referring to tragedy. Tragedy was an exemplary mode of poetry 
for Aristotle, for it has found its natural form/fulfilment (ten auten phusin 1449al5). Aristotle
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clear that ethical and political truth is not like epistemic truth; still, it is not 
relativistic, or lacking in definitive standards .212 in the Poetics, Aristotle starts 
to indicate what the criteria are for this different kind of truth -  i.e., the 
necessary (anankaion) and the probable (eikos) (1451a39). The necessary and 
the probable generate recognisable and recurring (if not entirely certain) 
patterns in human life, events which happen neither always and without 
exception, nor randomly, but for the most part and "as a general rule" {[to] hos 
epi to polu)?^^ Given this, I believe that those Taws' which govern the 
contingent world of hum an behaviour, those patterns which allow man to 
theorise, to plan deliberately, and (hopefully) live a good life, can be more 
fully understood through stories or narrative, through a medium that shows 
him the kinds of situations that are likely to elicit certain kinds of emotions, 
thoughts, and responses. To do this successfully comes from the reasonable 
combination of six elements: plot (muthos), character (ethos), thought (dianoia), 
style/diction/speech composition (lexis), spectacle (opsis), song (melopoiia). In 
what follows, I will focus on muthos and ethos.
M uthos and Ethos
gives an 'evolution' of poetry in ch.4, and tragedy is presented as a later step in the natural 
progression of mimesis, a process that began with Homer. Else writes that Aristotle saw 
Homer as the "inspiration" of the dramatic poets (his work 'contained' the ideal), and that 
while tragedy was, for Aristotle, a more advanced form of mimesis than epic, the dramatists 
"learned from an epic how to be dramatists" (Else The Argument Cambridge, MA: 1957, pl61). 
2^ 2 In Poetics 25, Aristotle discusses poetic standards by way of the poet's relation to un-truths. 
The poet errs, A claims, if he "makes" the "impossible" (adunata 1460b24). Though he goes on 
to say that such fictions may be justified if they serve the "greater goal of the art," depicting 
adunata is still an error, and should be avoided if at all possible. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of 
Poetry and Fine Art London: 1902, pp.163-177) writes that poetry deals not with facts, but with 
what "transcends fact", not with what "is," but with what "ought to be." This, he continues, 
is distinct from the "actual world." The probability and necessity that constrain a poem are 
"internal," and need no "real" counterpart. While I agree that the people and events that 
poetry depicts need not have a direct referent in the world (though Aristotle is clear that they 
can, Poef.l451b29-32), I would still argue that the 'ideals' of poetry that portray men are 
ultimately derived from experience in the world. Only from this real experience can poetry 
draw in the audience, providing examples with whom they can relate, if not precisely 
identify.
213 For further discussion on this concept of "the as a general rule", see de Ste. Croix 
"Aristotle on History and Poetry" Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton: 1992, pp. 23-32).
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Aristotle claims that the plot is the ''soul" of tragedy (Poetics 1450a38). A 
good plot consists of a series of "serious" (spoudaios) actions (1449b23), linked 
together in accordance with what is "necessary" (anankaion) and "probable" 
( e i k o s ) , the intention of expressing what is "universal" (katholou) 
(1451b9).2i4 Through tragedy, which is to say, by way of the actions it 
portrays, the audience sees concrete examples of how serious actions -  spoken 
of in general terms in the NE  and Politics -  are actually manifested. Recall that 
in NE  X, Aristotle discussed the kind of activities that make up a eudaimon life, 
and explicitly ruled out "trivial past-times" in favour of serious actions (NE 
1177al-10). Serious actions aim at goals which are purposive, and follow 
from evaluative judgements and deliberate decisions about substantive ideas 
of how one ought to live, One might link Aristotle's conception of 'serious 
action' to the Politics as well, through the activities proper to the citizen. 
Recall that these were defined generally by Aristotle as those activities which 
require deliberation and judgement (Pol. 1257bl3ff.). M an's capacity for 
deliberation and judgement play an essential role in his virtue, both during 
times of leisure and in times of war and strife -  in either case, the virtuous 
m an must deliberately choose to act on what is right to do given his 
circumstances. This means neither being steered by any excessive emotion a 
particular circumstance might elicit, nor rigidly following 'rules' that might 
not take into account all the important details about the present situation.
Broad exposure to what serious actions can actually look like, the kinds of 
conflicts they tend to raise, and the emotions they are likely to stir, are not 
however, addressed by Aristotle in his ethical or political treatises, nor would 
it be appropriate for him to have done so. The descriptions and abstract 
definitions offered in his ethical and political writing, while surely useful and 
important for delineating the 'boundaries' of issues, do not show men how
Again, the understanding of universal here is distinct from that in episteme (i.e., fixed, 
necessary and eternal). Rather it is one which is better understood as defined by de Ste. Croix 
(above).
215 For more on spoudaios and ethical virtue, see Golden. Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis 
(Atlanta: 1992, p.67 esp. n. 60)
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'"serious" actions are in fact played out in the world. In poetry, such actions 
'come to life' (with for example, Antigone, who must choose between her 
loyalty to her polis, or 'higher' law; or Orestes, who feels he can avenge his 
father only by killing his mother, or with Oedipus who must choose how he 
will proceed given the horrible situation in which he deliberately, yet 
unwittingly put himself). Through poetry, men see dilemmas arise and 
choices made, and can then view ways that difficult kinds of choices are 
worked out.^i^
An important insight man gains from tragedy is the realisation that the 
choices and actions he makes do not always come to neat, happy resolutions, 
and thus, neat, happy resolutions are not the standards man should seek 
when judging and understanding their lives. This is revealed through the fact 
that the tragic protagonists are, generally speaking, good men with admirable 
intentions.217 Still, many tragic actors make terrible (and deliberate) decisions, 
and often perform morally repugnant acts.^is However, tragic agents are not 
so irrational or demented that the audience cannot make sense of their actions 
at all -  even the unspeakable deeds of Medea represent an enraged jealousy 
that one might understand, even while being shocked and sickened by it.^i^
216 xhere is a sense in which the viewer of a dramatic performance gets to view human life 
from a unique place -  an 'embedded' Archimedean point. He is at once amongst other 
viewers who similarly have chosen to come to watch the play, yet he is not himself involved 
in the action he sees. Furthermore, he can see events portrayed from multiple view points, 
often difficult to do in one's own life. For further discussion on this point, see Euben. 
Corrupting Youth (Princeton: 1997, pp.186-89)
Aristotle calls the characters in the best tragedies "esteemed and prosperous" men, those 
who fall between the extremes of "pre-eminent virtue and vice," men who are virtuous in a 
way that is not divinely heroic, but "like ourselves" (1453a5-10).
And it is these human decisions that drive the plot forward. Those tragic events which 
lead to the important goals of "reversal" and "recognition" should not be driven, for instance, 
by divine intervention, or any other inexplicable forces (1454a33ff.), nor should the actions 
represented in poetry be in any way irrational {alogon 1454b7). The catalyst for change, that 
which propels the story to the next step, are the events, and when these events stem from 
men (which in the best tragedies they do), they should be deliberate choices, i.e., people 
acting according to what is necessary or probable given the particular circumstances and their 
characters.
In a best case scenario, one might see, for instance, how Medea yields to her jealous 
passions and think "I can relate to such jealousy, but that is not a good way to react!" One 
who feels pride in a particular accomplishment might note that part of what led Oedipus
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In the "finest tragedies" (1452b31), Aristotle claims that the often dismal fate 
of the agent should be the result not of bad character, but of a mistake made 
that was somehow outside his control: "[the tragic character] is a man who is 
not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is not brought about by 
vice or depravity, but by some error/frailty (hamartia)" (1453a7-10). For 
instance, a good tragedy might revolve around a situation in which relevant 
facts are obscured from the agent, or perhaps a dilemma which demands 
action but presents no definitively "fine' choice. However, these situations, 
though difficult, do not trum p m an's responsibility. In a sense, m an's logos 
makes him responsible by nature. But then, given this responsibility, and the 
dire situations in which tragic agents find themselves, in what does the virtue 
of the character lie? For Aristotle, man is judged by those deliberately chosen 
actions he performs in life. Similarly 'character' in tragedy is "that which 
reveals moral choice" (1457b7-8). In life and in poetry, a m an's actions are 
motivated by his desires and beliefs, and thus express his character. As man 
is responsible for his character, so too is he responsible for his actions and, to 
some extent, the quality of his life overall. Part of what poetry shows is that 
despite the fact that bad luck can intervene in hum an life, it does not 
undermine m an's responsibility, nor his capacity for virtue (though it may limit 
his capacity for complete eudiamonia, e.g., Priam NE llOOaS). White argues 
that tragedy shows men ways to redefine virtue so that a virtuous character 
may be seen to be under human control, even if complete eudaimonia is not: 
"fortune does not change the moral status of our character: fortune only 
provokes us to display it. "220
Through poetry, man sees that he cannot base the quality of his life on 
accident or luck, as animals must. At the same time, he is not immune from 
these forces, as the gods are. Tragedy, in showing not only the forces of luck.
astray was his distorted sense that he was a "self-made" man (see Euben, Corrupting Youth 
Princeton: 1997, ch.7), and think a bit more about one's own background and ties to it.
220 White, S.A. "Aristotle's Favorite Tragedies" Essays on Aristotle's Poetics ed. Rorty 
(Princeton: 1992, p.224).
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but the ways in which men respond to it, reveals the undeniable influence of 
fortune in hum an life in such a way that it helps to reconcile it with man's 
responsibility. Through Aristotle's conception of tragedy, man leams to see 
that the limitations of hum an responsibility extend as far as hum an control, 
and while man does not control all that comes into his life, he can control his 
response to what he e n c o u n t e r s .221 Through the interplay between 'external' 
forces and character, tragedy shows its audience virtuous responses to 
seemingly unbearable situations, and with this, ways that men generally can 
display virtue, despite the profound misfortunes they may encounter. 
Because the forces of chance are inescapable, tragedy teaches man to rest his 
final judgement not solely on the consequences of his choices and actions, 
which he makes always with only partial knowledge, but also on how he 
reacts after learning of his m istakes.^  Tragedy reduces the extent to which 
m en may feel imprisoned by the forces of l u c k / c h a n c e / b y  teaching 
them  to cast error in a light that reveals the possibility of empowerment given 
the ability to understand the source of, leam from, and use 'mistakes'.
Poetry then helps man to set up realistic expectations, and this entails 
discerning a sense of meaning and unity which is of a different sort than in a 
problem in geometry or an epistemic d e m o n s t r a t i o n . ^ ^  Man needs 
appropriate standards to structure his life, and reasonable goals at which to 
aim. The standards of necessity and probability are appropriate and again, 
point the reader to Aristotle's ethical and political work, building on it and 
making it clear what kinds of criteria man should look for in the "inexact 
sciences," where the goal is not certainty, but the "as a general rule" ([to] hos
"Aristotle's whole system of ethics posits a high degree of human responsibility which 
would be severely undermined if too much weight were given to the terrible possibilities of 
hamartia." (HaUiweU, S. The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel HiU, NC: 1987, p.l37).
^  This was an issue in the NE as weU -  men who act badly yet have no regrets are incurable 
(NE 1150a23)
223 "Despite uncertainty and variability of their subject matter...ethics and poetry stUl share 
with aU other inquiries a commitment to logic as the result of a concern with causation" 
(Eden, K. Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition Princeton: 1986, p.37). And the 
cause of action, Eden goes on to reiterate, are the ethos and dianoia of the agent.
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epi to polu)?^^ And because poetry depicts human life, its standards are those 
that should be applied to the lives of those in the audience. They reveal the 
kinds of things certain kinds of men tend to do given certain kinds of 
circumstances. Poetry leads the audience to human universals, not 
metaphysical/ divine ones. Thus, they are not absolute, but "partake of the 
nature of the realm to which they b e l o n g . "225
The actions of a tragic plot, however, do not simply mirror 'real life'. They 
must have a distinct kind of unity -  they must come together in such a way as 
to have a clear beginning, middle, and end (1450b27-29).226 This "whole" 
comes from a series of actions which when taken together represent/portray a 
recognisable change (metaballein 1451al4). Human life, especially if guided by 
whim and emotion, rarely forms such a unity. 227 xhis is reflected in 
Aristotle's discussion of plot. A good plot cannot, he claims, consist in one 
man speaking about who he is and all he has done. A good plot should not 
revolve around a single individual, faithfully recording a comprehensive 
chronicle of the actions of one man (1451al5-16). As we saw with both 
Thucydides and Pindar, all human life is necessarily embedded in 
communities, with practices and traditions. Almost paradoxically, a single 
life can take its own form, be differentiated and understood, only when seen 
as intimately connected with other lives. Its wholeness, like that of a tragic 
plot, comes from the proper integration of its diverse parts, i.e., those choices 
made and actions taken as they come from and relate to other p e o p l e .228
224Again, for more on [to] hos epi to polu, see de Ste Croix "Aristotle on History and Poetry" in 
Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton: 1992, pp. 23-32),
225 Else The Argument (Cambridge, MA: 1957, p.305),
226 This unity is necessary for all poetry, whether the plot is a tragic one (either simple or 
complex), or if it is poetry narrative form (1459al6ff.).
227 It is interesting to note that when discussing the fact that poetry is more philosophical 
than history, Aristotle uses Alcibiades (1451bll) as an example of the kind of particularity 
that does not seem to coincide with the constraints of probability and necessity -  those criteria 
which make human action form a unity and become intelligible. Recall that in Thucydides, 
Alcibiades was represented as a man who regularly acted independently, with a kind of blind 
disregard for his tradition, to further his own personal ends and desires.
228 Likewise, a polis, the necessary precondition for flourishing human life is a unity, though at 
the same time, it is by its very nature "composed of dissimilars" (Po/.1277a5).
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M an can only make sense of himself and his actions by seeing them
manifested in and relating to the actions and choices of other men. Just as
m an cannot understand the human good through standards that are not
appropriate to it (e.g., epistemic standards) so too is it impossible to come to
understand and evaluate human life by exploring his own psychology in
isolation. Therefore, as the plot should represent life, it portrays a sequence of
events that involve not only an individual's actions, but hum an interaction in
such a way that the individual lives involved can be seen to form meaningful
wholes.229 Therefore, men leam from poetry what they leam from observing
life in the polis only in a distilled and dramatic -  constructed -  way. 230 in the
Poetics, this unity and meaning come primarily through the representation of
necessary and probable action, and not via characterisation. In speaking of
tragedy, Aristotle refers to it as:
the imitation not of people as such, but of action 
and life (biou), and both happiness and 
unhappiness rest on action. The goal is certain 
activity, not a qualitative state; and while men do
have certain qualities by virtue of their character,
it is in their actions that they achieve or fail to
achieve happiness (Poetics 1450al5ff.).23i
This disinclination to focus on the agent serves to shift the 'm odem ' reader 
from  a preoccupation with the particular psychology of an individual (in
Note that Aristotle explicitly rejects the plot that centres around one individual (ch.23), 
and praises those which involve relations between "those who are near and dear" (1453bl7- 
22). It is plots of this sort that succeed in arousing the emotions of the audience, and, as I will 
argue further below, spur them to reflect.
2 3 0  "Poetry must make more sense than much of the raw material of life does...Successfully 
unified works of art...allow us to experience images of a fictional reality ('events which could 
occur' ch.9) which has a more lucid and transparent significemce than we can readily find in 
the world around us" (Halliwell, S. The Poetics of Aristotle Chapel Hill, NC: 1987, pp.102-103).
While there is some debate amongst scholars as to whether Aristotle in fact wrote the 
phrase "and both happiness and unhappiness rest on action... achieve or fail to achieve 
happiness" (Else, The Argument Cambridge, MA: 1957, p.254). Else draws attention to the fact 
that bios connotes human life -  a "career" -  as opposed to mere zoe. This again links the Poetics 
to the NE, where Aristotle says that happiness is realised "in a complete bios" (ibid, p.257). 
The addition of kai biou (1450al7) might then work to link tragic praxis with moral action, and 
thus opposing Belfiore's argument, mentioned above ("Aristotle's Concept of Praxis in the 
Poetics" Classical Journal vol. 79 1983, pp. 110-124).
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actual life, this is generally one's own), to the mter-actions of a community, or 
the individual as he relates to others: "Tragedy involves a plurality of agents" 
(1449b36).232 By taking into account the forces outside individual control 
(some of which are derived from other individuals of the community) man 
gains insight into the kinds of things that can thwart his 'reasonable' goals. 3^3 
He also sees that his own personality is not simply self-made, but is the 
accumulation of his actions amongst others in the contingent world. This 
generates a more accurate picture of a human life and how the human good 
can be deliberately realised in it.^ 34 As man acquires more experience within 
his necessarily 'constrained' environment, he, paradoxically, becomes better 
able to free himself from/critique those constraints. Because the capacity to 
characterise and see one's own life as unified and whole is difficult (1451al6- 
19), tragedy might be able to reveal to men ways of imposing order on their 
own lives so that they too can be seen as unified, and even beautiful despite 
its being open-ended and made up of the kinds of activities natural science 
sees as a process, and not as a goal in itself.235
232 For discussion of Aristotle's understanding of ethos and its role in tragedy, see Jones On 
Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London: 1962, pp.32-38).
233 This is only one piece of what this broader perspective can yield, however. To see oneself 
and one's actions as 'situated' (i.e., as continually/inherently effected by and related to 
others), requires that one not only acknowledge and value one's own needs and views, but 
also those of others. Poetry's presentation of individuals acting among other actors, and 
within a series of events encourages, not a dissolutions of self, but mutual recognition which 
is imperative for good judgement: "the act of judging reaches its goal when someone who 
has, as we say, won his case still feels able to say: my adversary, the one who lost, remains 
like me a subject of right, his cause should have been heard, he made plausible arguments 
and these were heard" Ricoeur The Just p.l31. See similar points in Disch, Hannah Arendt and 
the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: 1994, spp.204-221).
234 Salkever notes that both rhetoric and tragedy, unlike episteme, use examples, not 
arguments in effort to persuade or reveal something to an audience ("Tragedy and the 
Education of the Demos" in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory ed. Euben, Berkeley: 1986, p.293). 
Similarly, Halliwell highlights the fact that Aristotle distinguishes poetry from other 
disciplines by the fact that it is a "portrayal/representation" and not an "affirmation" of what 
is real. Poetry describes and does not attempt to explain reality explicitly {The Poetics of 
Aristotle Chapel Hill, NC: 1987, p.71).
235 Poetry suggests that man flourishes when he leams to make sense of his actions by seeing 
them as a part of a larger, ongoing dialogue which is manifested not in certainty, unanimous 
consensus, and control, but in continued discourse and debate amidst contingency, in 
reasonable and creative action constrained by what is necessary and probable (Poetics 1454a33- 
8). "No case is simply the exemplification of a rule," Ricoeur writes. Human life is the
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Though Aristotle writes that poetry presents '"one action," he does not mean 
an individual deed observed in a 'theatrical vacuum' -  this might make things 
easier, but it would do so at the grave cost of distorting the very nature of 
hum an a c t i v i t y .^ ^ 6  T h e  genius of Homer lay in the fact that he did not, in the 
Iliad, "include all the adventures of Odysseus" (1451a24-25), but chose and 
selected those actions that were needed to present a whole i.e., a "structural 
union of the parts such that, if any one of them is displaced /  removed, the 
whole will be disjointed and disturbed" (1451a30-35); actions which come 
together to portray a plausible change (metaballein) "from bad fortune to good, 
or good fortune to bad" (1451al3-14). The "whole" that good poetry 
represents then serves to reveal to participating members of the audience, 
those things which are likely to happen given probability and necessity 
(1451a39), i.e., those events which, given certain kinds of characters and 
certain kinds of situations, happen as a general rule (e.g., how even the most 
noble motives can lead to bad consequences). This means that the poet must 
deliberately select and coordinate a finite bit of material which illustrates how 
a web of actions can come together according to what is necessary and 
probable to form a meaningful and beautiful whole so as to indicate some 
'universal truths' of human nature.237
ongoing interpretation of inherited niles/values/beliefs/laws, and the mere act of living an 
engaged and examined life entails that they be continually tested and interpreted. Each 
judgement is not a final ending, but creates a new 'precedent' to be used reasonably and 
creatively. Each judgement is an ending, but an ending that opens up a new path: "The 
suspending aspect of the act of judging at the end of a deliberative course therefore does not 
exhaust the meaning of this act." {The fust Chicago: 2000, p.l29).
Golden writes that a good plot should compel the audience to reflect and judge not just 
individual action, but "all the evidence in the play" (i.e., the web of events which come 
together to form a complete action). Plot does not merely record all the actions of one person, 
but is a careful selection of the interactions of many, assembled in such a way as to both 
correspond to what is necessary and probable, and in this, leads the audience to think 
critically, to make inferences.(Ansfof/e on Tragic and Comic Mimesis Atlanta: 1992, p.33)
737 For a criticism of tragedy (due to the inherent distortion made by the poet in representing 
actions as unified and whole), see Bittner "One Action" in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics 
(Princeton: 1992, pp.97-109).
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The poet does not give the false idea that this "whole" is all there is. Aristotle 
is clear that there can be, and in fact should be a sense that there is more to the 
world than those actions depicted in the plot.^^g Finding a beginning, middle, 
and end of actions from within the ongoing stream of life's events in life is 
difficult, but an essential condition for cultivating a sense of personal 
responsibility and agency. In presenting human life this way, poetry helps 
the audience to see how they might see their own lives as directed, and 
because of the pleasure the audience gets from the performance, they are 
encouraged to put in the hard, critical work required to do this.
Chapter 8: Realising the Human Good in Reasonable, Creative Action
"Knowing about virtue is not enough, but we must also try 
to possess and exercise virtue, or become good in any other 
way" (NE 1179b2-4).
Given the richer understanding of the human good that poetry provides, how 
might it serve the slightly more demanding aim of helping man to exercise 
virtue and actualise his good (specifically, by performing reasonable, creative 
actions)? We have seen that for Aristotle, virtue entails not only knowing 
what is fine/noble, but genuinely desiring it. This desire for the good not 
only signifies the proper 'psychic' harmony (whereby the ends of reason and 
emotion coincide), but it serves a practical purpose as well. A 'well- 
entrenched' desire for the good means that man will take pleasure in virtuous 
activity, and this pleasure will then consistently motivate him to act well. 
Pleasure also plays a part in the effectiveness/practical function of poetry. All 
men, Aristotle claims, enjoy representations, and it is through imitation that 
men leam: "through imitation [man] leams his earliest lessons; and no less 
universal is the pleasure taken in things imitated" (Poet. 1448b5-10). These 
two points taken together indicate a direct way in which poetry might help
238 For example, though he praises the OT, he acknowledges that some important events "fall 
outside the drama proper" (1453b30-34), and also at 1454b2-4, Aristotle looks at the strategy 
of employing a deus ex machina, a tool to be used in events which take place outside the plot. 
This indicates Aristotle's desire to have that which drives the plot be the work -  i.e., the 
decisions and action -  of men.
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man to realise his good. To begin, consider the first part of this claim, i.e., that 
men leam through imitation. As Aristotle claimed that the best poetry 
represents good men, it provides the audience with exemplars, men with 
''laudable aims" to leam  from.239 However, when considering tragedy, this 
'direct benefit' becomes somewhat problematic -  surely, the audience does 
not leam  from the OT that patricide and incest are virtuous. 'Tragic 
exemplars' are therefore complex in that it is not their particular actions that 
should be emulated. However, neither is it the case that their actions should 
be categorically denounced. Rather, tragic agents are 'models' to better 
understand deliberation and choice in the contingent world.^^o Though direct 
imitation is undesirable (and in fact impossible, as each particular hum an 
action is unique), tragic actors reveal ways in which intentions and actions 
can become muddled, and how important it is (if exceedingly difficult) to 
untangle and discem the boundaries of one's responsibility and find meaning, 
despite the fact that a man's individual actions can never be extracted and 
judged in isolation.
The fact that men find pleasure in representations feeds into Aristotle's 
understanding of education through imitation and suggests a way in which 
poetry might help man to realise the human good. The lessons embedded in 
tragedy demand effort and hard work, and this work might be 
daunting/overwhelm ing (or perhaps even incomprehensible) to many if 
presented in the context of an ethics lecture, deterring men from participating
Golden argues that Aristotle's use of spoudaios in the Poetics should not be translated 
merely as "serious," but rather should be understood as "noble" (Aristotle on Tragic and Comic 
Mimesis Atlanta: 1992, p.67). For further discussion on tragic actors as ethically 'upright', see 
Yanal, "Aristotle's Definition of Poetry (Nous vol. 16 1982, p.504); also Halliwell Poetics of 
Aristotle (Chapel Hül, NC: 1987, p 140). While "laudable aims" alone do not constitute a good 
life, I have argued that such aims tend to lead to better actions, and furthermore, if the actions 
that follow from good aims have unexpectedly bad consequences, those aims, because they 
reflect established character, will tend to produce good responses to unforeseen and unfortunate 
outcomes.
240 From actions, the audience leams to recognise and judge character: "tragedy is the 
imitation of action; and an action implies personal agents, who necessarily possess certain 
distinctive qualities of both character and thought, for it is by these that we qualify actions 
themselves" (1449b36-1450a2).
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and thus preventing them from reaping the benefits of the critical thought it 
demands. Poetry avoids this trap. As mimesis, it is enjoyable to all men 
(1448b8-9), and the pleasure it brings draws people in, encouraging them to 
attempt to untangle the complex web of actions portrayed. In short, because 
contemplating representations is pleasurable, mimesis can inspire men (and 
youth) to participate actively in rigorous and critical ethical thought in a way 
that theory often cannot.^^i This kind of 'hands on' experience acts as 
training, a prerequisite for theorising (for some perhaps, a kind of 
ethical/political theory in disguise) presented in such a way that "it is 
pleasurable not only to philosophers, but to men in general, whose capacity 
for learning is more limited" (1448bl3-14).242
In his commentary on Poetics 1, Halliwell notes that for Aristotle, the poet, 
unlike the natural scientist, does not issue "affirmative" (i.e., explicit, 
objective) propositions about the nature of life.^ s^ This idea is strengthened in 
Poetics 19, when Aristotle returns to dianoia only to dismiss it as "more
For poetry as a purely "intellectual clarification," see Golden. Aristotle on Tragic and Comic 
Mimesis (Atlanta: 1992, p.22ff). For variation on this view, i.e., poetry as "clarification" more 
generally, see Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 1981, p.390ff.).
This is not to say that poetry can make aU men into philosophers, in fact, quite the 
contrary. To see poetry in this light entails recognising the vast variation in capacities and 
lifestyles of different people, and builds on the fact that poetry is universally appealing so that 
it might benefit a wide range of different kinds of people in different ways. Note that in the 
Politics, Aristotle says that all men -"both the free and educated and vulgar mechanics" -  
should go to contests and festivals (1342al8-28)
243 Flalliwell. Poetics of Aristotle (Chapel Hül, NC: 1987, p.71). This is what makes poetry 
different from early natural phüosophy. Aristotle compares the work of Empedocles and 
Homer 1447.16-20 as an example: though the former writes in verse, he does not represent 
human life (or some aspect of it), and thus is not properly called a poet. In ch. 6, Aristotle 
says that tragedy (a perfected mode of poetry) is also not narrative {apagelia 1449b24-26): it is 
not merely a report of what is/what happened, but a deliberate construction. In ch.l7, Aristotle 
discusses the deliberate process that poetic composition demands, asserting that the poet 
must: "put the scene before his eyes...as if present at the very events." The representation, to 
be effective, must be realistic based on observation and experience. Only this wUl succeed in 
drawing the audience in and engaging them with the story. Else writes that Aristotle gives a 
"wholly impersonal, objectivist view of the poet -  Homer above all -  as a maker of structures: 
'Imitation' so defined becomes the closest neighbour to creation: not out of nothing -  no 
Greek ever believed in creation ex nihilo -  but out of carefully observed 'universal' human 
tendencies to thought and action" (Plato and Aristotle on Poetry Chapel HÜ1, NC: 1986, p.75). 
Thus the construction involved in making poems is one which is constrained, yet necessarüy 
creative.
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integral to rhetoric" (1456a34-35).244 Why is this the case? Why would 
Aristotle hesitate to have characters, or the poet himself express thought 
directly?245 Thought directly expressed would conflict with the nature of 
poetry, which is to rqjresent or portray. Poetry does not interpret the ways of 
men, nor does it explain them in direct discourse. Rather it shows human life 
in such a way as to encourage its interpretation, and in doing so, it cultivates 
practical understanding.246 The plots are structured such that they give an 
intriguing view into the motives behind actions, the process of deliberation 
and choice. Poetry combines rationality with wonder (thaumaston) -  events 
happen out of probability and necessity yet are unexpected {para ten 
doxan...di'allela 1452a4). In this, they evoke wonder and suspense, both of 
which motivate men to engage with and participate in the ideas represented 
in a way that mere argument generally does not.247 Men are thus more likely 
to get actively involved in what the actors (choose to) do.^ 48
Furthermore, because the actions in poetry are performed in a context which 
is limited ("[confined] to a singly revolution of the sun" (1449bl3); "easily 
embraced by the memory"; "the whole is perspicuous" 1451a5-14) they are 
made more comprehensible than the actions man confronts in life -  the 
audience can leam to trace intention, to action, to reaction and through this, 
understands better when and how to judge well. Judging well requires
Dianoia was introduced in ch.6 (1450al4) as one of the six elements of tragedy.
245 "The poet" Aristotle says, "should speak as little as possible in his own person, for it is not 
this that makes him an imitator" (1460a6-8). This brings to mind Thucydides, who similarly 
aimed to be deliberately absent from his History.
246 Poetry encourages men to make inferences by representing not what has happened, but 
what may happen/could  happen (1451b5-10).
247 The wonder and suspense however, do not come from fantastical language (language 
should be balanced, 1458bl-6) or lavish spectacle (1453bl), but from within the plot itself, i.e., 
from events which "follow as cause and effect" and accord with what is necessary and 
probable, but which are nevertheless surprising (1452a3-6). The audience is therefore 
encouraged to engage with, and find importance in the actions of men. Gardner writes that 
through surprise and suspense, the poet tempts the reader/watcher to work -  what would 
he/she choose in those circumstances? (On Moral Fiction New York: 1978, p .ll4).
248 One might speculate that because many Attic tragedians drew on well known stories, 
even on actual historical figures, a kind of distanced identification was possible, safer and in 
many ways easier than looking at oneself, but identification (and thus hopefully, 
participation) nevertheless.
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practice, and actions in the 'real world' are often too close, or too laden with 
detail to provide the useful, guided experience needed to cultivate practical 
knowledge. It is often difficult for men to get the necessary perspective to see 
clearly and judge their emotional responses and following actions.249 The 
capacity to discem the beginning's and end's of one's own actions is not 
innate, but must be developed and cultivated through practice. Man must 
learn to see, as best he can, the boundaries of intention, action, and 
consequence; he m ust see what kinds of responses seem appropriate in 
different kinds of situations. The construction of the poet helps him to 
acquire this ability.
But how does poetry do this and in what does such work and participation 
consist? Mimesis, Aristotle claims, encourages men to exercise and apply their 
understanding. In contemplating a representation, "they find they are 
learning, inferring what class each object belongs to: for example this 
individual is a so-and-so" (1448bl6-18). Part of what man m ust do to 
understand and realise virtue -  in fact, part of what virtue is -  is the capacity 
to make inferences, to understand, for example, what particular action in a 
given situation would fall under the general class of virtue. There is a 
(reasonable and creative) leap that must be made when man makes 
inferences, when he goes from particular to general, and poetry gives men 
practice in making this leap.^^o Furthermore, because it presents paradoxes 
and embraces contradiction, poetry helps man to make inferences from 
precisely the kind of 'data ' he finds in living his own life. Poetry reveals a
Golden highlights the fact that we have little/no distance on our own ideas/emotions, 
without distance (sense of the general through recognizing others) we cannot judge well and 
as an example, looks at Achilles before his discussion with Priam, when he is a "seething 
cauldron of uncontrolled emotions." It is only with the broader perspective Priam provides 
that Achilles can see his own situation with clarity {Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis 
Atlanta: 1992, p.34)
Golden writes that poetry is able to "represent universals that subsume and illuminate 
numerous particulars" (1448bl6-17; 1451b5-ll; 1453b8-14) Aristotle on Tragic and Comic 
Mimesis Atlanta: 1992, p,25).
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world that has an order and structure that is different from, though not 
subordinate to that of science and logic.^^i
In discussing the historical development of tragedy, Aristotle claims that it 
began as improvisation (autoschediastike). Poetry thus progressed through 
creative steps which stretched the medium beyond precedents and rules 
already in place until it eventually found its natural end (1449al0). There is a 
parallel to be draw n here with man himself, one which takes us back to 
Pindar's victorious athlete who, though grounded in and attached to a 
particular polls, dependent on its education and training, succeeded because 
he stretched m an's sense of the possible, going beyond what was previously 
done and known. Progression for both poetry and man involves creative, yet 
reasonable risk. Tragedy, as the recreation of past epics/familiar stories, 
embodies a form of reasonable creativity. Using material from the past, poets 
imagine a plausible and meaningful way of depicting it in the present.^^z an 
analogous way, men must reflect on and use their past experiences (or in the 
narrower case of the athlete, his training -  but both derived from a 
community) to help guide them so they can act reasonably, yet creatively 
(given the novelty of their particular, present circumstances) and construct a 
life which forms a unified whole.
For a discussion of alternative forms of 'logic', see Vemant "The Reason of Myth" in Myth  
and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: 1990, pp. 203-260).
252 Vemant Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: 1988, pp.242-43).
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Conclusion
In the preceding pages, I have attempted to answer two basic questions: What 
kind of a creature is man?, and given some proposed answers. What kind of 
('rational') thought is appropriate for political theorising? These questions 
seem to me to be pressing at a time when much of ethical and political theory 
has collapsed under a scientific model, deemed successful when it yields 
precise and definitive answers to the diverse and complex dilemmas 
inevitable in any hum an life. Such a model assumes that man is endowed 
with a keen capacity for instrumental rationality (i.e., straightforward means- 
to-end reasoning)—undoubtedly important—but it does not address the other 
kinds of reasoning he needs in order to live well in a world that is often far 
from 'scientific'. Experience of the human world reveals it to be one of 
contradiction and ambiguity, where men must make choices amidst 
competing and incommensurable goods—human beings act (and are held 
responsible for their actions) in a realm of probability and contingency, 
though rarely, necessity. However, this does not render m an's choices and 
decisions arbitrary, nor does it imply that ethical and political values are 
simply relative. Rather I have argued that given man's nature, his potential to 
become a responsible and flourishing political actor is realised through 
attentive and reflective experience (broadly defined). This experience is not 
'raw '; men cannot acquire it alone by passively 'absorbing' whatever they 
perceive to be the case in their pursuit of their own individual whims—rather 
it is guided, shared, interpreted, evaluated and demanding. Through such 
experience man can develop the kind of character that is capable of discerning 
(and eventually explaining) good ends in his circumstances (i.e., he can 
creatively balance his general conception of what man is as a species with the 
relevant concrete details of his situation). He can then make deliberate 
choices to act in ways that are likely to bring those ends about. In short, men 
must cultivate not only instrumental reasoning, but the capacity to think and 
act with both reason and creativity.
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This project began with Pindar, by fleshing out a conception of man prevalent 
at the time he wrote, i.e., a member of a species whose nature lies somewhere 
between god and beast—between the omnipotent and immortal, and the 
determined and fleeting. Pindar's odes worked in part by setting up the 
'illogical' juxtaposition of both divine and animal characteristics in man. His 
words showed the audience /  reader how seemingly mutually exclusive 
attributes can, and do, occur simultaneously in the victorious athletes and 
further, in mankind in general. That is, Pindar portrayed man as a creature in 
whom opposites exist together, a being who is at once dependent on his 
family and city, their practices and laws, yet also capable of moving beyond 
these 'constraints', free to diverge from and surpass that which came before 
him. The form of the ode, its constituent parts, m irror this 'hum an' tension— 
they include references to familiar myths and common history, yet they are 
composed for, and aim at praising and extolling the particular, new action of a 
unique individual. Furthermore, the athlete who performs the illustrious 
deed, though dependent on his community and its traditions, is celebrated 
precisely because he went beyond them, because he exceeded what had 
hitherto been done/know n. It was the breaking with tradition, though slight 
and always respectful, that brought the victor fame (and with this fame, a 
kind of immortality; though man is clearly not immortal like the mighty gods, 
his memory is preserved for posterity through the odes). This delicate 
relationship—between community and individual, between old and new, 
between god and beast—reveals an irony in Pindar's conception of man: he 
seems to need 'constraints' (family, city, traditions, common 
practices/beliefs—and of course, the political structure needed to have 
organised games in the first place) in order to successfully move beyond 
them—'constraints' are the precondition for exercising his (limited) freedom 
wisely, and initiating the kind of change and progress which is beneficial and 
illuminating rather than hubristic and arrogant.
Pindar's words express the dissonance that arises because of the conflicting 
characteristics in man, but his odes did not try to resolve it, for instance, by
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establishing a definitive hierarchy between the two. Rather they encouraged 
and demanded that the audience /  reader develop a kind of rational thought 
which was not dependent on such a hierarchy, nor on coming to rest on a 
single, definitive answer. Instead, Pindar required that the audience/reader 
find meaning /  stability in his words, yet keep his thought "in motion", like the 
melody of the odes themselves. The elements of the odes were not 
automatically absorbed and understood but were presented in a form that 
was as challenging as it was beautiful. Pindar's words were often cryptic, his 
use of metaphor, ubiquitous, his narrative, far from linear, and at times even 
broken. The hard work that the obscurity of the odes demands, and the 
motivation that their beauty inspires reflect the effort men need to put into 
their own lives. Pindar suggests that though every life involves error and 
missed opportunities, man still has the ability to strive and, with disciplined 
training to which luck may come to adhere, excel.
Next I examined Thucydides" History of the Peloponnesian War, beginning with 
the same premise that initiated my analysis of Pindar's odes—the idea that 
m an is a creature whose nature lies between god and beast. I argued that 
Thucydides' History highlighted some of the consequences this conception 
had on m an's use of abstract political theory. The History seemed to w arn 
men to be careful of making judgements which relied too heavily on either 
detached, abstract principles or concrete, historical precedent, and instead 
demanded that they take an approach that balanced the two. This meant 
giving up "scientific' certainty when doing political theory and applying it to 
lived life, but successfully (I believe) avoided the chaos of relativism as well as 
the stagnation of conservativism.
I drew on the philosophy of Hannah Arendt to structure my analysis of 
Thucydides. Like Pindar, Arendt stressed the importance of understanding 
an individual's actions through human interaction. (And as I hope became 
clear in Chapter 3, like Aristotle, she seemed to believe in the inherently 
political nature of man.) For Arendt, the notion of an Archimedean
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standpoint in political theory, an overarching 'neutral' principle, was illusory. 
Even more, any claim to have discovered it had shown to be destructive. 
Claims to have found Truth, ideas that are immune to critique and debate, she 
believed bred the intellectual laziness which was likely to result in cruelty and 
oppression. The good choices and sound decisions that distinguish a healthy 
political community must come from 'within', i.e., from people mindfully 
engaging and deliberately acting with and amongst others. We must strive, 
Arendt insisted, not for a single, 'impartial' perspective, but for a broad range 
of particular, 'embedded' perspectives. This 'fragmented' point of view 
comes through close attention not only to one's own life as a member of a 
specific political community, but from exploring the lives of others from 
different political backgrounds and traditions as well (both contemporaries 
and historical).
Building on Arendt, I argued that Thucydides' History itself encourages and 
trains the reader in this endeavour—it moves constantly from one perspective 
to another, portraying the thought processes of different characters, and 
providing various examples of the reasoning that goes on 'behind' a decision. 
All this comes with little guidance from the author as to which view should 
be trusted over and above others. The reader alone must make judgements as 
he proceeds through the narrative. Gradually, this process develops a sense 
of who and what man is, the ways he thinks, and the kinds of things of which 
he is capable. Ultimately, Thucydides' History seems to deny the existence of 
a unified and sweeping political theory, capable of guiding each man's 
individual decisions. Through close examination of both motive and action 
however, Thucydides suggests we can start to get a sense of w hat is likely and 
probable for men, as kinds of creatures, in different kinds of situations.
But, because man can never achieve absolute certainty, every action involves 
risk, and thus, his success should not be measured solely by the outcomes of 
his actions, but also by the kind of thought that preceded them—the character 
of the agent. This understanding encourages man to find a way of drawing
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value from, and where possible, transforming those well- 
intentioned/thought-out choices that get distorted when acted upon/realised 
into something useful. However, this does not mean that good intentions/the 
right motives alone determine how we should evaluate hum an action, but it 
recognises that much of what man does lies beyond his control, and that 
sound intentions, though no guarantee of good consequences, are likely to 
bring about desired ends. Therefore we must, Thucydides and Arendt insist, 
develop characters which are capable of discerning the fragile and often 
unpredictable balance between general principle and relevant concrete details 
in a particular situation. Such a disposition can be developed only through 
experience in a polis—an organisation of men living together, according to 
laws, participating in common moral practices, with some sense of a shared 
past/tradition. Thucydides shows that the war, in shattering the structure of 
many Greek poleis, thereby destroyed the citizens' and leaders' capacity for 
reasonable and creative thought and action. Political life gives m an the 
security—both physical and psychological—necessary for this, and reading 
Thucydides' History is a 'supplement' to one's own political experience. An 
active, engaged reader will cultivate the essential hum an practice of balancing 
abstract and concrete that Thucydides and Arendt see as essential for 
reasonable, creative thought and action.
Finally, I looked at the work of Aristotle: specifically the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Politics, and Poetics. I began with his ethical and political theory, which 
seemed to assume many of the qualities of man I drew from the poetic and 
historical work of Pindar and Thucydides. With Aristotle, I argued that those 
characteristics that define the human species should be used as a framework 
within which to understand and realise man's good in general and each man's 
good in particular. Though unique as individuals with powerful personal 
desires and the capacity to act so as to achieve/acquire them, m an is also a 
kind of living creature with certain constant characteristics which reveal his 
species specific good. Given extensive (and again, guided) experience and 
reflection, these characteristics can be distilled, and the sense of the hum an
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good that emerges can be used to guide and frame one's life. However, those 
qualities that define man abstractly are manifested concretely in an infinite 
number of ways given that there are different men in different circumstances. 
This means that any theory which defines man and his good is necessarily 
imprecise—even with the guidance of a philosopher, we do not find absolute 
certainty! Rather we find a general outline (itself derived from experience), 
that m ust be used reasonably and creatively. My last task was an analysis of 
Aristotle's Poetics given this framework. This pushed the investigation 
further—through it I developed a stronger sense of just what reasonable 
creativity entailed; the capacity to draw sound generalisations by drawing 
inferences from seemingly disparate actions, to find ways of transforming 
mistakes and missteps into necessary and important pieces of any hum an life, 
and to be able to carve out the proper, if dynamic, realm of responsibility, so 
that one's own actions can be seen as meaningful and worthwhile.
In summary, this thesis has attempted first to examine and 'extract' a 
conception of man from texts that are decidedly 'non-philosophical' in that 
they do not set out problems and attempt systematically to solve them. 
Instead, the words of Pindar and Thucydides form stories, they draw on the 
traditions and practices of men by way of narrative, rich images, and 
illuminating metaphor. Furthermore, there is a sense in which these texts are 
in motion, alive—they vacillate from one perspective to another, from clarity 
to ambiguity, from certainty to suspense, from hope to despondence—and 
these vicissitudes demand the reader's active participation. This participation 
renders these poetic and historical texts a kind of guided experience, capable 
of cultivating the kind of critical thought I believe to be appropriate to 
political theory—from the varied, and at times contradictory portrayals of 
particular men, generalisations about man can be culled, and then become 
available for critique and debate. That is to say, the activity required to draw  
out a thorough/"thick" understanding of what it is to be human from works 
that portray many different aspects of human life I believe is an important 
part of developing the capacity for reasonable, creative thought.
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The understanding of man as a member of a species with a fixed good that is 
manifested in countless ways in different human lives can be derived from 
these diverse media. This conception however, does not yield a theory that 
can be used like a formula (à la utilitarianism)—we Ccinnot follow it precisely 
when we confront particular problems. Rather given our effort, it can reveal a 
reasonable (general) sense of what man is which can be used creatively in the 
specific (concrete) circumstances we confront. The motive behind examining 
the work of these three authors sprang from my belief that political theory 
must begin by knowing, as best it can, what man is, and that we can get to 
know man—what kind of creature he is and what a good life for him looks 
like—through experience, through observing what he has been/can be. This 
thesis therefore, aimed to show that we should not begin political theory with 
a Thin', impoverished conception of man, but rather we should come to 
theory 'thick' with experience, both personal and through that which we 
glean from poetic and historical texts. This generates a conception of man 
and his good which goes beyond mere preference satisfaction. And 
furthermore, in the process of 'participating' in these texts, we are 'trained' to 
engage in the kind of thought necessary to achieve this good, i.e., we leam to 
be reasonable and creative.
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